One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  Half of CinCUS Henry A. Wiley’s thirty-six page critique of the problem dealt with air operations.23 Praising the quality of Navy aircraft and aviators over those of the Army, he went on to stress “the great usefulness of aircraft carriers,” recommending that more be procured, though noting the difficulty of protecting them. In the process, stressing a point first made by Blue commander Vice Admiral Montgomery Meigs Taylor during planning for the problem, Wiley concluded that the primary objective in carrier operations was the defeat of the enemy carriers.

  Given her thirty-three knot speed, it may seem curious that Saratoga was “sunk” by enemy battleships, but this was in fact the first of many such incidents. Carriers would be “sunk” or “damaged” by surface ships during virtually every problem between 1929 and 1937, and would come under “gunfire” on numerous other occasions.24 The fleet’s aircraft lacked the range to conduct effective operations at long distances, forcing carriers to get close to their objectives to launch and recover strikes, putting them at risk from slower surface combatants. Not until mid-1941 would the U.S. Navy have aircraft capable of long-range operations, a year after the Japanese navy. This vulnerability, as much as any hostility to aviation, led some Admirals to be wary of independent aircraft carrier operations.

  FP X (March 1930) required Blue (U.S.) to conduct an offensive across the Caribbean to oust Black (a European power) from a lodgment in the Antilles. Inspired by Saratoga’s performance in 1929, Black’s Admiral William C. Cole formed an independent strike group around Lexington. As Blue, with both Saratoga and Langley, drove across the Caribbean from Panama, Black concentrated north of Haiti. On 10 March, with destroyers and cruisers forming a scouting line ahead of her, Lexington proceeded at high speed into the Caribbean south of Guantanamo, as the Black main body followed, covered by flying boat patrols. Scouts from the two fleets began making contact on the 13th.

  Early on the 14th, with the fleets about seventy-five miles apart, south and southwest of Haiti, the two Blue carriers were on a northwesterly course some two dozen miles east of Navassa Island. Some Langley fighters were on reconnaissance, and both carriers had aircraft spotted on deck and others below being serviced. Shortly after 0800 three Lexington scout bombers spotted the Blue carriers. Calling for support, at 0815 the scouts dive-bombed Saratoga, putting several bombs into her flight deck, inflicting serious damage. Saratoga’s crew began to put out notional fires and haul aircraft out of danger, but fourteen minutes later five waves of Lexington dive-bombers began arriving, forty-two aircraft in all, to shower the ship with bombs. Aircraft aboard Saratoga began “exploding” and she was ruled out of action. Four minutes after that, fifteen Lexington fighter bombers struck Langley, followed two minutes later by a dozen more, and soon she too was ruled to be in flames. Blue aircraft returning from patrol interfered, but were ineffective. In less than twenty minutes both Blue carriers had been put out of action, and Black surface forces shortly arrived to sink Langley.

  The USS Lexington with Martin bombers on deck.

  In his critique, CinCUS William V. Pratt noted how the “suddenness with which Black gained complete control of the air” had decided the outcome of the problem.25 Inspired by the “Battle of Navassa Island,” most observers agreed on the importance of getting in the first blow, urged the acquisition of more carriers, and recommended procurement of better scout aircraft, to increase the carrier’s reconnaissance reach and ability to make preliminary strikes. Aviation officers stressed the value of operating carriers in independent strike forces, while the Chief of Staff of the Battle Fleet recommended carriers conduct continuous scouting and maintain an offensive reserve always ready to strike the enemy.26

  During FP XI (April 1930), held in the same waters, both sides tasked their aircraft carriers with eliminating their opposite numbers. Inclement weather and a number of command and staff errors hampered the effectiveness of air operations, though Saratoga did eventually inflict extensive damage on Lexington, confirming the value of hitting the enemy’s aircraft carriers first. During the problem, Vice Admiral William C. Cole, commanding Blue, had formed a task force around Lexington, and in his critique he proposed that permanent Carrier Task Forces be established—of one carrier, heavy cruisers, and destroyers—to train and operate together: an idea that would be extensively tested for the rest of the decade, be formally implemented in early 1941, and prove highly effective during the first year of the Pacific War.27

