One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  On 4 May White was spread throughout the Hawaiian chain, with seaplane tenders stationed at several islands from Midway to Hawaii. Black was concentrated about one hundred miles southwest of Midway, near the 180th meridian, formed into two task forces, a main body with Lexington and the bulk of the fleet, and an expeditionary force, including Saratoga, carrying Marines to capture Midway. Both sides initiated aggressive air patrols.

  White flying boats detected the Black main body very early on the 4th, ascertaining its speed and course. Meanwhile, the Black expeditionary force reached Midway, conducted air and gunnery attacks, landed Marines, and on the 5th an aircraft tender began operations. On the 6th, Bloch dispatched Lexington, an aircraft tender, and a small force to capture French Frigate Shoals. White’s aggressive air patrolling paid off, and by mid-morning Tarrant had a clear picture of the location and strength of the Black main body and began to make movements accordingly. Meanwhile, around noon, Black’s Lexington Task Force captured French Frigate Shoals, though White resistance resulted in serious damage to the carrier.

  By mid-morning on the 7th, as the Lexington Task Force rejoined the Black main body, reconnaissance contacts between the two fleets became more frequent. By 1320 the two fleets were close enough for Black battleships to open fire on White heavy cruisers, initiating a long-range skirmish that lasted several hours. White’s carrier Ranger, operating autonomously, provided support to the surface forces, heavily damaging Saratoga and some of Black’s transports. Overnight, White essayed several well-executed cruiser-destroyer attacks, with patrol bombers taking advantage of moonrise to make low altitude strike. Black’s losses were heavy, with an aircraft tender and eight other vessels “sunk” and both carriers, two battleships, and four other ships taking varying degrees of damage, while White suffered several heavy cruisers and destroyers damaged.

  At 0441 on the 8th, a general battleline action began, lasting for about an hour. As the battleships exchanged fire, White patrol bombers attempted several attacks, but were badly handled by Black carrier fighters. Though White inflicted heavy damage on Black, leaving Lexington in almost sinking condition, it suffered in turn, “losing” the surface action. Breaking off, White retired on Lahaina Roads, while conducting patrol bomber attacks against the new Black base at French Frigate Shoals. The problem was declared at an end at noon.

  Critiquing the exercise, Admiral Bloch praised the work of carrier aircraft in scouting and defending against White patrol bombers and submarines, but made scant mention of their offensive potential.60 Defending his decision to keep the carriers close to the battleline, he asserted that by being with the main body they benefited from “mutual support,” noting that “75% of the damaged assessed on Lexington was due to gun and torpedo fire,” which hardly proves his point. Discussing Admiral Horne’s proposal to use the carriers independently, drawing their security from their high speed, evasive tactics, and offensive ability, he asserted that “evasive tactics” would result “in a private war between the opposing air forces, often with complete disregard of the part of the air forces were intended to play in the furtherance of the plans” of the Fleet Commander. He further claimed that “evasive tactics were fallacious and untenable” against tender-based or shore-based long-range aircraft, an odd assertion given that he had just praised the performance of his carrier aircraft for their role in the defense of the fleet against those threats. While Bloch was right about the vulnerability of carriers to air attack, he failed to recognize that the best way to secure the fleet—and one’s own carriers—from air attack was to ensure the loss of the enemy’s carriers.

  Horne made some valuable recommendations on the need for all-weather carrier aircraft, increased training in night air operations, improved availability of aviation fuel, and, naturally, greater autonomy for carriers.61 Other observers noted that the new PBY patrol bombers had been less effective than expected in long-range mass attacks, but excellent for reconnaissance.

  This Fleet Problem is the only one for which there is a hint of command interference in a dissenting opinion. Aviation officers later claimed that “after the exercise, when Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne . . . circulated a paper calling for independent carrier operations, Admiral Bloch had him recall all copies.” This assertion cannot be proven, but suggests a high degree of dissatisfaction with Bloch’s handling of the critique.62 Certainly, Bloch’s appointment as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet in January 1938 probably came as a shock to naval airmen.

  FP XIX (March–April 1938) was a general test of the fleet’s abilities, held in several parts.63 For Part II, Black had to concentrate off Southern California, defended by White. Black, commanded by Vice Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, had Lexington and Saratoga, six battleships, and various other vessels. Kalbfus spurned the advice of his friend Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, who commanded the two carriers, and formed two task forces, each of a carrier, three battleships, and some cruisers and destroyers, approaching Southern California from the northwest and south, respectively. In contrast White’s Vice Admiral Tarrant, as he had done the previous year, built a task force around Ranger, put his four battleships in a supporting role, and reserved his strong contingent of PBYs for offensive operations.

