Behind Diplomatic Lines

by Patrick R. H. Wright

  I pointed out, particularly in comparison with the postings of Charles’s predecessors (Luxembourg, Vienna, Amman and Budapest), that Charles was getting a highly prestigious and important job. The PM lashed out savagely, accusing Robin Butler of twisting the constitutional position – saying that she was not bound to accept either his advice or mine. She several times implied that she could not go on without Charles, and that she might resign herself. At another point, she said that it would be either Charles or Geoffrey Howe. She also said that she would simply not work with any successor, and she knew that there was no one of Charles’s character; this gave me a chance to say that we had two candidates in mind, one of whom was a very experienced speech-writer, and the other described by Antony Acland as the best diplomatic service officer he knew – the last point made her look a little thoughtful for the moment.

  The PM railed against the FCO, saying that its watchwords were negotiation and compromise; that she had had to fight them all the way on Rhodesia, Falklands, Hong Kong, Europe and NATO. The only good advice had come from Charles. I reminded her that we had given her three first-class private secretaries, and would do so again. She quoted Philip de Zulueta as someone who had been allowed to stay on for seven years, and no one had dared to fight Macmillan. Why were we fighting her? I pointed out that the FCO had, at that time, thought that de Zulueta was damaging his FCO career, as indeed he did. Robin tellingly added that de Zulueta had regretted his departure from the service all his life.

  At one point, the PM misinterpreted me as saying that she had forced Nicky Gordon Lennox out of Madrid, and added mysteriously that she would be quite happy to see him come back as PUS. (A Freudian slip, reflecting her thinking about Charles’s future after Madrid? Or perhaps a comment on her plans for me?) Throughout this meeting, she was moderately polite to me personally, saying that she knew I was a ‘loyal friend’ of Charles.

  After the meeting, Robin, Andrew and I spent half an hour in the Cabinet room discussing the fallout of this discussion. Robin really does seem to be serious about his position; he told Andrew that he felt that his reputation as Cabinet Secretary was at stake, having conveyed to me a written assurance that Charles Powell would be released for Madrid.

  14 JUNE 1989

  Permanent secretaries had an interesting discussion this morning about style of government, with widespread criticism of the way in which the PM is attacking everything and everyone – Europe, NATO, the economy etc. – without proper ministerial discussion or strategic thinking.

  16 JUNE 1989

  I took the opportunity of a private meeting with Geoffrey Howe today, after our ‘bilateral’, to give him a full account of my meeting with the Prime Minister. This led on to a discussion about the PM’s attitudes, and her current tendency to attack everyone and everything. Geoffrey seemed quite grateful that I had taken the brunt, particularly since (as Robin Butler had mentioned to me) he and Nigel Lawson have just put in a minute on EMS, referred to by John Kerr as ‘the resignation minute’ – i.e. virtually saying ‘accept that the time is getting near to join, or we shall both resign’.

  18 JUNE 1989

  John Kerr telephoned me late this evening about the EMS Paper, on which the PM has apparently (and typically) tasked Charles Powell and Alan Walters to produce a reply. One theory is that she may agree to an earlier move on EMS, provided all talk of a social dimension is dropped – a ludicrously unattainable objective. Her first reactions to the Paper are said to have been very bad.

  19 JUNE 1989

  Virginia and I went to Geoffrey Howe’s diplomatic banquet in the Duveen Gallery at the British Museum – discreet checks having been made to confirm that the Greek ambassador did not object violently to eating next to the Elgin Marbles. Adam Fergusson (Geoffrey’s PPS) buttonholed me after dinner to ask if anyone had yet checked with the Spanish to see if they would actually accept Charles Powell. The Spanish have broken away from the Conservatives in the European Parliament, and Adam thought there was a serious likelihood that they would refuse. That really would be an ironic twist to a long-running saga!

