Hitler: Military Commander

by Rupert Matthews

  As in the earlier war, the main attack would be pushed through central Belgium around Liege while holding actions were taking place along the Maginot Line to distract the French and small-scale attacks were launched in the centre to tie down some of the French divisions. A key difference was the addition of a plan to race along the Channel coast and sieze the ports to stop British suppplies and reinforcements being sent to France.

  Army Group B, which was to launch the main attack, was allocated all the panzer units and motorised infantry, together with most of the Luftwaffe’s Stukas, to guarantee speed of movement in the anticipated blitzkrieg. Army Group A, to the south, was allocated only infantry and artillery as its role was essentially defensive.

  As early as October Hitler had been expressing disquiet at this plan. He had, after all, marched into France in 1914 as a very small part of the original Schlieffen Plan and had seen its failure at first hand. He did not like repeating past mistakes and, in any case, usually preferred bold new plans to safe old ones. He asked Halder if it would not be possible to launch an armoured attack in the south to outflank the French and British resisting the main assault in Belgium. Halder had replied it was not because the mountainous Ardennes region was unsuitable for tanks.

  Halder was not alone in thinking this for the French generals believed the same thing and had drawn up their war plans accordingly. They firmly held the opinion that the Maginot Line of fortifications along the Franco-German border was invulnerable and that any German attack would therefore come further north. Knowing that the German military favoured tank-led operations, the French Staff looked for favourable tank country. The Ardennes area was hilly and the only roads were narrow and twisting. While it would be possible to drive a tank through it, the French argued, the long supply convoys of petrol and ammunition would become hopelessly jammed. Looking further north still, the French Staff saw the open plains of Belgium and concluded the main German attack would, as in 1914, take place there.

  To counter the expected attack, the French Staff envisaged the French and British forces racing forwards into neutral Belgium as soon as the German forces invaded from the east. Co-operating with the Belgian Army, the allied armies would blow the bridges over the various water obstacles – such as the Albert Canal, the Meuse and the Scheldt – to form a series of gigantic tank traps. With the blitzkrieg advances thus slowed down, the French Staff believed, the Germans could be ground to a standstill by heavy artillery and massed infantry formations. The French believed that the Germans would not want to face another four years of bloodletting in the trenches. Once stalemate was achieved, somewhere between Namur and Amiens, it was hoped the Germans would sue for peace. If not, plans were in existence for massed mobilisation of the French citizens to support a long war of attrition.

  The French had good reasons for being confident. In almost every area of military comparison they had a clear superiority over the Germans. In terms of manpower the Germans could field 133 divisions, while the combined French and British forces had 112 and the Belgians and Dutch could add another 32. The French were particularly proud of their field artillery which was more accurate and easier to move than the German guns. Moreover the French had 11,000 guns compared to some 8,500 in the German army.

  Nor were the French backward in using the more modern weaponry. They had 3,000 tanks to face the 2,600 German panzers, and each French design was at first glance superior to its German counterpart. The medium tanks were typical. The French S-35 had frontal armour 55mm thick, that of the Panzer III was 14.5mm. The S-35 carried a 47mm gun, the Panzer III a 37mm gun. The French tank could move at 25mph on roads, the German at only 20mph. Moreover the French could count on the 600 British tanks and those in the Belgian and Dutch armies as well as on its own.

  Only in the air did the Germans enjoy a clear superiority. They outnumbered the French and British by about five to four in fighters, but by a massive 1,700 bombers to just 380. Although the paper strength of the opposing fighter aircraft was comparable, the German machines could reach 350mph with ease while the French aircraft had a top speed of 300mph. The superior British Hurricanes and Spitfires were present in such tiny numbers it was unlikely they would make much difference to the struggle in the air.

  Given these figures, there were many generals on the German side who agreed with the French Staff. Most of these generals concluded that an assault in the West was doomed to end in stalemate and some tried to dissuade Hitler from making the attempt. But one man, the Chief of Staff in Army Group A, saw that while one plan would fail another might succeed. This was General Erich von Manstein and he was determined to get his ideas put in front of Hitler.

