The 900 Days

by Harrison Salisbury

  Admiral Kuznetsov became convinced in later years that some time after noon on Saturday Stalin finally realized that conflict with Germany, if not inescapable, was more and more likely. Kuznetsov’s theory is supported to some extent by the evidence of Army General I. V. Tyulenev, who in June, 1941, was in command of the Moscow Military District.

  General Tyulenev was a Red Army veteran. He had commanded the Soviet troops which took over the Polish areas adjacent to the Ukraine in 1939. He had won his spurs in the Civil War. He had served in the Czar’s Army and had been with the Red Army’s 1st Cavalry.

  As Moscow commandant he was in close touch with Stalin and the Kremlin. He was well briefed on the threatening situation on the Western frontiers. He knew there had been hundreds of Nazi overflights. He knew that Soviet forces had been forbidden to respond to such incidents, and he was uneasy about the situation. However, like many other officers, his concern was eased by a Tass communiqué published June 14 denying there was any basis for rumors of impending war. As he said, “It was impossible not to believe our official organs.”

  Some time on Saturday8 General Tyulenev was told that the Kremlin was calling. When he picked up the receiver, he heard the harsh voice of Stalin, who asked: “Comrade Tyulenev, how are we fixed so far as antiaircraft defense of Moscow is concerned?”

  Tyulenev gave him a brief outline of the status of air precautions as of that Saturday.

  Stalin then said: “Considering the disturbing situation, you should bring the Moscow antiaircraft forces to 75 percent readiness for action.”

  That was the end of the conversation. Tyulenev asked no questions, but he called his chief of air defense, Major General M. S. Gromadin, and told him not to send the AA batteries to summer camp, but to order them on full alert.

  Another decision was made June 21—although possibly by coincidence. A unified fighter command for Moscow air defense was set up and orders for its operation were signed and given to Colonel I. D. Klimov. It was designated as the 6th Fighter Corps but did not actually become operative until after war had begun. It ultimately comprised 11 fighter squadrons with 602 planes. On June 22 its strength was zero.

  Before leaving for the day General Tyulenev checked with Defense Commissar Timoshenko, who advised him there had been more evidence of German war preparations: there were suspicious activities at the German Embassy; many of the embassy personnel had left, either departing the country or driving out of Moscow. Tyulenev telephoned General Staff headquarters as well. He was told that Soviet border commanders reported a quiet day but that intelligence sources continued to indicate an imminent German attack. The information had been relayed to Stalin, who said there was no point in stirring up panic.

  Stalin’s question about the Moscow air defenses did not arouse alarm in General Tyulenev’s mind. He had his chauffeur drive him to the quiet little side street, Rzhevsky Pereulok, where he lived with his wife and two children. He glanced at the newspaper, Vechernaya Moskva, as he drove through the main streets. No special news. He noticed that posters had been put up for Leonid Utyosov’s first summer jazz concert at the Hermitage Park. On Monday a movie was opening—The Treasure of the Gorge. The General heard some youngsters singing from an open window, one of the new popular songs: “Lyubimy gorod . . . beloved city.”

  He wondered what to do on Sunday. Should he spend the day at his summer villa at Serebrany Bor, just outside Moscow, or should he take the youngsters to the opening of the water stadium at Khimki?

  He decided to postpone a decision until morning and, picking up his wife and children in Rzhevsky Pereulok, drove on out to his dacha.

  Tyulenev’s account leaves no doubt that if Stalin reached the conviction on Saturday afternoon that war with Germany was imminent, he did not communicate a feeling of urgency to his military associates. No evidence has come to light that he took other precautionary action on Saturday afternoon until after 5 P.M., when Marshal Timoshenko and General Zhukov were summoned to the Kremlin.

  There a meeting of the Politburo was discussing the possibility that the Germans might attack either Saturday night or on Sunday. Marshal Semyon Budyonny is the only source for what happened, but his account conveys a sense of the unreality of the occasion.9 Those present were called upon to offer their views of what should be done. Budyonny suggested that all armies east of the Dnieper be ordered to start moving in the direction of the frontier. Once they were in motion, he said, “it doesn’t matter what happens. Whether the Germans attack or not, they will be in position.”

