Nightmare at Scapa Flow: The Truth About the Sinking of HMS Royal Oak

by H J Weaver

  The evidence of several defence witnesses, including Captain Dewar, suggested that Admiral Collard’s recollection of events was less than accurate. Major Attwood, for example, spoke of hearing ‘raised, angry voices’ at the dance and he had also observed ‘Admiral Collard shaking his fist at the Bandmaster’. It was only the Major’s prompt action in obtaining an apology for the Bandmaster and his men which had avoided trouble in the ship.

  The prosecution’s main point at the summing-up, however, was that Commander Daniel’s letter was subversive by its very nature, no matter where the truth lay about the facts on which it was based. In addition, allegations that the events described had had a bad effect on morale and discipline were only ‘vague’. It was an argument which the court accepted. Commander Daniel returned to his sword pointing towards him. Found guilty of all four charges, he was ordered to be dismissed his ship – at the time, HMS Cormorant, the shore base at Gibraltar, to which he had been attached for the court martial – and severely reprimanded.

  Captain Dewar, in turn, pleaded not guilty to the two charges against him when his case began on Wednesday, April 4.

  His questioning of Admiral Collard, while producing some brisk exchanges, did nothing to shake the Admiral’s story. Subsequently, however, he scored a telling point when he examined Admiral Kelly about what he had done with the two letters when they reached him.

  ‘I took them to the Commander-in-Chief,’ he replied.

  ‘Why?’

  ‘Because I thought there was no other course open to me.’

  Captain Dewar thanked him politely for the admission which, in effect, meant that, if the Captain was guilty of forwarding a subversive document, so was the Admiral.

  Later, when himself questioned again, Captain Dewar said he blamed ‘uncontrollable fits of temper on the part of Admiral Collard’, for all the trouble in Royal Oak. Why had he not talked the matter over with the Admiral? ‘I felt any personal protest would have been ineffectual. Admiral Collard would have immediately lost his temper and threatened me with a court martial.’

  In his address to the court, Captain Dewar said: ‘I treated Admiral Collard as an honoured guest of the ship. But how could I hope to maintain my authority if he attacked me in this way? Being convinced these incidents had to stop, what was I to do? If I went to him I knew I should be bullied. I might have gone privately to the Vice-Admiral, but I do not believe in creeping up back stairs . . .

  ‘It was I who pressed for a court martial and a broad charge . . . I am now before you on the trivial charge of having failed sufficiently to censor a letter . . . I submit there is absolutely no case against me . . . A great question of justice and principle is involved. I ask the court not only to acquit me, but to acquit me honourably . . .’

  The final argument put forward by the prosecution was basically that Captain Dewar had not made proper use of the ‘reasons in writing’ procedure, which was designed for ‘the avoidance of heated discussion, to give the junior an opportunity for explanation and the senior a chance to consider that explanation when the heat of the moment had passed.’ ‘I submit,’ said the prosecutor, ‘that anyone who had the welfare of the Service at heart would have restrained himself a little longer, and forwarded a proper letter of “reasons in writing”, and quietly made known his own cause of complaint at a later and more convenient date.’

  It took the court only 20 minutes to come to the conclusion that Captain Dewar was guilty of only one offence – forwarding Commander Daniel’s subversive letter. He, too, was dismissed his ship and severely reprimanded, and a subsequent appeal failed to upset the sentence. That was, however, by no means the end of the affair. The rights and wrongs of the case continued to be debated both in Parliament and the newspapers with all three parties to the action – Admiral Collard, the two court-martialled officers and the Admiralty – having their champions and critics.

  One general cause for concern was that neither Captain Dewar nor Commander Daniel should have their naval careers ruined for having committed a technical offence arising from a clash of personalities. But, in the end, neither they nor Admiral Collard escaped unscathed.

