Churchill's Secret War

by Denniston, Robin

  Speculation on the opening of a Balkan Front continued throughout August, a month which also saw preparations for the campaign.22 On 1 August Wilson opted for a scaled down, improvisatory ‘Accolade’. The next day Churchill wrote to him: ‘Here is a business of great consequence to be thrust forward by every means. Should the Italians in Crete and Rhodes resist the Germans and a deadlock ensue, we must help the Italians at the earliest moment, encouraging thereby also the support of the populations.’ On 3 August he ordered the COS to stop supplying Turkey and to work up an action plan for the Dodecanese. On 5 August Wilson asked Eisenhower for eight ships, four squadrons of P-38 Lightnings, transport aircraft and troops, to arrive in the Middle East by 14–15 August. On the 7th Eisenhower agreed to some but not all of these requests but five days later he and Tedder reconsidered the commitment and urged the abandonment of ‘Accolade’. The ‘Quadrant’ Conference set limits to operations in the Aegean but despite this drastic change in Allied Mediterranean priorities Wilson signalled Eisenhower on 23 August that he was loading the task force for ‘Accolade’.

  Operations in the Aegean – September to November 1943: the Limitations of ‘Boniface’

  ‘Improvise and dare,’ Churchill wrote to the COS on 9 September, the day of the Allied landings at Salerno south of Naples and the day after Italy’s surrender: ‘This is the time to play high.’23 The Salerno landings coincided with Badoglio joining the Allies, despite his knowledge that the Germans knew through intercepts what he was up to. And on 13 September he telegraphed Wilson: ‘The capture of Rhodes by you at this time with Italian aid would be a fine contribution to the general war.’ On 25 September he telegraphed Eisenhower: ‘Rhodes is the key both to the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. It will [sic] be a great disaster if the Germans are able to consolidate there.’ On the same day24 ‘an unknown naval convoy was due at Milos at 04.00 hours, due to sail again at 17.00 hours for Candia [Crete]’. Operational instructions were issued the same day. First Rhodes, then Cos, then Leros had become the target for a British assault and a successful German counter-assault.

  Wilson was to undertake the long-planned capture of Rhodes largely by bluff, since Eisenhower by now refused support. He had to be content to try and occupy the lesser Dodecanese islands, Kastellorizo, Leros, Cos and Samos, while sending an Inter-Service Mission to Rhodes to treat with Gen Scarioni and Adm Campioni and attempt to destroy the 7,000 strong German Assault Group based on Rhodes. If this was successful he planned to land the 234th Infantry Brigade in three merchant ships, not assault loaded; success would depend on the use of the harbour at Rhodes and the airfields on which one or two squadrons of Spitfires would be ready to land. But Müller managed to catch him off balance. On 9 September Hitler ordered Müller to resist all attacks on Rhodes from any source, and when on 9–10 September Maj the Earl Jellicoe led the Inter-Service Mission to Scarioni and Campioni, the German Gen Klemann seized the former while on 11 September the latter ordered the Italian garrison on Rhodes to capitulate to the Germans. The Germans had adjusted to the possible loss of Italy following the Axis collapse in North Africa in May 1943, by training Gen Klemann’s mobile division on Rhodes to be able, in the event, both to accept the surrender of far more numerous Italian troops there, and then also repel the British assault of Rhodes.

  Churchill continued to exchange signals with Wilson, pointing out on 13 September that ‘the capture of Rhodes by you at this time would be a fine contribution to the general war’, while Wilson kept Churchill in touch with his scaled down assault on the smaller islands in a signal the following day.25 On 17 September a substantial force of imperial troops invaded Cos.26 On 21 September Wilson submitted similar plans to the COS for Leros and two days later 2nd Battalion, Royal West Kent Regt (minus B Company) invaded Samos. But the next day the German Assault Group was assembled to retake Cos and plan the retaking of Leros under the codename ‘Leopard’. On 27 September27 a TOO intelligence report on the Aegean situation noted that (German) landing craft left for Piraeus with all the Italians on Kythera.28

  Drache was attacked off Syros; Polone was blown up and an unspecified operation by Bulgaria was postponed for twenty-four hours owing to lack of air escort. The Greek ship Elleni Coliorio sailed from Pegadia but was set on fire by the Luftwaffe south of Skarpanto.29 BJ 137725 reported two landing craft and 200 troops on Mytilene were to ‘operate against the island of Chios’. Cephallonia was occupied by the Germans on 26 September after a heroic ten-day Italian resistance and nearly 100 Italian officers were murdered. Churchill, learning of this from an Enigma decrypt exploited the German atrocity for all it was worth, stirring the Turks, Italians and French with the news of German callousness. On Kythera the Italians joined the Greek partisans and offered stout resistance on Andros.