  20 JUNE 1989

  The Charles Powell saga continued today with a visit from Robin Butler to tell me that the PM had rejected our advice, and had told him that only his resignation would force her to release Charles. Robin showed me his minute in reply, saying that it was not right to base her actions on a threat. He strongly reiterated his advice, and rehearsed at length the timetable of events over Charles’s postings (for which I had spent a weekend going over Charles’s personal file, and preparing a paper for Robin). The next crunch will come with Geoffrey Howe, who told me this afternoon that he was not prepared to let Charles stay on. I am not at all sure what my own position is, since ultimately it is presumably open to the PM to decide what to do.

  21 JUNE 1989

  I told Geoffrey Howe the latest news about Charles Powell, and he asked where that left him. He was not at all sure that he should not regard it as a case of Charles or himself. He described his meeting with the PM and the Chancellor last night on EMS, and said gloomily that even if the PM was prepared to indicate some shift in her position at Madrid, she would certainly do it with such bad grace, and setting such impossible conditions, that all negotiating advantage would be lost. He was about to see Nigel Lawson, and told me (very privately) that both of them were getting very near to resignation. He was seriously worried about the PM’s state of mind, and the damage it was doing to the nation. He frankly wondered if Douglas Hurd or Cecil Parkinson could do the job better.

  I said that I hoped he would not do anything in a hurry, and that he would make sure that Nigel Lawson kept firm. I pointed out that Lawson was probably readier to leave politics for the City than Geoffrey himself; he acknowledged that this was probably true. But for the first time ever, he told me it was not much fun, and that all his dealings with No. 10 had become a perpetual hassle. I said that I was personally glad that I had at least been able to take one hour of abuse off his shoulders last week.

  John Kerr tells me that, following the meeting between Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson with the PM, Lynda Chalker had asked Geoffrey how it had gone, to which he replied: ‘None of your business.’ Not surprisingly, she is on poor form at present.

  22 JUNE 1989

  Resignations are still in the air today. Tony Fanshawe told me at lunch that Lord Young had handed in his resignation to the Prime Minister last night because he was ‘fed up’, though it was not clear what with. Geoffrey and Nigel Lawson have meanwhile decided to return to the charge on EMS after their recent meeting, and Geoffrey appears to be in a fairly robust mood today.

  Virginia lunched with Elspeth Howe this afternoon, who told her that Margaret Thatcher was totally impossible. ‘We should all stick together, and to our guns.’ She said that it was a pity that all this could not be leaked.

  Geoffrey Howe discussed Hong Kong with me today, wondering whether he should have gone on Panorama. I said that several people had told me they thought it was a mistake, but I had seldom seen a politician put in such a difficult position. I would certainly have advised him beforehand to do it, given the need to get across the government’s case. He is thinking of writing to John Birt about the programme, which I think is probably a mistake.

  23 JUNE 1989

  Andrew Turnbull telephoned me at 5.30 p.m. to say that the Prime Minister had reached her verdict on Charles Powell, and wished to keep him. He asked me to let Geoffrey Howe know, before he and the PM meet ‘over the weekend’. Andrew asked me if I wished to see Charles this evening. I said rather stiffly that I saw no need. Charles knew well enough what my views were on where and when he should go.

  I then talked to Robin Butler, who had already heard the news, and was in deep gloom about it. I said that I had not yet told the Foreign Secretary the news, but would feel bound to rehearse in full the arguments which Robin and I had put to the PM. Robin said that this was entirely reasonable.

  I then had three telephone con
versations with Geoffrey (two of them from his car), who became more and more determined to oppose the decision. I warned him that the PM was almost certainly immovable on the subject, and I really saw no alternative to going along with it, unless Geoffrey felt he could deploy the political dangers for the PM, and the government, of the decision. I pointed out that the constitutional arguments were not strong (though it is theoretically open to the Foreign Secretary to refuse to recommend Charles for further ambassadorial appointments).

  I talked also to Stephen Wall, who agreed with me that a real confrontation with the PM was more likely to lead to Geoffrey’s departure – either by resignation, or by being sacked. I set out the arguments in a long minute, including (at Geoffrey’s request) the de Zulueta precedent and parliamentary handling. Tam Dalyell and David Winnick will have a field day when the news breaks, as will Michael Heseltine, whose resignation was of course closely tied up with Westland and Charles Powell’s involvement.

