Before and After Alexander

by Richard A. Billows

  21. Coin with portrait of Philip V of Macedonia from British Museum

  (Wikimedia Commons public domain image from PHGCOM)

  During all these years of military adventuring, Philip made one irreparable mistake: watching events in the west, and the scale of the warfare between the Romans and the Carthaginians there in the Hannibalic War (218–201), Philip decided it would be wise to make friends with the eventual winner; and in 216, after Hannibal’s crushing defeat of the Romans at the Battle of Cannae (216), it looked as if the Carthaginians were going to win. Philip’s alliance with the Carthaginians, forged in that year, brought him into hostilities against the Romans, who of course beat the Carthaginians in the end and never forgot or forgave Philip for joining their enemies at their (the Romans’) lowest point. The first war between Philip and the Romans ended in a stalemate peace in 205; but in the second Philip suffering a crushing defeat at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in Thessaly in 197. This defeat highlighted a problem: the constant warfare of the first twenty years of Philip’s reign had seriously depleted Macedonia’s military manpower. It was only with great difficulty, and by calling up boys as young as sixteen and men over fifty, that Philip was able to muster eighteen thousand Macedonian pikemen and two thousand cavalry to face the Romans (he also had two thousand more men stationed in garrisons in southern Greece and Asia Minor). After his defeat and its heavy losses, Philip managed to call up six thousand five hundred more men from the cities of Macedonia, but his army was in no condition to fight on. He had to sue for peace and accept the conditions the Romans laid down: the loss of Thessaly and all other territories outside the ancestral Macedonian kingdom proper.

  Thus began the second and in many ways more impressive phase of Philip’s reign: from 196 until his death in 179 he strove successfully to rebuild the manpower and economic strength of Macedonia, modeling himself more on Philip II and Antigonus Gonatas than on Alexander or Demetrius. By the end of his reign he was able to leave to his successor Perseus an army of over forty thousand men: stronger than Macedonia had been since before the Galatian invasion of 279. How did he achieve this? A hint is given by a letter Philip wrote to the people of Larissa in Thessaly as early as 214:

  King Philip to the magistrates and the city of the Larissans, greeting. I have heard that those who had been enrolled as citizens in accord with my letter and your decree and listed in the records have been removed. If this has indeed happened, those who advised you so have mistaken both the advantage of your country and my judgment. That it would be the best of all things if, as many as possible being citizens, the city were strong and the land not left, as now, disgracefully barren, I think not one of you would disagree. It is indeed possible to observe others employing such enfranchisements, among whom are the Romans, who receive into their citizen body even their slaves when they free them and even allow them to share in the magistracies, and by such means have not only strengthened their country but also sent out colonies to some seventy places. So now, then, I urge you to consider the matter impartially, and to restore those who were chosen by the citizens to the citizenship; and if some have done something to the harm of the kingdom or the city or are not worthy for some other reason to be listed, concerning these persons make a postponement until I, when I have returned from my present campaign, shall hold a hearing … (Austin The Hellenistic World doc. 60 = Dittenberger Syll. no. 543).

  We see here king Philip striving to strengthen the cities of his kingdom (in this case Larissa in Thessaly), by adding new citizens to keep the cities strong and their land cultivated. He showed the same concern during the remainder of his reign, strengthening the cities of Macedonia by bringing in new settlers, often from Thrace or even Illyria, thereby rebuilding the population of Macedonia and strengthening its economic base by bringing more land under cultivation and re-opening mines that had fallen into disuse. He was in sum a king who took the business of ruling seriously, both as a commander and as an administrator, following in this the examples laid down—as already noted—by his grandfather Antigonus Gonatas and above all by his namesake, the great Philip II.

