Reconstruction

by Brooks D. Simpson

  With this question settled, the country will promptly recover. Our currency—paper, gold, and silver—waits only for peace to become equalized in values; our manufactures only wait for peace and national security to enter upon a production for export, to which the country has been a stranger since 1860. All things are ripe, with abundance of capital, for a general revival of trade, and of production, and general employment of labor, which has been so largely idle since 1873. The politicians, the placemen, strikers and blowers in office and out of office, stand in the way. They want office and plunder, and they prefer even war to a denial of their wants. Wo be unto those who overlook the suffering interests of the whole people and listen to the clamor of the howling mob of spoils-seekers.

  Chicago Tribune, January 21, 1877

  “LET US NOT DELUDE OURSELVES”:

  MISSOURI, MARCH 1877

  St. Louis Globe Democrat:

  The Warning

  THE VERY strong temptation to call Mr. Phillips a Cassandra now is checked by the reflection that Mr. Phillips was called a Cassandra twenty years ago, and it is impossible not to remember that if we had listened to his sinister prophecies at a former period, we might not now be compelled against our will to listen to his new warnings against an old danger. Mr. Phillips is narrow, prejudiced, obstinate, fanatical; he refuses to see anything more than the negro side of any controversy in which the negro is involved, and he has no more hesitation in saying disagreeable things than politicians ordinarily have in repeating pleasant platitudes. But if the people of the United States are sensible, they will listen to Wendell Phillips’ words with serious attention, for they are worthy of the serious attention of all, and they will not concern themselves about Phillips’ personal peculiarities or past record, but will simply ask themselves whether his words are true, and whether his forecast of the political situation is reasonable.

  His whole argument turns on a plain question of fact: Are the Southern Democrats willing to accord to the negro his civil and political rights without reservation or abridgment? If they are, then all of Wendell Phillips’ eloquence is idle wind; his contest is merely with the phantoms of his own conjuring. But, if the Southern Democrats are not willing to accord civil and political rights to the negro as fully and as freely as they are accorded to the immigrants in New York or in Illinois, then his warnings are indeed those of a Cassandra foretelling worse than the fate of Troy; the war will have to be fought over again, or else all of its results will have to be surrendered. It follows as the night the day.

  Is it worth while seriously to argue the question whether the White League Democrats of the South are in favor of negro equality? Thus far, out of some 8,000,000 of them, Wade Hampton is the only man who has ever committed himself to the doctrine, and he protests so much that we believe that even he would not call God to witness his sincerity so often if he did not have a fixed assurance that there was not the slightest danger of his being called on to make his professions good. Why, what reason should the White League have for its existence except an opposition based on color? Proscription of the negro, exclusion from the polls, the schools, the jury box, the witness stand, is the one plank in their platform, the one article of their creed, the one principle of their politics, their bond of union, their ­incentive to action, the source of their strength, and the purpose of their lives. The war is over, and they don’t propose to renew it. They admit the authority of the Union in national affairs; but negro equality in local politics—do we need to give them a trial before making up our minds on that point?

  The last vestige of Federal interference in local politics will probably disappear in a few days. The fates have been too strong to allow a further continuance of that method of securing republican governments; but do not let us be deceived about the consequences. Let us not delude ourselves by crying peace, when the only peace there is is the peace of Poland, the peace of death, the peace which reigned until the election of Lincoln came to disturb it. If we surrender, let us surrender with our eyes open; let us admit that the untiring hate of the Southerners has worn out our endurance, and that though we staked everything for freedom under the spur of the rebellion, we have not enough of principle about us to uphold the freedom, so dearly bought, against the persistent and effective opposition of the unrepentant and unchanged rebels. Whether we will ever again struggle to regain that supremacy of liberty which we are about to abdicate so basely, is a question to be discussed by itself; for the present, it suffices to say that the words of Phillips are less than the truth; that his bitter and burning eloquence fails to do justice to the situation, and that the day which sees the last Federal soldier evacuating the South in obedience to the demands of the White Leaguers, will also see the last of the liberty which we conquered for the negroes.

  March 31, 1877

  “NOTHING MORE TO DO WITH HIM”:

  NEW YORK, APRIL 1877

  The Nation:

  The Political South Hereafter

  THE DISSOLUTION of the last sham government at the South—an event which we have a right to believe cannot now be long delayed—will place the Southern States, as regards the rest of the nation, in a position which they have not before occupied for almost a generation. Heretofore, in the discussion of nearly all national questions, the most embarrassing and vexatious element at any time to be considered, and frequently an overwhelmingly important one, was “the South.” This term designated a number of contiguous States, bound together by mutual interest in the maintenance of a social system which was understood to be inimical to the feelings, at least, if not to the welfare, of the inhabitants of all other States; and “the South” was always, therefore, a more definite term than “the West” or “the North.” Slavery dominated every other interest, and held the Southern States together in political unity. The phrase “the solid South” was a legitimate one before, during, and even after the war, and only recently has it become a political bugbear. But the threefold cord which bound the Southern States together—the defence and perpetuation of slavery, the struggle for the establishment of an independent confederacy, and the trials of reconstruction—no longer exists, and nothing has taken or can take its place. For a time, perhaps, traditions of the dead “institution,” war memories, and the possession of a race of freedmen may together do something toward perpetuating a united South, but the union will surely be mostly in appearance, and any little reality which it may possess will speedily give way before opposing and stronger forces.

