Breakout from Juno

by Mark Zuehlke

  IN THE CONFUSION, few upfront had noticed Bomber Command’s arrival at 1400 hours. Guided by 42 Mosquitoes, 417 Lancasters and 352 Halifaxes came “straight from the coast line” in “a carefully timed run … over our own troops.” While most of the hundreds of bombers dropped accurately, over the ensuing two hours, seventy-seven bombers—forty-four of them Royal Canadian Air Force—“by ill hap” dropped payloads short. Most of the errant bombs fell in the area of Saint-Aignan and around the huge Hautmesnil quarry, both important hubs.

  The sight of open bomb-bay doors sparked a general panic in the rear areas. Yellow smoke sprouted all over, yellow recognition panels were thrown out, and yellow flares were fired to indicate friendly positions. But Bomber Command knew nothing about yellow indicators marking friendly forces. Incredibly, its Pathfinders used yellow flares and smoke bombs to situate assigned targets.25

  The 12th Field Regiment’s guns were deployed at Hautmesnil. The gunners enjoyed a “grandstand seat” as bombers released on Quesnay Wood. “It really looked impressive and one wondered how the Jerries could live through it,” Captain Thomas Bell wrote.

  Then the next wave came over at less than a thousand feet altitude. As “they approached we could see the bomb doors open and bombs come tumbling out. It was a horrifying sight and the result was a terrible nightmare. In a steady, stately procession the heavies came over, wave after wave, unendingly. The first bombs dropped on us at 1430 hours and at 1540 hours we had our last.”

  Yellow smoke canisters were ignited, and men waved large yellow f lags. Bell could see the pilots and co-pilots in the cockpits. “How can they mistake us!” he yelled. Then more bombs fell. “The agony of suspense was terrifying and escape impossible. The air after each stick was dropped would be filled with flying debris, and between waves the ammunition from dumps and blazing vehicles was exploding in every direction. The whole area of the quarry was a raging inferno.”26

  When it ended, 12th Field counted its losses—twenty-one dead and forty-six wounded.27 No. 16 Battery was hardest hit and then No. 11, while No. 43 Battery escaped any damage. All of No. 16 Battery’s vehicles and trailers were destroyed and most guns damaged.28

  During the morning, 2nd Division’s 6th Infantry Brigade had ordered its leading battalions back of the bomb targets around Fontaine-le-Pin, west of the Caen-Falaise highway. The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders duly complied. South Saskatchewan Regiment’s Lieutenant Colonel Fred Clift disagreed. Pulling back the forward companies would reveal their positions to the Germans. And the distance authorized for withdrawal “would leave [them] still very close to the bombing without being dug in.”29

  Both Camerons and Sasks were bombed with equal ferocity despite opposite responses. The densest bomb concentration landed precisely where Clift had been instructed to situate ‘B’ Company, leaving twenty-four “huge craters.”

  Not that ‘B’ Company got off unscathed. It still suffered heavy casualties. Private Chic Goodman was in a slit trench near that of company commander Captain Henry Maxwell Inglis. When the bombs fell, Inglis was checking on his men. In a bombing lull, Goodman saw Inglis and his batman running towards their slit trench. Then another bomb exploded. The twenty-year-old officer and his batman “just disappeared,” and their slit trench was replaced by a huge bomb crater.30 South Saskatchewan casualties tallied twenty-eight killed and forty-one wounded.31

  For saving some lives, much credit was given at the time and subsequently to pilots of Auster spotting planes used by artillery officers to direct fire. These pilots bravely flew into the midst of the bombers, firing red flares to guide them away.32 At 9th Infantry Brigade headquarters, near Cintheaux, the intelligence officer spotted an Auster “signalling to the heavy aircraft in what seemed … a successful attempt to direct them on the proper target.”33

  However, in a detailed investigation of the August 14 bombing errors, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris dismissed any possibility that the Auster pilots had a positive effect. “My comment on this is that in the first place the rest of the bombing was under way, firmly controlled by the Master Bombers and achieving excellent results on the correct aiming points. In the second place red Verey lights fired into smoke or seen through smoke burning on the ground are likely to and did in fact, give a misleading imitation of target indicators.” Whether the Auster pilots influenced events in any form remains a matter of debate.

