The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  When Haldeman dictated his diary entry that evening he recorded what he considered positive developments in the Watergate matter. In fact, the investigation had taken a turn for the worst. I tried to call Haldeman that evening to report what I had learned, but he was attending a dinner at the Kennedy Center, as a member of the board of trustees.

  June 23, 1972 (Friday)

  Firing the “Smoking Gun”

  The June 23 New York Times ran a front-page Watergate story focused on the Cuban angle, suggesting that an organization of Cuban veterans who had served in the U.S. Army after the Bay of Pigs had been involved. It included Nixon’s comment at his press conference that “the White House had ‘no involvement whatsoever [sic]’ in the incident at the Democratic headquarters.”1 The Washington Post moved Watergate to the Metro section and featured photos of all the men arrested at the DNC on their way to a bail hearing. An article by Woodward and Jim Mann included President Nixon’s press conference statement, actually tracking what the president had said: “The White House has had no involvement whatever in this particular incident.”2 The Post also had a story on the Cuban exile community’s view of the Watergate incident: They did not understand it.3

  Although it was highly unusual for me to call Haldeman on his interoffice phone line, that morning I did so at the request of John Mitchell, with whom I had spoken the preceding evening. Just before that conversation with Mitchell I had met with acting FBI director Pat Gray and learned that he felt the FBI investigation was “out of control,” and there was nothing he could do about it. Gray was candid in admitting that he really did not know how to keep the FBI’s investigation within bounds, but he trusted the man handling the investigation, Assistant Director Mark Felt, to do so. As time and events have revealed, Felt (better know as Bob Woodward’s “Deep Throat”) had his own agenda: Using leaks, he would either embarrass Pat Gray out of the top job, hoping that the president would instead select an old hand like Felt for it because he could control the place, or make Gray appear conspicuously incompetent to the Senate, which would not confirm him, and then Felt would be available to pick up the pieces.4 While Felt and the old Hoover crowd certainly did not want to see Nixon defeated by someone like George McGovern, who might relieve all of them of their jobs, they also did not want an outsider like Gray, a former assistant attorney general of the civil division, not even a law-enforcement type, running their FBI.

  As a former attorney general, Mitchell was not surprised that Gray could not control the FBI. I had already told Mitchell that Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, the head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and the Watergate investigation, said he would not get into unrelated issues, such as campaign contributions.5 But also, based on what Gray had said during our meeting, it was clear that neither Petersen nor U.S. Attorney Harold Titus was providing any guidance to the FBI, which had already begun aggressively tracing the money found on the burglars and digging into campaign contributions. Gray explained that FBI agents had visited arrested DNC burglar Bernard Barker’s bank, a development that had been leaked to The Washington Post the day before. Because of that leak, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and I were told by Mitchell that Liddy had been given checks from two “anonymous” donors—Ken Dahlberg, a CRP fund-raiser, and a Mexican attorney by the name of Manuel Ogarrio—which had arrived in Washington after the April 7, 1972, cutoff date, but which had actually been in the possession of CRP fund-raisers before the cutoff. Finance committee general counsel G. Gordon Liddy had advised that he would solve the problem, which we had now learned he had done by giving the checks to his recruited Watergate burglar Bernard Barker, who had cashed them at his bank, the Republic National Bank of Miami. Although the money had been returned to CRP in early May and commingled with other cash in the committee’s safe, by pure happenstance some of that money had later been given to Liddy for his intelligence-gathering operation. Mitchell, aware of this problem, was deeply concerned that innocent campaign contributors who had been promised anonymity were now going to not only be revealed but become involved in Watergate.

  During my conversation with Mitchell, I also told him Gray had said that many in the FBI thought they had run into a CIA operation at the Watergate, because of all the agency connections. This prompted Mitchell, who thought Watergate could embarrass the CIA, to request that I suggest to Haldeman that he call in Vernon “Dick” Walters, the new deputy director of the CIA, to invoke the “delimitation agreement.” Mitchell explained that this was a long-standing understanding between the FBI and the CIA to not investigate each other’s activities.

  Until 1997, when told by the BBC during its preparation of a documentary series on Watergate, I was unaware (as were investigators and prosecutors) that Haldeman had made notes of our June 23 conversation, during which I relayed what Gray had told me and Mitchell’s recommendation. Those notes were as follows:

  Invest[igation] out of control—Gray doesn’t know what to do

  They’ve found Dahlberg

  Also $ out of Mex[ican] Bank

  W/[ill] know who the depositors were today

  informant came into Miami [FBI office]

  photog[rapher] devel[oped] film for [arrested Watergate burglar] Barker—pix DNC

  Peterson [sic]—Titus—no guidance

  Is at brink right now—

  Either w/[ill] open all up—or be closed

  FBI conv[inced] its CIA—Cols test[imony to FBI] cleared him

  Gray looking for way out—called Helms

  call Walters in—

  say don’t know where going—need some help

  have him talk to Gray

  When Haldeman arrived in the Oval Office at 10:04 on the morning of June 23, 1972, he was carrying the notes of our conversation. As he seated himself, the president was still reading documents Alex Butterfield had brought in for his signature; his first comment to Haldeman was that he wanted to get up to Camp David as soon as possible.6 Haldeman said that Secretary of State Rogers wanted a quick meeting, and Henry Kissinger was returning from his secret trip to China. Nixon said he would meet them together and invite Henry to join him at Camp David for dinner and a full debriefing. When Butterfield departed, Haldeman turned to Watergate and the latest developments.*