  We believe the proposition to be almost self-evident, indeed, that hereafter there is to be no South; none, that is, in a distinctively political sense. The negro will disappear from the field of national politics. Henceforth the nation, as a nation, will have nothing more to do with him. He will undoubtedly play a part, perhaps an important one, in the development of the national civilization. The philanthropist will have still a great deal to do both with him and for him, and the sociological student will find him, curiously placed as he is in contact and competition with other races, an unfailing source of interest; but as a “ward” of the nation he can no longer be singled out for especial guardianship or peculiar treatment in preference to Irish laborers or Swedish immigrants. There is something distasteful, undeniably, in the idea of one who has played so important a part in our past political history making his final exit in the company of the Carpet-baggers; but for this unfortunate coincidence the negro is not to be blamed.

  The disappearance of the factitious interest which made the South politically a unit will permit the rapid development of several natural and obvious disintegrating forces which, indeed, have been already in operation for some time, but the results of which have been obscured by the overshadowing interloper which has just been disposed of. Climate, soil, natural productions, diversity of pursuit, and varieties of race will certainly disintegrate politically the States of the South as well as the States of the North. The “sunny” South, of course, was a fiction, an agreeable convention only, for in the matter of c
limate the South presents variations comparable at least with any to be found in the North. St. Louis, St. Augustine, and New Orleans, for instance, are as diverse in climate as are any three cities which might be selected in the Northern States. The pecuniary ties, moreover, which unite some Southern States to the North are already stronger than any which bind them to their former political associates. Missouri, for instance, in its commercial relations and sympathies is a Northern State, as, in a modified sense, are Maryland and Delaware; and Florida apparently is set apart already as the winter home of wealthy and invalided Northern men, whose influence upon the tone of its politics begins to be perceptible notwithstanding the hubbub of its recent performances in counting electoral votes. Again, it is evident that the cotton, rice, tobacco, and cane-producing districts of the South will attract very different classes of people, and beget very different manners and opinions from those inevitably associated with mining and manufacturing communities. Thus, South Carolina will soon differ from Missouri even more than Vermont does from Pennsylvania or Minnesota from Massachusetts. Political disintegration at the South may show itself most plainly at first in connection with the discussion of economic questions. There is to-day throughout all the Southern States, probably, a traditional inclination towards free-trade, although the leaning is not a very decided one, and the change from this to an opposing attitude is a process which may be witnessed soon in several of them. Is it not possible, at least, that the cotton and rice States may increase their present leaning towards free-trade, while Louisiana, Virginia, and Kentucky demand protection against Cuban sugar and tobacco? Or, on the other hand, may not South Carolina yearn for Government aid in the establishment of manufactories, and New Orleans sigh for free-trade in Mississippi products? Will the present great poverty of the Southern States, again, incline them to give ear to the jingle of “silver” theories, and make “greenback” delusions easy of belief, or will the memory of their own once plentiful “scrip” be a sufficient protection against indulgence in financial heresies? And will the South look with longing eyes upon visions of canals and railroads until it heedlessly begins the cry for internal improvements at Government expense, or will it be warned by the ghosts of Crédit Mobilier and Northern Pacific? It is evident, we believe, without lengthening the list of these enumerations or suggestions, that the Southern States may soon be as divided upon the subjects of tariff, currency, laissez-faire or paternity in government, etc., as we have been and still are at the North, and if New Hampshire and North Carolina should happen to join hands in defence of some political theory in opposition (say) to Louisiana and New York, “the South” would soon become as vague an expression, from a political point of view, as “the West” is now.

  The future of the freedman will be bound up undoubtedly with that of the white man, and does not now require separate consideration. Great numbers of negroes will certainly remain upon the cotton-fields, rice-swamps, and cane and tobacco plantations, and, being employed as field-hands, their political opinions for a long time to come will inevitably reflect those of their employers. Others will learn to work in factories or become mechanics and small farmers, and, generally, all over the South for a long time, negroes will find the places now filled at the North by Irish, German, and Chinese laborers. The political influence of the freedman, considered as distinct from that of the white man, will be almost imperceptible. His ultimate influence upon our civilization, as determined by the relative fecundity of the two races, and their action and reaction upon one another as the negro becomes better educated and more independent, is a subject which can be discussed more profitably a generation hence.