  It seems not to have occurred to Budyonny or any one else at the meeting that such a plan would put thousands of troops in motion on highways and railroads, an easy target for the German dive bombers.

  Budyonny’s second proposal was to “take all the ropes off the planes” and put them on a No. 1 Alert. In normal Soviet practice the planes were secured to the ground by ropes and wires. Budyonny’s proposal meant that they would be freed and that the Soviet pilots would sit in readiness for take-off in their cockpits.

  Budyonny’s third proposal was that a line of deep defense be set up on the Dnieper and Dvina from Kiev to Riga. He proposed that the population be mobilized with spades and shovels to transform the banks of the rivers into an impassable tank barrier. He thought that such a defense line would probably be needed because the Germans were in a stage of full military readiness whereas the Soviet forces were in the opposite condition.

  There was some discussion, and then Stalin intervened: “Budyonny seems to know what to do, so let him be in chargé.”

  Budyonny forthwith was named to command the Soviet Reserve Army with the construction of the Dnieper defense line as his immediate assignment. Georgi M. Malenkov was made his political commissar. The appointment came nine hours before the Nazis attacked. Budyonny had nothing with which to carry out his task—no staff, no troops, no equipment, nothing. He hurried off to army headquarters on Frunze Street and told Malenkov he would telephone him as soon as he had a staff put together.10

  At that time, or so Admiral Kuznetsov believes, Stalin must have decided to put Soviet armed forces on a state of combat alert and to order them, in case of need, to oppose a German attack by force.

  Such a decision by Stalin, Kuznetsov concluded, would explain the pile of telegraph blanks which he saw in front of Timoshenko and Zhukov when he was summoned to the Defense Commissariat at 11 P.M. Saturday evening. They had been working for hours at Stalin’s instructions, Kuznetsov believed, drafting orders to put the commands on the alert. These orders were not actually dispatched until about 12:30 A.M. on the twenty-second. So the possibility exists that whatever instructions Stalin may have given at the Politburo meeting were contingent on developments in the course of the evening, such as a possible talk with Ribbentrop.11

  One more action was taken. Special representatives of the High Command were dispatched to border military districts and to the fleets to warn them of the dangers and instruct them to put their units on combat alert.

  It was this mission which put General Meretskov on the Red Arrow to Leningrad Saturday night. But since the High Command’s emissaries were sent by railroad trains which would not arrive at the command points before some hour on Sunday (and in some cases not before Monday)12 it would hardly seem that the Kremlin was convinced that German attack was only hours away.

  Indeed, the texts of the warnings which Timoshenko and Zhukov sent out (many of which arrived hours after the German attack) were only cautionary. They instructed the units to be alert, but they prohibited forward reconnaissance into enemy territory. And they warned sternly against provocations.

  A serious question arose in Admiral Kuznetsov’s mind that Saturday night.

  “I could not throw off some grievous thoughts,” he recalled. “When had the Defense Commissar [Timoshenko] learned of the possible attack of the Hitlerites? What time had he been ordered to put the forces on combat alert? Why had not the government [Stalin] instead of the Defense Commissar given me
the order putting the fleet on combat alert? And why was it all semiofficial and so very, very late?”

  Twenty-five years later the Admiral’s questions still awaited a full answer.

  * * *

  1 Khozyain is the old Russian word for “master” or “landlord.” This is what serfs called their owner. It was customary for bureaucrats to use this term in referring to Stalin.

  2 Dekanozov, for many years an official of the Soviet Security Service and close associate of Lavrenti P. Beria, Soviet security chief, was named Soviet Ambassador in Berlin after accompanying Molotov to Berlin for the conference with Hitler and Ribbentrop in November, 1940. Dekanozov was executed with Beria on December 23, 1953.

  3 The figure of 152 violations of the Soviet air frontier from January 1, 1941, to the beginning of the war is given in the official Soviet military history. (P. N. Pospelov, Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941–1945, Moscow, 1961, Vol. I, p. 479.) The Ukrainian and Byelorussian commands reported 324 overflights from January 1 to June 20, 1941. (V. V. Platonov, Eto Bylo Na Buge, Moscow, 1966, quoting Krasnaya Zvezda, April 14, 1965.)