  Robin Butler tells me that he does not think he can continue to work with Charles Powell, and must look forward to a possible seven years with the Prime Minister with some trepidation.

  I had a meeting with Geoffrey Howe to discuss the very difficult decision of whether to allow BAE to sell Hawk Trainers to Iraq, which Geoffrey (quite rightly) wants to put to OD.

  1 JULY 1989

  On return from a visit to Khartoum (just in time, since a coup nearly delayed our departure, which would have made us miss Marcus, my eldest son, and Rebecca’s wedding), I discovered that Geoffrey Howe had not yet sent his minute to the PM about Charles Powell, having been advised (probably rightly) that the tough draft that I had produced last week was too confrontational, and might even precipitate Geoffrey’s departure from the government. Stephen Wall had produced a more emollient draft, which Geoffrey had not liked either. I therefore sat down at 5 a.m. and produced a third draft, which was collected from a neighbour’s house in East Sheen and taken to Chevening (after we had departed for the wedding at the registry office in the Marylebone Road, and for Stuart Bates’s wedding breakfast in the Savoy).

  3 JULY 1989

  A telegram arrived from Geoffrey Howe in Hong Kong (where he is having a tough time trying to explain government policy on the right of abode), giving a slightly revised version of my draft minute, which I later showed to Lynda Chalker, after it had been issued. Lynda told me that an MEP friend of hers and Robin Butler’s had told her that Robin was in a more depressed mood than he had ever seen; and that Robin had allegedly said that he was ready to accept a good offer of outside employment. I did not comment on this.

  I later called on Robin, who is still agonising over what to do. I sympathised, and said that any suggestion that he might resign would have made his continuing relationship with Margaret Thatcher very awkward. He commented that, given her personality, it might actually have increased her respect for him. Winning battles over her opponents does not increase her respect for them.

  5 JULY 1989

  An early start for breakfast with Lynda Chalker at the Royal Horseguards. She expects a reshuffle on 17 July, but not involving major Cabinet posts. She was visibly unsettled to see a group of Cabinet ministers (David Young, John MacGregor, Tony Newton and Francis Maude) also breakfasting, and was madly trying to work out why. She is very jealous of her ministerial colleagues, and particularly William Waldegrave.

  William Waldegrave asked me to call to try to find some money for the Hungarians, where he is visiting next week. He has caught the PM’s disease of wanting to hand out goodies on every overseas visit – a tendency that has already distorted the aid programme. When I explained the difficulty of getting more than minimal sums, he admitted that he was not used to working in a department with such a small budget.

  I am worried about David Gore-Booth’s overenthusiasm for the Arab cause, and his tendency to infuriate the Americans unnecessarily. Not surprisingly, there are signs that the Jewish lobby are starting a campaign against him. He needs to watch it.

  Tim Lankester paid his first call since succeeding John Caines as PUS of the ODA. I briefed him on FCO/ODA relations, and the relationship of both of us with No. 10, who have leaked some wild remarks by the PM on moving the ODA right out of London – related, as I told him, to the PM’s neurosis about being surrounded by too much Foreign Office.

  I accompanied Geoffrey Howe to lunch with Sultan Qaboos of Oman at one of his adjacent houses in Upper Brook Street. On arrival, we were ushered into a large salon with two, apparently original, Canalettos on the wall. I told Geoffrey they must be photographs, but he discovered later that they are indeed genuine. After waiting for ten minutes, and having been offered orange juice, I asked whether the Sultan knew we were there, and was told that he was still with George Younger upstairs. After a further delay, we were ushered into the street, and into the next-door house, where again nobody seemed to know what was happening. It finally emerged that we were supposed to be in a third house (also adjoining), where Qaboos had just arrived. Gin and tonics, and champagne, were then served for us both (though not for the Sultan or Hussein bin Ali).