  Generally speaking, while the political breaking up of the South will do away with a powerful barrier to national advancement, and will bring each State into closer sympathy with the national Government, nevertheless we hardly expect to receive any immediate and valuable aid from the South toward the solution of our present executive, judicial, and legislative problems. In this, however, we may happily be mistaken. It is true that the South has long been more “provincial” than the North, that it is far from possessing similar educational advantages, that it is now almost barren of literary productions or literary and scientific men, and that these facts would seem to indicate a natural soil for the germination and growth of all kinds of crude and coarse theories of society and government; but, on the other hand, it is not easy to imagine the South developing theories more crude than some now cherished in Indiana and Pennsylvania, and which find shelter even in New York and Massachusetts. We are inclined to believe, also, that the average man of the South is a more pliant and enthusiastic follower of his chosen leader than the average man of the North, and the Gordons, Hills, Lamars, and Hamptons may be depended upon to exert a widespread and, in the main, healthful influence. We cannot forget that it was the well-digested plan of a Southern Gordon with regard to the collection of revenue to which a Northern Morton could give no friendly reception and could make no better reply than a taunt and a sneer. But the important point to be remembered here is the fact that all political contributions of the South, of whatever character, will hereafter go towards the upbuilding of a national as distinguished from a “sectional” unity. For the first time in our history we are entitled to assert that there is no danger of national dissolution. Heretofore our chief attention has been given to the saving of national life, and only incidentally have we been able to consider its character or to decide upon the best methods of perfecting it. We can now devote ourselves to legitimate politics—that is, to studies of governmental science—with a fair prospect of being able to throw some light upon many of the unsolved problems of modern life.

  The Nation, April 5, 1877

  CODA

  1879

  REFLECTING ON RECONSTRUCTION:

  CHINA, SPRING 1879

  John Russell Young:

  from Around the World With General Grant

  Frequently our conversation would turn to home affairs and politics. On these questions the General always speaks without reserve. “I have never,” he said, “shared the resentment felt by so many Republicans toward Mr. Hayes on the ground of his policy of conciliation. At the same time I never thought it would last, because it was all on one side. There is nothing more natural than that a President, new to his office, should enter upon a policy of conciliation. He wants to make everybody friendly, to have all the world happy, to be the central figure of a contented and prosperous commonwealth. That is what occurs to every President, it is an emotion natural to the office. I can understand how a kindly, patriotic man like Hayes would be charmed by the prospect. I was as anxious for such a policy as Mr. Hayes. There has never been a moment since Lee surrendered that I would not have gone more than halfway to meet the Southern people in a spirit of conciliation. But they have never responded to it. They have not forgotten the war. A few shrewd leaders like Mr. Lamar and others have talked conciliation; but any one who knows Mr. Lamar knows that he meant this for effect, and that at least he was as much in favor of the old régime as Jefferson Davis. The pacification of the South rests entirely with the South. I do not see what the North can do that has not been done, unless we surrender the results of the war. I am afraid there is a large party in the North who would do that now. I have feared even that our soldiers would begin to apologize for their part in the war. On that point what a grand speech General Sherman made in New York on a recent Decoration Day. I felt proud of Sherman for that speech. It was what a soldier and the general of an army should say. The radical trouble with the Southern leaders is, that instead of frankly acting with the Republicans in the North, they have held together, hoping by an alliance with the Democrats to control the government. I think Republicans should go as far as possible in conciliation, but not far enough to lose self-respect. Nor can any one who values the freedom of suffrage be satisfied with election results like those in the last canvass for the presidency. I have no doubt, for instance, that Mr. Hayes carried North Carolina,
and that it was taken from him. No one old enough to read and write can doubt that the Republican party with anything like a fair vote would have carried, and perhaps did carry, Arkansas, Alabama, and Mississippi. I never doubted that they carried Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida. Whether it was wise or unwise to have given the negro suffrage, we have done so, and no one can look on satisfied and see it taken from him. The root of the whole difference lies in that.

  “The South,” continued the General, “has been in many ways a disappointment to me. I hoped a great deal from the South, but these hopes have been wrecked. I hoped that Northern capital would pour into the South, that Northern influence and Northern energy would soon repair all that war had wasted. But that never came. Northern capitalists saw that they could not go South without leaving self-respect at home, and they remained home. The very terms of the invitations you see in all the Southern papers show that. The editors say they are glad to have Northern men provided they do not take part in politics. Why shouldn’t they take part in politics? They are made citizens for that. So long as this spirit prevails there will be no general emigration of Northern men to the South. I was disappointed, very much so. It would have been a great thing for the South if some of the streams of emigration from New England and the Middle States toward Iowa and Kansas had been diverted into the South. I hoped much from the poor white class. The war, I thought, would free them from a bondage in some respects even lower than slavery; it would revive their ambition; they would learn, what we in the North know so well, that labor is a dignity, not a degradation, and assert themselves and become an active Union element. But they have been as much under the thumb of the slave-holder as before the war. Andrew Johnson, one of the ablest of the poor white class, tried to assert some independence; but as soon as the slave-holders put their thumb upon him, even in the Presidency, he became their slave. It is very curious and very strange. I hoped for different results, and did all I could to bring them around, but it could not be done.