  On 2 October the Italians were being disarmed by the Germans on Andros, and operations were in progress against Naxos, Paros and Antiparos.30 Reinforcements were requested for the garrison on Syra. The next day Cos fell to a German group of 2,000 troops, 17 ships and 130 bombers after what Churchill (picking up the phrase from its opposite in a Fish intercept) described as ‘unsatisfactory resistance’. The day after, he was heavily marking an intercept which contained the following German signal:

  The aim of the enemy [in the Aegean] is clearly apparent. It is to obtain possession of the Dodecanese islands and to create there sea and air bases from which to cripple shipping in the Aegean which will serve for a base from which to launch an operation against Northern Greece – Salonika – from the Aegean, if it should be undertaken. Daily recces are requested and if possible a survey twice a day of the naval base of Leros which dominates the Aegean, is necessary in order to obtain a picture of the further intentions of the enemy.31

  Despite German successes among some of the islands, by the end of September the British had established themselves on Cos, Leros, Samos, Simi, Stampalia, and Icaria. By 3 October Churchill was telegraphing ACM Sir Arthur Tedder, C-in-C Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean: ‘Cos is highly important and a reverse there would be most vexatious. I am sure I can rely on you to turn on all your heat from every quarter, especially during this lull in Italy’; and to Eisenhower on the same date: ‘We are much concerned about Cos, and are sure you will do all in your power to prevent a vexatious injury to future plans occurring through the loss of Cos.’ Eisenhower and Tedder strengthened their view that the Italian campaign – however it developed – would need all available Allied resources. They were right about this in the long run, but Churchill knew from Dedip (and they might therefore have not known that he knew, not being privy to this source) that sparing some men and equipment for the eastern Mediterranean would have paid off handsomely. Their reading of Boniface and consequential appreciation of the war throughout the Mediterranean led them to a cautious and negative response. Dedip also told him the von Papen threat to Turkey – that the Germans would bomb Istanbul if they allowed the Allies to use air bases on Turkish soil – was no longer a realistic option for Germany, and it was most unlikely that Hitler would have sanctioned such a move anyhow.

  By 5 October 600 British troops had been taken prisoner on Cos, and much booty captured. Churchill circled ‘an Italian colonel shot’.32 Two and a half thousand other Italians, with guns, cutters and ‘one luxury yacht for the use of Oc Battle Gruppe’ were also captured. German losses were reported as 15 killed, 70 wounded. Mopping up continued.33 On 5 October the German Army Assault Division was assigned to Rhodes; a three-page intercept set out who was occupying which island; ‘about 700 Italians went to the bottom in the SS Ardena’.34 Good results were reported on Antimachia (Cos). There were indications, too, of impending operations against Naxos ‘compiled from a document seen by source’.35 The Luftwaffe reported Germany was in complete possession of Cos. Churchill circled German ‘losses small in the face of tough English resistance’, indicating his concern that German losses were not serious, and possibly contrary to what was being reported to him from Cairo. The Cos situa
tion was still fluid and ‘it is not certain whether Müller was in Crete or somewhere in the Dodecanese (e.g. Rhodes) when he sent his report’.36 The same day the Germans were ordered to occupy Amorgis (in the Cyclades) and then go on to assist their fellows on Cos. Landing craft laden with prisoners were heading from Cos to the Piraeus.

