A Short History of South-East Asia

by Peter Church

  The French administration of Laos (technically now the protected kingdom of Luang Prabang plus nine Lao provinces) was lightly staffed. Much administration was carried out using traditional authority structures and Vietnamese minor officials. Vietnamese public servants, traders, and professionals came to predominate in Laos' small urban population. Chinese also came to play a significant role in Laos' trade. Generally the Lao lowlanders accepted the French and other outsiders, but mountain‐dwelling groups rose in revolt on several occasions. They were protesting against taxation and corvée demands possibly imposed inequitably, even corruptly, by officials from the traditionally resented lowlands.

  Prior to World War II, modernisation in Laos was extremely limited. The telegraph and around 5,000 kilometres of roads (mostly unpaved) eased communications, but 90 percent of the population remained in subsistence agriculture. Health care and other social services were confined to the towns, and no Western‐style education was available in Laos beyond primary level (most primary education was conducted in the Buddhist temple schools). The Lao elite went to Vietnam or France to acquire an education, returning to form a small royal and aristocratic upper class, and a fledgling Lao middle class composed of public servants, policemen and soldiers, primary teachers, and the like.

  WORLD WAR II AND THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR, 1940–1954

  In 1940 the Thais, taking advantage of Japanese pressures on the French and with Japanese support, occupied the Lao provinces west of the Mekong. (These would be returned to the French in 1947.) However, the French retained administrative control in most of Indochina, under an agreement with the Japanese which allowed the free movement of Japanese forces. Thus, most of Laos stayed under French supervision until March 9, 1945, when the Japanese interned all French personnel in Indochina.

  The war years before March 1945 nevertheless brought significant change. The French, seeking to buttress Lao popular support, began to stimulate Lao nationalist pride. A “national renovation movement” staged rallies and parades, built schools and other amenities, fostered Lao music, dance, and literature, and led to the first Lao newspaper. The first explicitly Lao infantry battalion was formed, under French control, in 1943. As elsewhere in South‐East Asia, therefore, nationalist politicisation was a feature of the war years in Laos, although the Lao movement focused only on the Lao lowlanders.

  After March 1945 the pace quickened. In April, the king of Luang Prabang was obliged by the Japanese to repudiate the French and declare Laos “independent.” In August, when the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, politicised Lao people were split between those who acquiesced in a French return and those who saw the opportunity to set up a genuinely independent state. The latter formed the Lao Issara (Free Laos) and set up a provisional government.

  By now, however, an additional complication for Lao nationalism was taking shape. Between August and September 1945, Ho Chi Minh's communists seized control in northern Vietnam and set up the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Some Lao Issara, seeking allies, established ties with the DRV, which eagerly backed the anti‐French movement in Laos. The political contenders in Laos—and the entire population—were about to be sucked into the maelstrom created by the advent of communism in the region and by French—and later American—efforts to eliminate or contain it.

  The French recaptured Laos by May 1946, and leading Lao Issara figures fled, some to Bangkok and some to link up with the DRV guerilla forces (the Vietminh) battling the French in Vietnam. In the late 1940s, Lao guerilla groups developed along the mountainous Laos–Vietnam border, aided by Vietminh knowhow and supplies. Significantly, these groups won the support of some uplander communities hitherto alienated from the Lao nationalist movement. The uplanders may have been recruited with some cynicism by the Lao and Vietminh—who primarily viewed the uplanders as important for their strategically valuable territory and local knowledge—but trans‐communal nationalist cooperation had at last made a start.

  Meanwhile, the Lao Issara group in Bangkok was disintegrating. The French, anxious to pacify Laos in order to focus on the conflict in Vietnam, made a series of concessions to Lao feelings which undercut the hostility of many Lao Issara toward the restored French presence. In 1946, the French appointed the Luang Prabang monarch as king of all Laos, and also permitted an elected national assembly, leading to a national government. In 1949, they declared Laos “independent,” though they retained ultimate control of the kingdom's armed forces, foreign policy, and finances. The concessions were enough, nevertheless, to woo many Lao Issara back to Laos under amnesty.