  The outcome was decidedly in White’s favor. At the start of the maneuvers, on 16 March, Tarrant sent the Ranger Task Force northwest from San Diego–San Pedro, following with his slower battleships. Contact occurred on the 17th, and aircraft from Ranger promptly hit Lexington, an attack followed immediately with a mass strike by thirty-six PBYs, which put the Black carrier out of action. Soon afterward, White’s battleships caught Saratoga and, despite her much greater speed, promptly sank her.

  The sides were reorganized for Part V (25–30 March), which postulated that after a major defeat by Blue (Japan), Red (U.S.) had regrouped to defend Hawaii. Blue, under Kalbfus, had most of the fleet, three carriers, nine battleships, and so forth. In contrast, Red had only four cruisers, some two dozen destroyers, fourteen submarines, and about seventy-two PBYs, including those assigned to the 14th Naval District, and, on paper, Army aircraft based in Hawaii. Having learned from his experience in Part II, Blue commander Kalbfus listened to King, who planned a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor. King directed Saratoga to the northwest of Hawaii, and then, running in behind a convenient weather front, the carrier launched an attack very early on 29 March from one hundred miles north of the island, hitting local air bases with devastating effect. 64 While the air attacks were under way, Saratoga ran in closer to shore, to facilitate recovery of the aircraft, which was completed by 0835. Quickly refueling and rearming his fighters, King had enough of them airborne in time to beat off a counterattack by PBYs from Oahu, which suffered heavily.65 This set the stage for successful Blue landings on Oahu.

  Part IX (25–28 April), postulated a Purple (Japan) offensive bypassing Hawaii to hit the Green (U.S.) West Coast, at a time when the bulk of Green’s fleet was otherwise occupied; although the attacking fleet was larger, the scenario was similar to that of FP XIV, though with decidedly different results. Purple, under Kalbfus, had Saratoga, Lexington, and Ranger, plus battleships and some surrogate battle cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers. Including surrogates, Green was somewhat stronger in surface combatants and had some submarines, all based primarily at San Pedro and Mare Island, plus fifty-four flying boats on the West Coast and seventy-two in Hawaii, and a constructive “main body” near the southern end of Baja California.

  Kalbfus again released the carriers to King for independent operations, and before dawn on 28 April they “raided” Mare Island, and then eluded pursuing Green destroyers, taking little damage. The raid drew the Green battle fleet northward from the San Pedro area, into an ambush by Purple’s surface forces, supported by the carriers that had moved south at high speed, bringing the problem to an end.

  Twice during FP XIX fast carrier task forces had executed surprise raids on major bases, Pearl Harbor and Mare Island, providing “excellent experience . . . in
planning and executing a fast carrier task force attack against shore objectives.”66

  FP XX (20–27 February 1939) assumed that White, a European fascist power, had secured a foothold in the Lesser Antilles, sparking a response from Black (U.S.).67 The problem was the first to involve four carriers, Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, and Enterprise. As a result, while the fleet was concentrating in the Caribbean, Vice Admiral Ernest J. King conducted special maneuvers in the use of large carrier task forces; this was the largest concentration of American carriers to operate together until October 1943. 68

  For the Fleet Problem, Black’s Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, an aviator, had Ranger plus five aircraft tenders as well as several battleships and cruisers, and numerous destroyers, auxiliaries, and a contingent of Marines; White’s Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus had Lexington, Yorktown, and Enterprise plus about the same proportion of surface combatants, as well as numerous submarines, and target ship Utah, a surrogate for a troop convoy, with the mission of reinforcing the White foothold in the Lesser Antilles. In the air, White was stronger in attack aircraft, with some 220 carrier planes plus some 48 battleship and cruiser floatplanes, but Black had more aircraft overall—72 carrier planes, nearly 60 floatplanes, 102 PBYs, and 62 land-based Marine aircraft.