  Harris was furious with his bomber crews. “I regard the errors of the few who erred as being in this particular case inexcusable solely on the grounds that no matter what misleading conditions and indications existed any adequate effort to maintain the check on a timed run from the coast line to the target area could and would have prevented those errors.”34

  The two Pathfinder crews involved were dismissed and reposted to “ordinary crew duties.” Squadron and flight commanders “relinquished their commands.” They and their crews were returned to ordinary duties. Harris pointed out that despite “the regrettable errors during the action, more than 90% of the Bomber Force attacked, accurately and heavily, the correct targets.”35

  Nothing could undo the damage. Sixty-five Canadians were confirmed killed, 241 wounded, another 91 declared missing and later presumed dead. The Poles counted 42 dead and 51 missing.36

  WHILE THE BOMBS were falling, Tractable had become increasingly confused. In the middle of 3rd Division’s column, the Glens’ Sergeant Doug Conklin had found riding in the Kangaroo a strange experience. “If you dared peek over the side, you could see us going by Germans … And it was scary! You wondered what was going to happen … Then they just stopped … and everybody jumped out and after a bit of confusion, they got us together and we were pretty well behind the Germans, though there were some there.”37

  The Glens dismounted to seize Montboint and the adjacent château. Thick woods surrounded both, and a tough fight was expected. Instead, the Germans, who “occupied the area in considerable strength, surrendered after brief engagements, and an enormous quantity of equipment was taken,” Lieutenant Colonel Roger Rowley reported. The Glens rounded up 220 prisoners.

  ‘B’ Company met stout resistance around the château from four machine guns, which a Tiger tank protected from being flanked. Just before Tractable, the Canadians had been supplied with Wasps—Bren carriers mounting flame-throwers—and Rowley sent for some. They quickly wiped out three machine guns, flaming one “at the extraordinary range of 120 yards.” The Germans manning the fourth gun fled, rather than suffer a fiery death.

  The Tiger was not so easily quelled. Three Crocodiles attempted to engage it and were promptly knocked out. Finally, the Glens pushed a 6-pounder anti-tank gun through woods to gain a side-on angle. A round of newly issued Sabot ammunition put the Tiger out of action.38

  For Rowley, the day had been a test. Since replacing Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Christiansen, he had been treated icily by the regiment. Rowley had no connection to the Glens. He had come from the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. And this day, Rowley had led well—he had been aggressive, but not careless of lives.

  In the 4th Division column, 8th Infantry Brigade had dismounted upon reaching the Laison and forded it on foot. The Queen’s Own Rifles secured Maizières. Le Régiment de la Chaudière passed through and advanced up the wooded slope to look down upon the valley beyond. The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment then marched southeastward to Sassy. They entered the village at 2200 hours, finding it “clear of enemy.”39

  Out front, the tankers had continued advancing. The Foot Guards punched through to Olenden. “Everywhere were knocked out and burning tanks, our own and the enemy’s, while the air was choked with dust, cordite fumes and smoke and laced with machine-gun tracers. Olenden was very strongly held and here all squadrons engaged in a violent battle. Tank and personnel casualties were very high. The area was soon littered with burning tanks and dead Germans, while as each enemy position was destroyed, prisoners came forth in large numbers.”40

  With South Alberta Regiment
in support, 10th Infantry Brigade closed on Olenden shortly after the Foot Guards left to continue southward. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders attacked cautiously, finding nothing but dead bodies, burning tanks, and shattered houses. Pressing on, they occupied an equally undefended Perrières before nightfall.41

  After the Superiors had crossed their “rubble bridge,” the British Columbia Regiment followed suit. Together, Superiors and Dukes had advanced to high ground four miles south of the Laison. En route, they overran a large German infantry force evacuating Sassy and tore into them with machine guns. In a matter of minutes, 250 Germans surrendered and “as many more” were killed.42

  Gaining the high ground, Lieutenant Colonel Keane and Lieutenant Colonel Parish studied their maps, confirming that the contour lines accorded with the surrounding terrain. “It was quiet, the sun was getting low. Tanks glided into position, crews dismounted, stretched their stiff muscles, lit cigarettes, cracked open a package of hardtack or wrestled with a tin of sardines or bully beef and looked around … to count the losses. We had lost 15 tanks,” Captain Douglas Harker wrote.43 The Dukes and Superiors had gained the most ground this day—close to six miles. For those who participated in it, Tractable’s first day would forever be known as “the Mad Charge.”