  4 According to Izmail Akhmedov, a Soviet security agent assigned to the Berlin Embassy in May, Dekanozov got a report from an agent on Saturday naming the next day, Sunday, as the time of attack but told his staff to forget it and go on a picnic Sunday. (David Dallin, Soviet Espionage, New Haven, 1955, p. 134.)

  5 Berezhkov omits any mention of Dekanozov’s name or of the Dekanozov-Weizsäcker meeting. Because of his execution in 1953 Dekanozov apparently has become an unperson.

  6 His most recent warning had been on Wednesday, June 18.

  7 Dekanozov’s interview with von Weizsäcker did not occur until 9:30 P.M. Berlin time (11:30 P.M. Moscow time). Dekanozov reported the results of his talk by urgent cable, which could hardly have been transmitted and decoded before 1 or 1:30 A.M. Telephone connections between Moscow and Berlin normally were very fast—not more than ten or fifteen minutes, or a maximum of thirty minutes, being required to put through a call. Customarily, however, the embassy reported by telegraph. (Berezhkov, personal communication, March, 1968; I. F. Filippov, Zapiski o Tretiyem Reikhe, Moscow, 1966, p. 24.)

  8 Kuznetsov gives the time as 2 P.M. Tyulenev’s memoirs merely indicate Saturday afternoon.

  9 There is no reference to this meeting in the memoirs of such high military figures as Tyulenev, Kuznetsov, Voronov and Zhukov. Nor is it mentioned in official Soviet histories. Budyonny did not indicate precisely who was present. (Budyonny, personal communication, July, 1967.)

  10 Many Soviet sources confirm that Budyonny was named Reserve Forces Commander and instructed to move reserve forces to the Dnieper River line. The Politburo decision of June 21 is reported by V. Khvostov and A. Grylev (Kommunist, No. 12, August, 1968).

  11 This view is supported by the fact that at 4 A.M., June 22, an urgent message was sent by Molotov to Dekanozov, reporting the contents of the Molotov-Schulenburg talk and specifically asking Dekanozov to raise with Ribbentrop or his deputy the three questions to which Schulenburg did not respond: what reasons Germany had for being dissatisfied with her relations with the Soviet Union, what the basis was for the rumors of impending Soviet-German war, and why Germany had not responded to the Tass statement of June 14. (V. L. Izraelyan, L. N. Kutakov, Diplomatiya Agressorov, Moscow, 1967, p. 184.) Dekanozov was never to have an opportunity to raise the questions.

  12 Marshal G. I. Kulik, another Deputy Defense Commissar, was sent to the Special Western Military District. He did not arrive at Bialystok, headquarters of the Tenth Army, until late Monday, June 23. By that hour he seemed to General I. V. Boldin to be dazed and at sea. Marshal Kulik reached Bialystok only a few hours before Major General M. G. Khazelevich of the Tenth Army was killed and his army virtually destroyed. (I. V. Boldin, Stranitsii Zhizn, Moscow, 1961.)

  4 ♦ The Night Wears On

  WHEN THE BALTIC FLEET COMMAND GOT WORD FROM Admiral Kuznetsov that the Germans might attack in the early hours of Sunday morning, it came as no surprise. In fact, as Admiral Panteleyev, Chief of Staff, recalled, they had been expecting “minute by minute that the next telegram or telephone call would bring the dark word—war!”

  It was almost midnight Saturday when Panteleyev was summoned to join his superior, Fleet Commander Admiral Tributs. “It’s happened,” he thought as he hurried out of the big war room to the Admiral’s private office. There he found Tributs with his Military Council member, Commissar M. G. Yakovlenko. Tributs was leaning back in his black-leather chair, nervously tapping his knee with a long pencil. He displayed no other sign of emotion.

  “I’ve just talked with Kuznetsov,” he said without preliminaries. “Tonight we must expect an attack by Germany.”

  Panteleyev dashed back to his desk and started sending alerts to all fleet units, to the Fleet Air Staff and the Administration of Rear Services and Supplies.

