One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  32.Thomas Fleming, “February 7, 1932—A Date that Would Live in Amnesia,” Kazine No. 27; Clark G. Reynolds, On the Warpath in the Pacific: Admiral Jocko Clark and the Fast Carriers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), pp. 96–99; Wadle, “United States Navy Fleet Problems,” pp. 78–84; “Grand Joint Exercise No. 4,” Time, 15 February 1932; Charles M. Austin, “Victory for ‘Blues’,” New York Times, 15 February 1932; “Blue Forces Seize Hawaii in Darkness,” Washington Post, 14 February 1932; “Manoeuvers Close with ‘Blue’ Ahead,” New York Times, 14 February 1932; “Joint Exercise Highly Successful,” Washington Post, 21 February 1932.

  33.In an interesting experiment, acting on a suggestion made after FP X (1930), the carriers swapped aircraft, forming two specialized air groups. Saratoga ended up with ninety-seven aircraft, mostly fighters, while Lexington had only fifty-eight aircraft, mostly bombers and scouts, in the hope that a higher operational tempo might be attained. The experiment was repeated during FP XX (1939), when Ernest J. King swapped Lexington’s scout bomber squadron for Enterprise’s fighter squadron, but the results were not impressive. In spring 1943, the two Allied carriers in the Pacific, Saratoga and HMS Victorious, pooled their air groups, both of which consisted of American-built aircraft, the former ending up with seventy-two TBF bombers, but only twelve fighters, and the latter thirty-six fighters but only twelve bombers, which seems to have yielded no useful advantage.

  34.M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Frederick H. Schofield”; Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 58–118; Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, pp. 97–107. Some newspaper accounts are of interest: Charles M. Austin, “Action Off California in March,” New York Times, 16 February 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Admirals Play Their Game of War,” New York Times, 13 March 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Fleets, Far at Sea, Play Hide-and-Seek,” New York Times, 13 March 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Black Planes ‘Sink’ Carrier Saratoga,” New York Times, 18 March 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Aviation Triumphant in Naval War Games,” New York Times, 27 March 1932.

  35.Cited in Coletta, “Dirigibles,” p. 224.

  36.Campbell, “The Influence of Air Power,” pp. 133–36, has an excellent analysis of the debate over the revision of the air attack rules.

  37.NWCA, Carton 56, L. McNamee, U.S. Fleet Umpire Instructions, 1932: Suggested Changes, and Carton 56, William A. Moffett, Chief, BuAir, p. 2; Naval Historical Collection Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, 5 October 1934, and Box 270, CINCUS to Holders of USF 10, Change #12, USF 10, 24 January 1938. For Utah see R. S. S. Howman-Meedk, Harold Johnson, K. D. McBride, and Christopher C. Wright, “Target Ships,” Warship International, 2002, No. 1, pp. 24–36.

  38.“Honolulu Awaits ‘Attack’ from Sea,” Washington Post, 30 January 1933; “Hawaii Guns Await ‘Foe’ in War Games,” New York Times, 30 January 1933; “Air Assault Opens Hawaii War Game,” Washington Post, 1 February 1933.

  39.M964-15, 1, United States Fleet, Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral R. H. Leigh, 20 April 1933; NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May 1933; Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 119–86, provides some excellent analysis.

  40.NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May 1933, Section 4, p. 2.

  41.Clark G. Reynolds, John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 245–47, 268.

  42.M964-16, 1, “Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934.” There is a good analysis in Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 187–276, and Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, pp. 120–42; Harris Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn, ed. Mark Russell Shulman et al. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1999), pp. 362–69; Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 231–35. Press coverage was extensive; e.g., “102 Navy Vessels Open ‘30-Day War’,” New York Times, 11 April 1934; “Submarines Aid in Fleet ‘Battle’,” New York Times, 12 April 1934; “Fleet Begins Trip Through Panama Canal,” Washington Post, 22 April 1934; Hanson W. Baldwin, “4 Caribbean Bases Await Fleet War,” New York Times, 5 May 1934; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Gray Fleet Seizes Culebra Island,” New York Times, 11 May 1934; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Final ‘Battle’ Ends Fleet Manoeuvres,” New York Times, 18 May 1934.

