The Untold History of the United States

by Oliver Stone

  The United States would take that stand in Korea. Truman told congressional leaders, “If we let Korea down, the Soviet will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some time, or else let all of Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe. Therefore, . . . [I have] ordered our forces to support Korea . . . and it . . . [is] equally necessary for us to draw the line at Indo-China, the Philippines, and Formosa.”28

  Truman particularly feared a Soviet incursion into Iran. On June 26, he called Korea “the Greece of the Far East.” Spinning a globe and pointing to Iran, he told staffers, “Here is where they will start trouble if we aren’t careful. . . . If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East.”29

  The Communist victory in China had raised the stakes in Korea. Having lost the China market, Japan now looked to Korea and Southeast Asia, where conditions were also volatile. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh’s Communist-led forces were challenging French rule. A powerful insurgent movement was competing for power in the Philippines. British colonial interests were under attack in Malaya. Acheson explained, “It became apparent in Washington that the U.S. [had to] adopt a very firm stance in the Far East,” especially since “the governments of many Western European nations appeared to be in a state of near-panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act or not.”30

  More than 100,000 Soviet-trained and -equipped North Korean troops overwhelmed U.S. and South Korean forces, pinning them down around Pusan. MacArthur had turned a blind eye toward CIA warnings and other evidence that the attack was coming.

  Facing defeat, MacArthur requested and received permission to push past the 38th parallel and liberate the North. He staged a surprise amphibious landing of 17,000 men at Inchon in September. Truman lauded MacArthur’s “brilliant maneuver” and described his Korean campaign as being rivaled by “few operations in military history.”31 Truman bent over backward to placate the prickly MacArthur. Republicans seized on any hint that Truman might hesitate to send U.S. troops across the border as a sign of “appeasement.”

  MacArthur assured Truman that the Chinese would not enter the fight but agreed to use only Korean troops as he moved toward the Chinese border. Acheson had also dismissed the possibility of Chinese involvement as “sheer madness.”32 MacArthur even spoke about the fighting ending by Thanksgiving and having the troops out by Christmas. He dismissed repeated warnings by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai that the Chinese would enter the war if the United States persisted in its advance northward. The Chinese were also incensed over the U.S. led campaign to deny them UN representation and the United States’ decision to defend Formosa with the Seventh Fleet. Mao wanted to send troops, but the Chinese Politburo remained divided. Stalin sent encouragement. He assured Mao that the Soviets and Chinese were stronger than the United States, Great Britain, and their European allies, especially now, before Germany and Japan had been rearmed. Stalin had earlier told Kim that launching the war was a way to get back at “the dishonest, perfidious, and arrogant behavior of the United States in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and especially its decision to form NATO.”33

  General Douglas MacArthur during the U.S. surprise amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950, which Truman lauded as a “brilliant maneuver.”

  MacArthur blithely disregarded his agreement to use only Korean troops and ordered the air force to bomb near the Chinese border. When the Joint Chiefs demanded that he not bomb within five miles of the border, he responded, “I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing.”34

  Chinese forces attacked UN troops in Unsan on October 25. On November 8, the Joint Chiefs cabled MacArthur to suggest that his mission might need to be reconsidered. MacArthur replied that the pressure from British, French, and many Americans to stop at the 38th parallel found its “historic precedence in the action taken at Munich.” “To give up any part of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists,” he blustered, “would be the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times.”35

  Truman and the Joint Chiefs acceded to MacArthur’s demands. On November 24, MacArthur launched the major offensive that he believed would end the war. But suddenly hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops streamed across the Yalu River, sending U.S. and Allied troops into a frantic retreat. The setback was devastating. MacArthur solemnly announced that “we face an entirely new war.”36 Acheson told Congress that the United States was on the brink of World War III. Truman agreed. “It looks like World War III is here,” he wrote in his diary. General Omar Bradley called it “the greatest military disaster in the history of the United States.”37 Time reported that it was the “worst defeat the U.S. had ever suffered.”38

  China’s UN Security Council spokesman heralded the resurgence of liberation movements throughout the region: “Regardless of the savagery and cruelty of the American imperialist aggressors, the hard struggling people of Japan, the victoriously advancing people of Vietnam, the heroically resisting people of Korea, the people of the Philippines who have never laid down their arms, and all the oppressed nations and peoples of the East will certainly unite in close solidarity. . . . They will fight dauntlessly on to win the final victory in their struggle for national independence.”39 The British government favored ending the war as quickly as possible, believing, according to the Chicago Tribune, that it was “being conducted in near-hysteria and with prodigal waste.”40 But U.S. leaders decided to first lay waste to North Korea.

