One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  Changes in the concept of carrier employment also occurred in the course of the war from a blue-water replacement for the battleship to that of a more littoral and land-focused platform. This led to the idea of aircraft carriers operating throughout the world in environments where land-based air power may not be available. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger personified his evolving view of the utility of the carrier many years later with his famous question during times of crisis, “Where are the carriers?”109 Of course, carriers themselves underwent significant enhancements beginning with upgrades to Essex-class ships. This led to development of the big deck super carriers including the Forrestal class in 1955 followed by the nuclear-powered Enterprise and Nimitz classes.110

  A need for carrier-based fighters that could compete with the Communist MiG-15 in air-to-air combat as effectively as the Air Force F-86 Sabre influenced the development of the F-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom II, both of which performed well against the MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 in Vietnam. Modernization of naval ground attack capability resulted in production of the superb A-4 Skyhawk light attack jet.111 Further, the need for an all-weather, night strike plane led to production of the A-6 Intruder (along with its electronic warfare variant, the EA-6B Prowler), another weapon system that performed very well in Southeast Asia and subsequently. The tactical maturing of the helicopter during the war had an impact on land combat like few innovations in military history. This constitutes another important area where the experiences and lessons of the Korean War profoundly affected events a few years later in Vietnam.112 Regrettably, this good use of lessons learned and improvement in warfighting did not extend itself to an understanding of the role of strategy in warfare—and the importance of adequacy in strategy—once the United States committed itself to the conflict in Southeast Asia.113 Having accepted war without victory in Korea, American leaders twenty years later found it possible to accept defeat for the first time ever in Vietnam.114 The most important lesson of Korea and of the history of warfare in general is that wars are won by adequate strategy and not tactical or operational excellence alone. This seems to have been completely lost on America’s leaders of the 1960s.115

  THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

  The United States went to war in Vietnam to stop aggressive Communism, just as it had in Korea, but numerous differences existed in both the road to war and in its execution. Among the most notable was the gradual nature in which American leaders moved the nation toward engagement. Unlike the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950, there was no main force attack across a recognized border that could rally international outrage. Apparently the Vietnamese Communists had learned from the mistake of Kim Il-sung in this regard.116 The leaders of North Vietnam cloaked their aggression under a banner of ideology and nationalism with a heavy coating of ambiguity. Unlike North Korean leaders, they cleverly avoided creating an image in their persons or actions that would stand comparison to the aggressive acts of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (or for that matter, Communist North Korea).

  Another significant difference between Vietnam and Korea involves the state of American military preparedness. Unlike the almost criminal neglect of the U.S. armed forces in the late 1940s, American’s military Services entered Vietnam well prepared, probably better prepared than in any of its previous wars. Of course, the U.S. Army was primarily prepared to fight a conventional war and not an insurgency, which constituted a major part of the Vietnam War in its earlier phases.117 This situation resulted from the Cold War orientation of military leaders of that period, and should not detract from the general quality of the Services. As noted before, all Services had learned many lessons from the Korean War and integrated subsequent improvements into their planning, procurement, training, and Service cultures. It seems the only lesson unlearned was the need for an adequate strategy that would match U.S. policy objectives, adapt America’s superb military capability to the needs of the Vietnam War, and turn tactical and operational supremacy into strategic success.118 That lesson was the responsibility of America’s civilian and military leaders at the highest level, and one in which they failed utterly.

  North Vietnam’s Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, initially thought that he could bring down the South Vietnamese government through political action and internal agitation. Yet the government of Ngo Dinh Diem not only survived those efforts, but also began taking effective action against Communist leaders and organizations throughout the South. By 1959 Ho and his colleagues believed it necessary to launch an armed insurgency to achieve their objective. This began on a large scale in July of that year with the infiltration of some four thousand well-trained cadre men into South Vietnam. From that point on, events began to favor the Communists, and by 1961, the Viet Cong appeared on the verge of victory.119 By this time, the United States was deeply involved in the affairs of South Vietnam and the prospect of its collapse revived memories of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, and the political recriminations it created within the United States.120 This presented a problem requiring delicate attention at the highest level of government.