  Cole’s proposal was first tested in FP XII (February 1931), a trial of the effectiveness of an aircraft-heavy force against a conventional Battle Fleet with limited air assets, during a hostile attack on the Pacific side of the Panama Canal.28 Blue’s Vice Admiral Arthur L. Willard, although inferior in most assets, was given Lexington and Saratoga, several aircraft tenders, and the airship Los Angeles (ZR-3). He formed a “Striking Force” under Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, who organized two task forces, each of one carrier, two cruisers, and four destroyers. Directly under Reeves, the Saratoga Task Force was to cover the approaches to Panama from the northwest and west, while the Lexington Task Force, commanded by the carrier’s skipper, Captain Ernest J. King, provided cover from the south and southwest. Airship Los Angeles was assigned to patrol along the demarcation line between the carrier operating areas, while aircraft based on tenders conducted reconnaissance and patrols in support of the carriers and their scouting lines. The Black fleet commenced the maneuvers about 850 miles southwest of the Panama Canal, a few degrees above the equator, divided into two expeditionary forces and supporting task forces.

  Blue’s task organization proved quite effective. Flying boats from Panama located elements of the Black fleet on 18 February, the second day of operations. On the 19th, both Blue carriers located the Black expeditionary convoys, with some help from the airship Los Angeles, which was promptly lost to an enemy airplane. Extensive carrier air strikes on Black caused heavy damage, but not enough to prevent both Black convoys from effecting notional landings, though the beachheads came under sustained air attack until the problem ended on the fifth day.

  Although not decisive, the performance of naval aviation during the problem had again demonstrated that aircraft, and particularly carrier aircraft, could serve as an offensive arm. Nevertheless, carrier operations had been hampered by the short range of their aircraft, which forced them to approach close to their objectives, leading to several close encounters with Black surface forces.

  Los Angeles received mixed reviews. While Black’s Admiral Frank H. Schofield concluded that their cost was “out of all proportion to their probable usefulness,” noting that “they had an appeal to the imagination that is not sustained by their military usefulness,” Blue’s Vice Admiral Willard, endorsed their use.29

  Perhaps the most important result of this problem was that it first revealed the serious logistical demands of carrier operations. The high speed and operational tempo that the carriers maintained resulted in both running very low on fuel, avgas, ordnance, and aircraft—about half of which were “lost” in combat or to mechanical problems. At the time, these logistical difficulties were viewed as limitations of carrier aviation, but they underscored the need for an effective underway replenishment system, already under experimentation.

  After routine exercises around Panama, the Battle Fleet departed for California in March, leaving behind the carriers, which entered the Caribbean with the Scouting Fleet for a series special maneuvers (21–30 March). The most important of these was the first, essentially a duel between two carrier task forces, each of one carrier, four light cruisers, and two destroyers, with Rear Admiral Reeves in Saratoga defending the canal from an attack by Captain King’s Lexington.30

  After Lexington had a day’s head start to “lose” herself in the Caribbean, the maneuvers began well before dawn on 22 March. With Saratoga about 150 miles east of Colon, Reeves, considering King’s options, concluded that Lexington was most likely northeast of Colon and sent a destroyer in that direction, calculatin
g that the aggressive King would be unable to resist the “bait.” He then positioned Saratoga in echelon behind the destroyer. Reeves’ estimate was exactly correct. Lexington scouts found the destroyer soon after dawn on the 22nd. King ordered a major air strike to trace the destroyer’s course back to Saratoga. Meanwhile, a Saratoga scout had already located Lexington. Reeves put a large strike in the air and ordered some cruisers toward the enemy carrier. As Lexington’s aircraft looked for Saratoga, seventy Saratoga aircraft “sank” their carrier, aided by the cruisers that arrived during the action; from the time Saratoga’s strike was launched until Lexington was “sunk” little more than an hour had passed. While this underscored the importance of getting in the first blow, the “loss” of Lexington led to some calls for “small carriers and flying deck cruisers” to avoid losing too many aircraft with a single ship, a recommendation that went nowhere.31