  Immediately after the courts martial, the Admiral was placed on the retired list, the First Lord explaining in a statement to the Commons that ‘he had dealt with trivial causes for dissatisfaction in a manner unbecoming his position and showed himself unfitted to hold further high command . . .’ The decision meant that he missed the knighthood which, in the normal course of events, would almost certainly have been his as a matter of routine.

  Commander Daniel, feeling that he would be a marked man henceforth, resigned from the Royal Navy almost at once and joined the Daily Mail as its naval correspondent. He was not temperamentally suited, however, to the hustle and bustle of Fleet Street and resigned in 1931 to devote himself to freelance writing. That did not prove a success and he drifted from one job to another. Eventually his health broke down and he died from arterio-sclerosis in South Africa in 1955.

  Captain Dewar, contrary to the betting, was given a new command, HMS Tiger, an elderly battlecruiser. This appointment enabled him to complete the sea-time he needed to qualify for promotion, but as soon as he was made up to Rear-Admiral in 1929 he was placed on the retired list. He wrote a book called The Navy From Within; returned to a desk job during the second World War; and afterwards became an intermittent writer of letters to the newspapers on naval topics.

  In his full-length book The Royal Oak Courts Martial author Leslie Gardiner makes one interesting point which will appeal to collectors of coincidences. He says: ‘Collard’s name and Dewar’s, bracketed together so many times in the Press in the spring of 1928, were bracketed again, and for the last time’ in the spring of 1962. ‘On the correspondence page of The Times appeared, as its principal letter of the day, a warning to the Government by Admiral Dewar regarding the proposal to spend twenty million pounds on a Polaris submarine. Opposite, Admiral Collard’s death was announced, at the age of eighty-six.’

  The date was Friday, April 13.

  Following German routine, the handwritten log of the U-47 was typed and copies sent to the Commanding Officers concerned. The three pages covering the Scapa Flow action are reproduced here.

  Endnotes

  1. The Royal Oak survivors have not been entirely without German support for their story. Walter Schellenberg, who served for many years in SS Foreign Intelligence, ultimately became its chief and was appointed head of the unified German secret services after the arrest of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris in 1944, says in his memoirs that Lt. Prien ‘was already on his way back to the open sea before the British even knew what was happening’.

  2. With the exception of Renown, the whereabouts of these ships is given elsewhere in the text. Renown sailed from Scapa Flow on Oct. 2 and arrived at Freetown, Sierra Leone, at 0723/Oct. 12.

  3. The unsatisfactory state of knowledge about Lt. Prien’s mission is indicated by the fact that publishers, too, frequently print contradictory versions of the same episode without any attempt to discover which, if either, is true. A paperback edition of Enemy Submarine by Wolfgang Frank, who served on Admiral Dönitz’s staff during the war, appeared in Britain in 1977. Herr Frank repeats the claim that Repulse was torpedoed in Scapa Flow. The British publishers, however, have interpolated in the text the official British story that Lt. Prien mistook Pegasus for the battlecruiser.

  4. Lt. Prien’s two watch officers, Lt. Englebert Endrass and Lt. Amelung von Varendorff, who were on U-47’s bridge during the Royal Oak action, also failed to survive the war. Both were lost after being given their own commands.

  5. Mr Herrmann’s career as a submariner ended abruptly in 1944 when U-1209 ran herself onto some rocks, topped by a lighthouse, off the coast of Cornwall. He was taken prisoner and decided to make his life in Britain after the war. The somewhat undistinguished end to his career at sea was the result, he says, of ‘a simple error of navigation’, but he takes the philosophical view tha
t it was ‘better than being brought up on the end of a fish hook’.