  43.“Canal Defenses Trained on Fleet,” New York Times, 20 April 1934; “Submarines Give Test,” New York Times, 20 April 1934; “Great Fleet Heads for Canal Attack,” New York Times, 21 April 1934; “Warships Mass in Pacific,” New York Times, 21 April 1934; “Battle for Canal results in a Draw,” New York Times, 20 April 1934.

  44.M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, pp. 71ff.

  45.Ibid., p. 36.

  46.Trent Hone, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941,” The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003), pp. 1139–41, has a short analysis of these tactics. Arguably, the most notable occasion on which the U.S. Navy used such tactics was in the desperate Battle off Samar, 25 October 1944.

  47.M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, p. 54; Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, pp. 127–28; “Macon Fails in Fleet Test,” Washington Post, 10 May 1934, p. 1; “Airship Building Will Come to Halt,” New York Times, 14 February 1935.

  48.M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, p. 36.

  49.Campbell, “The Influence of Air Power,” p. 183ff, summarizes the evolving view of the role of the carrier in the fleet.

  50.M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet [15 September 1935]; NWCA, Carton 63, Operations of the U.S. Fleet, Fleet Problem Sixteen, Enclosure “V”; U.S. Fleet OpPlan 1–35, Task Organization, 1 March 1935. See also, Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, pp. 143–50. Harris Laning, then ComBatFor, included some interesting commentary on the problem in his memoirs, An Admiral’s Yarn, pp. 372ff. The problem was heavily covered by the press, the New York Times alone carrying dozens of stories.

  51.In addition to the flying boat and its crew of six, lost with all hands, four other aircraft were lost to accidents during the problem, though there was only one additional fatality; Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, p. 145.

  52.Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” pp. 1135–37. Laning does not mention this incident in his memoirs.

  53.M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet [15 September 1935], p. 32.

  54.Despite extensive surviving documents for this problem, this writer was unable to find either a detailed narrative or anecdotal chronology. See, however, M964-21, 2, CINCUS to CNO, 26 November 1935, “Fleet Problem XVII,” with Enclosures; M964-21, 2, CNO to CINCUS, 23 December 1935, “Fleet Problem XVII, Concept of”; M964-21, 6, United States Fleet, Operation Plan No. 3-36, 20 January 1936, “Task Organization”; NWCA, Carton 64, “Fleet Problem Seventeen, Report of CINCUS,” 6 June 1936; NWCA, Carton 64, “Critique, Phase II, Fleet Problem Seventeen, United States Fleet,” 15 May 1936. Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, pp. 151–56, has some useful observations. This was the first Fleet Problem for a virtual complete ban was imposed on the press, so tight that even honors to Neptunus Rex were not reported until months later; see Hanson W. Baldwin, “Navy Sails Far South in Secret War Games,” New York Times, 24 May 1936; Windsor Booth, “Roosevelt’s Crossing of Equator Recalls Mass Polliwog Initiation at Fleet Maneuvers,” Washington Post, 29 November 1936.

  55.M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Operation Order No. 5-36, 13 May 1936; M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Carrier Group OpOrd 236 (14 May 1936). Unfortunately, no similar document was found for Brown. See also Paolo E. Coletta, Patrick N. L. Bellinger and U.S. Naval Aviation (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 189–93.

  56.M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Operation Order No. 5-36, 13 May 1936, p. 2. Although lack of documentation makes it diffic
ult to determine Brown’s organization and plans, these appear to have been quite similar to those adopted by Black based on occasional comments in NWCA, Carton 64, Fleet Problem Seventeen, Report of CINCUS, 6 June 1936.

  57.Shortly after Fleet Problem XVII, Langley was taken in hand for conversion to an aircraft tender, to free tonnage for the construction of newer carriers, leaving the fleet with only three carriers until Yorktown (CV-5) entered service in late 1937.

