Nightmare at Scapa Flow: The Truth About the Sinking of HMS Royal Oak

by H J Weaver

  ‘Instead, it goes without saying that the impression will be created that this immense sale was achieved in present-day Germany. I believe one does not have to be versed in politics to foresee what consequences this unscrupulous sales trick will have. Abroad everyone will say: “Look, that’s how the Germans are, Nazis today just as they always were.” I should not like to be involved in a transaction with such a basis.

  ‘The question which I should like to direct to you runs as follows: “Do you see a possibility of cancelling the deal with The Gray’s Inn Press? Or, if the first copies of the book are already on the market, at least prevent the publication of further copies?” Should you refuse, I must reserve to myself all further steps on the grounds set out above. In any case, I should like you to know right now that I refuse to be involved in any business dealings relating to the Prien book in its original form and intend to make a gift of any royalties to charity, should I fail to prevent further publication of the book here and abroad in its present form.

  ‘As my collaboration in the Prien book has become widely known, I feel it is necessary, for the sake of my reputation as a writer, to detach myself publicly from such new editions . . .’

  Herr Soschka, now retired, lives in a flat in the suburbs of West Berlin. Despite three hours of conversation, lubricated with a bottle of Schnapps, he was unable to add much to the background of Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow.

  ‘In those days, of course, you could publish only what you were allowed to publish,’ he said. ‘I simply handled the production. None of the editorial people involved are alive now.’ Herr Soschka met Lt. Prien once: ‘It was about Christmas, 1940, when he was on leave in Berlin. I liked him. He seemed very cheerful and signed a copy of the book for me.’

  Herr Soschka thought it improbable that Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow could have been published without Lt. Prien’s approval of the text. On the other hand it was difficult to believe that the man who volunteered for the mission to Scapa Flow . . . the man who gave a drink to Cadet Bird because he was cold and showed concern about the men he was forced to send to their deaths . . . the man of whom Herbert Herrmann says: ‘He hated all the fuss when he was ashore and was always glad to get back to sea’ . . . would willingly lend his name to this tissue of lies, errors, distortions and jingoistic nonsense.

  The one person most likely to know the truth seemed to be Frau Ingeborg Sturm-Prien, his widow.

  Frau Sturm is a jolly and attractive blonde who lives today in Cologne. According to Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow, Lt. Prien first saw her as a stranger, a pretty girl standing in a garden, presented her with a bunch of flowers, later came upon her likeness by accident in a photograph, met her, wooed her and married her. ‘Actually,’ she told me, ‘we first met when we were paired off as table companions at a wedding.’

  Her present husband, Herr Paul-Heinz Sturm, a banker turned soldier, was a rival for her hand at the time. They married a couple of years after the announcement of Lt. Prien’s death in the spring of 1941. The weeks prior to the formal announcement were traumatic for her. ‘Three U-boat commanders, all well known, were lost within a few days of each other,’ she said. ‘I was informed that U-47 was missing, presumed lost, but ordered to keep the information to myself. It was thought that the news would be too much of a shock for Germany. For weeks my friends asked: “When is your husband coming home again?” and I had to pretend that he would be.’

  She, too, went to Berlin when Lt. Prien and his crew were flown there after Scapa Flow. At the time she made a note, still in her possession, to the effect that her husband was critical of the circus made out of his whole exploit: ‘He resented being caught up in the political-propaganda machine. He saw his deed solely as a sailor’s achievement.’

  ‘He hated fuss,’ she went on. ‘After Berlin, we went on holiday to Austria and I remember how uncomfortable he was in the train when people kept nudging each other and pointing him out.’ If there was one word to describe him, she would choose the word ‘realist’. ‘He asked a lot of himself and a lot of others,’ she said. ‘I know he was disappointed not to have achieved more in Scapa Flow – he told me so – and he was angry about the recurrent torpedo failures. After the Norwegian campaign he visited Berlin and complained forcefully about the whole matter.

  ‘But he always remained a realist and never set himself goals which were impossible to achieve . . .’

  Frau Sturm remembers that he received a manuscript of Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow. ‘He was very angry and kept crossing things out,’ she said. She is quite certain in her own mind, however, that these changes were never made and that he did not know this until the book was published. ‘The wrong spelling of the names von Hennig and Varendorff are certainly something he would have noticed and corrected,’ she explained.