  At the start of the war, MacArthur and others had advocated using atomic bombs in support of combat operations. “I see here a unique use for the atomic bomb—to strike a blocking blow—which would require a six months repair job. Sweeten up my B-29 force,” he enthused. General Charles Bolte figured that ten to twenty atomic bombs from the U.S. arsenal could be spared. In July, Truman sent nuclear-configured bombers to Great Britain and Guam. The Joint Chiefs decided, however, that, given the small size of most Korean cities, conventional bombing would suffice. They also expressed concern about Soviet retaliation and public revulsion at such acts. But now, following the entry of the Chinese into the conflict, the United States was desperate and the Chinese offered more suitable targets.41 Truman stunned the press corps in late November 1950 by announcing that all options, explicitly including atomic devastation, were on the table:

  If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival. . . .

  Q. Will that include the atomic bomb?

  THE PRESIDENT. That includes every weapon that we have.

  Q. Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?

  THE PRESIDENT. There has always been active consideration of its use. . . .

  Q. Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, or civilian—

  THE PRESIDENT. It’s a matter that the military people will have to decide. . . . The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has.42

  That day, Air Force General George Stratemeyer ordered SAC commander General Hoyt Vandenberg to dispatch atomic-capable bomb groups to the Far East. LeMay volunteered to direct the attacks. Representative Mendel Rivers of South Carolina declared, “If there ever was a time to use the A-bomb, it is now.”43 Senator Owen Brewster from Maine proposed using it against the Chinese. Representative Tom Steed of Oklahoma preferred “the Kremlin.” Representative Joseph Bryson of South Carolina just wanted to make sure it was dropped on somebody: “The hour is at hand when every known force, including the atomic bomb, should be promptly utilized.”44 Lloyd Bentsen of
Texas, the future Democratic vice presidential candidate, proposed that the president “advise the commander of the North Korean troops to withdraw . . . beyond the 38th parallel within one week or use that week to evacuate civilians from a specified list of North Korean cities that will be subjected to atomic attack by the United States Air Force.”45

  Gallup found that, by 52 to 38 percent, the public supported using atomic bombs, reversing earlier poll results. UN delegates warned that the Asian people would be “horrified” by such use.46 Attlee rushed across the Atlantic to tell Truman that the Europeans shared that horror. Following Attlee’s visit, Truman told a group of congressmen that it would be wrong to hit Moscow’s surrogates when the Kremlin was the real culprit, but that using atomic bombs against the Soviet Union would provoke retaliation against London, Berlin, and Paris.

  On December 9, 1950, MacArthur requested authorization to use atomic bombs at his discretion. On December 24, he submitted a list of twenty-six targets. He also requested four bombs to drop on invading forces and four more for “critical concentrations of enemy air power.” He calculated that dropping thirty to fifty atomic bombs “across the neck of Manchuria” could produce “a belt of radioactive cobalt” that would win the war in ten days. But that was just the short-term effect. The belt of radioactive cobalt would spread “from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea.” Therefore, he figured, “For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.”47

  While MacArthur was conjuring up visions of atomic Armageddon, others were bemoaning the tremendous setback to the United States’ international prestige caused by the debacle in Korea. New York Times correspondents in capitals across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East reported on the “loss of confidence in the United States.” In France, “The decline in American prestige has been little short of disastrous.” In India, where U.S. “prestige has suffered immensely,” many people were “secretly pleased to see the Westerners trounced by Asians.”48 Some questioned U.S. ability to halt a Soviet occupation of Europe, given how poorly U.S. forces had performed against China.

  With U.S. and South Korean casualties mounting rapidly, MacArthur began issuing statements from Tokyo blaming others for the military debacle and pushing for all-out war with China. On March 10, 1951, MacArthur requested a “ ‘D’ Day atomic capability” in response to the Soviet bolstering of air capabilities in Korea and Manchuria and a buildup of Chinese forces near the Korean border. “Finletter and Lovett alerted on atomic discussions. Believe everything is set,” Vandenberg wrote on March 14.49 On March 24, 1951, knowing that Truman was pressing for a cease-fire, MacArthur broadcast his own ultimatum to China. Truman bristled, “I’ll show that son-of-a bitch who’s boss,” but let the incident slide.50 But when Republican Congressman Joe Martin read to the entire House a letter that MacArthur had written in which he stated that “if we lose this war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable,”51 the Joint Chiefs unanimously recommended that MacArthur be relieved of his command. On April 11, the White House announced MacArthur’s firing.