  “Now, on the investigation, you know, the Democratic break-in thing,” Haldeman began, “we’re back to the problem area, because the FBI is not under control, because Gray doesn’t exactly know how to control them, and their investigation is now leading into some productive areas.” More specifically, he explained, the FBI had “been able to trace the money” found on the burglars to the bank that issued the new hundred-dollar bills, although not to the individuals to whom the bills had been given. “And, and it goes in some directions we don’t want it to go.”

  Haldeman shared other information Gray had given me, including that a photographer who had developed film for Watergate burglar Bernard Barker had gone to the FBI in Miami with photographs of documents on Democratic National Committee letterhead. He then turned to the reason he was raising this matter, although neither Mitchell nor I had suggested it be taken to the president: “Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell’s recommendation that the only way to solve this . . .” Here he paused and prefaced the recommendation with a bit of selling, telling the president, “We’re set up beautifully to do it, in that the only network that paid any attention to the Watergate story last night was NBC,” and summarized NBC’s coverage as “a massive story on the Cuban thing, and all that.”

  Haldeman then continued with his recommendation regarding the out-of-control FBI: “That the way to handle this now is for us to have [CIA deputy director Vernon] Walters call Pat Gray and just say, stay the hell out of this business here, we don’t want you to go any further on it.” Haldeman did not explain what business he was talking about. In fact, I had told Haldeman I was concerned that the out-of-control FBI was going where H
enry Petersen had assured me the investigation would not go, and that was into campaign contributions, as I later testified, as did Haldeman.7 Although Haldeman’s comment to the president did not make that clear, I have little doubt that Nixon and Haldeman understood that what they were talking about was perfectly legal anonymous campaign money. Haldeman assured the president that having Walters do this would not be “an unusual development.” The president agreed, and Haldeman added, “And that would take care of it”—the “it” being a campaign contribution.8

  “What about Pat Gray, you mean he doesn’t want to?” Nixon asked.

  “Pat does want to. He doesn’t know how to, and he doesn’t have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He’ll call Mark Felt in, and Felt wants to cooperate because he’s ambitious, and say, we’ve got the signal from across the river to put the hold on this. And that will fit rather well, because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that it is the CIA.”

  “But they’ve traced the money to whom?”

  “Well, they’ve traced to a name, but they haven’t gotten to the guy yet.”

  Fearing the worst, the president asked: “Who is it, is it somebody here?”

  “Ken Dahlberg,” Haldeman said.

  “Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?”

  Haldeman explained that Dahlberg had provided twenty-five thousand dollars in Minnesota, and his check ended up with Bernard Barker. But there was more money involved, Haldeman said: Funds from contributors in Texas went to a bank in Mexico, and the FBI would be tracing these names today. Haldeman had been told how Liddy, as general counsel for the CRP finance committee, had passed the checks on to Barker to cash in his Miami bank, which he then returned.

  The president’s first reaction was that the FBI would have nothing if these contributors did not cooperate, for he understood from his background and experience that no one had to talk to an FBI agent.9 Sharing his thoughts, he told Haldeman, “Well, I mean, there’s no way, I’m just thinking, if they don’t cooperate, what do they say? They were approached by the Cubans. That’s what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans, too. Is that the idea?”

  “Well, if they will. But then we’re relying on more and more people all the time. That’s the problem. And the FBI will stop if we could take this other step.” In short, rather than enlist liars, Haldeman wanted to simply curtail the FBI’s investigation.

  “Alright, fine. Right,” the president said, approving the action.

  “And they seem to feel the thing to do is get them to stop.” Haldeman’s “they” was an apparent reference to Mitchell and me. Haldeman was usually an honest broker in passing along thoughts from the staff to the president, which suggests that, since he was now calling for a much more aggressive approach than either Mitchell or I had ever proposed, it is possible that Haldeman had discussed this further with Mitchell when they met in Haldeman’s office after we had spoken.10 Mitchell might have suggested that Ehrlichman and Haldeman call Helms in.

  “Right, fine,” the president repeated, and Haldeman explained the mechanics of it.

  “They say the only way to do that is a White House instruction. And it’s got to be to Helms and, ah, what’s his name? Walters.”

  “Walters,” the president echoed.

  “And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in—”

  “All right, fine,” the president said. Having approved the plan, the president now wanted to know how Haldeman was going to deal with Helms and Walters. Given the fact that “we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things,” Nixon believed he would be receptive.11

  “That’s what Ehrlichman says,” Haldeman added, regarding Nixon’s earlier assistance to the CIA.