  Roosevelt was, as we have seen, more inclined to respect Turkish sensitivities than the other Big Two, and less interested in the eastern Mediterranean. So his ‘final negative quenched [Churchill’s] last hopes’.37 He told Wilson: ‘I am doing all I can’, and on 7 October telegraphed Wilson: ‘I’ll back you through thick and thin even if things go wrong provided everything in human power is done.’ Wilson’s reply the next day referred to ‘intelligence from all sources, including most secret sources’, indicating that Enigma decrypts to GHQ ME were being read. How it was thought possible to co-ordinate resistance to the Germans in the Aegean from 700 miles away in Cairo remains a question to which military historians have no clear answer. They tend to pin blame for the Dodecanese disaster not on Wilson but Tedder, who refused to supply air cover except tokenly even when Allied superiority in the Mediterranean was massive – 4,000 Allied aircraft to 800 Axis.38 On 10 October Churchill pursued the chimera of island prizes by telegraphing Wilson: ‘If you are left to take a setback it will be bad. Do not therefore undertake this on the cheap. Demand what is necessary and consult with Alexander. I am doing all I can.’ And the following day:

  Cling on if you possibly can. It will be a splendid achievement. Talk it over with Eden, and see what help you can get from the Turk. If after everything has been done you are forced to quit, I will support you, but victory is the prize.

  Later, on 1 November, Alanbrooke blamed himself:

  If only I had had sufficient force of character to swing [the Americans] how different the war might be. We should have had the whole Balkans ablaze by now and the war might have finished in 1943.39

  The irreconcilable positions of Churchill, backing Wilson, and Roosevelt, backing Eisenhower, were to leave marks on Anglo-American relations of which the slowing of the Allied advance up Italy may have been a partial cause. But not all the British commanders, quite apart from Tedder, shared Churchill’s determination to win back the Dodecanese and force Turkey into the war. For instance on 6 October the new First Sea Lord and former naval C-in-C in the Mediterranean, Sir Andrew Cunningham, warned:

  The use of Turkish airstrips, while enabling us to provide a valuable support for offensive operations against the islands, would not help us a great deal to defend Leros and Cos on account of the distances involved and the absence of an adequate warning system.40

  This may explain Tedder’s reluctance to send aircraft. The next day Churchill begged Roosevelt for nine landing craft, standing idle because it would be six months before they would be needed for ‘Overlord’. But Roosevelt answered two days later: ‘Strategically, if we get the Aegean islands, I ask myself where do we go from here, and vice versa, where would the Germans go if for sometime they retained possession of the islands?’ It was a good question: in the event they went nowhere.

  On 7 November Menemencioğlu rejected Eden’s demands for the use of Turkish airfields since this would constitute a commitment to enter the war, and would be so regarded by the Germans. Churchill turned to the FO, which had hitherto contributed little to the Aegean disaster except to warn Churchill not to upset the Turks. He wrote to Eden, then in Ankara on another attempt to get the Turks in – ‘Is there no hope? If nothing can be done you should consult with Wilson whether Leros garrison should not be evacuated to Turkey’; and to Alexander, ‘You should now try to save what we can from the wreck.’ On the same day Tedder signalled that he ‘must concentrate on the Italian campaign. “Accolade” must be postponed.’

  Two days later, on 12 October, Eden met Wilson and the Middle East commanders in Cairo, where it was agreed that Cos could not be recaptured but Leros should be retained and everything depended on ‘Handcuff’ – the assault on Rhodes, now known by commanders on the spot to be impossible. Kalymnos was captured and garrisoned by the Germans on 7 October. Müller postponed ‘Leopard’ (the operation for Cos) ‘for naval technical reasons’.41 On 16 October HW1/2118 confirmed the enemy knew that ‘Accolade’ could not now be staged. Tedder’s view had prevailed. Bad weather was feared. Churchill minuted to Portal, ‘is all this to stop altogether? It seems very profitable.’ Cos was being used as a base for German attacks on other islands. Churchill minuted to the COS via Ismay (his usual route): ‘What actually is being left to ME? Are they getting any bombing help from Tedder?’ and reminded them of Tedder’s responsibility for the eastern as well as the central Mediterranean war zone.

  By 22 October Churchill had become extremely upset about the Dodecanese, especially Cos and Tedder. From Boniface he knew of Müller’s postponement of ‘Leopard’.42 From the same source he was aware the Germans knew that a mine-laying operation between Cos and Leros was impossible without MTB protection. He knew SS troops were involved, to oversee the disembarkation of troops on landing craft. This meant crack Nazi troops were engaged, causing still higher risks for the troops on the ground and even less chance of island prizes being won. He knew the Germans thought onward passage from Syros, in the Cyclades, to Cos was too dangerous ‘unless Allied cruisers and destroyers were first eliminated’. He knew the German plan to get Amorgos and ‘break through at dawn to Cos’. He knew the German reaction to the British commando raid on Levitia (an island of the Dodecanese west of Kalymnos) the day before. He knew that the local German commander sought permission ‘to seize Italian uniforms for Brandenburg unit for use as a disguise.’43 All this and much more he learnt from timely daily supplies of Boniface and Dedip.