  Notable amongst the returnees was the royal Prince Souvanna Phouma, who became prime minister following elections in 1951. However, his half‐brother, Prince Souphanouvong, in an echo of the country's history of ruling‐class dissension, threw in his lot with the Vietminh‐backed guerilla forces. In August 1950, Souphanouvong became prime minister of the newly formed Pathet Lao (“Land of the Lao”), a front organisation open to all Lao patriots though tightly controlled by committed communists. Another key pioneer Pathet Lao figure, as defence minister, was the Lao–Viet communist Kaysone Phomvihan, who was destined to become Laos' first and long‐lasting communist prime minister.

  By early 1954, Pathet Lao forces controlled large areas of the north and north‐east of Laos, including the Plain of Jars and the provincial town of Sam Neua. They had been significantly helped in their advance by major Vietminh incursions into Laos in April 1953 and January 1954. The Pathet Lao was not invited to the Geneva Conference, convened by the great powers in May 1954 in the hope of settling the Indochina conflicts, but the Conference recognised Pathet Lao strength and acknowledged its right to administer the territory it held. The conference called, however, for the integration of the Pathet Lao with the Royal Lao government and armed forces, and for the neutralisation of Laos.

  THE FAILURE OF “NEUTRALISATION,” 1954–1964

  Following the Geneva Conference, the French speedily withdrew from Indochina. In Laos the negotiations for a new, integrated national government would prove tortuous and long. The Pathet Lao was determined to enter a coalition only on strong terms, and was wary of growing American influence in Laos. In Vientiane, the moderate Souvanna Phouma was swept aside by US‐supported right‐wingers, who had gained the upper hand in the national assembly and Royal Lao armed forces.

  Elections in December 1955 led, however, to Souvanna's return to the prime ministership on a platform of national reconciliation. In August 1956, Souvanna and the Pathet Lao leadership agreed on broad proposals for a “government of national union.” Elections for 21 extra assembly seats were finally held in May 1958, with parties aligned with the Pathet Lao acquiring 13 of these. Souphanouvong entered the government as a senior economic minister. Another Pathet Lao leader, Phoumi Vongvichit, also acquired a ministry.

  The arrangements were a dubious recipe for stability. In June 1958, Souvanna was again forced from office by the rightists, and the succeeding government went on to rule by decree. Souphanouvong and the other leftist deputies were arrested, although they later escaped with the aid of their guards and returned to Pathet Lao territory in the east. Pathet Lao troops, who had been awaiting integration with the Royal Lao forces, were disarmed, but many of them, too, escaped back to Pathet Lao territory. By July 1959 guerilla warfare was again in full swing in the north and north‐east. US aid to the Royal Lao forces sharply increased. Simultaneously, CIA personnel began to form “special forces” in Laos, attracting support among the Hmong in particular. With CIA assistance, Hmong opium output began to find vast new markets in South Vietnam, Thailand, and beyond.

  The conflict increased in complexity in August 1960, when forces led by a young paratroop captain, Kong Le, seized Vientiane and demanded a restoration of neutrality. Souvanna Phouma agreed to return as prime minister, and subsequently reached an agreement with Souphanouvong on behalf of the Pathet Lao. In December 1960, however, Royal Lao troops under rightist command stormed Vientiane. Kong
Le, his troops, and Souvanna fled to the Pathet Lao–controlled Plain of Jars. The communist world and some nonaligned nations (such as India) now upheld Souvanna as Laos' rightful prime minister. The United States and the West recognised a new military‐controlled Vientiane government, technically under another prince, Boun Oum, as prime minister.

  Despite American intrigue in Laos up to this point, the incoming US president in January 1961, John F. Kennedy, concluded that a neutral Laos was desirable. Neutrality, it was hoped, would exclude DRV forces from using the “Ho Chi Minh Trail,” much of which ran through Laos, to reinforce and supply NLF (“Vietcong”) forces now fighting the regime in South Vietnam. In May 1961, another Geneva Conference called once more for the neutralization of Laos. In June, the three Lao princes, Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphanouvong, agreed to a second attempt at coalition government.