  Actually, the fleet was not in bad shape to meet the emergency. Some progress had been made in preparing the Leningrad sea approaches to repel German attack. As early as May 7 Admiral Tributs decided to post patrol ships at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland and at all naval bases in order to intercept Nazi submarines or surface vessels. However, the cold weather, the late break-up of the ice and the persistent fog delayed Admiral Tributs in making his dispositions. It was not till the second half of May that one submarine, the S-7, took station in the Irben Strait, which gives access to the Gulf of Riga. On May 27 the patrol submarine S-309 assumed a position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. At the same time picket ships were posted at Hangö on the Finnish shore across the Gulf of Finland from Tallinn, at Libau (Liepaja), the westernmost Soviet harbor, only seventy miles east of the Soviet-German frontier, and at Tallinn and Kronstadt.

  Before June 1 all Soviet cruisers and most of the mine layers and submarines, as well as the floating submarine base, had been pulled back from Libau to Ust-Dvinsk, the fortress and naval base near Riga, where antiaircraft protection was superior to that in exposed Libau. The Oka, a special mine layer equipped to put down antisubmarine nets, was sent from Libau to Tallinn, and the battleship Marat was returned from Tallinn to its old base at Kronstadt.

  Neither the Baltic commander, Admiral Tributs, nor his superior, Admiral Kuznetsov, had much taste for Libau. It was an open harbor only a few minutes’ flight from the German air bases in East Prussia, and the naval commanders did not regard it as suitable for wartime use. The Russian Imperial Navy had taken the same view. Under the imperial war plans all warships were evacuated from Libau on the opening day of World War I.

  When Libau fell into Soviet hands with the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in July, 1940, Stalin raised the question of what to do with it. He wanted to put a battleship there. Admiral Kuznetsov argued vigorously against this. Stalin listened silently and in the end agreed to station only light naval vessels, principally a submarine brigade, at Libau.

  At the same time, as a sop to Stalin, two old battleships, the Marat and the October Revolution,1 were transferred from their secure, well-equipped base at Kronstadt to the new Tallinn base. There they stood in the open roadstead, awaiting the construction of a protective mole. This work, in the hands of the NKVD (police) labor force, was proceeding with utmost dilatoriness (as was most base and fortification work in the Baltic areas).

  In April Admiral Panteleyev and several other fleet commanders went to Riga to confer with the recently formed staff of the Special Baltic Military District, which was commanded by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov. The army and naval commanders sat long over their maps. In the eight months since the Baltic states had been absorbed by the Soviets much had been done, but much remained to be done. Fortifications along the new frontier were far from complete. The Baltic District was short of troops, short of tanks, short of antiaircraft guns, short of planes. Work on airfields for the new fast fighters and long-range bombers (which they hoped to receive) was going very slowly. Worst
of all, the army men said that since the construction was in the hands of the police there was no way to speed it up.

  The naval men had equally serious complaints. The new coastal artillery batteries, including those designed to defend Libau from sea attack, were far behind schedule. The new naval bases on the Baltic coast were just being organized. Even the facilities at Riga were not ready and would not be until May 25. Eighty percent of the naval aircraft had to be stationed at rear bases, far from the potential war theater, because the airstrips had not been finished. One officer who inspected the advance fortifications was shocked to find that concrete gun pits were sited so close to the frontier that they had no protective mine fields or barriers in front of them. Others lacked any means of swinging guns in directions other than to the west—they would be useless once an attacker got behind them. Some embrasures were too narrow to contain the weapons they were supposed to receive.

  By May the shore batteries at Libau had been installed, but there was no protection from the land side. The naval commander was responsible for defense against sea attacks, but land action was in the hands of the army’s Special Baltic Military District. Coordination between the two services had not been worked out. Army GHQ was at Riga, that of the navy at Tallinn, 180 miles away. The question of supreme command in case of war was not settled. The situation was similar at all Baltic bases in the Leningrad Defense area with the exception of Hangö, where the navy had been given supreme command.

  The army’s attitude was epitomized by the Baltic Military Commander, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov. When Admiral Kuznetsov sought to discuss with his army namesake a project for constructing a defensive ring on the land approaches to Libau and Riga, General Kuznetsov exclaimed in indignation: “Do you really think we would permit the enemy to get to Riga?”

  Only after repeated urging by Tributs, a lively, energetic, impetuous and highly qualified naval officer who could not conceal his feeling of alarm, was the 67th Infantry Division sent to man the land defenses of Libau. But this was on the eve of war, and formal liaison between army and navy was still unresolved as late as midnight, June 21.2