  But none of this knowledge averted disaster. All he could do was to congratulate Wilson on ‘the way you used such poor bits and pieces as were left to you’ and urged him to ‘keep Leros safely. Nil desperandum.’44 He did not need Boniface to tell him that on 22 October 4th Battalion of the Buffs (4th Battalion, Royal East Kent Regt) embarked for Leros in two ships, one of which, HMS Eclipse, hit a mine two days later, with the loss of 135 officers and men plus over 125 of the ship’s crew. On 24 October Churchill telegraphed Wilson: ‘I’m sorry you had bad luck over the destroyers and getting the Buffs into Leros yesterday.’45 The next day Boniface revealed that the Germans had been ordered to occupy Amorgis (in the Cyclades) and go for Cos.46

  British failure to retain control of the islands was an example of where the best intelligence is useless without the military means to take advantage of it. Hinsley’s account emphasises the importance and yet the impotence of Boniface throughout the campaign. Yet Molony wondered why the British admirals ‘could not have deduced from perplexing intelligence that German warships were about to go into action’ – reflecting the lack of any local inter-service co-ordinating machinery or any of the infrastructure necessary for a successful combined operation. Tedder pronounced the Aegean situation fundamentally unsound but Churchill telegraphed Eden, now in Moscow, on 1 November to try and grip the Leros-Samos situation. ‘This is in a most hazardous plight but the prize is well worth struggling for.’ On 7 November Menemencioğlu rejected Eden’s demands for the use of Turkish airfields and a commitment to enter the war. The same day Boniface reported that the Leros operation was imminent. ‘Convoy to proceed as planned.’47 There followed a German appreciation of British forces on Leros. Churchill circled strength of British navy and land batteries, He was telephoned by ‘C’ later in the day that the landing convoy was at Leros.48 ‘C’ told him the next day that three German landing craft were aground there.49

  HW1/ 2221, 2222, 2226 and 2234 carry more Enigma tactical details. The date 11 November was D-Day for ‘Tragic’.50 The Allied bombardment of Cos early on that day caused some German naval casualties.51 ‘Two British destroyers came out of Turkish waters and will fire on Cos.’ Hinsley observes:

  Sigint made it clear that Hitler, though he in
creased the risks and prolonged the postponement by vetoing attacks on Allied warships as they lay up in Turkish territorial waters nevertheless remained determined that ‘Leopard’ should be carried out, as a surprise move, at the first opportunity.52

  Hitler still believed that six or seven British divisions were standing by in Egypt to attack Rhodes, Crete, the Greek mainland and the Peloponnese.53

  As for Turkey, Kurihara reported from Ankara to Tokyo on new Anglo–American–Russian pressure on Turkey to join the war . . . but ‘it will be a considerable time before Turkey joins. Papen says Russia strongly attacks Turkish neutrality.’54 There was pressure from both sides. ‘An advance by the Soviet army is what Turkey fears most of all.’ On the 9th (as already reported) Müller postponed ‘Leopard’ for twenty-four hours; Churchill marked the Boniface intercept. The Battle Group M (Cos) had been ordered to carry out Operation ‘Leopard’ on 9/11 by the latest, despite the loss of the Olympos convoy. ‘It is of decisive importance for the whole operation.’

  On 10 November the War Cabinet telegraphed the Joint Staff Mission in Washington as follows:

  Turkish government is now considering the proposal put to them by Foreign Secretary in Cairo last week that they should enter the war before the end of the year. In regard to Rhodes and the Dodecanese, although not operationally essential, it would clearly be desirable to clean up the islands as soon as possible and the idea should appeal to the Turks: (a) The Turks should be asked to say whether they are prepared to undertake the early capture of these islands; and (b) If they say they are unable to do this we should starve out the islands and occupy them later at our leisure.