  Manstein based his alternative plan on two key factors. First the differences in the tactical use of tanks between the French and German armies and second the roads in the Ardennes.

  French tactics envisaged a war fought in a tactical situation not too different from that of the Great War. They expected there to be long lines of field entrenchments forming a continuous front. Tanks could be used alongside artillery and infantry to create a local breakthrough. The lighter tanks might even advance with the cavalry to exploit such a breakthrough and to secure an objective, but it was expected that the defender’s mobile reserves could be brought up before the attackers could advance more than a few miles. The defending tanks would then fight the attackers to a standstill and a new line of trenches and pill boxes would be established.

  As a result of this tactical doctrine, the French spread most of their tanks among their infantry divisions to be used to support small scale attacks or defensive actions. The intended use of the tanks also affected their design. With limited, local objectives the French tanks in battle would have no need of a dedicated commander. Therefore they were not designed to cope with one, instead the tanks were equiped with small turrets with enough space for just one man, who directed the tank as well as operating the main gun.

  The German tanks had much larger turrets with room for two men. One was the gunner while the other was the tank commander. This configuration allowed the tank commander to concentrate on keeping up to date with the changing battlefield and to keep in radio contact with his unit commander. Such an ability was essential to the more fluid, faster moving type of warfare envisaged by the Germans in blitzkrieg. Nor did the Germans tie their tanks to slow-moving infantry divisions, but formed them into dedicated panzer divisions able to operate on their own and supported by motorised infantry, the Panzergrenadier.

  Manstein knew that these features would give the German tanks a marked superiority in fast-moving open warfare once a breakthrough had been achieved. The question he posed himself was how to achieve such a breakthrough. Manstein believed the existing Operation Yellow plan would lead the main German force head to head against the strongest enemy formations and result in a static battle of the type that would favour the French and British. To find a way around this, Manstein turned to another German officer known to be enthusiastic on mobile panzer warfare, Heinz Guderian.

  Guderian was at this point the head of mobile field forces, charged with organising the recruitment, equipping and supply of the panzer divisions. He was an expert on the practicalities and logistics of tank warfare, and knew exactly what the German panzers and their supply system were capable of achieving. In November 1939 Manstein consulted Guderian who later recorded ‘Manstein asked me if panzer movements would be possible through the Ardennes to capture Sedan. I knew the area from the Great War and, after studying the map of roads, confirmed that it was.’

  Manstein knew that once past Sedan and over the River Meuse an advancing panzer force would have wide open countryside ahead of it, ideal territory for German-style tank tactics. A fast advance would be possible, severely disrupting the enemy battle plan. Manstein took his idea to his superior, General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group A. Rundstedt was at first sceptical, but had his staff organise a series of war games which showed the plan to offer dramatic possib
ilities. In December, Rundstedt passed Manstein’s ideas on to OKH.

  At OKH, Halder and Brauchitsch cast a cursory eye over the plans and dismissed them, largely on the grounds that they thought the roads in the Ardennes would be unable to support the large numbers of supply vehicles that would have to pass over them. Manstein would not give up, however. He sent the plans to General Alfred Jodl at Hitler’s own OKW staff in the hope that the bold idea would appeal to the Führer. At this point fate took a hand.

  On 10 January a parachute major was flying from Munster to Bonn to confer with the Luftwaffe over elements of the parachute landing planned to secure bridges in Belgium. He carried with him the complete OKH plans for the invasion, scheduled for 17 January. The aircraft was hit by a snowstorm and made a forced landing on what the horrified major suddenly realised was a Belgian airfield. He hurriedly tried to set fire to his documents, but they failed to catch light. The delighted Belgians lost no time passing the plans on to the Dutch, French and British.

