The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  November 10–12, 1972, Key Biscayne

  No sooner had I completed an extended interview with Segretti in Palm Springs on November 10 than I was summoned to Key Biscayne. On November 11, I met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at the guest house in the presidential compound so that they could listen to the recording of my session with Segretti (which was made with his consent). As usual, Haldeman made detailed notes, and then went to the president’s home to report what Segretti had revealed. While not sinister, his actions were political pranks in the extreme.

  On November 12 Haldeman told me I should return to Washington with the president when he and his staff departed on Air Force One that evening. During the flight Nixon came back to the guest compartment to meet my wife, and he warned her, “We’re going to keep your husband damn busy.”6 My role had changed. With Watergate I had been simply picking up tidbits of information from Liddy, Magruder, Mitchell, Mardian and Kalmbach, as well as from the lawyers hired to represent the reelection committee, and became a go-between for Haldeman and Ehrlichman with Mitchell. Now I was responsible for directly investigating Segretti’s relationship to the White House, a project on which I worked, along with my many other assignments in the counsel’s office, until early December.

  November 13–14, 1972, Camp David

  After his postelection respite in Florida, the president headed for Camp David on Monday morning, November 13, where he remained based for much of the rest of the month, with Haldeman and Ehrlichman joining him for lengthy stays. It was there they worked on the fundamental reorganization of the executive branch of the government, creating presidential counselors who would have jurisdiction over various departments and agencies while reporting directly to the president or his senior staff. Along with the restructuring of the lines of authority, the three men were busy deciding who would actually run the government. The president decided to keep Kleindienst as attorney general for a year, and said to Ehrlichman on November 14, in a discussion of the Department of Justice, that he would tell Kleindienst, “We can’t make an exception of your department, Dick. We’re cleaning up all the departments, so they’re going to go.”7 But then, remembering Watergate, the president remarked, “We can’t start making exceptions, with the possible exception of Petersen.” Then he said to Ehrlichman, “I understand you want to keep him.” Ehrlichman chuckled, sarcastically responding, “I don’t necessarily want to, but we’ve got to, he’s got the—” The president interrupted, saying, “He knows too much.” And Ehrlichman kept talking, explaining, “He’s got the keys to the can.”

  Another Watergate-sensitive appointment that arose during this conversation was the director of the FBI. The president wanted a cop at the FBI, and liked Jerry Wilson, who was the head of the DC Metropolitan Police, as long as Ehrlichman was “sure he’s a ballplayer.” “I just don’t want Gray to have to go up for confirmation,” Nixon added. “That’s the problem with Gray.” He liked the idea of appointing Gray as undersecretary of state, seemingly forgetting that this, too, was a post that would require confirmation.

  November 24, 1972, the White House

  The subject of Henry Petersen arose again when the president returned to the White House for a day. Nixon complained to Ehrlichman during a morning meeting in the Oval Office: He was annoyed that the Justice Department had yet to prosecute anyone regarding Watergate.8 Still, the president told Ehrlichman, he wanted to give an appearance of change, although he acknowledged that “Petersen has got to be kept.” Ehrlichman agreed and said he had confirmed that after further checking, and added, “He’s adequate, and when this thing is over, we’ll find a nice judgeship for him, and he can go out.”

  During a brief meeting before heading to New York City that afternoon, the president explained to Haldeman that he had been doing further thinking about Watergate:9 “I had thought that what ought to happen, I been doing some more reading about the Watergate thing, and so forth. Why the hell don’t you get Mitchell and John Ehrlichman, you and Dean and sit down and thrash the damn thing out?”