  Early 1932 saw one of the most dramatic events in the evolution of carrier aviation. For GJE No. 4, Blue (U.S.), with most of the Battle Force, including Lexington and Saratoga plus a constructive expeditionary force, had to recapture Hawaii from Black (Japan), which had taken it earlier.32 Blue’s Admiral Richard H. Leigh adopted a proposal by veteran airmen Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell and Captain John H. Towers for a surprise attack on Oahu by an “Advance Raiding Force” of the carriers and some escorts.33 Departing the West Coast with the main body, on 5 February the Advance Raiding Force separated from the fleet and proceeded to Hawaii independently. After a final twenty-five-knot run to about one hundred miles north of Oahu, the carriers began launching 150 aircraft in two waves before dawn on Sunday, 7 February. Achieving total surprise, the first wave hit Army air fields across Oahu and then went after the fleet and installations at Pearl Harbor. Army aircraft intervened, to little effect, and were themselves intercepted while returning to their bases by the Blue second wave, which inflicted heavy losses on the defenders.

  Recovering their aircraft, the Blue carriers took evasive action, heading southwest of Oahu. At dawn on the 9th, Saratoga again raided Oahu while reconnoitering landing sites, once more with considerable success, though losing ten of the sixty-six aircraft engaged. Heading south, she linked up with Lexington overnight. By 11 February, Blue had effected landings on Oahu covered by aircraft from the carriers, though by then both were low on aircraft and Lexington was out of action due to enemy attack.

  The critique of GJE No. 4 was acrimonious, as Army and Navy personnel disagreed on many issues. Nevertheless it was clear that the carrier raid on Oahu on Sunday morning, 7 February—termed by historian Thomas Fleming “a date that would live in amnesia”—had thrown the defenders off balance, and they were never able to gain the initiative. Less than a decade later, the Japanese would open the Pacific War with precisely the same attack.

  A month later FP XIII postulated that Blue (U.S.) was preparing a major offensive from Hawaii against the outer fringe of the Black (Japan) empire, a series of “atolls” at Puget Sound, San Francisco, San Diego–San Pedro, and Magdalena Bay, Mexico.34 Blue’s Admiral Leigh again had the bulk of the fleet, plus Saratoga (seventy-two aircraft), commanded by the aggressive Captain Frank R. McCrary, as well as thirty-six patrol planes and torpedo bombers based at Pearl Harbor and thirty-five battleship and cruiser floatplanes, plus a notional expeditionary force. Black’s Vice Admiral Willard had Langley and Captain Ernest J. King’s Lexington, with a total of ninety-eight aircraft, plus four aircraft tenders with thirty-six flying boats, and the airship Los Angeles, plus some surface forces.

  Blue formed two principal task forces, a convoy and escort, and an offensive force composed of Saratoga, three battleships, and ten destroyers, to attack Puget Sound. Black, operating from the San Pedro–San Diego area, formed four task forces and a train. The “Striking Group,” Lexington with some cruisers and destroyers, was to intercept Blue at the earliest opportunity and inflict maximum damage to his forces, supported by submarine attacks to erode his strength in preparation for a surface action.

  The maneuvers began on 10 March, with both fleets moving cautiously. Black submarines ascertained Blue’s course, which suggested San Francisco was its objective. On the morning of the 13th, however, Blue altered course for Puget Sound while the Saratoga Task Force remained on course for San Francisco, both as a deception and to provide cover for the rest of the main body. By morning on the 14th, the opposing carrier groups were hardly two hundred miles apart on a collision course, and scouts from Saratoga detected three Black cruisers. Alerted to each other’s presence, the carriers launched air strikes against each other as the range closed early that afternoon. Saratoga aircraft inflicted 38 percent damage on Black’s Lexington, but received 25 percent damage from enemy aircraft.

  Captain King now convinced Willard to operate Black’s Lexington independently against Blue’s carrier, to reduce the enemy air threat. He moved Lexington out of range of Saratoga under cover of darkness, to gain sea room. During the 15th, clashes between surface forces began to develop as Black cruisers probed the outer perimeter of Blue’s screen, though Saratoga aircraft sank two Black cruisers and heavily damaged a third. These strikes betrayed her position. Calculating that Saratoga would be recovering aircraft just before dusk, King moved Lexington in at high speed and launched a forty-nine-plane strike that hit Saratoga just as he had figured; the Blue carrier was ruled to have taken 49 percent damage, rendering her incapable of operating aircraft. The following day, Black destroyers “sank” Saratoga, rendering Blue bereft of carrier support. Although the maneuvers continued, the fleets lost contact on the 17th and the problem was ended.