  The new government came into existence in July 1962, with Souvanna as prime minister. The coalition led a tenuous existence, beset by tension, provocation, and assassination, until mid‐1964 when its Pathet Lao component effectively abandoned it, later dismissing it as a US puppet. Souvanna held on as prime minister, but he and other neutralists were now reduced to irrelevance. Laos was becoming one of the key theatres of war in the sharply escalating conflict in Vietnam.

  LAOS AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, 1964–1975

  Secret US bombing of Pathet Lao areas began in May 1964. By the late 1960s, and into the early 1970s, the bombing was massive, attempting saturation destruction of the manifold branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It created an estimated 750,000 refugees in Laos, and nightmarish conditions for Pathet Lao forces, but it never closed the Trail, or eliminated Pathet Lao headquarters and networks. On the ground, the Royal Lao and “secret” forces (and also substantial Thai forces) engaged each year in a “dry season” war with the Pathet Lao. For many years the pattern of territories held by the opposing forces did not alter significantly. By 1972, however, the Pathet Lao was beginning to gain ground, backed by an increasingly optimistic and well‐armed DRV.

  In Paris, the DRV was engaged in serious peace talks with the United States, which would lead to the January 1973 agreements under which the United States withdrew its ground troops from Vietnam. The Pathet Lao, pursuing a policy parallel to that of the DRV, offered in 1972 to talk with the Vientiane government “without preconditions.” In February 1973, the two sides reached an Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos.

  The agreement provided for cessation of hostilities, after which the two sides would administer their respective territories, and for the withdrawal of foreign troops. The United States and Thailand withdrew their military personnel, though the DRV continued to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Further detailed agreements led to the formation of two bodies on which both the Vientiane government and the Pathet Lao were represented. These were the Provisional Government of National Union, in which Souvanna Phouma became prime minister, and a National Political Consultative Council (NPCC), of which Souphanouvong became chairman.

  The NPCC subsequently committed itself to the retention of the monarchy and to generally liberal political and economic principles. Pathet Lao government ministers also acted moderately, reassuring many Lao people. The Pathet Lao goal of taking over the government remained, however, and the circumstances seemed to be favouring the achievement of that goal. Rightist morale was sinking as the United States, step by step, wound back its commitments in Indochina. Corruption and self‐seeking—which had long been debilitating factors in the Royal Lao government area—intensified as fears grew that the US‐aid bonanza was coming to an end.

  Even so, the Pathet Lao moved cautiously when, in April 1975, communist forces toppled the regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh. Pathet Lao troops engaged the Hmong secret army, but in the lowlands the Pathet Lao relied on staging a “popular revolution.” In April and May, mass demonstrations against US properties and Lao rightists led to the winding‐back of all American activity other than diplomatic representation, and propelled the flight from Laos of people identified with the former Vientiane government. The flight intensified when the Royal Lao forces were taken over by a pro–Pathet Lao commander in August. In November, following further demonstrations, the king abdicated and Souvanna Phouma stepped down as prime minister.

  On December 1 and 2, 1975, a “National Congress of People's Representatives” voted unanimously to establish the Lao People's Democratic Republic, to be governed by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Prince Souphanouvong became the new republic's first president, a position he held until his retirement in 1986. Kaysone Phomvihan became prime minister, a position he retained until 1991, when Khamtay Siphandon succeeded him and later became president in 1998.

  LAOS SINCE 1975

  After 1975, the new government imposed doctrinaire socialist policies on Laos. State trading organisations replaced private trade, and Laos' small industries were nationalised. The properties of traitors were expropriated. Political and social discourse became rigidly controlled, and those perceived to be opponents of the regime were eliminated or consigned to “reeducation” centres. In 1978, the reorganisation of agriculture into cooperatives began. These policies aggravated the conditions created by 30 years of political upheaval and war, the withdrawal of US aid, and an economic blockade imposed by Thailand. The declining economic situation and the political oppression led to the exodus as refugees of as much as 10 percent of the population. By 1979, Laos had lost the majority of its educated and skilled people.