  It would perhaps be neither unfair nor unreasonable to suggest that it was his sense of realism which persuaded Lt. Prien not to press on beyond the Hoxa boom, once convinced that he had been seen by the driver of the car on the shore, and to forestall any subsequent argument about whether his decision had been the correct one.

  The suggestion in the war diary of Admiral Dönitz that the appearance of two aircraft over Scapa Flow caused a mass exodus of ships of the Home Fleet and robbed U-47 of even greater success than was actually achieved indicates a complete German misreading of the situation. This is borne out by other documents in the Military Archives at Freiburg.

  The Luftwaffe Situation Report for October 13, for example, contains the confident assertion that the reconnaissance carried out the previous afternoon over Scapa Flow showed the presence of seven battleships, 10 cruisers and an aircraft carrier, Furious. The report even names the battleships: Nelson, Rodney, Resolution, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Hood and Repulse. Of these vessels, as has already been made clear, only Royal Oak and Repulse were in Scapa Flow at the time: Nelson, Rodney and Hood were at Loch Ewe, Royal Sovereign was at Plymouth, and Resolution did not belong to the home Fleet.

  Similarly, the naval North Sea Situation Report on the morning of October 14, a few hours after the sinking of Royal Oak, contains the observation that, according to the listening service, ‘the battle-cruiser Repulse returned to Scapa in the night of October 12–13’. This is a complete reversal of the facts: on the night of October 12–13 Repulse proceeded from Scapa Flow to Rosyth.

  Finally, on October 15, the naval War Diary noted: ‘The damage inflicted on Repulse is confirmed by the fact, established by air reconnaissance, that the battlecruiser is lying in dock at Rosyth. An air attack on Repulse has been requested.’

  The first signals which passed between U-47 and Germany after the Scapa Flow mission are not in the Freiburg files. In addition, Admiral Dönitz chose not to reply when I wrote to him, raising a number of queries about the exploit. However, David Lees subsequently inquired into the matter of the signals on my behalf by letter. In his reply, Admiral Dönitz stated that he had been informed by telephone that Lt. Prien had made a signal saying he was safe. In the normal manner, he had identified the ship he had sunk as a battleship ‘of the Royal Sovereign class’.

  Mr Lees returned to this topic during a personal visit to Admiral Dönitz, in 1978. Admiral Dönitz he says, repeated that Lt. Prien had referred to his victim as a battleship ‘of the Royal Sovereign class’ and added that the signals from U-47 had not put a name to the second, or northern, ship. Kapitän-zur-See Hans Meckel, who was the Admiral’s Chief of Communications in 1939, was present at this interview. His recollection of the content of the signals was the same as that of Admiral Dönitz and he added that the other messages which passed between U-47 and Germany were concerned with arrangements to fly Lt. Prien and his crew to Berlin for their audience with the Führer.

  Who then had provided the positive identification of Repulse? In answer to the direct question, Admiral Dönitz replied: ‘The German High Command.’

  It need not occasion any surprise that Admiral Dönitz did not argue the point with his superiors. Nor is it stran
ge that Lt. Prien showed reluctance on his return to Germany to accept Repulse as his ‘northern’ ship. He would have been well aware that it was impossible for divers to have examined the damage, for emergency repairs to be carried out, and for the vessel to sail, or be towed, the 250 miles from Scapa Flow to Rosyth in the space of about 40 hours.

  The grey ships have long been gone from Scapa Flow to be replaced by the vessels of the oil industry. The wreck of Royal Oak lies in less than a hundred feet of water, and, on a calm day, her dark shape can be seen by passengers making the 12-minute journey by air from Wick to Kirkwall. Oil still seeps to the surface from her fuel tanks. The hull, which has now been declared a war grave, is covered with barnacles and the seaweed known as dead men’s fingers. The large green buoy which rides the waves above reads: ‘This marks the wreck of HMS Royal Oak and the grave of her crew. Respect their resting place. Unauthorised diving prohibited.’

  Of the 424 officers and men who escaped to fight another day – and, in some instances, to die in the process – about 60 are still alive. They gather in Portsmouth, the depot of their old ship, each October. On the Friday night they meet in a naval club, consume a great deal of beer and rum, and talk about a time when the world was younger and they were at war. Herbert Herrmann comes down from Scotland with his wife each year, and, at the simple service next morning at the war memorial on Southsea Common, lays a wreath. He does not look quite himself because of all the drinks pressed upon him the night before.