  As early as 1950, the United States had established a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon to oversee disbursement of financial aid and delivery of armaments to the French during their Indochina War.121 This grew into a mechanism for supporting the government of South Vietnam and eventually included U.S. military advisers to the South Vietnamese armed forces.122 In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy and his administration began to consider, for the first time, the prospect of sending U.S. ground combat forces into the conflict. It was an unappealing prospect, and one that Kennedy avoided, deciding instead for increased financial and material support along with sending additional military advisers.123 This surge of American support, coupled with more aggressive action by South Vietnamese forces, stabilized the situation for a time. The increased American commitment included contingents of U.S. Army and Marine Corps helicopters designed to enhance the mobility of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN). The Marine element—named Operation Shufly—continued to perform that mission until March 1964 at which time it was absorbed into the larger effort under way in Vietnam.124 In addition to advisers, aviation units, and support elements in South Vietnam, U.S. carriers patrolled the Vietnam coastline throughout the early 1960s, launching unarmed reconnaissance aircraft as well as search and rescue helicopters when any of the aircraft were lost.125 The role of naval aviation in the Vietnam War began with America’s earliest involvement and remained an essential element across a wide spectrum of missions throughout.

  The aircraft carriers of the Vietnam era included Essex- (upgraded), Midway-, and Forrestal-class ships and USS Enterprise. They typically carried Air Wings of two fighter squadrons, two or three attack squadrons, early warning and photoreconnaissance planes, and varying detachments of helicopters. The Essex carriers could support F-8 Crusader fighters, A-1 (formerly AD) Skyraiders, and A-4 Skyhawk attack planes. When the Skyraiders were withdrawn from the fleet in early 1968, they were replaced with additional squadrons of Skyhawks. On the big-deck Forrestal carriers, at least one of the fighter squadrons would consist of F-4 Phantom II jets. When the A-6 Intruder bombers reached the fleet in 1965, they also resided on Forrestal carriers as did the next generation of light attack planes, the A-7 Corsair II.126 These carriers and their escorts were less mobile in Vietnam than during Korea due primarily to geography. Whereas the peninsular character of Korea provided ample opportunity for carriers to reposition themselves to best support their missions, the linear coastline of Vietnam along the South China Sea did not lend itself to such action. The carriers in Southeast Asia operated about 150 miles offshore from a reference point east of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) named Yankee Station. As in the Korean War, carriers and Air Groups from Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 77 performed a variety of missions in support of the war effort.

  U.S. Navy F-4B Phantom II from the USS Ranger, February 1968.

  Although carrier air tended to focus on
North Vietnam early in the war, it so impressed General William Westmoreland that he requested a second station farther south from which to conduct naval air operations in South Vietnam. In response, the Navy created a point off the South Vietnamese coast southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, which it named Dixie Station. This southern position normally had a lower priority for carriers than Yankee Station because Air Force and Marine Corps tactical aircraft were also available from land bases in South Vietnam and Thailand with which to support ground operations.127 Since Yankee Station primarily supported operations in North Vietnam, it was usually more active and typically had at least three carriers on station permitting twenty-four-hour operations. It was not unusual for there to be four or five carriers on Yankee Station and the count even went as high as six at one point late in the war.128

  By the end of 1962, the United States had over 11,000 military personnel in South Vietnam consisting primarily of advisers, pilots, and support personnel. Throughout this early period, officials denied that Americans engaged in combat in South Vietnam. Yet advisers went into battle with their assigned units, and pilots flew combat missions in support of operations from the earliest days, often under the guise of training or advising. Predictably, Americans began taking casualties during this time, including thirty-two killed in action during 1961–1962.129 In February 1962, Washington transformed the MAAG into an overarching organization to coordinate assistance and operations, renaming it the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), with General Paul D. Harkins assigned as commander.130 General William Westmoreland would replace Harkins in this role during July 1964. In November 1963, before Washington had made any key decisions regarding the introduction of American ground combat forces, assassins had taken the lives of Presidents Diem and Kennedy, leaving the new American president, Lyndon B. Johnson, in the position of deciding Vietnam’s future.131 Regrettably, Johnson would prove to be America’s least resolute wartime president.