  “Ehrlichman, Dean and I are going to do that right now. Let us go one round first before we get into—”

  “Here’s what I would like to do with it, and right here, maybe Dean will have to say something,” he began telling Haldeman. “The main thing that we’ve got to do is to protect the presidency, and on that, we need a simple, clear statement, and we need it early, which simply says again what we’ve already said, by Dean, and in the form of a report to the president.” He began describing what my report should say: “‘Pursuant to your request, I have made an investigation in regard, for the so-called Watergate incident now, [and] I have found that there is no present member of the White House staff who was, who had knowledge of it, or was involved in the, da da da, Watergate matter.’” He then explained, “You see, I have said that publicly, and I want him to say it again.” But the president wanted even more, although he was not clear on how it would be phrased: “Ah, [then, I would] go on to say, I’ve also found that ah, that ah, ah, that ah, neither ah, neither ah, ah,” but when he could not clarify his thoughts he fell silent for a moment, until he finally continued. “If he can, you ought to use the opportunity to clear Stans, and the finance committee, you know what I mean? Just say that they were not involved. As far as your campaign committee, if they’re not cut out, they’re, it is because, you should just say they’re going on with the investigation, but, but, I conducted, my investigation indicates that ah, that, that, at least Stans, I mean, maybe you can get that out of the way, such, so that I can, so you say, that Secretary Stans had no knowledge, nothing to do with it, and Attorney General Mitchell, former attorney general Mitchell. Don’t go any further than that, don’t go any further. Don’t go down to Magruder or people like that, because you’re going to get your ass caught.”

  Then he said, “Now, with regard to the Segretti thing, he should just say that, ah, maybe that statement has to come a little later, but it should be one. We get all the business about, as John [Ehrlichman] says, letting it all hang out. Let’s find some sort of a peace. But in the end, there may not be that flat, categorical statement. And I think it’s got to come from Dean, that I conducted an investigation pursuant to your direction. I have found that, and then maybe this will fix everything, if he names names. For example, he should tick them off: that Mr. Haldeman was involved. Untrue. Mr. Colson was involved. Untrue. That, ah, as far as Mr. Chapin was concerned, he recommended, and so forth.”

  He soon continued, “I think that kind of statement is needed from the standpoint of the presidency. Now, I don’t want to do anything that will harm other individuals if we can avoid it, but you see, by that you get the very simple statement that that’s what it was about. That’s the kind of thing, you see, that will, that we can stand on. As Ziegler says, there’s the statement that we stand on. And now John Ehrlichman’s view probably will be, and Dean’s as a lawyer, we’ll let it all come out, and it will be clear that the president’s not involved.” But he did not want to wait on the legal process, telling Haldeman, “This is a public relations exercise as much as anything else. Dean has got to report that pursuant to my directions he has conducted a thoroughgoing investigation of this and has found that so forth. See what I mean?”

  Haldeman, who had been making notes, responded, “Yep, he has to draw that conclusion, or else you’ll be—” Nixon interrupted, “There was no White House participant.” He explained how the report could state that Chapin had not directed Segretti, but Haldeman cautioned him that this was “shady ground.” As their conversation about Chapin, and also Strachan, continued, the president asked, “Well, what is your view, Bob, about Chapin, what we could do with him? Don’t forget, now is the time we’ve got to do something there.” Haldeman, without missing a beat, replied, “Well, I think he’s got to move out,” to which Nixon said, “No question about that.”

  “And, I mean, out of government. I don’t think he should just move out of the White House,” Haldeman c
larified, noting, “I think if he stays around somewhere else, you got a problem. But don’t rush him out.” The president suggested having him work for his foundation, but Haldeman thought not; rather, they might assist in placing him with the Marriott Corporation, which sponsored special events, a subject of interest to Chapin. As for Strachan, they would place him elsewhere in government. “Well, we’ve got to clean the skirts,” the president said, to sum up.

  While Nixon was in New York, dropping by his former law firm, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander, to say hello, Haldeman called for a meeting with Ehrlichman and me, and we gathered in Ehrlichman’s office for a lengthy afternoon session at which Haldeman reported on his conversation with the president. That evening Haldeman noted the outcome of our meeting in his diary: “Decided we’d have to follow the full-disclosure route on Segretti, and that we can’t do anything much on Watergate because of the court case.”10 It was agreed that I should prepare a report on Segretti.

  December 5, 1972, the White House

  Although the president’s schedule, as well as his thinking, was dominated by his efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Vietnam, Haldeman continued to share incidental matters of interest, such as the fact that Teddy Kennedy’s Senate subcommittee was undertaking an investigation of Segretti.11 In passing, the president asked about the Dean report, and Haldeman said, “Yeah, I should have it today, his draft.”