  When news of the incident reached Hitler, he was predictably furious and ordered Brauchitsch to bring the attack forward to dawn the following day. A few hours later, after he had calmed down, Hitler countermanded the order and postponed the invasion of France indefinitely. Hitler ordered the OKH to come up with new plans and again put forward his own idea of a flank attack in the south. Jodl added Manstein’s ideas to the mix of concepts on which the staff went to work.

  In March 1940 a conference was held at the Chancellery in Berlin to discuss the different concepts being put forward and Manstein was given a slot to put forward his ideas. According to Manstein he explained his plans for a panzer assault through the Ardennes which would capture Sedan and cross the Meuse. He paused. ‘Hitler then asked me ‘and then what are you going to do?’ Hitler was the first person who had thought to ask me this vital question. I replied that I would continue west. The supreme leadership had to decide if my aim was Paris or Amiens. I thought that I should go past Amiens to the English Channel.’

  Hitler merely nodded, but his question had shown once again that he was able to grasp the potential of a new idea faster than his generals. Within a few days of the conference he was demanding that the OKH draw up detailed plans for the invasion of France based on Manstein’s ideas. But Hitler added a significant touch of his own. He ordered that the attack should start in the north as originally envisaged, but that this should be merely a feint to draw the French and British deep in to Belgium. Hitler also ordered the Ardennes column to be made even stronger than envisaged by Manstein. Hitler did not see this as merely a strong flank attack. He wanted to encircle the allied armies to the north and destroy them.

  Hitler was enthused by the idea, later dubbed Sichelschnitt, (‘Sickle-stroke’) and threw himself into the detailed planning even more closely than he had done with the Polish campaign. It was at Hitler’s insistence that the Panzer IVs were removed from other panzer divisions and concentrated in those which would make the main drive through Sedan. With his usual detailed grasp of technical detail he realised that the Panzer IVs would be needed in the south while the Panzer IIIs and other models would be quite capable of the less demanding tasks allocated to them in other areas.

  Kurt Student, commander of the parachute corps, was summoned to see Hitler next. Student already knew that his tiny force of 4,500 parachute troops, backed by 12,000 infantry in transport aircraft, was to capture the bridges over the Rhine in Holland and he expected Hitler to quiz him over these plans. Student was in for a surprise. Almost as soon as he was through the door, Hitler had Student studying a map of the area around Maastricht. The problem, Hitler explained, was that once German troops crossed the Dutch border, the Belgian defenders on the Albert Canal would have plenty of time to blow the bridges. Even more fatal to a quick advance was the massively strong fortress of Eben Emael whose guns dominated the Maas and Albert Canals, making a forced crossing virtually impossible.

  Hitler knew exactly how small a patch of ground was needed to land one of the new and top-secret transport gliders. He told Student that he wanted such a glider to land on top of Eben Emael. The troops would then use another top secret invention - a powerful form of plastic explosive - to blast open the casemates and gun emplacements. Student was taken aback and asked for time to think about the idea. Hitler gave him just 24 hours. Next day Student was back to express his full agreement with what he later called ‘the most original idea of the war’.

  By late March the plans were effectively complete. The staff at OKH had worked with their customary efficiency to draw up a scheme by which the assault troops could advance confident that they would be kept supplied and supported by a vast array of pontoon bridges, engineers, ammunition, food, tank recovery vehicles and even blacksmiths. Incredibly the bulk of the transport in 1940 was still horse-drawn. The invasion date was set for 5th May.

  As usual, Hitler was taking the full credit for himself. Talking of the attack through the Ardennes he said ‘When I spoke to the generals about this new plan for the West, the only one who really understood me was Manstein’. The fact that Manstein had come up with the idea himself was conveniently forgotten.