  Both Admirals made air power the central focus of their plans, each in his own way. Andrews, an aviator, deciding that his objective was the destruction of the White fleet, held the bulk of his fleet southwest of Puerto Rico, covered by patrol bombers based there, in Haiti, and the Virgin Islands, and formed a cruiser scouting line, backed by Ranger, to probe for the enemy planning to bring about a day surface action within range of his carrier and patrol bombers. In contrast, Kalbfus planned to keep out of reach of Black’s air force, to concentrate on getting his convoy through, but was willing to use it as “bait” to entice enemy action. He placed the convoy and Lexington ahead of his battle fleet, with his second carrier between the battleships and the bait, and his third carrier covering the exposed right flank of the fleet as it advanced into the Caribbean. He reasoned that if Black committed its air power against the convoy, his carriers would be able to protect it, while reducing enemy air resources; and should Black surface forces intervene, his air forces would punish them while he brought up his battleships. Although relatively creative, Kalbfus’ plan elicited objections from Vice Admiral Ernest J. King, overall air commander, who wanted to use the carriers more aggressively.

  The fleets began feeling for each other on 20 February. Despite rough seas, both sides were able to put floatplanes in the air and began spotting each other’s cruiser scouts on the 21st. Since King had instructed his airmen that Ranger was their primary target, they obediently refrained from attacking Black’s cruisers. As a result, some Black cruisers encountered and began exchanging fire with some of the White convoy’s escorts. During this exchange, Yorktown’s Air Group, returning after failing to locate Ranger, arrived on the scene and all seventy-two aircraft promptly attacked and sank two of the Black cruisers, while the third was dispatched by White surface ships. Meanwhile, Enterprise and Lexington aircraft spotted other Black scouts, sinking two cruisers and damaging two more. In one afternoon Black had lost half its cruisers sunk or damaged, though White lost thirty-nine aircraft, plus damage to three heavy cruisers.

  Overnight on 22–23 February, Kalbfus attempted to destroy Black’s reconnaissance assets by nocturnal destroyer raids on enemy aircraft tenders at San Juan, Culebra, and St. Thomas, followed by carrier air strikes at dawn. The attacks had mixed results; two tenders were sunk, for the loss of several of the attacking destroyers. As a result, around dawn on the 23rd, reserving Yorktown to cover the main body, Kalbfus released King with Lexington and Enterprise and some escorts to finish the job. King took this task force eastward around Puerto Rico, to approach his objectives from the north, and on the following morning, assigned Enterprise to strike the Black air bases and aircraft tenders, and Lexington to search for Ranger. To improve the carriers’ chances, he switched Lexington’s scout bomber squadron with Enterprise’s fighter squadron, thereby giving each carrier a rather specialized air group. Before the carriers could complete their missions, however, Black PBYs from Culebra spotted them and, soon joined by PBYs from San Juan and Samana Bay, began a series of attacks against Enterprise and Lexington that lasted from mid-morning into the late afternoon. Although Black PBY commander, Captain Marc Mitscher, claimed great success, the umpires ruled that Lexington had taken only light damage, while his aircraft had lost heavily to anti-aircraft fire. The PBY attacks did, however, delay King’s strikes on their tenders for a day. Finally, early on the 25th, Enterprise launched her aircraft against Black’s air bases and aircraft tenders from a point about 120 miles north of San Juan, which resulted in two aircraft tenders and two oilers being sunk, as well as many aircraft destroyed. During its flight to Samana Bay, Enterprise’s Torpedo Squadron 6 spotted the Black main body and was immediately ordered to search for Ranger, actually about a hundred miles to the north. Ranger, however, had by this time located Enterprise northwest of Puerto Rico by using an experimental high-frequency direction-finding system. Between 0845 and 1040 Ranger aircraft subjected Enterprise to a series of bomb and torpedo attacks; lacking fighters, Enterprise was sunk. Shortly after this, Ranger was spotted by White reconnaissance aircraft, and she took some damage. By the afternoon of the 25th, Black had lost four aircraft tenders and two oilers sunk, plus at least fourteen PBYs destroyed and a further forty-seven damaged with little possibility of repair, while White had lost one carrier and seen another damaged. Late that afternoon, Black PBYs from San Juan (where the elusive fifth Black aircraft tender had just arrived) began two days of attacks against White. Part I was declared over on the 26th, a day earlier than planned due to the enormous “loss” of aircraft by both sides; Black had only forty PBYs operational, with limited facilities to repair or maintain them, plus fifty-seven aircraft on the lightly damaged Ranger, while White had eighty-six operational aircraft on its two remaining carriers, Yorktown and the damaged Lexington. Officially no “winner” was declared, but there was widespread opinion to the effect that White had done well.