  The 1932 maneuvers reaffirmed the lesson that in carrier warfare, the first strike is the most important. Blue air commander Harry Yarnell concluded his critique by noting that Lexington and Saratoga were inadequate to the needs of a Pacific war, suggesting a minimum of six, if not eight, as a basic operational necessity, while Captain King argued that the Fleet Problem had demonstrated that carriers should be operated by divisions.

  The Fleet Problem also added further evidence that the airship was of doubtful value as Los Angles had done nothing useful. Airship proponents brushed this aside, touting the merits of the new “flying aircraft carriers,” Akron (ZRS-4) and her sister Macon (ZRS-5), neither of which had taken part in the maneuvers. Nevertheless, in a prescient comment to CNO William V. Pratt, CinCUS Frank Schofield said “the need for aircraft is not more Akrons, but more carriers,” which seems to have summed up the fleet’s opinion as well.35

  FP XIII brought to a head the contentious issue of the effectiveness of air attacks against ships. Neither World War I nor the events that followed provided any useful guidance, and an acrimonious debate had developed in the Service—and between the Navy and the Army—over this question.36 Rules for horizontal bombing and dive-bombing had been developed based on trials held during the late 1920s using dummy bombs against various targets. Following FP XIII, Commander, Battle Force (ComBatFor) Admiral Luke McNamee, considering the existing rules too optimistic, proposed some revisions, while Rear Admiral William A. Moffett Jr., formidable Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, proposed even more generous guidelines.

  About this time the target ship Utah (AG-16, ex-B-31) entered service. Trials with Utah produced figures even less optimistic than those proposed by McNamee, and new guidelines were issued for FP XIV (1933) over protests from aviation enthusiasts. In 1934 more optimistic rules were introduced, only to be rescinded in 1938. Wartime experience would prove that even the most pessimistic prewar guidelines were rather generous.37

  The Rules Debate: How Accurate in Terms of Bombs on Target Are Air Attacks against Maneuvering Capital Ships?

  FP XIV was intended to test the fleet’s ability to defend its bases from carrier raids and the effectiveness of carriers operating independently. Black (Japan) had to conduct a series of carrier raids against Blue (U.S.) bases on the West Coast in order to disrupt preparations for offensive operations. Black’s Vice Admiral Frank H. C
lark had Saratoga and Lexington and seven heavy cruisers, together the fastest ships in the fleet, plus some old destroyers and two oilers. Blue’s Admiral Luke McNamee had virtually everything else in the fleet.

  Since Black was to begin operations near Hawaii, the arrival of the carriers in the islands permitted a joint exercise with the Army’s Hawaiian Department supported by local naval forces (27 January–1 February).38 The defenders went on full alert on the 27th, when the carriers were still well to sea, as destroyers and some other vessels were dispatched to patrol northeastward of the islands. On the 29th the defenders initiated a twenty-four-hour air patrol out to 150 miles. Clark, not an aviator, adopted a plan devised by his airmen. Avoiding enemy air patrols, the carriers and some escorts arrived north of Molokai around midnight on 30–31 January, while a task group of heavy cruisers approached Oahu from the south. About two hours before dawn on the 31st the carriers put some ninety aircraft in the air, reserving about forty for fleet defense. The strike force attained complete surprise, arriving over Pearl Harbor around dawn, and was ruled to have inflicted serious damage.

  While the carriers proceeded to Hawaii and maneuvered with the Army, Blue prepared for the enemy raid.39 Admiral McNamee concluded that Black was most likely to operate its carriers individually and conduct a series of simultaneous raids. Since the most critical Black targets were around San Francisco and San Pedro–San Diego, and knowing the range of the attacking aircraft, he formed two large task forces. The Northern Group’s patrol area reached 100 miles from San Francisco, while the Southern Group reached 125 miles from San Diego–San Pedro. Each patrol area consisted of an outer perimeter of destroyers, submarines, and other vessels picketed more or less within sight of each other, supported by cruisers some miles to their rear, and battleships still further back, while flying boats patrolled beyond the outer edges.