  AS NIGHT FELL, General Montgomery modified his orders. Instead of just winning the heights overlooking Falaise, the Canadians would now also take the town. Second British Army would concentrate on eliminating elements of Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies attempting to escape eastward from the developing pocket. Falaise was to be taken quickly, so as not to delay the primary Canadian task of advancing southeastward to Trun and then turning south to meet U.S. Third Army and close the gap that existed between.

  On August 5, Montgomery had set a boundary between the 12th U.S. Army Group and Twenty-First Army Group of eight miles south of Argentan. The XV U.S. Corps of Third Army reached this boundary on the evening of August 12, crossed it, and advanced to within two and a half miles of Argentan. Major General Wade H. Haislip then ordered the corps to halt while he sought instruction from General George Patton. Early on August 13, Patton told Haislip to take Argentan and “push on slowly in the direction of Falaise.” Patton’s emphasis on “slowly” was to prevent a potential friendly-fire clash.

  That afternoon, with Haislip just fifteen miles south of Falaise, Patton ordered a halt in response to Bradley’s fear that the Germans “now stampeding to escape the trap” would trample XV Corps in their path. He also fretted that when Canadians and Americans met, there would be “a disastrous error in recognition.” Bradley discussed none of this with General Montgomery.44 Meeting with Montgomery and Second Army’s General Myles Dempsey earlier in the day, Bradley left them with the impression that “there was apparently no restraint placed on further northward movement by XV Corps.”

  Having added to First Canadian Army’s tasks, Montgomery did nothing to strengthen it. Montgomery had been highly flexible—shifting divisions and corps from one army to another as required. Yet at a time when reinforcing First Canadian Army with divisions from the bloated British Second Army would have hastened closing the gap, he did nothing.

  Hence, Bradley and Montgomery—each in his own way and for differing reasons—critically delayed encircling the Germans. Both generals, it seemed, were casting eyes towards the Seine and the original long encirclement strategy for destroying German forces in Normandy.45

  The Germans were not stampeding. But Commander in Chief, West Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge recognized the time for flight fast approached. On the night of August 14–15, he reported that First Canadian Army had launched a “big attack on both sides of the Caen-Falaise highway. It had been halted for the moment but would be continued.” I SS Panzer Corps could “ only stand fast if additional forces were moved in.”

  He also reported that the attack by General der Panzertruppen Hans Eberbach “could not be carried out.” Eberbach, in fact, “had gone over to the defensive.” If the attack did not occur, von Kluge said, “the only remaining possibility was to break out with all forces from the pocket towards the Northeast.”46

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  A Molten Fire Bath

  LIEUTENANT GENERAL GUY Simonds had wanted to continue the drive to the heights overlooking Falaise through the night, but 3rd Infantry Division and 4th Armoured Division were in too much “disorder.” The night was instead spent “collecting stragglers and in getting wireless sets back on their proper nets.” There was also the need to alter the operation to include capturing Falaise.1 The 3rd Division plan remained unchanged. Having outflanked Quesnay Wood, the division would hook westward to the Caen-Falaise highway and then advance to Point 159 and Versainville, from where they could continue straight into Falaise from the north.

  Slight modifications were required for 4th Armoured Division. Major General George Kitching proposed “to clean up the triangle between Olendon, [É]pan[e]y and Perrières by first light, then get the armour on to its original objectives and pass a battalion through to Falaise.”2 The loss of 4th Armoured Brigade’s commander and essential communications equipment stalled implementation of this plan till morning, as Kitching needed the night to build a new brigade headquarters and have it rendezvous with Lieutenant Colonel Murray Scott, who temporarily commanded the brigade.