  When Philip came to the throne in 221, his close contemporary Antiochus III had already been ruling for over a year, having succeeded his older brother Seleucus III as king in 223. He found the Seleucid kingdom at a low ebb: his father Seleucus II had been a weak and ineffective king, and his older brother Seleucus III had been assassinated within a couple of years of succeeding to the kingship. In the east, the Parthians and the Greek colonists in Bactria pursued largely independent policies, and the Median governor Molon was seeking to establish his own power. In the west, in Asia Minor, local dynasts like the Attalids of Pergamon, the Ziaelids of Bithynia, and the Mithridatids of Pontus were building their own kingdoms, and the local representative of Seleucid power—Antiochus’ cousin Achaeus—was aiming at the kingship for himself. The Seleucid Empire seemed headed for collapse. Over the course of rather more than twenty-five years of campaigning, Antiochus III rebuilt the empire, reconquering the east as far as the borders of India, and Asia Minor as far as the Hellespont, and in 201 even succeeding in taking Palestine from the Ptolemies and adding it to the Seleucid realm. In doing all of this, Antiochus III won for himself the epithet “Megas” (the Great) and a reputation as a second Alexander, having campaigned and won victories throughout the lands that Alexander had conquered. At the height of his power, in 196, the Seleucid Empire was as extensive as it had been under its founder Seleucus I, and it seemed stronger than ever. Had he died in 196 or 195, Antiochus the Great would be remembered as a glorious ruler, the most successful Seleucid ruler without caveat.

  22. Portrait bust of Antiochus III “the Great”

  (Author’s photo, taken at Metropolitan Museum, NY)

  Not all of this was achieved by pure campaigning and military force, though Antiochus was clearly an excellent commander and leader of men. To hold lands he had campaigned in, he needed effective administrative arrangements, calling for organizational skills. We are fortunate to possess numerous documents surviving in inscriptions that show his interactions with key subordinates, with Greek cities, and with native communities. He emerges from them as a careful and thoughtful ruler of his realm and its various peoples, recognizing that the strength of the realm depends on the wellbeing of its people. One such document, which I quote here, is not in an inscription but in a literary source—the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus—and is of particular interest since it deals with a non-Greek population group and shows the king’s interest in their contribution to his kingdom, and in making them happy to serve the realm.

  King Antiochus to Zeuxis his “father” (honorific term for senior trusted subordinate), greeting. If you are well, that is good. I myself am also well. Hearing that people in Lydia and Phrygia are rebelling, I thought that this required careful attention on my part and, having consulted with my “friends” (that is, high officials) about what should be done, I decided to transfer two thousand households of Jews from Mesopotamia and Babylonia together with their possessions into the forts and the most strategic places. I am sure that they will be loyal guardians of our interests because of their piety towards god, and I know that evidence of their trustworthiness and zeal for what is requested of them has been given to my ancestors. I desire, therefore, although it is difficult, that they may be transferred with the promise that they shall use their own laws. And when you bring them to the places mentioned, you shall give to each of them a plot on which to build his house and land for farming and the growing of vines, and you shall grant them exemption from the tax on the produce of the soil for ten years. In addition, until they harvest crops from the land, let there be measured out for them grain to sustain their servants. Let there also be given enough for those performing military service in order that, meeting with kindness from us, they might also be more zealous for our interests. Take care also for this nation in so far as possible in order that it be disturbed by no one (Josephus Jewish Antiquities 12.148�
��53).

  What we see is a king who followed the example of his ancestor Seleucus, and of Seleucus’ mentors Philip II and Antigonus the One-Eyed, in building up his realm by creating settlements, establishing prosperity in such settlements, and so securing both the good of his people and his own strength. Like Philip V, Antiochus eventually made the mistake of provoking the Romans, leading to a Roman invasion of Asia Minor in 190 and a devastating defeat for Antiochus in the Battle of Magnesia late in that year. To win peace with the Romans, Antiochus had to surrender control of all the Seleucid lands in Asia Minor, and he died an embittered and disappointed king a few years later. His sons, Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV, managed to maintain and even rebuild Seleucid power somewhat, but after the death of Antiochus IV the kingdom fell into repeated civil wars and decline, until the final Roman takeover in the sixties BCE. As a result, Antiochus III is, like Philip V, mainly remembered for his defeat by the Romans. But he was a strong and successful king until that fateful conflict.