  MacArthur’s eagerness to use atomic weapons did not factor into this decision. Just the week before, the Chiefs had ordered atomic attacks on Manchurian bases if the Chinese sent in another large contingent of forces. On April 6, Truman approved that order and authorized the transfer of nine atomic weapons from AEC to military custody on Guam and Okinawa.52

  Firing MacArthur proved calamitous for Truman, whose approval rating sank below 30 percent. “Seldom has a more unpopular man fired a more popular one,” Time magazine noted.

  Republican leaders in the House and Senate met to discuss impeachment. Senator William Jenner accused the administration of treason: “this country today is in the hands of a secret inner coterie which is directed by agents of the Soviet Union. Our only choice is to impeach President Truman.”53 Joseph McCarthy also wanted to impeach the “son of a bitch” for firing MacArthur and said that Truman must have been drunk at the time on “bourbon and benedictine.” He accused Truman of signing “the death warrant of western civilization.”54

  The public sided with MacArthur. Seven and a half million spectators cheered him at a New York parade. He received a hero’s welcome in Washington, Boston, San Francisco, and Chicago. MacArthur emotionally defended his conduct of the war before a joint session of Congress and bade a final farewell:

  It has been said . . . that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. . . . The world has turned over many times since I took the oath . . . at West Point, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that “old soldiers never die; they just fade away.” And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good bye.55

  General Douglas MacArthur at Soldier Field in Chicago during his 1951 farewell tour after his dismissal by Truman.

  The address was broadcast live on national radio. “We saw a great hunk of God in the flesh and we heard the voice of God,” gushed Congressman Dewey Short of Missouri.56 Truman, however, chided the “damn fool Congressmen crying like a bunch of women” over “nothing but a bunch of bullshit.”57

  MacArthur’s reference to the ballad “Old Soldiers Never Die” touched off a popular music frenzy. An executive at Remick Music Corporation, which owned the copyright, described the reaction as an “earthquake” and ordered publication of fifty thousand copies of the sheet music. Gene Autry rushed off his movie set to record a version for Columbia Records, which sold twenty-five thousand copies a day. Decca Records quickly issued two versions, one by Red Foley, the other by Herb Jeffries. RCA Victor issued a version sung by Vaughn Monroe. Capitol Records put one out by Jimmy Wakely. Bing Crosby sang it live on his radio show. Columbia and RCA Victor recordings of MacArthur’s speech were selling as fast as they could be stocked.

  Congressional hearings on MacArthur’s firing and Asia policy went on for two months. Congressional Democrats and top military brass effectively rebutted MacArthur’s arguments. General Bradley rejected MacArthur’s proposed war with China as “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” After that, MacArthur’s luster faded rapidly. Truman’s popularity never recovered. His approval rating sank to a record low of 22 percent. Acheson said that the war “was an incalculable defeat to U.S. foreign policy and destroyed the Truman administration.”58

  MacArthur was replaced by General Matthew Ridgway, who requested thirty-eight atomic bombs in May 1951. But that spring and summer, with Stalin’s help, the United States, China, and the two Koreas began negotiations, which dragged on for two years. The U.S. air war continued unabated, unleashing a firebombing campaign similar to the one the United States had visited upon Japan five years earlier. Now the weapon of choice was napalm. New York Times reporter George Barrett described the effect of a napalm attack on a hamlet of two hundred people north of Anyang, which he characterized as “a macabre tribute to the totality of modern war”:

  The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they had held when the napalm struck—a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked, holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue crayoned at mail order number 3,811,294 for a $2.98 “bewitching bed jacket—coral.”59

  Almost every major city in North Korea was burned to the ground. Survivors sought shelter in caves. South Koreans fared little better. The British armed forces yearbook reported for 1951, “The war was fought without regard for the South Koreans, and their unfortunate country was regarded as an a
rena rather than a country to be liberated. As a consequence, fighting was quite ruthless, and it is no exaggeration to state that South Korea no longer exists as a country. Its towns have been destroyed, much of its means of livelihood eradicated, and its people reduced to a sullen mass dependent upon charity. The South Korean, unfortunately, was regarded as a ‘gook,’ like his cousins north of the 38th parallel.”60 Casualty estimates vary widely, but approximately 3 to 4 million Koreans died, out of a total population of 30 million, as did more than a million Chinese and 37,000 Americans.

  A U.S. plane releases napalm over North Korea. Even after peace negotiations began in the spring of 1951, the U.S. air war continued unabated, with napalm as the weapon of choice. Almost every major city in North Korea was burned to the ground.

  Women and children search through the rubble in Seoul. During the war, 3 to 4 million Koreans died, out of a total population of 30 million, as did more than a million Chinese and 54,000 Americans.

  By February 1951, only 39 percent of Americans still supported the war. It ended in a stalemate. Americans wondered how their powerful, modern military could fail to defeat an ill-equipped army of Korean and Chinese peasants.