  Kitching had not wanted Scott. He had asked for Lieutenant Colonel Bob Moncel, currently a staff officer at corps headquarters. Simonds and Kitching were agreed that he was the best candidate to command the brigade following Leslie Booth’s death. Without explanation, Simonds deferred making the appointment. That left Kitching with Scott, a competent commander of the Governor General’s Foot Guards but not suitable for brigade. Kitching was also unaware that Scott had broken his leg the previous day and was trying to carry on despite this painful injury.

  “The combination of so many casualties amongst my senior officers,” he later wrote, “the frequent changes of command of regiments, squadrons and troops; the loss of so many tanks and crews; the breakdown of communications and our inexperience of battle were factors that greatly affected our ability to function as a division … I do not think these factors were appreciated sufficiently by General Simonds whose vision was focussed on the horizon and whose thoughts were often a day or two ahead of us.”3

  In the early morning, 4th Armoured Brigade renewed its southward advance. While the tank regiments passed west of Épaney, the Lake Superior Regiment supported by a Canadian Grenadier Guards squadron approached the village from the east, and 10th Infantry Brigade’s Algonquin Regiment assaulted it from the north.4

  Having assumed command of the Algonquin Regiment the previous day, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bradburn advanced ‘D’ Company at first light. Major P.A. Mayer directed No. 16 Platoon to capture some farms on Épaney’s outskirts to set up a firm base. The other two platoons would then enter the village with No. 17 Platoon and seize the church in the central square. All went well until No. 17 Platoon “stirred the hornet’s nest,” and a hail of sniper fire drove both platoons to ground. Withdrawing the company, Bradburn threw the rest of the battalion into a full-scale attack that raged through the day. By the time the Germans withdrew, the division’s “time schedule was breaking down.”5 To the east, the Superiors never reached Épaney. They met one resistance pocket after another and finally dug in on the village’s outskirts for the evening.6

  For the tankers, August 15 was a day of muddling disappointment. The Foot Guards, under command of Major E.M. Smith, advanced west of Épaney and encountered a strong gun line in woods south of the village that engaged the tanks from head on and both flanks. After losing several tanks, the Foot Guards pulled back.7

  By initially screening their advance with smoke shells, the Grenadier Guards avoided tank losses until Major Doug Hamilton directed them towards a ridge between Épaney and Point 159. Coming within range of the gun line in the trees, one tank was hit and brewed, its crew so badly burned that one man died.

&nb
sp; By 1300 hours, 4th Division’s advance was stalled before the German guns in the woods. The Grenadiers, British Columbia Regiment, and elements of South Alberta Regiment were all grid-locked. “In the absence of guidance from above,” the Grenadiers’ war diarist wrote, regimental commanders were left to their own devices. During this entire time, 4th Armoured Brigade relayed no orders. The Dukes’ Major Chuck Parish and Hamilton dismounted to confer. “Observation showed the high ground to be open and flat without cover and it was felt by both the BCR and ourselves that an [advance] across this ground without [infantry] and proper [artillery support] would prove disastrous.” Artillery was called for, but not delivered. At 1500 hours, an erroneous report placed the Foot Guards on Point 159. They were actually well behind the other regiments. “All together the whole day proved very much wasted,” the Grenadiers’ war diarist complained.8

  During the afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Scott—virtually incapacitated by pain—agreed to evacuation. With Simonds still refusing to send Moncel and refusing to explain his reasons, Kitching proposed personally leading the brigade while also commanding the division. Simonds scotched that notion immediately. When he continued to withhold Moncel, Kitching had no recourse but to appoint the overly cautious Lieutenant Colonel Bill Halpenny temporary commander.9

  RIGHT OF 4TH Armoured Division, 3rd Infantry Division had met fierce resistance during its advance on the heights overlooking Falaise. With its 8th Brigade having fought in 4th Division’s ranks the previous day, 3rd Division was badly overextended. Its 9th Brigade was still engaged in mopping up German resistance in the Laison Valley. To take over the divisional advance, 7th Infantry Brigade’s Canadian Scottish and Royal Winnipeg Rifles had spent the nighton a forced march to reach the front by dawn.