The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  “You know, at the Bureau, we ought to put a Bureau man in there somewhere. We’ve got to. I don’t know [whom],” Nixon said. But Haldeman had a suggestion: “Well, this guy Feldman is pushing hard. Is that his name?” “Felt,” the president corrected. Haldeman said Felt was “pushing to try and be our boy,” noting, “he’s obviously looking to be more, I guess.” “He is our boy,” the president observed and added, “yeah, you know, I want one that’s our boy. I’m not going to screw around on that score.” Referring to his selection of a new FBI director, the president said, “But, you see, if you take him out of the Bureau, it’s very hard for anybody to piss on him,” meaning that if his new director was drawn from the FBI, he would be safe.

  “We ought to throw some tests at Felt,” Haldeman suggested. “We could put some real sticky wickets to him and see how he bounces.” Then the conversation turned to a sticky wicket for the Secret Service. The president wanted to know if they had a line into McGovern’s Secret Service protection detail. Haldeman said that they did not. “We should, we can obviously try,” Nixon pressed. “Well, sure, ought to try, but I don’t know how to do it,” Haldeman admitted. Nixon surmised that his opponents had tried to get the Secret Service to provide information about him, but Haldeman was not so sure and thought it very risky should they get caught. Nixon backed off and said that he did not want Haldeman to try, but instead he hoped that someone in the Secret Service might “sometimes volunteer information.” Haldeman thought some might like to do that, and the conversation drifted into vague talk and prospects about the potential of causing political problems for McGovern and DNC chairman Larry O’Brien.

  July 28, 1972, the White House

  With the president’s busy schedule and a slowdown in the investigation and reporting on it, I found no recorded conversations focusing on Watergate from July 23 through July 27. On the twenty-eighth, Haldeman mentioned relatively good news during that morning’s meeting, assuring the president that the investigation was progressing nicely, with nothing amiss.10 “It’s on a reasonably good track, considering,” Haldeman said. “The grand jury is going through the 1701* people, but Petersen’s view to Dean is that, I think we’re going to be able to finish this grand jury thing up pretty quick, and they’ll bring indictments on the seven. And we can probably bring them the later part of August or wait around until mid-September. And Dean said he got the distinctive feeling that Petersen was asking for guidance as to which we wanted. But he was also telling me they were going to bring indictments on seven, and that’s very good news, because that means they’re indicting the Watergate five, plus Hunt and Liddy and, and then that’s all. John [Ehrlichman] says, if they—”

  “Are they going to put out a statement about the others?” the president asked.

  “Apparently not. They’ll just have to indict those, and our view, I think, is to wait, because there’s a very good chance of it not going to trial until after the election.” The president, who was pleasantly surprised, added an “Oh, yeah?” before Haldeman continued, “It will be called on a special calendar, and the special calendar is fairly clear, so it could come up pretty soon. But even if it gets to court, there’s a set of pretrial motions they’ve got to go through, and all of that stuff. So, John [Ehrlichman] feels that we ought to go for a delay and hope nothing happens before the election, because we’re better off with that than we are with anything. My original feeling was, get it out now, get it done in August, and get it over with. But that might hit it right in the middle of the Republican convention—”

  “No, no, no, no,” the president interrupted, and Haldeman continued, “—where there’s a lot of TV attention, which would be a problem, too.” The president wanted to be sure he understood who was going to be indicted, so he asked, “If they indict seven, can we trust the ones they’re thinking about are Hunt and the other fellow,” he said, forgetting Liddy’s name. Haldeman assured him, “That’s almost an ideal scenario. If they would indict seven and then not get around to the trial until after the election, we’re in pretty good shape. Now, on the [Democrats’] civil suit, the judge took some time off. He’s out of chambers. So he’s coming back, and what they’re going to do there is, we have a motion, which they think the judge will probably uphold, to withhold any further steps on the civil suit pending the outcome of the criminal suit, that any action on the civil suit would damage or interfere with the rights of the defendants in the criminal suit, or something like that. They’ve got some legal matter, fiddling around with those, which they think they’ll get, and if we do that, then we’re home free.”