  The Fleet Problem, although short, demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in carrier operations. Both commanders had handled their air forces rather well, each concentrating his efforts at destroying his enemy’s air power before attempting to go after his battle fleet, by making carriers the centerpiece of independent task forces. The problem led to many recommendations. Perhaps the most important criticism, though most neglected, was that Carrier Air Wings lacked sufficient fighters to both defend the ship and escort strike forces; the proposal would languish until well into the Pacific War, with serious consequences. The problem offered further evidence, if any was needed, that horizontal bombers were ineffective against maneuvering warships, in contrast to dive-bombers and torpedo bombers, which proved quite potent. The PBY again won praise for its effectiveness at long-endurance reconnaissance and patrol, though its use as an attack bomber received mixed reviews.

  Held in the Pacific, FP XXI (April–May 1940), the last in the series, addressed various aspects of a Pacific war. Two parts were significant for carrier aviation, II and VI, in both of which commanders—even confirmed “Gun Club” members—demonstrated considerable facility in the operation of carrier task forces and also remarkable organizational flexibility. 69

  For Part II (3–5 April), the West Coast was constructively taken to be a chain of atolls, controlled by Black (Japan) to the northeast, with a major base at San Francisco (standing in for the Marshall Islands), while White (U.S.), with its homeland off Central America, controlled Hawaii and San Diego (Guam). Black’s Admiral Charles P. Snyder had to effect a rendezvous between a task force returning from a strike on Hawaii, and a covering force based at San Francisco, while White’s Vice Admiral William S. Pye, coming up from San Diego, had to try to stop him. Black’s raiding force, having lost a carrier during the attack on Hawai
i, consisted of cruisers and destroyers, while the covering force had Yorktown, with some battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. White had Lexington and Saratoga, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, plus patrol bombers based at San Diego.

  Beginning the problem at sea about 350 nautical miles southwest of San Diego, White’s Pye decided to use his superiority in air power to defeat the Black covering force before it could rendezvous with the raiding force, and formed three task forces, one of Lexington and Saratoga with four heavy cruisers and four destroyers; the second of light cruisers and destroyers; and the third, a main body of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.

  Black’s Snyder, calculating that seasonably foul weather would impede White’s air operations, decided to postpone combat as long as possible, to increase the chances of joining his task forces, set their rendezvous for noon on 5 April at a point roughly seven hundred miles southwest of San Francisco, north of the direct route from Hawaii. He planned to keep Yorktown fifty to seventy-five miles to the north of his main body, and use her offensively, closing to launch air strikes over the battleships, and then heading back a safe distance upon recovery of her aircraft.

  Snyder’s plans were disrupted by a streak of bad luck. The weather turned out to be unseasonably good, and shortly after the problem began the umpires informed White that Black’s code had been broken. As a result of these strokes of fortune, Vice Admiral Pye’s plans unfolded more or less as expected. His reconnaissance aircraft spotted Black’s covering force in mid-morning on the 4th, only about two hundred miles east-of-north of his own main body About an hour after noon, Lexington’s aircraft began a series of attacks against Black, shortly joined by Saratoga’s planes. Black’s combat air patrol beat off the initial attacks, but from 1350 to 1458 Yorktown suffered 40 percent damage, with her speed cut to sixteen knots, while the battleships averaged 9 percent damage, with fleet speed down to fourteen knots. White’s losses in aircraft were heavy, twenty of the forty-six attackers being shot down, which led Pye to protest “unrealistically optimistic assessments of AA fire effectiveness” in his after action report. Toward the end of the air attacks, Black’s raiding force came within sighting distance of the White carriers, and there was some exchange of fire before the two groups lost track of each other due to poor visibility and high-speed maneuvering. There followed “a confused night battle” between White destroyers and the Black fleet, raising damage to Black battleships to an average of 30 percent and reducing fleet speed to just nine knots, though over 60 percent of the attacking destroyers were sunk. A bit after dawn on the 5th, Yorktown managed to get off her only strike of the maneuvers, but Black’s bad luck held; only one Yorktown squadron located the White main body, and it did little harm. Later that morning, the White carriers conducted two more strikes on Black, inflicting more damage, though losing thirty-four of the nearly one hundred attacking aircraft. By then, however, Vice Admiral Snyder had managed to interpose his main body between the two Black task forces. With the weather deteriorating, CinCUS James O. Richardson, acting as Chief Umpire, declared this phase of the problem over.