  What we see with all three of the kings highlighted here, and with the other successful kings of the three dynasties—kings such as Ptolemy II, Antigonus Doson, Antiochus I, and Antiochus IV—is that they did not see the kingship as some sort of privilege allowing its holder to do as he liked and pursue pleasure, but as a serious duty requiring hard work and some degree of self-sacrifice for the good of the kingdom and the people. As Antigonus Gonatas reputedly expressed it, kingship is an endoxos douleia, a glorious servitude. That phrase expresses the best ideal of Hellenistic kingship. The servitude is the hard work for the benefit of the subjects and the realm; the glory is what the king wins by performing this servitude tirelessly and well.

  2. THE ARMIES

  The Hellenistic kingdoms were empires conquered by the spear and maintained by the threat, and at times the active exercise, of military force. Strong and effective standing armies were, consequently, vital to establishing and sustaining security within these kingdoms: keeping the provinces loyal and quiet and deterring or seeing off threats from the outside. The nature of the armies of the Hellenistic kings was that established by Philip II: his army and military system continued to be the standard followed throughout the Hellenistic world. That is to say that at the core of each army was a mass of pikemen armed with the Macedonian sarissa and trained in its use. Many of these pikemen were of Macedonian descent, thanks to the numerous Macedonian military colonies founded by the Successors of Alexander; many more, however, were from the native Asian peoples, equipped and trained as Macedonian-style pikemen after recruitment who, from being originally merely “military Macedonians” eventually came to be considered and treated as Macedonians in every way, just as Philip II had turned Thracians and Illyrians into Macedonians. In addition, the armies had thousands of cavalrymen trained in the Macedonian style of cavalry fighting; units of specialized mobile infantry and cavalry to guard the armies’ flanks in battle and do the scouting, skirmishing, and foraging; and there were usually units of native troops fighting in their own equipment and styles as auxiliaries.

  Since our historical sources are chiefly interested in warfare, we have plenty of testimony of these armies in action. But for a more detailed look at the organization and discipline of such Hellenistic armies, a remarkable inscription found near the city of Amphipolis provides special insight. It records the military regulations in force in the Macedonian army when on campaign in the time of Philip V, and I quote from its remaining fragments here by way of illustration.

  Making rounds: in each regiment night rounds are to be made in turn by the tetrarchoi (sergeants) without lights. Anyone sitting down or sleeping on guard duty is to be fined by the tetrarchoi for each infraction one drachma (roughly a day’s pay) …

  Equipment: those not bearing the weapons assigned to them are to be fined according to regulations: for the stomach-guard, two obols; for the helmet, the same; for the sarissa, three obols; for the sword, the same; for the shin-guards, two obols; for the shield, a drachma …

  Construction of quarters: when they have completed the palisade for the king and the other tents have been pitched and a space has been made, they are immediately to prepare the bivouac for the hypaspists (an elite infantry unit) …

  Foraging: if anyone burns grain or cuts down vines or commits some other disorderly act, a reward for information against them is to be paid by the generals …

  Passwords: guards are to receive the password whenever they close or open the passages through the palisade …

  (Austin The Hellenistic World doc. 74 = Moretti ISE II.114).

  There is a good deal more, but these brief quotations are sufficient to give an idea of the care that went into organizing and regulating the Macedonian army in this era. Soldiers in this military system knew exactly what was required of them, and an exacting military discipline was maintained, with substantial fines for infractions against discipline. Soldiers were responsible for keeping their assigned equipment in good condition, for setting up camp in an orderly way, for maintaining proper discipline while foraging and while on guard duty, and so on. The duties of officers to oversee all of this were laid out in detail. Overall, the regulations establish that a Hellenistic army, at any rate under those kings who paid attention and saw to the maintenance of order, was a well organized and smoothly functioning military machine. The success of such armies in creating and maintaining the Hellenistic kingdoms can be readily understood. It is noteworthy that these particular military regulations come from the reign of the Antigonid king Philip V, whom we have seen above to have been a conscientious ruler and a successful military commander.