  The president had an observation on the timing of the indictment: “The trial will never be finished before the election. Well, if the people plead not guilty. If they plead guilty, it would be [before the election].” Haldeman reported, “We know some of them are going to go not guilty. Hunt is going to go not guilty.”

  “Hell yes. Fight it to the end,” the president said. “And you know, the problem that you could have on this is that some lower-echelon shit-ass at the Justice Department or the FBI will try to leak out stuff about this and that and force, in some way or other, force it to another direction. You know that can happen. Fortunately, we have not tried to cover up Mitchell. We’ve allowed them to cooperate with the investigation.”

  “The record has to show us in pretty good shape,” Haldeman said.

  Clearly, based on his conversations with Haldeman, the president understood that Magruder’s perjured testimony had saved John Mitchell, not to mention prevented the further unraveling of the Watergate cover-up. But he was thinking politically, not legally. He understood that Magruder had largely cooked this story up by himself. There is no evidence suggesting that it ever occurred to him that his knowledge and approval of Magruder’s actions effectively placed him at the top of a conspiracy to suborn perjury. But even Haldeman’s encouraging news did not mean he could relax, for Magruder had yet to appear before the grand jury. Rather, for Nixon, it was time to start thinking seriously about getting even and dealing more effectively with his enemies now that his reelection was almost a certainty.

  August 1, 1972, the White House

  During 10:33 A.M. to 11:50 A.M. Oval Office conversations with Haldeman, following a brief discussion about obtaining information from Larry O’Brien’s taxes, the two men turned to the subject of news leaks about the Watergate investigation.11 Nixon said he had noticed the wire service story about the money.* “How will that affect us?” the president asked. Haldeman said, “I don’t know. Nobody knows. We’ll find out today.” They speculated that the information had come from the Justice Department. Haldeman said they had plugged one leak at Justice, “But apparently there’s another. They said that this is inevitable.”

  “Well, that’s not true,” Nixon protested.

  “We’ve got people in there that are against us,” Haldeman said, referring to anti-Nixon attorneys, but he pointed out that they had pro-Nixon appointees as well. “They’re trying to keep it all bottled up, and they’ve done it,” he reminded the president. “Considering the explosive nature of what’s there, they’ve done a pretty good job.” After making that point, Haldeman turned to the latest information about the investigation, which he had obtained from John Ehrlichman after he’d met with Attorney General Kleindienst the day before.*

  Haldeman explained, “Now, the scenario on that, they all seem pretty well agreed on, is that the only danger is Magruder, who does have to go before the grand jury. But Dean has gone over and over it with him, and Jeb is going to stay with his story, and stay with it solid. They think there’s no problem if he does, and that he will not be indicted. They will come down with seven indictments, the five plus Hunt and Liddy. That’ll be about September fifteenth that they’ll bring the indictments.” Haldeman explained why, with pretrial motions, the case would not be tried before the election. He noted, “We’ll have to ride out the very bad story. We’ll have to ride through the indictment story. But Liddy’s al
ready tarnished, and Hunt’s already tarnished, so it’s no great new revelation. It’ll just be a confirmation of previous stuff, and it’ll be bad. It’ll hurt us, but not like the trial would. And Dean is not worried about that, and he also thinks that we’re in good shape on holding the civil case until after the criminal.”

  “On the grounds it would be prejudicial,” the president added. Haldeman then turned to Judge Richey’s handling of the civil lawsuit. “Judge Richey is playing everything exactly right,” he reported. “The only concern I’ve got there is that Judge Richey is the dumbest judge in the entire business, apparently. Fortunately, he’s on our side, and his dumbness may help us, because he’s not encumbered by any”—Haldeman chuckled—“any intellectual need to do certain things. And Judge Robb, who is a little more perceptive—”

  “Roger Robb,” the president injected, with a tone of surprise.*

  Haldeman continued “—has taken it upon himself to, ah—”

  “Advising Richey,” Nixon injected anticipating Haldeman’s report.

  “—sort of take a fatherly interest in guiding Richey’s hand. And Robb clearly sees all the implications.”

  “Roger would,” Nixon confirmed, pleased with this information.