  58.NWCA, Carton 64, CINCUS to Fleet, U.S. Fleet OpOrd No. 7-37 (1 May 1937); M964-22, 3, Commander Battle Force (Commander Black Fleet) to CINCUS, 11 May 1937, “FPXVIII—Narrative of Events and Track Chart”; M964-23, 1, Commander Scouting Force (Commander White Fleet) to CINCUS, 10 May 1937, “Fleet Problem XVIII, Narrative of Events”; M964-23, 1, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, to CINCUS, 4 June 1937, “Comments and Recommendations–Fleet Problem XVIII.” See also, Reynolds, On the Warpath, pp. 121ff. Press coverage was restricted, but some useful stories did appear: “Air and Sea Drive Besets Honolulu,” New York Times, 25 April 1937; “Fleet Attacking Oahu In Pacific War Game,” Washington Post, 26 April 1937; “Fleet ‘Attack’ Ends, Ships at Honolulu, New York Times, 26 April 1937. For the problem, the entire geography of the Pacific was notionally rearranged; White’s homeland was in the Aleutians, the Alaska Peninsula, and Kodiak Island, while Black lay somewhere in the southwestern Pacific, and Hawaii and Johnston Island were stand-ins for Micronesia.

  59.M964-23, 1, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, to CINCUS, 4 June 1937, “Comments and Recommendations—Fleet Problem XVIII,” p. 7.

  60.M964-23, 1, Commander Battle Force (Commander Black Fleet, Fleet Problem XVIII), to CINCUS, 23 June 1937, “Comments and Recommendations on Fleet Problem XVII,” pp. 7–11, 18–19.

  61.Joseph J. “Jocko” Clark, Capt., USN. “Comments and Recommendations-Fleet Problem XVIII,” M964-23, 1, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, to CINCUS, 4 June 1937, p. 65.

  62.Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 272. If true, this suggests that Horne’s available final report, M964-23, 1, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, to CINCUS, 4 June 1937, “Comments and Recommendations—Fleet Problem XVIII,” is a much toned-down document.

  63.M964-24, 1, United States Fleet, 3 January 1938, Operation Order No. 3-38, Task Organization, with annexes; NWCA, Carton 65, U.S. Fleet, General Instructions and Information (12 January 1938), and U.S. Fleet OpPlan 3-38 (6 January 1938), with annexes.

  64.Captain John Towers commanded Saratoga, the first of the Navy’s pioneer airmen to command a carrier, having earned his wings in 1911. Lexington did not take part because food poisoning had incapacitated 450 of her crew. For a brief treatment, see “Lexington, CV-2, March 29, 1938, Hawaiian Flu Felled 450 Sailors,” Carrier Capsules 151 (31 March 2000), www.carriersg.org/151.htm.

  65.Very tight security resulted in King’s “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor receiving no press coverage at the time, but word eventually leaked out; see Lieutenant Stephen Jurika Jr., “Pilots, Man Your Planes,” The Saturday Evening Post, 7 January 1939, pp. 33ff.

  66.Grimes, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, p. 184.

  67.M964-25, 1, CNO to CINCUS, n.d., “Fleet Problem XX—Concept of”; NWCA, Carton 65, U.S. Fleet OpOrd No. 13-38 (4 November 1938), Task Organization; M964-25, 4, U.S. Fleet Operation Order 3 November 1938; E. C. Kalbfus, “Fleet Problem XX: White Fleet Estimate of the Situation”; Black Fleet, “Fleet Problem XX Estimate of the Situation,” 18 January 1939; Commander Battle Force to CINCUS, 20 March 1939, Critique Fleet Problem XX—Remarks of Commander WHITE Fleet; Commander, Black Fleet (Commander, Scouting Force) to CINCUS, Fleet Problem XX—Comment and Recommendation. Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 33–50, has an excellent treatment. The scenario assumed that a coup in Green (notionally comprising northern Brazil, the Guianas, half of Venezuela, and most of the Lesser Antilles) had secured Italo-German support. It reflected the events of the Spanish Civil War and was hardly fanciful, given pro-fascist movements in several Latin American countries. A commentator in Time flatly stated that the problem was intended to “remind Europe’s fascists that the U.S. is still a major power in the Atlantic,” see “Fleet Problem XX,” Time, 9 January 1939.

  68.Saratoga remained in the Pacific with a small task force showing the flag and conducting exercises in underway replenishment. As carriers required about two years to become fully operational, Yorktown (CV-5) and Enterprise (CV-6), commissioned in September 1937 and May 1938, respectively, were limited to operating aircraft in good weather during daylight hours only. Minoru Genda later claimed that watching a newsreel of the four American carriers operating together during King’s maneuvers led him to propose creation of the “First Air Fleet,” which opened the Pacific War for Japan in spectacular fashion. See Minoru Genda, “Evolution of Aircraft Carrier Tactics in the Imperial Japanese Navy,” Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy, ed. Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 24. In October 1943 three fleet carriers and three light carriers conducted a series of raids on Wake Island.