  A very nice and interesting lunch party followed, including Robert Alston, Tim Landon and David Gore-Booth. All cutlery was gold plated and each guest was given the choice of five main courses, following lobster and caviar served in vast quantities. Qaboos was fairly relaxed about Soviet–Iranian relations, following Rafsanjani’s visit to Moscow, on the grounds that they are not natural allies, and on both political and religious grounds Iran is more likely, in due course, to mend her fences with the West.

  I called Robin Butler to discuss Nico Henderson’s diaries, which he has submitted in unedited form for pre-publication clearance. I shall have to tell Nico that they are simply not on; they break almost every rule in the book in his comments on ministerial relationships, royal conversations and official advice. I expect to have a tough time with Nico, who will argue, with some justification (as did Christopher Meyer many years later, in connection with his book DC Confidential) that he has not done anything which many ministers have been allowed to do. [Nico finally only got clearance for the publication of his memoirs by appealing to Douglas Hurd after my retirement – Douglas himself having strong (and not totally objective) views about the Radcliffe rules, and indeed the rules restricting intelligence records.]

  7 JULY 1989

  Further talk of reshuffles today. Geoffrey Howe told me that Simon Glenarthur has decided to leave government. Simon himself invited me to call, saying that he could no longer support his children’s schooling on a ministerial salary. I expressed suitable regret and appreciation for the interest he has taken in the service.

  At Geoffrey’s request, I asked Denis Greenhill to call after lunch, to sound him on possible ministerial talent in the Lords, and in particular on Lord Caithness. Denis confirmed that Caithness is a very popular and effective minister (for the Environment). He also commended Baroness Hooper and Baroness Elles, though Geoffrey later told me he did not think the latter would do – far too powerful a personality. I would like to see Janet Young back again, but she is probably much too dug in to her private life, and would find it difficult to accept junior ministerial rank again, having once been in the Cabinet.

  When Charles Powell called, and I had suggested that we regard the dossier about his future closed for the time being, I put in a plug for more access to No. 10 for FCO under-secretaries, saying that the PM had twice told me she would welcome this. When I asked about reshuffles, he said (no doubt correctly) that he knew too much. [A sign of the times; in my day, reshuffles were handled exclusively by the principal private secretary and the Cabinet Secretary.] He did however tell me, very privately, that the FCO would have quite an extensive, if not total, reshuffle, and that he regarded Geoffrey Howe’s departure as ‘not impossible’. On that, he says, the PM’s mind is not yet made up.

  Otherwise, he thought nearly all the jobs would change: Lynda Chalker to the ODA, to be replaced by Francis Maude; and th
at Glenarthur would ‘probably’ leave (he was clearly not aware of Simon’s own decision).

  I gave lunch to John Blelloch – a relationship that needs constant attention, given Tom King’s desire to keep all Northern Ireland affairs to himself. Tom will almost certainly move on, perhaps to be replaced by Chris Patten?

  10 JULY 1989

  A poisonous editorial in The Independent on Hong Kong, claiming in effect that the PM wants to do the decent thing, but that Geoffrey and the FCO are stopping her. It calls for Geoffrey to go. In any other paper, I would have assumed that this was inspired from No. 10; but I doubt whether The Independent (which, like The Guardian, has opted out of the lobby system) is susceptible to this.

  I telephoned Denis Greenhill to tell him that Lord Cairns (formerly Simon Garmoyle) had put his name to No. 10 as an interested ministerial candidate. As ex-head of VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas), he might well be a plausible candidate.

  11 JULY 1989

  I asked the US ambassador to call at 4 p.m., to receive a wigging on US attitudes to Vietnam boat people, on which they have been very obstructive and unhelpful. Henry Catto explained the domestic sensitivities on anything to do with Vietnam; but I pointed out that this hardly justified unhelpful lobbying against us in Geneva. I also drew a contrast with the Americans’ treatment of asylum seekers from Haiti, Mexico and El Salvador. They have forcibly returned some 19,000 Haitians since their agreement with ‘Baby Doc’ in 1981.