  When Johnson acceded to the presidency, he faced an increasingly aggressive Communist campaign in South Vietnam, yet his initial reaction was to continue the policy of equivocation, even in face of direct attacks on American personnel and facilities.132 That would change somewhat in August 1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in which three North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the American destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Maddox was part of the Navy’s DeSoto intelligence-gathering program that supported South Vietnam’s covert operations in the North. When the enemy boats fired torpedoes at Maddox, its captain returned fire and vectored in a flight of F-8 Crusaders from USS Ticonderoga, which attacked with rockets and cannon fire, adding to the damage inflicted by Maddox and sinking at least one of the boats. Two days later, during hours of darkness, a second attacked occurred, which the sailors of Maddox and Turner Joy (which had joined Maddox after the first attack) believed to be real, but many historians consider illusionary.133 Regardless of the veracity of the second attack, the Gulf of Tonkin incident(s) marked the beginning of a greater level of American involvement in the Vietnam War. Within hours, President Johnson ordered retaliatory air raids, known as Operation Pierce Arrow, against five patrol boat bases along the North Vietnam coast, on any enemy boats observed, and at the fuel installation at Vinh. Crusader, Skyhawk, and Skyraider aircraft from Ticonderoga and Constellation launched their attacks on 5 August, sinking eight boats, damaging twenty-one, and destroying the fuel installation at Vinh. The Navy lost two planes in the attack including an A-4 Skyhawk flown by Lieutenant (jg) Everett Alvarez from Constellation. Alverez became the first Navy prisoner of war in Vietnam, remaining so for the next eight and a half years.134 Regrettably, the pilot of the second plane, Lieutenant (jg) Richard Sather did not survive. Both losses resulted from ground-based anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire.135

  The most important result of the Gulf of Tonkin incident(s), of course, was the Southeast Asia Resolution (commonly called the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) of 10 August 1964 in which the U.S. Congress granted President Johnson broad authority to assist South Vietnam and other U.S. allies in Southeast Asia.136 After the 5 August attack on the North Vietnam naval facilities, President Johnson fell back into the pattern of inaction, declining to react even to direct and intentional attacks against American personnel and aircraft in South Vietnam. To some extent, the upcoming November 1964 election, in which Johnson was running for president of the United States as a peace candidate, may have influenced his decisions.137 His opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater, was widely viewed as a dangerous hawk who would embroil the United States in a war in Southeast Asia if elected. Regardless of the reason, this lack of American action gave heart to Communist leaders, and the situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate.138

  In late 1964 and early 1965, the North Vietnamese government began moving main force North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units into the South for a war-winning push.139 Communist guerrilla activity increased, including attacks against American personnel and facilities. The administration finally reacted to Viet Cong provocations in February 1965 (after Johnson’s re-election and inauguration) when Communists attacked the U.S. base complex at Pleiku, South Vietnam, killing nine Americans, wounding one hundred, and inflicting heavy damage on U.S. aircraft and structures.140 In response, some eighty-three planes from Coral Sea, Hancock, and Ranger, along with an element of the South Vietnamese Air Force struck back in an operation named Flaming Dart I. This action included strikes on the North Vietnamese barracks at Dong Hoi and Vit Thu Lu as well as targets in Vinh, all at the cost of one A-4 Skyhawk. Critics consider these objectives relatively insignificant, selected by civilian leaders back in Washington and not military commanders who sought a stronger response against more legitimate and vital targets.141