  ‘Taffy’ Davies organises the reunion. A couple of days before the first one I attended, he telephoned with what he said was an important message. ‘I’ve been telling some of the troops that you’re trying to find out what really happened on the night the old gal was sunk,’ he explained, ‘and they asked me to have a word with you. I know it isn’t necessary, but they insisted. They said they hoped you wouldn’t be nasty to Herbert or embarrass him in any way.

  ‘He’s a very good friend of ours.’

  Sources

  The following Admiralty and War Office documents, available at the Public Record Office, are those I have relied on for the facts about the sinking of HMS Royal Oak and other aspects of the career of Kapitänleutnant Günther Prien from a British point of view:

  ADM1/9777 – Submarine Intelligence Summaries.

  ADM1/9792 – Naval Intelligence In Wartime.

  ADM1/13721 – Summary Of Information On German U-Boats, 1943.

  ADM1/17561 – Report on Captain Gilbert Roberts’s Visit To Kiel, May, 1945.

  ADM1/17602 – Particulars Of Enemy Torpedoes, 1945.

  ADM16/4205 – The German Submarine Campaign, by Captain (S) Ernest Thring.

  ADM136/13 – Ship’s Book of HMS Hood.

  ADM182/126 – Confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders, 1939.

  ADM187/2-4 – Pink Lists (showing the whereabouts of HM ships at 1600 hours each day) for October, November and December, 1939.

  ADM189/60 – Annual Report Of Torpedo School, 1940.

  ADM199/1 – Introduction Of Convoy System: Regulations And Procedures.

  ADM199/130 – Anti-U-Boat Attacks, 1939–40.

  ADM199/137 – Anti-U Boat Attacks, 1939–40.

  ADM199/158 – Loss of HMS Royal Oak: Board Of Inquiry.

  ADM199/390 – Northern Patrol War Diaries, 1939–40.

  ADM199/393 – War Despatches of C.-in-C., Home Fleet, 1939–41.

  ADM199/1788 – U-Boat Incident Signals, 1939.

  ADM199/1789 – U-Boats Sunk Or Damaged.

  ADM199/1895 – Lyness Base Records: Scapa Moorings.

  ADM199/1939 – Daily Operations Report For First Lord.

  ADM199/1957 – Daily Summary Of Naval Events, 1939.

  ADM199/1982 – Daily Summary Of Naval Events, January–March, 1941.

  ADM199/2032 – U-Boat Incidents, September–October, 1939.

  ADM199/2033 – U-Boat Incidents, November–December, 1939.

  ADM199/2057 – Monthly Anti-Submarine Reports, 1939–40.

  ADM199/2058 – Monthly Anti-Submarine Reports, 1941.

  ADM199/2130 – Survivors’ Reports, Merchant Vessels, September–November, 1939.

  ADM199/2196 – Summaries of Naval War Diaries, October, 1939.

  ADM199/2197 – Summaries Of Naval War Diaries, November, 1939.

  ADM53/ Logs of HM Ships. October, 1939: Ashanti (107549), Aurora (107577), Bandit (107595), Belfast (107730), Bittern (107781), Boadicea (107800), Bramble (107828), Broke (107889), Calypso (107938), Cardiff (107693), Caledon, (107931), Colombo (108072), Cossack (108123), Curlew (108170), Delhi (108256), Dunedin (108416), Enchantress (108513), Eskimo (108564), Fame (108642), Fearless (108668), Firedrake (108690), Fleet-wood (108705), Foresight (108726), Foxhound (108784), Furious (108819), Glasgow (108895), Greenwich (108995), Guardian (109042), Hastings (109091), Hazard (109126), Hebe (109138), Hood (109200), Iron Duke (109327), Jackal (109356), Janus (109369), Jervis (109405), Jupiter (109418), Maori (109718), Mashona (109728), Matabele (109749), Mohawk (109786), Newcastle (109922), Pegasus (110029), Pelican (110039), Punjabi (110129), Renown (110180), Repulse (110192), St Martin (110356), Scotstoun (110482), Seagull (110518), Sharpshooter (110544), Somali (110652), Southampton (110664), Speedy (110677), Stork (110695), Sturday (110706), Tartar (110780), Valorous (110901), Wanderer (111081), Weston (111147), Whitehall (111158), Whitley (111170), Witch (111224), Woolston (111248). November, 1939: Devonshire (108303), Norfolk (109959), Suffolk (110718).