  There was, of course, in the conquered lands of Asia and Egypt, an inevitable disjunction between the Macedonian armies, which were invasive and drawn from a population of settlers brought from the outside, and the native peoples over whom they ruled and whose submission they guaranteed. This disjunction was most clearly manifested in the case of the use of native troops as auxiliaries in the Macedonian armies. Most of the time, Hellenistic rulers in Asia and Egypt took care to use native forces sparingly, and in restricted and subordinate roles, in order not to give such forces, and the peoples they were drawn from, the idea that they might rival or even challenge the military capabilities of the elite Macedonians and other Greeks. What could happen if these restrictions were not observed is seen in the case of the Ptolemaic army in the late third century, when an emergency situation led king Ptolemy IV to make greater use of, and place more reliance on, Egyptian troops than was wise for a non-Egyptian ruler.

  In 218 Ptolemy IV faced an invasion of Palestine, which the Greeks tended to call Coele (Hollow) Syria, by Antiochus III at the head of a great army. While Ptolemy IV mostly concerned himself with the pursuit of pleasure, his ministers Agathocles and Sosibius had been preparing for this invasion for some time, and succeeded in gathering a large army to oppose it. They had pursued every avenue to find troops, not just mobilizing the Macedonian and other Greek manpower resources of Egypt, but sending agents abroad to find allies and mercenaries from Greece and elsewhere. They kept Antiochus occupied with diplomatic missions and negotiations while they prepared their force: the whole tale is recounted in detail by the historian Polybius (5.63–64). In the end, they were able to gather a pike phalanx of some twenty-five thousand men and more than eight thousand mercenaries. In addition there were a little less than six thousand cavalry, of whom some two thousand were mercenaries recruited from Greece. Specialized light infantry forces included three thousand Cretan archers, another three thousand Libyans trained to fight in the Macedonian style, and around six thousand Thracians and Galatians drawn from settlers in Egypt. But altogether these forces were not enough to stand up to the army Antiochus had mobilized. The army was, therefore, supplemented by native Egyptian infantry: “the Egyptian contingent made up a phalanx of about twenty thousand men, under the command of Sosibius” (Polybius 5.65). When the showdown battle finally occurred, at Raphia in southern Palestine in summer of 217,
Antiochus defeated Ptolemy’s cavalry and made the classic mistake of over-pursuing. While he was gone, Ptolemy’s infantry phalanx defeated that of Antiochus and won the battle, the Egyptians playing a significant role in bringing about this success.

  For the moment that was a good outcome: Ptolemaic control of Palestine was assured. But Polybius (5.107) describes the aftermath, a few years later:

  after this Ptolemy became embroiled in a war against the Egyptians. For by arming the Egyptians for the war against Antiochus, this king (Ptolemy IV) made a decision which was acceptable in the short term but a great miscalculation for the future. For the Egyptians were elated by their success at Raphia and could no longer endure to take orders, but sought someone to lead them as they now believed they were able to fend for themselves; and that is what they achieved not long after (in 207/6 BCE).

  The war was a disaster for Ptolemaic Egypt, severely weakening Ptolemaic rule and lasting for decades: large parts of upper (i.e. southern) Egypt escaped Ptolemaic control entirely until finally “pacified” around 186. As Polybius later summed it up (14.12): “this war, apart from the savagery and lawlessness each side displayed to the other, involved no regular battle, sea-fight, or siege, nor anything else worth mentioning.” That is to say, it was fought in guerrilla style, with extreme brutality on each side: the Egyptians trying to drive out the hated Greek and other settlers, the Ptolemaic forces trying to force the Egyptians back into subjection. The utter reliance of the Hellenistic powers on having a strong standing army with a predominance of Macedonian and other Greek manpower could not be more clearly demonstrated.