  “So they think we’re in as good of shape as we could hope to be. Here it is, we’re sitting on a powder keg, and then the kind of thing, like the thing that came out this morning”—referring to the Woodward and Bernstein story—“there’s all sorts of possibilities of someone—Oh, they subpoenaed Stans before the grand jury, but we got that quashed, fortunately.” Haldeman overstated the case, for what actually happened was that arrangements had been made for Stans to give his grand jury testimony at the Department of Justice, given the leaks coming out of the courthouse. Stans had been outraged at being hauled before the grand jury, and while he was not involved in Watergate, Haldeman explained why Mitchell had Ehrlichman intervene: “And they’re worried about Stans. And they don’t think he’s stable enough to handle the questioning very well. He gets indignant, and they just think he’s not such a good witness. They don’t want him under questioning. Magruder, they’re pretty straight on. Magruder’s scared. He asked Dean, ‘Might they indict me just to get an indictment for political reasons, or whatever?’ Dean said, ‘No, the court won’t do that, and the jury won’t do that.’ And Jeb said, ‘Well, I just want you to know, if, if they do, that I’m staying with my story all the way. I’ll go down with ’em, and there’s no question about that.’ And Dean said, ‘The one thing I’m worried about with you, I know you’ll do that. The thing I’m worried about with you is that, after you do that, if you don’t get indicted, that you’ll start running around blabbing about how, you know, you pulled yourself out of that. And let me explain to you that there’s a five-year statute of limitations on this case. And that you’re subject to being hauled in at any time in the next five years, and you keep your God damn mouth shut. Don’t talk to your wife, or your mother, your kids, or anybody else.’” Nixon approved. “Damn right,” he said softly. Haldeman continued with his version of my conversation with Magruder: “‘If you get out of this one, just remember, you’ve got this cloud hanging over you for five years. And you’re not out ’til that’s over, so don’t have a celebration when the indictments come through and you’re not on ’em.’”

  “He feels they will not indict him?” Nixon asked.

  “That’s right. They have not made a case against Magruder. A lot of lines lead to him, but they don’t tie—” The president interrupted to ask about the Sloan and Magruder conflict, and Haldeman reported that Magruder’s concocted account would impeach Sloan on a few details, but Sloan had done fine. “But inevitably some of what he had to say leads to Magruder. But Magruder’s just going to say, and honestly believes, that Sloan pocketed some of the money. There’s some discrepancy in how much money went where, and Magruder’s going to say he thinks Sloan pocketed it.”

  “You don’t think he did?”

  “No. But Magruder does, fortunately. And we’re just going to leave it at that. Let him go ahead and think it, because there’s no possible way he could harm Sloan. Sloan will never know what Magruder says. And he can’t, because Sloan’s not culpable at all under this case. Now, they laid some groundwork in a grand jury record for another case, but apparently they can’t use it. And they gave Sloan immunity on the other case, on anything beyond this case.”

  The president found this interesting, and Haldeman continued, “It’s too early to say, but it would appear that, given a very difficult situation, and no cooperation from Justice, either the FBI or Kleindienst, that our guys and these two lawyers the committee’s hired have done a superb job of keeping this thing—” But the president did not want to be overly optimistic, and he cut off Haldeman to remind him that the worst might still happen. “Let’s just be, let’s be fatalistic about the God damn thing.”

  “If it blows, it blows,” Haldeman said. “If it blows, it blows, and so on,” Nixon repeated. “And we’ll ride it out,” Haldeman noted. “I’m not that worried about it, to be completely candid with you,” the president remarked. This surprised Haldeman somewhat, given the effort being made to prevent the worst, and he was prompted to add, “Well, it’s worth a lot of work to try and keep it from blowing.”

  The president explained his thinking: “After all, if Mitchell’s gone, and we find out that nobody at a higher level was involved, the White House not being involved, and all that stuff, and the Cuban crap in there—are the Cubans going to plead not guilty, too?” Haldeman explained that everybody was being taken care of, so they need not worry about those involved in Watergate. He began vaguely, answering Nixon’s question about whether the Cubans would plead: “I don’t know, but everybody’s satisfied. They’re all out of jail, and they’ve all been taken care of. And they’re all—” Haldeman rephrased, “They’ve done a lot of discreet checking to be sure there’s no discontent in the ranks, and there isn’t any.”