  Nixon thought the way to approach Helms was by mentioning Howard Hunt, who he figured might be a sore spot for the CIA. “Of course, with Hunt, you will uncover a lot of problems,” the president said, when suggesting wording for the approach. “See, you open that scab, there’s a hell of a lot of things, and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves.” Having dealt with the FBI question, the president again returned to that of Mitchell’s involvement in the unfolding mess. “One thing I want to know, did Mitchell know about this thing to any much of a degree?”

  “I think so,” Haldeman said ambiguously, apparently referring to Watergate, since Haldeman knew Mitchell had no knowledge of the handling of the campaign money. It is at this point that the conversation becomes somewhat difficult when they are clearly talking about different subjects and seamlessly shift between them, but I believe I have sorted it out correctly.

  “Ssshiiit,” the president reacted in a hushed, hissing tone.

  “I don’t think he knew the details,” Haldeman continued, “but I think he knew,” still apparently talking about Mitchell and the break-in.

  But then Nixon made it clear he was talking about campaign contributions when he added, “He didn’t know how it was going to be handled, though, with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth, did he? Well, who was the asshole that did this thing? Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts.”

  “He is,” Haldeman confirmed.

  “I mean, he just isn’t well screwed on, is he? Isn’t that the problem?” Nixon asked.

  “No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder on,” Haldeman answered, clearly referring to Watergate.

  “Pressure from Mitchell?” Nixon asked, now understanding that Haldeman had changed the topic.

  “Apparently.”

  “Mitchell has said that everybody was concerned about ITT, or something, so do something.” The president was trying to understand what had motivated Mitchell, and it appears he was referring to their June 20 conversation, for no one else had spoken to Mitchell about why the break-in had been undertaken.

  The president was unhappy to learn these things, and had received enough bad news. “All right, fine, I understand it all. We won’t second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn’t Colson,” he said, referring again to Watergate.

  On Colson, Haldeman had some good news, which I had given him in our earlier conversation. The FBI had interviewed Colson the day before and established that he was not involved. Rather, as Haldeman told the president, “The FBI guys working the case had concluded that there were one or two possibilities, they think it was either a White House operation and they [the White House] had some obscure reasons for it, or it was the Cubans and the CIA. And after their interrogation of Colson yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House but are now convinced it is a CIA thing, so the CIA turnoff would—”

  “Well, not sure of their analysis, I must say that. I’m not going to get that involved,” the president noted.

  “No, sir. We don’t want you to,” Haldeman told him.

  “You call them in.”

  “Good,” Haldeman said.

  “Good deal. Play it tough. That’s the way they play it, and that’s the way we are going to play it,” which the president later said was a reference to the Democrats, not the CIA.

  “Okay, we’ll do it,” Haldeman reassured him, and they moved on to other topics.

  As the conversation was coming to a close, the president was still thinking about the plan to call in the CIA. “When you get these people in say, look, the problem is that this will open the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the president just feels that, I mean, without going into the details, don’t lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it.” He suggested Haldeman tell them that “the president believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And because these people [referring to the Democrats] are playing for keeps, that they should call the FBI in and say t
hat we wish for the country, don’t go any further into this case, period! And that destroys the case.” Haldeman agreed, and the president added, “That’s the way to put it, do it straight now.” While Nixon appears to have intended to escalate the use of the CIA beyond merely cutting off the FBI’s pursuit of campaign funds, when Haldeman called in Helms and Walters, he only addressed the Mexican money, so again it is unclear whether they were on the same wavelength.12

  Years later, Haldeman admitted he had gone far beyond anything Mitchell and I had recommended. As he explained, “Dean had suggested that I call Walters at the CIA. I knew Walters well. Normally, I would have simply called him over to my office at the White House and asked him if he would help us out. Whether he would have turned me down or not doesn’t matter. The fact is, there never would have been the ‘smoking gun’ conversation in the Oval Office that resulted in Nixon’s resignation if I had just called Walters myself, as I usually would have.” While Haldeman acknowledged that he had done “something I shouldn’t have done,” and that it was “a crucial—even historical—error,” he never did explain why he involved Ehrlichman and Helms, or why he remained silent about his notes of our conversation.

  Reporters and historians (as well as Richard Nixon) have also failed to understand the brief exchange, when this matter arose again, in the Oval Office between 1:04 P.M. and 1:13 P.M. on June 23.13 This second conversation has been viewed as further evidence of the president thrusting himself into the Helms and Walters meeting by summoning Haldeman back to the Oval Office just before it took place. Nixon (not to mention his researchers for his memoir) got the facts wrong: The president did not, as he wrote in his memoir, call “for Haldeman to come in again” after a meeting with his economic advisers and two ceremonial meetings to further instruct him on what to say to Helms and Walters.14 Rather, it was Haldeman who initiated the follow-up discussion. He already needed to go to the president’s office in Ehrlichman’s place to edit a statement on higher education legislation to be released later that afternoon. Haldeman was covering this so Ehrlichman could be in his office when Helms and Walters arrived.15