One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  Early aviation experiments in the Navy were multifaceted. The Navy considered a number of ways to adapt air power for naval applications. Everything was tried; most were adopted. With the technology of the 1910s, the Navy looked into lighter-than-air (LTA) as a viable possibility for fleet support. Given that LTA was at the time comparable technology to heavier-than-air, the Navy began an expanded program of LTA development.10 In addition to LTA, the Navy embraced land-based aircraft in experiments both onboard ships as well as from land bases. Further, the Navy was interested in sea-based floatplanes and flying boats for the flexibility they promised. Beginning with the 1911 USS Pennsylvania experiments, the Navy sought ways to incorporate air power into existing doctrine. In January, test pilot Eugene Ely made aviation history when he landed his Curtiss pusher on a modified deck, proving the feasibility of aviation for naval applications. Further Navy tests proved the viability of aircraft wedded to ships, aircraft carrier technology received due attention, and floatplanes were assigned to seaplane tenders, battleships, and cruisers. As Navy experiments progressed, Navy doctrine began to form. In the end, developing doctrine focused on the core naval roles that aircraft provided in support of the fleet.

  The Great War brought rapid expansion to the naval air arm; during the war Congress appropriated the necessary funds.11 At one point, an idea was floated to define U.S. naval aviation as a separate component of the Navy, like the semiautonomy of the Marine Corps, which was unsuccessful.12 During the war, naval aviation came into its own. Planes and balloons were employed to support the fleet in the Atlantic. Early roles included using air assets in the observation role to protect the fleet against German surface and sub-surface threats. The U-boat (Unterseeboote—submarines) was emerging as a threat to the U.S. Navy and merchant marine when transporting goods to the war zone. Naval aviation found its niche: protecting fleets and convoys from the German Hochseeflotte. However, the first “Battle of the Atlantic” was fought with very primitive technology; the United States did not yet have aircraft carriers. The Navy employed balloon ships and seaplane tenders (which used cranes to lower and recover seaplanes for use) in the role of fleet protection. Interestingly, the Navy did set up static bases on land in the United States, using land-based aircraft for fleet support and for anti-submarine warfare close to the East Coast. Along the Atlantic coast of the United States, the Naval Reserve Flying Corps was tasked with practicing flying and providing observation for the Navy. Among the corps were a group known as the “Yale Unit,” formed into the Aerial Coast Patrol, flying out of Gravesend Bay (New York) spotting for mines.13 However, when the war started for the Americans,14 the Navy still only had fifty-four planes, three balloons, and forty-eight Navy and Marine Corps officers. With the commitment to the war, the Navy expanded rapidly.

  The first component was money. Immediately after the declaration of war, the Navy was given $3 million for aviation procurement, followed by $11 million in June and another $45 million in October. Money was not the issue. Unfortunately, planes were not easily built, and pilots took time to train. The Aircraft Production Board, headed by Howard Coffin, streamlined aircraft production for both the Army and Navy, providing the much needed airframes for war. As part of the later-termed military-industrial complex, a dedicated Naval Aircraft Factory was established in Philadelphia to produce flying boats and seaplanes for the Navy. Although production promises were extravagant, the first H-16 flying boats did not start to roll off the production line until March 1918. Training was even more erratic. Most of the training was farmed out to established training facilities, including one in Toronto, Canada; most Navy pilots were trained at NAS Pensacola (Florida).

  In addition, in order to show good faith to the French, U.S. Navy aviators were sent to France in June 1917. A liaison was sent to Paris; the Navy was determined to support France’s war effort in any way possible. The French demanded that American pilots be retrained by French aviators who already had combat experience, while American mechanics received remedial instruction in country as well. The Americans then set up coastal bases in order to free up French pilots for other duties. By taking over some French bases and building others, the Navy began providing air cover with coastal patrols. Extending their influence across the channel and into the North Atlantic, the Navy also set up bases for operations, training, and repair in England including Eastleigh and Killingholme and in Italy.