  “They’re all out on bail,” the president noted. “Hunt’s happy,” Haldeman added. “At considerable cost, I guess?” the president inquired. “Yes,” Haldeman said flatly. “It’s worth it,” the president said, giving his blessing to the expenditures. “It’s very expensive. It’s a costly exercise—” Haldeman said, to make the point that they were spending hundreds of thousands of dollars. “That’s what the money’s for,” the president injected. Haldeman continued, “—but that’s better spent than, than, ah—”

  “Well, they have taken all the risk and they have to be paid. That’s all there is to that,” Nixon declared, making it clear that he approved of the payments to those involved. “They have to pay, although, I must say that I’m second-guessing whoever made the decision,” the president added, regarding breaking into the DNC. “That’s pretty damn stupid,” Haldeman agreed. “About as stupid a thing as I’ve ever heard of. I mean, that is as bad as you can get it,” the president said. “But whoever it is has suffered for his sins, plenty,” Haldeman observed.

  “I know. Oh no, don’t do that. Never blame. But the poor son of a bitch, what the hell, you’ve got such a stupid God damn idea. He must have got it from Hunt. It sounds like him, doesn’t it? Hunt, Liddy, I mean. I can’t think of anybody in our, in that organization. Magruder wouldn’t think up such a damn thing. I mean, he isn’t—” Nixon said. Haldeman added, “I can’t conceive that he did. I think it’s Liddy. Liddy, apparently, is a guy that just, you know—”

  “Hates ’em,” Nixon speculated. “Well, he lives on this kind of stuff. I mean, he loves the—” Haldeman was starting to explain Liddy’s zealotry when the president asked, “Now, he resigned?” seeking to reaffirm his recollection. “A long time, no, he was fired,” Haldeman explained, and they reviewed the fact that Liddy had been dismissed when he had not cooperated with the FBI, a fact that had been published in the media. Nixon asked if Hunt’s noncooperation was publicly known, but Haldeman was not certain.

  “Well, he’
s not here,” Nixon noted, and then fell silent. Given his next comments it is clear that he was thinking about the information Haldeman had provided: Those involved in the Watergate break-in were now being paid, and he was concerned.* “You know, they might just be so silly to be paying a bribe on Hunt, if they are putting him on, to make this case, the case about Watergate and so forth. Well, let me say, he’s not worth that. I think, it’s not that much, I hope, I mean, I know of, I never discount the kind of crap the press will put to us on a thing like this. But, Bob, it does not, we’ve, we’ve stayed completely away from it. I’ve stayed completely away from it, and we will, ah, MacGregor, of course, will take, as he should, a holier than thou attitude, ‘I don’t know anything about it.’ Right?”

  “Yeah, and we’ve kept Colson clear of it,” Haldeman said, and added, “And we’ve held up this civil thing. It’s on a discovery deal, but [a] motion will be made on the civil suit just to suspend all activity on that, pending the outcome of the criminal.” The president was still thinking about pardons for those involved, and he asked Haldeman if they had gathered charges against his opponents, as they had done with a veteran’s group down in Florida that had been charged for antiwar activities. Haldeman said that they were looking for more, and maybe they would catch some “bad guys” at the forthcoming Republican convention, whom they could hang on to for a while, and then let them go.

  After a brief silence, the president asked: “You say no cooperation from the Justice Department? I understand the FBI.”

  “Well, it’s been very hard. It’s, it’s hard. Petersen has been reasonably good, in fact, pretty, I guess, darn good,” Haldeman reported. “The problem has been Kleindienst just totally washed his hands. And now he’s come back in. Ehrlichman hauled him in yesterday and said, ‘You know, this has gotten ridiculous. Now that you’ve got everything you need. Now, for God’s sake, turn it off. Bring your indictments.’ And Kleindienst seemed to see the light. At least he’ll be on it.” The president wanted to know the timing, if indictments could be handed down sooner by the grand jury, and if there was a way to speed up the process. Haldeman said that it was possible, but he did not think it was desirable to have them until after the Republican convention in August, because of the press coverage. “Well, I’m just nervous about it. Maybe there could be some problems,” the president said. “Not Jeb, I’m not nervous about Magruder.” Then he explained what was on his mind. “Do you think Sloan pocketed the money?”