  WO166/114 – Scottish Command War Diary.

  WO166/1234 – Orkney And Shetlands HQ War Diary.

  WO166/2049 – Orkney Fixed Defences, RA, War Diary.

  WO166/2055 – Orkney and Shetland Defences, AQ Branch, War Diary.

  WO166/2507 – 226th Heavy A/A Battery, RA, War Diary.

  WO166/3551 – Orkney Fortress Company, RE, War Diary.

  In addition, the following published sources were consulted:

  Jay W. Baird, The Mystical World Of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939–45 (University Of Minnesota Press, 1974).

  Cajus Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries (Macdonald, 1967).

  Jochen Brennecke, The Hunters And The Hunted (Burke Publishing Co., 1958).

  Malcolm Brown and Patricia Meehan, Scapa Flow (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1968).

  Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Cassell, 1948).

  Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, Memoirs (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959).

  Wolfgang Frank, Enemy Submarine (William Kimber, 1954) and The Sea Wolves (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955).

  Alexandre Korganoff, The Phantom Of Scapa Flow (Ian Allen, 1974).

  Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda (Oxford University Press, 1944).

  Alexander McKee, Black Saturday (Souvenir Press, 1959).

  Günther Prien, I Sank The Royal Oak (Gray’s Inn Press, 1954).

  Captain Stephen Roskill, DSC, RN, The War At Sea, Vol.1 (HMSO, 1954).

  William Shirer, Berlin Diary (Hamish Hamilton, 1941).

  Technical Reproduction Branch, Admiralty, Führer Conferences On Naval Affairs – Minutes Of Staff Meetings Between Hitler And Various Commanders (1947).

  The Seaman, May 11, 1938.

  Daily Express, October 18, 1939.

  DerAngriff, October 18, 1939.

  The Orcadian, October, 1939.

  The following German official sources were also studied at the Military Archives in Freiburg:

  RM7/5

  Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung.

  RM7/266

  Lageberichte Ostsee, Nordsee, Atlantik.

  RM7/279

  Lage Nordsee.

  RM7/329

  Lageberichte West, Luftwaffenfu¨hrungsstab.

  RM87/2

  Kriegstagebuch, Grossadmiral Karl Do¨nitz.

  and the logs of U-47.

  Appendix A

  Acknowledgements

  In the course of research for this book I have frequently been asked how I became interested in the Royal Oak story and set about trying to disco
ver the truth. A brief account may therefore be of interest to some readers and will certainly provide an opportunity of thanking the many people who helped with the task.

  Early in 1975 I was asked to write a 3,000-word article about the sinking of Royal Oak. It soon became clear that this was impossible because the facts were obscure and there was hardly any aspect of the exploit over which everyone was in agreement. At that time it also seemed that nobody was aware that the Admiralty documents relating to the case had become available with the reduction of the secrecy embargo from 50 to 30 years and anybody with a Public Record Office reader’s ticket could consult them.

  Mr Frederick Lambert, then in charge of the Rolls Room at Chancery Lane where the indices of Admiralty files were kept at that time, and his staff could not have been more helpful in recommending sources as well as producing them. The same is true of Mr George Donovan and his staff at Ashridge in Buckinghamshire, storage place of the logs of HM ships.

  Transcripts of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of HM Stationery Office.

  Mr George Clout and Mr Terry Charman at the Imperial War Museum were equally co-operative in producing books about Lt. Prien in a variety of languages, plus German newspapers of the time, and they also kindly suggested some sources which might otherwise have escaped me.

  Mr Herrmann received me courteously in his home on two occasions. Our discussions were hampered to some extent by two factors: he felt he had a prior commitment to helping the author of The Royal Oak Disaster – which was, by then, well on its way to the bookstalls – and, I think, he also felt, incorrectly, that I was basically hostile to Lt. Prien’s case.

  He said at one point: ‘Anyone with common sense would know that we were not expected to sink the entire Fleet. The idea was to penetrate the anchorage, do some damage, and get out again. That’s what the skipper did – and it makes a man liked by any crew under any circumstances.’ I have therefore tried not to involve him in any matters which might be considered contentious.