  6. The other vessels consisted of 13 destroyers (HMS Somali, HMS Ashanti, HMS Mashona, HMS Matabele, HMS Tartar, HMS Eskimo, HMS Fearless, HMS Foxhound, HMS Fame, HMS Foresight, HMS Jervis, HMS Jupiter and HMS Sturdy (attached to Furious); five minesweepers (HMS Hazard, HMS Hebe, HMS Seagull, HMS Sharpshooter and HMS Speedy); the A/A ship Curlew; the seaplane carrier Pegasus; 10 armed merchant cruisers (Asturias, Aurania, Scotstoun, California, Chitral, Montclare, Rawalpindi, Salopian, Transylvania and Voltaire, being used as an accommodation ship); the destroyer depot and repair ship Greenwich; the netlayer Guardian; the auxiliary minesweeping trawlers Silicia and Sterton; the Fleet tugs Bandit and St Martin; nine boom defence vessels (Barbican, Barcroft, Barlow, Barranca, Brine, Dragonet, Moorgate, Plantagenet and Signet); and six Fleet drifters (Fumarole, Harmattan, Horizon, Indian Summer, Sheen and Shower). In addition, the hospital snip Aba was in the anchorage. The two ‘heavy ships’ of the Home Fleet not at either Scapa Flow or Loch Ewe were HMS Royal Sovereign at Plymouth and HMS Ramillies (detached) at Gibraltar.

  7. The other six vessels were Glasgow (1737), Dunedin (1810) and Newcastle (1915), to patrol in the Atlantic with Glasgow; and Furious (0140), to Loch Ewe, escorted by the destroyers Foxhound and Fearless.

  8. Despite all the arguments which have raged over visibility, there is no doubt that the Northern Lights were active that night. The log of Southampton, patrolling east of the Shetlands, some 175 miles away, contains the entry: ‘2030 Observed the Aurora Borealis.’ This is confirmed by the log of Jackal, one of her escorting destroyers: ‘An excellent display of Northern Lights throughout the watch.’ John Laughton, an Orkney resident, recalls seeing the ‘Merry Dancers’, as they are known locally, over Scapa Flow early that night: ‘I was out walking with a cousin and we recited Aytoun’s lines:

  Fearful lights that never beckon,

  Save when kings and heroes die.

  9. The time of high water was 2338 according to the Royal Oak Board of Inquiry. The above corrected time was supplied by Commander Nisbet Glen, RN, superintendent of the Tidal Branch of the Ministry of Defence Hydrographic Department.

  10. Trotz der sehr hellen Nacht und der brennenden Lichter kann ich den Dampfer in keinem der beiden Seerohre ausmachen.’ The ship was almost certainly one of the neutral vessels which made regular use of the Pentland Firth for passages between the North Sea and Atlantic.

  11. This incident does not appear in most accounts of Lt. Prien’s mission, but his log says: ‘Die vorgefluteten Tauchbunker und Zellen werden ausgeblasen.’

  12. It is not clear whether the guards had just come off duty or had perhaps wandered round from the kitchen at the rear of the hall, which they used as a guardroom. When Mr Tullock heard next morning of the loss of Royal Oak, he thought – wrongly – that the guards might have been responsible for keeping a lookout at Kirk Sound and, if he came forward, was questioned and revealed what the guards had been doing, they might be court-martialled and shot. That is why he kept silent for nearly 40 years.

  13. One wild December night I went out to Burray on the seaward side of Kirk Sound to talk to a man who claims to have actually seen U-47 making her entrance. Jock Park says that, on the night in question, he and his brother Ronnie had rowed down to Skerry Sound, adjoining Kirk Sound, to indulge in the honoured Orkney pursuit known as ‘wreckin’ ’ – the removal of anything of value – aboard the blockship Cape Ortegal. His story is: ‘About midnight, I looked across towards St Mary’s and saw what I thought was a tug passing through Kirk Sound. She was very low in the water. Next morning, when I heard about Royal Oak, I realised that what I thought was a tug must have been a submarine.’ I have not included this incident in the main narrative because Mr Park’s insistence that it was low water at the time must inevitably create some doubt about whether his recollection is accurate. I think he is probably right about the U-boat, wrong about the low water, but it is not easy to argue tides with an Orkney fisherman.