  Shortly after Flaming Dart I, the Viet Cong struck the U.S. barracks at Qui Nhon, killing twenty-three Americas and wounding many more. Ninety-nine planes from Coral Sea, Hancock, and Ranger immediately responded with Flaming Dart II, which attacked the Chanh Hoa barracks just north of the DMZ. Weather problems unique to this area, particularly during the winter months, minimized the effectiveness of this strike. Additionally, ground fire brought down three Navy planes while damaging several others. These were the first of the Alpha Strikes, which utilized all available elements of a carrier wing.142 Alpha strikes could put a very heavy weight of ordnance on targets in a very short period of time, “either for shock effect or to penetrate very heavy defenses.”143 Despite the quantity of firepower used, the Flaming Dart operations proved ineffective in reducing attacks on American personnel and installations. Therefore, President Johnson initiated an air campaign against North Vietnam on 13 February 1965 named Operation Rolling Thunder, which purported to increase gradually the pain of war to the point that North Vietnamese leaders would give up their effort.144

  The execution of Operation Rolling Thunder involved carrier aircraft from Task Force 77 along with land-based Marine Corps and Air Force planes flying from South Vietnam and Thailand.145 There were many problems with Rolling Thunder, including the fact that the first attacks did not launch until 5 March and then mostly against insignificant targets. Additionally, the missions were initially limited in frequency, placing little or no pressure on North Vietnamese leaders and certainly having no effect on their behavior.146 Unlike the aggressive, hard-hitting interdiction and strike packages against North Korea during 1950–1953, Rolling Thunder amounted to an ineffective, highly restricted, low-impact effort entirely wanting in its effect.147 This did not result from the lack of effort by American aviators, but from restrictive targeting. In other words, Rolling Thunder was an intense effort against second-and third-level targets and not a thrust for the enemy’s jugular. Of course, none of this kept the operation from being highly dangerous to the pilots flying the missions. Despite the effort expended, Rolling Thunder failed to communicate American determination to the Communist enemy as President Johnson had intended. Hanoi took the gradual and minimalist approach of Rolling Thunder as an indication of l
ack of will rather than a demonstration of American resolve.148 Additionally, the strategy, tactics, and target selection that underlay Rolling Thunder were inconsistent with the advice of most military commanders, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and eventually even the American ambassador to South Vietnam.149

  Ironically, the decision to place inordinate restrictions on the air campaign in North Vietnam occurred simultaneously with the commitment of American ground combat forces into the South. Many commanders considered this disconnect to be a serious mistake. In the words of Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief of Pacific Command at the time: “Despite John McCone’s (the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) perceptive warning vis-á-vis the implications of deploying those ground forces without making full use of our air power against the north, Secretary McNamara chose to do just that; i.e., to downgrade the U.S. air effort in North Vietnam and to concentrate on air and ground action in the south. This fateful decision contributed to our ultimate loss of South Vietnam as much as any other single action we took during our involvement.”150 Of course, not everyone agrees with Admiral Sharp’s point of view on the potential of air power to win the Vietnam War; yet when Rolling Thunder ended in October 1968, few would argue that it had been an effective campaign.151

  The Rolling Thunder campaign that began so inauspiciously in February 1965 was designed to progress from near the DMZ northward, under the assumption that the Communists would give up the war rather than risk destruction. But the effort never had the conviction necessary to impress North Vietnamese leaders.152 The restrictions placed on the operation ensured it would not be effective, and the policy of gradualism permitted the Communists to adjust to every measure.153 Such requirements as administration approval before every strike, no pre-strike reconnaissance, no follow-up secondary strikes, and positive identification of enemy aircraft before engagement (at closing speeds of up to one thousand miles per hour) incensed commanders and pilots alike. Additionally, prohibiting pilots from attacking surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites before they were fully functional (and not always then) and not allowing pilots to use unexpended ordnance on targets of opportunity were initially frustrating and ultimately deadly. Should it be necessary to cancel a mission for any reason whatsoever, including weather, the flyers could not simply re-schedule it, but had to go through an entirely new planning and approval cycle.154 Additionally, President Johnson ordered periodic bombing halts intended to cause the North Vietnamese to reconsider the situation, all of which had no more impact than the ineffectual bombing itself.155