  The Navy’s role in World War I air power was mixed and controversial. The Navy was dedicated to providing fleet support, spotting for mines, and conducting anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic and English Channel. But when the Navy requested land-based bombers for offensives against German submarine pens and various land targets, in an early form of strategic bombing, the Army balked. U.S. Army Major General Benjamin Foulois, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Services in theater, blocked Navy procurement of land-based bombers, arguing that strategic bombing was an Army role. The tensions created during the war were continued into the postwar, interwar, era.15 The Army was not only obstreperous about the Navy mounting bombing attacks, it was also vehemently against separating the air services altogether, an argument that would continue to rear its ugly head. In the end, General John Pershing, Commander of the American Allied Expeditionary Forces, was given the final vote; he allowed the Navy to have bombers after the Army’s requirements had been met. The Navy finally had the equipment and manpower to launch bombing raids in September 1918, but only in piecemeal attacks against German targets. By the end of the war, the Navy had discovered two important lessons: first, the need and viability of aircraft for fleet protection, and second, the uphill battle they would face in competing with the Army for aviation resources.

  As well, the Navy realized the effort and costs of the new modern arm. By the end of the war, the Naval Air Arm had grown to include 1,147 officers and more than 18,000 men assigned overseas.16 Naval aviators had flown 22,000 sorties during the war, in a variety of airframes, mostly French and British. By the armistice, the Navy owned 570 aircraft in theater as well as 15 dirigibles and another 215 balloons of all types. Naval expansion illustrates the importance of the new technology to naval strategy.

  The immediate postwar period brought downsizing and doctrinal changes to the Navy. Most of the changes were imposed; but significant changes also came from within. The U.S. Navy made a concerted effort to retain the important new air arm into the post–World War I era in the face of external limitations and internal reassessment.

  Immediately after the war, in historical fashion, the U.S. military—guided by the government—began to radically downsize. Contracts for uncompleted material were cancelled, soldiers and sailors were discharged from duty, and the military demobilized. Navy aviation, while considered important, returned to prewar numbers of men and equipment. However, this was not all bad; the pilots and aircrew were more experienced after the war, and the equipment was substantially better. Naval airframes went on sale as surplus; wartime naval aviators began civilian careers as commercial pilots and instructors, often in the same surplus military aircraft they had flown during the war.

  The early 1920s brought a number of significant changes to naval aviation. The first was good news, in the form of spending. The Naval Appropriations Act (1920) gave money to the Navy, some of which was put toward naval aviation. From the 1920 Act, the Navy commissioned the USS Jupiter (later Langley), the first U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Two other ships were commissioned as seaplane tenders,17 and money was set aside for two dirigibles—one built, and one bought from England. Six coastal bases were also funded.18

  At the highest levels of Navy command—as well as the Navy’s most prestigious schools—naval aviation was a hot topic. In a series of memos between the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the President of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, naval aviation emerged as a front-burner subject.19 The CNO asked the president of the NWC about current thought on the theme, and the president responded with a memo to the CNO.
20 The two-page memo discussed the importance of naval aviation and how it could best serve the Navy. The NWC president was adamant that the Navy retained its aviation capabilities—under no circumstances should it give control of the sphere to the Army.21 At the behest of the president, the NWC began instruction and lectures on the importance and employment of naval aviation as a key component to an integrated Navy doctrine.22 The Navy began a lasting tradition of exploring and explicating the role of aviation in naval doctrine.

