One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power
Page 34
A number of other operations involving naval aircraft are worthy of discussion in drawing conclusions about the development of naval aircraft through World War II. Radar-equipped aircraft made tremendous strides in operations after dark during World War II, completing some 5,800 action sorties from carriers and land bases. From a total of only 76 attacks (air-to-ground and air-to-air) against enemy targets in 1942, naval aviation night operations grew to include 2,654 nocturnal attacks in 1944. The PBYs would not have been able to have as much of an offensive impact as they did without their night attack capability.71 Carrier aircraft, despite fears about tying carriers to beachheads in support of amphibious operations, achieved a great deal of success in providing close air support to assault forces, primarily flying from escort carriers. Naval aircraft, including carrier-based ones, proved that they could neutralize land-based air power, with fighter sweeps focusing on enemy airfields on island chains and the Japanese homeland serving the purpose of striking potential attackers at their source. “Pilots must be impressed with the double profit feature of destruction of enemy aircraft,” read a June 1945 memorandum on target selection for Task Force 38 carriers operating off Japan. “Pilots must understand the principles involved in executing a blanket attack. The Blanket Operation is NOT a defensive assignment. It is a strike against air strength.”72 Finally, in the field of weapons development, the advances like electronic countermeasures equipment to thwart enemy radar and the introduction of high-velocity aircraft rockets (HVAR) made carrier aircraft more capable platforms, the latter yielding positive results particularly in close air support against enemy defensive positions.73
In a speech delivered during the 1920s, Admiral William S. Sims remarked, “One of the outstanding lessons of the overseas problems played each year is that to advance in a hostile zone, the fleet must carry with it an air force that will assure, beyond a doubt, command of the air. This means not only superiority to enemy fleet aircraft, but also to his fleet and shore-based aircraft combined.”74 This statement reflected the essence of naval air power, and it can be argued that during the interwar years all aspects of aircraft development, from design to tactics, supported the drive of naval aviation advocates toward a fleet that reflected this vision. By 1945, at the end of the greatest war the world has ever known, a triumphant flight of hundreds of carrier planes over the battleship Missouri (BB 63) as the instrument of surrender was being signed on her deck was proof that the vision had been realized.
NOTES
1.Lieutenant Austin K. Doyle to Mrs. Jamie R. Doyle, 13 February 1929 (Admiral Austin K. Doyle Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum (hereafter cited as Doyle Papers).
2.Doyle graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1919 as a member of the class of 1920, his graduation date moved up because of World War I. He commanded two carriers, Nassau (ACV-16) and Hornet (CV-12), during World War II.
3.Roy Grossnick, ed., U.S. Naval Aviation, 1910–1995 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), p. 37.
4.Peter M. Bowers, Curtiss Aircraft, 1907–1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 74–75; Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 99, 117.
5.Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911–1929 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp. 27–30, 37; Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 38.
6.Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin to his wife, 23 January 1914 (Captain Henry C. Mustin Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
7.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, pp. 505–6.
8.Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, pp. 37–38.
9.“Tactics,” Thesis submitted by Commander Patrick N. L. Bellinger as a member of the class of 1926 at the U.S. Naval War College (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
10.War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
11.Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 186; Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 31.
12.René J. Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920, vol. 1 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 46–52.
13.Thomas Wildenberg, Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), pp. 104–7; “Aircraft Tactics—Development of,” Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, 3 February 1927 (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum); Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons, p. 116.
14.Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 167; Barrett Tillman, “Douglas TBD: The Maligned Warrior,” The Hook (August 1990), pp. 18–22.
15.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 49; “The Naval Air Service,” A lecture delivered at the Army War College by Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, 10 November 1925 (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
16.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, pp. 65–66.
17.Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons, p. 190; “Organization of Naval Aviation Battle Fleet, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, 1931” (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum); Bowers, Curtiss Aircraft, pp. 205.
18.War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934.
19.Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft since 1911 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 443–46; Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, pp. 136–37; Bowers, Curtiss Aircraft, p. 264; Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons, p. 190.
20.Moffett, “The Naval Air Service.”
21.The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Story (Hartford: Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, 1950), pp. 49–51.
22.Quoted in Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 114.
23.Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, pp. 212–13, quoted in Bureau of Aeronautics Newsletter (1 March 1933).
24.Commanding Officer, VF-5B, to Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 22 May 1935 (copy in Doyle Papers).
25.Aircraft Tactical Board, Aircraft, Battle Force to Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, 21 January 1936 (Doyle Papers).
26.Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, pp. 217–18; René Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 377.
27.New York Times, 10 February 1929.
28.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 38; Commander Air Detachment to Air Detachment, 28 June 1920 (William W. Townsley Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
29.Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, pp. 428–48.
30.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 48; Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, 174–76; Admiral Hugh Rodman to Captain Henry C. Mustin, 9 October 1920 (Correspondence File, 1917–1920, Box 2, Henry C. Mustin Paper, Library of Congress).