  14. This time, and the time of the two subsequent attacks on Royal Oak, have been queried in pencil after the log was typed, presumably because they do not tie in with the distances covered by U-47 according to the map which accompanies the log.

  15. ‘Es ist widerlich hell. Die ganze Bucht ist fabelhaft zu übersehen. Südlich Cava liegt nichts. Ich laufe noch näher. Da erkenne ich an B.B. die Hoxa-Sound Bewachung, für die das Boot als Zielscheibe in den nachsten Sekunden erscheinen muss. Damit wäre alles umsonst, zumal sich südlich Cava noch immer keine Schiffe ausmachen lassen, obwohl sonst auf weiteste Entfernungen alles klar erkennbar ist. 0055. Also Entschluss: Südlich Cava liegt nichts, deshalb, bevor jede Aussicht auf Erfolg aufs Spiel gesetzt wird, müssen erreichbare Erfolge durchgeführt werden.’

  16. The anchor bearings given in the cruisers’ logs are: Belfast, Fara 285º, Diamond Beacon 125½º, A buoy 244º; Caledon, Calf of Flotta 085º, Beacon 165º; Colombo, Fara Church 003º, South House Cava 331º, Barrel of Butter 024º; and Delhi, E. Point Cava 354º, N. Point Fara 262º, N. Point Risa 293º. The position of the Diamond Beacon can be confirmed with the postal authorities at Kirkwall and the stump of wood to which it was attached is still visible on Flotta. Cardiff, whose anchor bearings are missing from her log, was probably somewhere close to Delhi and Colombo. Vice-Admiral Sir Ian Hogg, KCB, DSC, RN (retd.), who was serving in the cruiser at the time, thinks she must have been anchored ‘well over to the west of the Flow as we had no sight or sound’ of the sinking of Royal Oak.

  17. ‘Dort liegen zwei Schlachtschiffe, weiter unter Land Zerstörer vor Anker. Kreuzer nicht auszumachen, Angriff auf die beiden Dicken. Abstand 3,000m, Eingestellte Tiefe 7.5m. Aufschlagzündung. 0116 (?) 0058. Ein Schuss auf den nördlichen, zwei Schuss auf den südlich liegenden losgemacht. Es detoniert nach gut 3½ Minuten ein Torpedo auf dem nördlich liegenden Schlachtschiff, von den anderen beiden ist nichts zu sehen! Kehrt! 0121 (?) 0102. Heckschuss.’

  18. The torpedo was G7e torpedo no. 2874, manufactured by the Berliner Maschinenbau Aktiengesellschaft, previously known as L. Schwarzkopf. The electric motor, gears and double-bladed propeller, still joined together and recovered from alongside the wreck of Royal Oak, have been identified by experts as part of a German electrical torpedo of pre-war manufacture.

  19. Visibility would have been better looking up from the bridge of U-47 than looking down into the Flow from a clifftop, and Mr Laughton’s range of vision would, of course, have been reduced by the fact that his eyes were not yet accustomed to the darkness.

  20. ‘3 Bugschüsse. Nach je knappen 3 Minuten nach den Abschüssen die Detonationen auf dem näherliegenden Schiff. Da rollt, knallt, bumst and grummelt es gewaltig. Zunächts Wassersäulen, dann Feuersäulen, Broken fliegen durch die Luft.’

  21. This also points to the arrival of the Daisy before 0400 when, with the change of watch, there would have been a different corporal of the gangway.