  But perhaps most importantly, events in September 1921 solidified Navy concerns about the significance of aviation in the maritime sphere. Ironically it was an Army officer who illustrated the value of aviation to the Navy: William “Billy” Mitchell. Mitchell, who set out to prove the importance of air power to the Army—in order to argue the point of an independent air force23—embarked on aviation trials at the expense of the Navy. In order to show the impotence of the Navy and how air power could be successful, he fabricated an aerial exposition to demonstrate the eclipse of U.S. naval power. With a few planes loaded with bombs, his pilots successfully bombed and sank captured German warships anchored for the demonstration.24 Mitchell did not get an independent air force, angered numerous Army generals and Navy admirals in his path, and was eventually court-martialed for insubordination. What he did achieve, unwittingly, was a determination in the U.S. Navy to pursue naval aviation as part of the Navy, for specifically naval roles. His actions widened further the existing schism between Army and Navy air early in the interwar period.

  Thus, into the 1920s the Navy combined institutional awareness with outside pressure to focus on the importance of aviation. Further, technology was catching up to the promises of effectiveness, and land- and sea-based aircraft were coming into their own. The Navy was still a few years away from carrier-based aviation in a definitive role at the same time that LTA technology was being eclipsed.25 The Navy continued development of aircraft technology as well as serious study on the importance of aviation to the Navy.

  Organizationally, the Navy attempted to conceptualize the role of naval aviation. By 1921, in an effort to retain its aviation arm, the Navy instituted the Bureau of Aeronautics. Citing the importance of the air arm to the Navy, and with the support of the secretary as well as the president, the proposal was signed into effect on 12 July 1921.26 Rear Admiral William Moffett became the first Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), who was tasked with advising the CNO on “all aeronautic planning, operation[s], and administration.”27 Friction emerged over procurement, with competition between BuAer, Plans, and Material divisions; however, coordination within the Navy—even with overlap—allowed Navy aviation to proceed with renewed importance.

  But, what to do with airplanes in a purely naval role remained the dominant question. The Navy was willing to let the Army continue its pursuit of “strategic” bombing as an Army role; the focus was instead on what airplanes could do for the Navy. By 1931 the Navy thought it had a compromise that everyone could work with. In a meeting between the CNO, Admiral William Pratt, and Chief of Staff of the Army General Douglas MacArthur—later known as the Pratt-MacArthur Agreement—it was decided that naval aviation would be “based on the fleet and move with it as an important element in solving the primary missions confronting the fleet . . . thus assuring the fleet absolute freedom of action without any responsibility for coast defense.”28 The presupposition was that the Navy would control all of the air over the water, the Army over the land; each service would stay on its own side of the coast. An immediate issue was that the Navy was still in the experimental phases with their first few aircraft carriers,29 and it was unclear that the Army would attend to coastal defense when called upon.30 With these limitations in mind, the Navy continued development of sea-based aircraft and retained a considerable number of land-based planes for use.31

  In subsequent meetings, there was a lack of consensus about the jurisdiction over coastal defense.32 Throughout the 1930s the Army and Navy bickered over who would watch the coasts in case of enemy action close to the continental United States. The Army, as supported by the Joint Staff in the Drum Board report (1933), indicated that the coasts were the Army’s responsibility, even if under Navy command.33 Likewise, Navy aircraft operating within a two hundred- to three hundred-mile distance from the coast may fall under an Army commander, again, as proposed by the Joint Board in 1935.34 However, it is important to note that while the Joint Board considered it an important issue (with meetings and publications up to and including 1939), and the Navy wanted the Army to commit, the Army did not consider it an important task in their doctrinal writings.35 The Army was more concerned with the doctrines of strategic bombing and slightly less concerned with support of the land forces; there was little writing or intellectual time given to coastal patrol. Interestingly, the Army was so concerned with its monopoly on land-based aircraft that the Secretary of War brought the issue to the president when he found out that the Navy was deploying (land-based) torpedo bombers to Coco Solo and Pearl Harbor. The secretary asked the president to deny future purchases of land-based aircraft for the Navy, citing conflict of interest and duplication of effort.36 Even though the Navy was allowed to continue procurement of land-based aircraft, the dilemma continued, with frequent heated conversations between the Army and Navy over jurisdiction and procurement.