31.Rear Admiral A. W. Johnson, The Naval Patrol Plane: Its Development and Use of the Navy, 1935 (copy in Kenneth Whiting Papers, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy).
32.Ibid.
33.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 86.
34.Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 175–76.
35.Ibid.
36.Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, pp. 95–96.
37.Rear Admiral Ernest J. King to Rear Admiral Arthur B. Cook, 21 July 1936 (Correspondence File-Arthur B. Cook, Box 5, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
38.Commander Aircraft, Base Force to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, 1 June 1937 (Memoranda File, 1936–1937, Box 4, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
39.Captain William R. Furlong to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, 4 September 1937 (Correspondence Files E–F, 1936–1938, Box 5, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
40.Miller, War Plan O
range, p. 176.
41.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 49. These tests were more famous for the publicity garnered by Army bombers that supported General William Mitchell’s efforts to form an independent air service.
42.Bureau of Aeronautics Memorandum, 13 December 1934 (Correspondence H-R, 1933–1936, Box 4, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
43.Admiral Joseph M. Reeves to Captain John H. Hoover, 9 April 1935 (Correspondence Files H, 1936–1938, Box 5, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress); and Captain John H. Hoover to Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, 10 January 1935 (Correspondence Files R, 1936–1938, Box 6, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
44.Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 179.
45.Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1941 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1941).
46.Ibid.
47.Captain John Hoover to Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, 10 January 1935 (Correspondence Files R, 1936–1938, Box 6, Ernest J. King Papers, Library of Congress).
48.See entries in Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, for respective aircraft; Barrett Tillman, “Cost of Doing Business,” Flight Journal, Vol. 14, No. 6 (December 2009), p. 31.
49.Statistical Information on World War II Carrier Experience: Special Study-Aircraft Performance Characteristics (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
50.Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II (Washington, DC: Air Branch, Officer of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946), p. 60.
51.Ibid.
52.Ibid., p. 84.
53.Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 183, 187; René Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 454–61, 320–29; Statistical Information on World War II Carrier Experience: Special Study-Aircraft Performance Characteristics (copy in Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
54.Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation, p. 448.
55.Ibid., pp. 423–31.
56.Commander, Fighting Squadron Ten to Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Report of Action—10–17 November 1942 (copy in files of Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
57.Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, 2nd edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 62; Papers of Thomas Provost (Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
58.John B. Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 458–68.
59.Captain Seldon B. Spangler to Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, Report on Trip to Pacific Area, 5 May 1945 (Vice Admiral Seldon B. Spangler Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
60.Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II, pp. 112–13.
61.Ibid., p. 109.
62.Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, p. 357.
63.Naval Aviation Combat Statistic—World War II, p. 102.
64.Ibid.
65.Captain Seldon B. Spangler to Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, Report on Trip to Pacific Area, 5 May 1945 (Vice Admiral Seldon B. Spangler Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum); Commander William N. Leonard to Vice Admiral John S. McCain, circa 1944 (copy in John S. Thach Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
66.Commander Seldon B. Spangler to Director of Material, Bureau of Aeronautics, Comments on Various Airplanes (Vice Admiral Seldon B. Spangler Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
67.Michael D. Roberts, Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2000), p. 443.
68.See Captain Richard C. Knott, The American Flying Boat: An Illustrated History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
69.Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft, p. 103.
70.Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II, pp. 15, 124.
71.Ibid., pp. 119–20.
72.Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 350; Commander, Task Force 38 to Task Force 38, 26 June 1945, Selection of Japanese Targets for Carrier Based Attack (copy in John S. Thach Papers, Emil Buehler Naval Aviation Library, National Naval Aviation Museum).
73.For HVAR use, see Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II, pp. 33–35.
74.In Chronological Section, 1904–1921, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett Papers (Microfilm copy in Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy).
CHAPTER 11
Straight Up: Vertical Flight in the U.S. Navy
Kevin J. Delamer
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL HELICOPTERS: SOMEONE ELSE’S PROBLEM
The story of naval aviation is the tale of a century spent surpassing artificial boundaries and constraints, often imposed by individuals who were not themselves naval aviators. The history of rotary-wing aviation in the naval Services is a parallel story. The first demonstration of the capability of a helicopter to operate from a ship was sponsored by the Maritime Commission and was conducted by an Army Air Force pilot on 7 May 1943. Colonel R. F. Gregory completed his preflight checks at Stratford, Connecticut, started the aircraft and “pulled pitch”—that is to say, raised the control lever in his left hand, the collective, increasing the pitch on all of the main rotor blades simultaneously. This increased pitch generated increased lift and the XR-4 helicopter rose into the air, stabilized for a moment, and headed for the Long Island Sound, where the SS Bunker Hill lay at anchor with U.S. Navy representatives embarked to witness the demonstration. The ship was a tanker modified with a plywood landing platform amidships. The arrangement of the landing platform, athwartships and surrounded by cargo-handling posts and booms, was less then optimal. Like many of the conditions in which naval rotary-wing aviation developed, this arrangement was a precedent that would require time to overcome. Colonel Gregory completed twenty-four1 flights from the deck of Bunker Hill that day, with intervening landings of the pontoon-equipped XR-4 on the water of Long Island Sound.2 In a sense, naval rotary-wing aviation was born that spring day, with an Army pilot at the controls. But the decisions that gave birth to naval rotary-wing aviation predate this demonstration. They were largely decisions made by officers of the United States Coast Guard.