  22. ‘Jetzt wird es im Hafen lebendig. Zerstörer haben Lichter, aus allen Ecken wird gemorst, an Land, etwa 200m. von mir ab, brausen Autos über die Strassen. Es ist ein Schlachtschiff versenkt, ein weiteres beschädigt und drei Aale hat der Teufel geholt. Alle Rohre sind leer geschossen. Ich entschliesse mich zum Auslaufen, denn:

  ‘1) Getauchte Angriffe kann ich mit meinen Sehrohren nachts nicht fahren, siehe Einlauferfahrung, 2) Bei der hellen Nacht kann ich mich bei dem stillen Wasserpiegel nirgends ungesehen mehr hinbewegen, 3) Ich muss annehmen, dass mich ein Autofahrer gesehen hat, der querab von uns stehen blieb, kehrt machte und mit hoher Fahrt nach Scapa zu wegfuhr, 4) Weiter nach Norden kann ich auch nicht, denn dort liegen, gut gedeckt gegen Sicht durch mich die vorhin schwach erkannten Zerstörer unter Land.

  ‘0128 Mit 2 x H.F.V. auf Auslaufkurs gegangen. Zunächst ist bis Skaildaquoy Pt. alles einfach. Danach geht es wieder los. Der Wasserstand ist gefallen, einlaufender Strom. Mit ‘‘L.F.’’ und ‘‘K.F.’’ versuche ich rauszukommen. Ich muss im Süden durch die Enge wegen der Wassertiefe. Es geht die
Wirbelei wieder los. Mit Kurs 058° und ‘‘L.F.’’ – 10sm. stehe ich auf der Stelle. Mit ‘‘H.F.’’ an dem südlichen Sperrschiff vorbeigequält. Der Rudergänger arbeitet vorzüglich. Mit 2 x ‘‘H.F.’’, zuletzt mit ‘‘G.F.’’ und ‘‘AX.V.’’ frei von der Schiffssperre, vor mir eine Mole! Mit harten Rudermanövern auch da noch rum und um 0215 Uhr sind wir wieder draussen. Schade, dass nur einer vernichtet wurde . . .’

  23. ‘Ich habe noch 5 Torpedoes fur evtl. Handelskrieg . . . Der Lichtschein von Scapa ist noch lange zu sehen, anscheinend werfen sie noch Wasserbomben.’

  24. ‘Dieser Kurs wird gewahlt in der HoShung, vielleicht noch einen zu erwischen unter der Küste und um U-20 auszuweichen.’

  25. ‘Ab 1000 Uhr werden in grosser Entfernung von Zeit zu Zeit Wasserbomben geworfen. Es werden mit Sicherheit 32 Bomben gezahlt. Ich bleibe deshalb bis zur Abenddämmerung auf Grund liegen.’

  26. There seems to have been some confusion in German minds about the battlecruiser. The German navy had identified the ship correctly as the Repulse while the Luftwaffe apparently thought the target was the Hood.

  27. One prior to the Scapa Flow mission.

  28. All of the times given by Commander Hopkinson coincide with the ship movements detailed in Chapter III. On October 13, for instance, Furious, Fearless and Foxhound sailed at 0140. According to Commander Hopkinson the boom was open from 0126 until 0228.

  29. The Pink List indicates that the number was actually six.

  30. The minimum weekly rations of British merchant seamen in 1939 were considerably better than those civilians would have to put up with for the greater part of the war. The scale had been laid down 33 years earlier in a schedule attached to the 1906 Merchant Shipping Act. It provided for water (28 quarts), salt beef (31b), salt pork (2¼1b), preserved meat (2¼lb), fish (3-41b), soft bread (31b), biscuit (41b), flour (21b), rice (½lb), oatmeal (½lb), potatoes (61b), dried or compressed vegetables (½lb), split peas (2-3pt), green peas (1/3 pt), onions (3oz), tea (3–4oz), coffee (¼lb), sugar (1¼lb), condensed milk (1/31b), butter (½lb), suet (¼lb), marmalade or jam (1lb), syrup or molasses (½lb), dried fruits (5oz), pickles (½pt), fine salt (2oz), mustard (¼oz), pepper (½oz) and curry powder (¼oz). The National Union of Seamen had no quarrel with the scale of these rations in 1939, but, in view of the growth of refrigeration, they were pressing for more cold meats, salads and tomatoes to be provided for crews in hot climates.