  69.M964-32, 1, United States Fleet, 16 February 1940, Change No. 1 to U.S. Fleet Operation Order No. 2–40; NWCA, Carton 66, U.S. Fleet OpOrd 2-40, Task Organization, 15 January 1940, with Annex B, “General Plan for Fleet Problem XXI and Annual Fleet Exercises, 1 April-17 May 1940.” Of particular interest is James O. Richardson, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, U.S.N. (Ret.), as told to George C. Dyer (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1973), pp. 236–50, the only published critique of a problem by a CinCUS. See also, John F. Wukovits, Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 49–56.

  70.M964-33, 4, COMSCOFOR (Commander Maroon Fleet), to CINCUS, “Maroon Report of Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI,” with COMSCOFOR to CINCUS, 26 April 1940, “Fleet Problem XXI, Part VI, Narrative,” attached; M964-35, 1, COMBATFOR to CINCUS, 15 May 1940, “Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of Commander Purple Fleet.”

  71.Richardson, Treadmill, p. 246. Campbell, “The Influence of Air Power,” pp. 177–79.

  72.M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H. Schofield,” pp. 16, 32. The higher operating tempo was particularly important during the years of Depression budgets (FYs 1930–1933), when flying hours appear to have fallen as low as fifteen a month; for some comment, see Steve Ewing, Thach Weave: The Life of Jimmie Thach (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), pp. 15ff.

  73.Two of these officers have good biographies: Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); and John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006). But Wilson Brown, and most of the other officers mentioned in this essay, still await one.

  CHAPTER 8

  The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940: The Impact on American Preparedness for World War II

  Timothy H. Jackson and Stanley D. M. Carpenter

  Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, Rear Admiral William F. Fullam, observing a display of naval aviation on Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, stated: “They came in waves, until they stretched almost from horizon to horizon, row upon row of these flying machines. What chance, I thought, would any ship, any fleet have against an aggregate such as this? You could shoot them from the skies like passenger pigeons, and still there would be more than enough to sink you. Now I loved the battleship, devoted my whole career to it, but at that moment I knew the battleship was through.”1

  Common perception has long held that the advocates of the large, dreadnought, big-gun capital ship actively frustrated and obfuscated aircraft carrier and general naval aviation development in the interwar period. While the battleship advocates, especially those associated with the Bureau of Naval Ordnance (aka the “Gun Club”) refused to view the aircr
aft carrier as the key capital ship of the future, many primary players of the period nevertheless did not discourage the development of naval aviation. Rather, most battleship advocates viewed the carrier as an adjunct to the battle line, performing fleet support roles such as scouting, reconnaissance, and gunfire spotting. Key leaders such as Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) from 1921 until his untimely death in an airship accident in 1933, pushed naval aviation development with great vigor and positive results. In Congress, naval aviation advocates such as Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), formed a corps of powerful advocates who ensured that the legislative and budgetary process supported naval aviation through the fiscally challenging 1930s. The ultimate expression of naval expansion following the lean interwar years, as characterized by ship and personnel drawdowns in accordance with naval armament treaties (1922 and 1930), came in the summer of 1940 with the two-ocean naval legislation (Vinson-Walsh Act). That legislation, the result of which was the massive United States Navy of World War II, will be examined in light of the impact on the evolution and development of naval aviation that rapidly replaced the battleship as the ultimate capital ship in the immediate post–Pearl Harbor era.

  Left to right: Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA); Secretary of Navy Francis P. Matthews; Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations; and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, 6 October 1949.

  While many directions might be taken, this chapter examines three essential topics. Part I addresses the contextual background to the evolution of aircraft carriers and naval aviation in the interwar period of 1919–1939. Part II examines the legislative process, particularly the actions of Representative Vinson, the major political champion of naval expansion and aviation. Finally, part III looks at the results of the 1940 legislation in practical terms and how it put to sea the fleet of 1943–1945 that won the war in the Pacific and ensured Allied domination of the Atlantic against the German Kriegsmarine. While other ship types resulting from the 1940 legislation will be mentioned, this chapter focuses on aircraft carriers and naval aviation.