  However, even with inter-Service rivalries with the Army, the naval air arm prospered in the 1930s. Government spending, while curtailed due to the Depression, was forthcoming: bases were built and expanded and aircraft technology evolved. The Hepburn Board (1938) asked for funds for planes and bases; the Navy realized that their duties to protect the fleet and provide necessary aviation assets were important.37 However, the funds were not up to the tasks as proposed, and the Navy lacked another important component: pilots and aircrew. When the government did finally relent and provide the necessary funds, there was little time to prepare, so that the old maxim held true: “When there is time, there is no money; when there is money, there is little time.” Navy aviation faced a crisis in 1939 when wars on two continents boiled over. When the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939, the Navy began “neutrality patrols” in the Atlantic and Caribbean with a mere 90 planes,38 some 700 frontline aircraft in total in the Pacific, flying from land bases and aircraft carriers.39 It was simply not enough, and war was at hand. Germany boasted an overoptimistic force of 5,000 aircraft,40 the Japanese were thought to have as many as 900 naval aircraft and 1,800 Army aircraft.41 The United States in general, and the Navy in particular, found themselves behind in aircraft production and pilot training as war exploded across the globe.

  In spring 1940 the president stepped in to address the situation. In May, Franklin Roosevelt ordered funds for 50,000 aircraft for the Army and Navy. In order to facilitate production at undreamed of levels, the National Defense Advisory Committee was formed to rethink American production. Industry was encouraged with contracts and funding, and the massive buildup for war began. The Navy, with only 1,741 aircraft in June 1940, prepared to accept thousands of planes rather than dozens, Congress authorized 4,500 new aircraft on the 14th, raised it to 10,000 on the 15th, and when France fell at the end of the month, funded 15,000. The immediate problem was the ability to produce the numbers necessary, but at least the Navy did not have to worry about money. The diverse inventory included multiple types for carrier aviation, but also included flying boats like the Consolidated PBY Catalina and PB2Y Coronado as well as the Martin PBM Mariner. The Navy asked for and eventually received (after bitter haggling with the Army) their version of the Consolidated B-24 Liberator (Navy designation PB4Y-1) as well as other land planes from the Army such as the Lockheed Hudson and Vega Ventura. The race against time was on; the Navy prepared as best it could for imminent hostilities against Germany—for the control of the Atlantic and protection of shipping headed to Britain as well as a potential conflict in the Pacific against Japan. When war came in December 1941, in addition to the reinve
ntion of American industry, the Navy had 5,260 aircraft of all types as well as 6,750 pilots available.42

  P-3 Orion conducting ship surveillance in mid-Pacific, September 1974.

  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy was forced to fundamentally reconceptualize doctrine. With the great battleship fleet either sunk or damaged, the only tool left to fight the war was naval aviation. Emphasis was placed on air power assets in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of war.

  EUROPE, THE NORTH ATLANTIC, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST GERMANY

  In the Battle of the Atlantic, the Navy took immediate action to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to supply Britain and keep it in the war. After the fall of France, the British relied heavily on the United States for materials (both civilian and military) for their struggle against Nazi Germany. The enemy retaliated with the naval Battle of the Atlantic, sending German U-boats to sink Allied merchant ships to starve out Britain. The combined U.S. and British response was threefold: the convoy system for merchant shipping, surface escorts for the fleets, and air cover from long-range aircraft. As early as summer 1942 Patrol Squadron (VP) 73, flying PBY Catalinas, was sent from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, to Iceland to fly anti-submarine patrols across the North Atlantic.43 However, there were immediate problems: the “Cats” were ineffective at night, they could not shadow the fleets throughout their journey, and there were too few aircraft necessary for the task. Further squadrons were dispatched to Atlantic bases to provide protection for the convoys; Fleet Air Wing (FAW) 7 was established at Dunkeswell, England, made up of VP-103, 105, and 110. Another three squadrons were eventually sent to provide this invaluable service.