  As time went by Hitler became noticeably agitated. At the daily military conferences his fingers were rarely still as they fiddled with pens, papers and anything else to hand. At the conference on the 3 May the Chief Meteorologist Diesing gave such an appalling weather forecast that the attack date was put back to the seventh. Next day the forecast was even worse, another 24 hour delay was ordered, then another. On 6 May the intelligence report gave alarming news. The Dutch army was being called up and road blocks were being erected. Hitler turned to Diesing and demanded to know the weather. ‘The conditions will be favourable on the 10 May’ came the reply. Göring wanted an assurance of at least five days good flying weather for the Luftwaffe, but Hitler interrupted before Diesing could answer. The attack would begin at dawn on 10 May.

  Hitler was determined to be as close to the front line as possible. Over the previous months he had ordered the construction of a forward command post near Euskirchen which he named Felsennest, the Eagle’s Nest. Blasted out of the solid rock, the command post was linked directly to the headquarters of the various attacking armies. Hitler ordered that all news was to be passed directly to the Eagle’s Nest and that any changes to the plan had to be approved by him personally.

  On the evening of 9 May Hitler and his entourage boarded a train outside Berlin. The staff were told they were going to visit the troops on a morale-boosting mission which would be filmed to be shown in the cinemas. Not until they arrived at Euskirchen did Hitler reveal what was really afoot. He had little choice: as they got out of the train a vast formation of Luftwaffe bombers thundered overhead, flying west.

  In Britain the attack prompted a change of government. Chamberlain resigned and was replaced by Churchill. This event had little immediate impact on the fighting, but that would soon change.

  Hitler, meanwhile, was receiving the reports from his commanders. He was most thrilled when he heard that the Eben Emael attack had succeeded - Hitler literally hugged himself. The parachute forces held on for 24 hours, until the two panzer divisions earmarked to invade Belgium arrived, crossed the intact bridges and motored west. Further north the parachute troops had also captured the bridges in Holland and had secured a position in the heart of The Hague, paralysing the Dutch government. These successes were vital to the plan. They convinced the French and British that the main German attack was coming in Belgium and caused them to march the bulk of their forces northwest to meet the threat.

  Hitler’s eyes now turned south to where the massed panzer divisions were moving through the Ardennes. The main thrust was being made by Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps with Reinhardt’s XLI Panzer Corps on his right flank, both formations under the command of von Kleist. To the north was the XV Panzer Corps under Hoth who, like Kleist, was responsible to Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A.

  Guderian reached the
Meuse at Sedan on 12 May. As expected the bridges had been blown by the French, but the far bank was less defended than the Germans had feared. This was because the French had estimated it would take German infantry, marching and fighting on foot, at least nine days to reach the Meuse. French forces were, therefore, not by then in position. Guderian had identified a loop in the river near St Menges as being ideal for a forced crossing. The wooded hills on the German bank were ideal cover for massing his forces and allowed his artillery to dominate the far bank.

  To make certain of success, Guderian called down a vast cloud of Stukas which pummelled the far bank on the afternoon of 13 May. As soon as the Stukas had dropped their bombs, at about 4pm, Guderian sent his infantry across in rubber boats. By dusk a secure foothold on the far bank had been secured and by midnight the engineers had built a bridge across which poured the panzers. By the afternoon of 14 May Guderian’s entire corps was over the river and had crushed the French forces opposing them. There was now nothing between Guderian and the English Channel except open space.

  The next day Guderian linked up with Reinhardt and then with Hoth. There was now a massive armoured spearhead of seven panzer divisions thundering west with some 40 divisions of infantry following as fast as they could march. By dusk on 16 May the panzers were approaching the headwaters of the Somme.

  The French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, was one of the few Frenchmen to appreciate fully the possibilities of tank warfare. When he heard that so many German tanks were over the Meuse he phoned Churchill. ‘We have lost the battle’ was Reynaud’s grim message. Having put down the phone to London, Reynaud picked it up again and sacked the French commander, the elderly Maurice Gamelin, replacing him with the more aggressive Maxime Weygand. The move was understandable, but Weygand was in Syria and it took him three days to reach his new command. They were to be three days of hesitation and confusion in the French high command.