There were a number of promoters of military helicopters. Colonel Gregory was a supporter, having been involved in efforts to adapt the Sikorsky VS-300 into a militarily useful aircraft. The senior leadership of the U.S. Navy did not include any advocates for this new technology. Far from embracing the helicopter, a series of attempts were made to assign the tasks associated with developing this new technology to someone else—anyone else! Initially, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations declined to participate in the development of military helicopters, requesting instead that the U.S. Army Air Force proceed with the development and advise the Navy once a suitable model was available.3 Even after the Army had determined that the VS-300 met the established criteria, the Navy remained skeptical. The Bureau of Aeronautics did issue a planning document in July 1942 calling for the procurement of four helicopters to be used in experiments, but in February 1943, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet assigned the task of exploring the use of ship-based helicopters for anti-submarine warfare to the Coast Guard.4 The U.S. Coast Guard operated as part of the U.S. Navy during time of war, but the assignment of the development task to that Service did not represent a ringing endorsement of the new technology.
The pontoon-equipped XR-4 flights from the USS Bunker Hill in May 1943 marked the birth of naval rotary-wing aviation.
The simple fact is that Navy helicopters, now so ubiquitous a part of every naval operation, owe their existence to the U.S. Coast Guard. The development of naval rotary-wing aviation begins before the U.S. Navy expressed any interest. In May 1940, when Igor Sikorsky conducted his first public demonstration, officers of the U
.S. Coast Guard were present. Commander Watson Burton, the Commander of Air Station, Floyd Bennett Field, and Commander William Kossler, Chief of the Aviation Engineering Division at Coast Guard Headquarters immediately recognized the capabilities that the new technology represented. Additional demonstrations for the U.S. military followed, witnessed by an expanding circle of Coast Guardsmen including Lieutenant Commander Frank Erickson.
Erickson was destined to have a profound impact on the development of Navy helicopters. An early helicopter enthusiast, having read about Sikorsky’s prewar experiments, he “saw great possibilities for an aircraft that could be operated from the deck of a small ship.”5 In June 1942 Erickson had reported to Air Station Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn, New York, as the executive officer. Shortly after his arrival, Commander Kossler, who had taught at the Coast Guard Academy when Erickson was a cadet, made a routine visit to Floyd Bennett Field. The substance of their discussions revolved around Sikorsky’s helicopters. Before the end of the month Kossler’s assistant, Lieutenant Bill Kenly, was sent to an appointment with Igor Sikorsky—by way of Brooklyn. Kenly asked if he could get someone to fly him to Stratford, Connecticut, for his meeting. Erickson later learned that the stop at Brooklyn was a subterfuge aimed at judging the true level of his interest in the project.6 If Kossler had any doubts, they were alleviated by the enthusiastic response of the executive officer. The date was 26 June and Erickson was en route to becoming Coast Guard Helicopter Pilot Number One.
The fervor demonstrated by these Coast Guard pioneers was arrayed against determined skeptics at the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics. In November 1941 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order placing the Coast Guard under the operational control of the Navy.7 This fact constrained the efforts of the Coast Guard to purchase helicopters. By law, Coast Guard aircraft procurement was controlled by the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), an organization hostile to the idea of developing rotary-wing aircraft. In 1942 it was a large bureaucratic organization with a wide scope of responsibility including fleet operations, procurement, research, development of shipboard systems supporting aircraft, and numerous other functions. The divisions, committees, and boards that performed these functions had evolved into a variety of fiefdoms, none of which experimental helicopters fell into comfortably. The attitude of the Navy as perceived by the Coast Guard leadership was simple. The helicopter had originally been proposed as a “flying lifeboat.” When Commander Kossler initially discussed the procurement of helicopters with Coast Guard flag officers the response was emphatic: “Hell, Bill, the Navy is not interested in lifesaving, [sic] they just want to get on with the business of killing the enemy.”8 While the later assignment of submarines and patrol aircraft to the recovery of downed airmen belies this attitude, the realities in early 1942 of an avalanche of immediate, critical tasks assigned to the bureau at the very least drove experimentation on helicopters to a very low priority.