  The introduction of cooperatives—the policy which most directly affected the majority of the peasant population—met with passive but intense opposition. Harvest yields were catastrophically less than hoped for, and, in mid‐1979, the policy was abruptly dropped. This about‐turn heralded a series of measures which would gradually free up the country's economy. In November 1979, private production was again encouraged, and state enterprises were obliged to include in their goals efficiency, productivity, and profit. In 1982, a reorganisation of government left the old guard in supreme control but introduced “technocrats” at vice‐ministerial level, decentralized some decision‐making, and liberalised foreign trade, private investment, and joint state–private enterprise.

  These and later changes to the command economy provoked some tensions within the ruling group. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the collapse of Soviet and European communism, the resulting loss of aid, and the growing economic liberalisation in Vietnam and China produced decisive moves toward a market economy. However, Laos remains a one‐party, theoretically socialist, state. Party diktat can override law and institutionalised procedures. Corruption, and the building of power bases through nepotism and personal favours, also complicate economic development. This was a theme addressed with unusual candour by Vice President Xaysomphone Phomvihane (son of the late President Kaysone) in 2007. He declared that corruption by party and state officials had become the country's principal social ill, followed by crime and drug abuse. He admitted that anticorruption legislation endorsed in 2005 had done little to address this. That legislation was designed to augment a 1999 anticorruption decree and the establishment of a counter‐corruption committee under the Office of the Prime Minister. Unlike Vietnam and China, where dishonest senior officials have been routinely made an example of and prosecuted, this is still seldom the case in Laos. In fact the US State Department has assessed that corruption is on the increase.

  With its small population, lack of infrastructure, and landlocked position, Laos is unlikely to shake off quickly its status as one of South‐East Asia's poorest countries, in spite of its liberal policies on foreign investment. Subsistence farming is likely to remain the chief user of labour for some time, and the chief means of survival for most Lao people. As mentioned in the introduction, the dual economy, whereby an economically undeveloped rural backwater exists uneasily alongside the more advanced capital city, has led to internal migration and some social upheaval as ru
ral people seek to improve their prospects. By the government's own figures, in 2001 a quarter of Vientiane's inhabitants and over half the people living outside the capital lived below the poverty line. However, Laos does have the potential for sustained economic growth. By the turn of the century, foreign enterprises were heavily involved in developing a number of hydroelectric projects, principally to sell power to Thailand and Vietnam. Other areas of potential development are mining, commercial agriculture, tourism, and limited areas of manufacturing.

  Laos' infrastructure has been improving with various forms of international assistance. An Australian‐financed bridge across the Mekong, which linked Laos and Thailand by road in 1994, and the expansion and upgrading of roads within Laos mean that it is becoming possible to drive from Singapore to Beijing, via Laos. In 2001, the Lao and Thai governments jointly announced an additional 1.5‐kilometre bridge would be built to promote cross‐border trade. Some Lao see their country's future as a transport hub, linking north‐east Thailand with the Vietnamese port of Da Nang on an east–west axis and southern China with Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore on the north–south axis.

  Fears of social and environmental—not to mention political—consequences of Lao development have often been at the forefront of national debate. In 1995, the government launched a crackdown on “counterrevolutionary activities”: a clear message that economic liberalisation should not be interpreted as leading to an end of the ruling party's monopoly on power. Such themes were unambiguously restated in 1997 when the country was admitted to ASEAN and was buffeted in the same year by the flow‐on effects of the Asian economic crisis which originated in Thailand. Although 2.5 million registered voters were encouraged to vote in nationwide elections held in 2002, the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party was assured a sweeping victory as all but one of the candidates permitted to stand were party members. At the Seventh Party Congress in 2001, foreign aid donors—whose contributions provide a third of national income—were disappointed by a failure to commit to reform of the unwieldy state sector. Indeed, the private sector was not even mentioned. At the Eighth Party Congress in 2006, President Khamtay Siphandon stood aside in favour of Lt‐Gen. Choummali Siagnason. Bouasone Bouphavanh was endorsed as the new Prime Minister. The influence of the military on government continues to this day. In early 2016, Bounnhang Vorachit was appointed President, having been Vice President and before that Prime Minister for over a decade. The Prime Minister is Thongloun Sisoulith, who was Deputy Prime Minister for many years. Bounnhang and Thongloun's appointments demonstrate the continuation of the authoritarian control of the powerful ruling party.