  December 9, 1972, Camp David

  On Saturday the president slept late, had breakfast at 10:30 A.M. and started making calls from his Aspen Lodge study. At 12:30 P.M. he phoned Chuck Colson, who gave him information that would have a significant impact on the handling of Watergate:12 “I just got a terribly tragic bit of news. That plane crash,” Colson said, referring to the widely reported crash of United Flight Number 553 the preceding Friday afternoon, December 8, at Chicago’s Midway International Airport. “Howard, Howard Hunt’s wife was on it, and it’s—” Nixon cut him off, “His wife is dead?” Colson, depressed and shaken, answered, “Yes, sir. She was killed in that plane crash in Chicago.” “Oh, my God,” Nixon replied. Colson understood that the loss of Dorothy Hunt—who he told the president was an extraordinary woman, brilliant, charming, polylingual and the mother of four beautiful children—would be devastating for her husband.

  December 10, 1972, the White House

  On Sunday morning Haldeman spoke with the president about the Chicago airline crash.13 “That was a tragedy, wasn’t it?” Haldeman said, when Nixon raised the subject. “Oh, Christ! I don’t care what the hell he ever did or anything like that,” the president replied, and mentioned that he was going to send a condolence note to Howard Hunt. But when he learned more details on the aftermath of the crash, he decided against it. Haldeman informed the president that ten thousand dollars in cash, in hundred-dollar bills, had been found in Dorothy Hunt’s purse, which had been recovered from the plane’s wreckage. When Haldeman said that they would probably be tracking the serial numbers on the bills, the stunned president asked hopefully, “Who gave ’em to him? We didn’t?” Haldeman did not know where the money had come from: “You know, whether it’s theirs, or there’s payoff money involved in it, it could be some of it, a lot of bills.”* Of course, if it was indeed payoff money, it could present a very serious new problem. When the president said he had not seen that information in the press reports, Haldeman reported that he had read about it in a wire service story.

  When Nixon remarked that he hoped Hunt would be able to explain the cash, Haldeman pointed out that they “may not be able to track it, he may have been smart enough to wash it,” making it untraceable. “Suppose, incidentally, this money is tracked back, who is it tracked to?” Nixon asked, clearly concerned that it might be traced back to someone close to him. Haldeman did not think that was a problem, and explained, “They put together some cash to take care of these people. I don’t know where it came from. I assume they were smart enough to do it [so] that it was not traceable cash, as the other stuff,” Haldeman noted, referring to the money found earlier in Barker’s account.

  Later in the conversation the president returned to Watergate: “Oh, incidentally, on the PR side, I thought of something else. I don’t like the White House staff getting bad PR, or bad raps; we need to look at that.” He didn’t want his “God damn good staff” getting smeared on “Watergate and Segretti,” spelling out his real point: “I want to get myself cleaned up.” He thought it important that Haldeman and Ehrlichman be cleaned up as well, because “you fellows carry out my orders.”

  Further conversation about payoff money made it difficult to address the president’s wish to make Watergate disappear, so at one point Nixon began asking for more information, somewhat indirectly and softy confronting Haldeman: “I know the situation, what the hell? You had to know a little about it. Ah, Chapin knew a little about it, ah et cetera, et cetera. You know what I mean—” “Chapin doesn’t know anything about [Watergate], all he knows is Segretti,” Haldeman answered, avoiding the question of his own knowledge of Watergate.

  “Yeah. What I might have, you had to know that something—” Nixon pressed. “I knew that something was going on,” Haldeman admitted. “You knew there was [a bug], bugging,” the president said, although these words were slurred. He added, “You knew we were getting some information.” Haldeman acknowledged that he did, responding, “That’s right.” “But we didn’t know such a stupid thing was included, was going on,” the president continued, regarding the Watergate operation. “That’s right. I didn’t know we were bugging people,” Haldeman added but did not further clarify his knowledge, other than to concede vaguely, “I knew we were bugging the other side.” To this comment Nixon added, “Perfectly legitimate.”* Following a confused exchange about what White House aide Jack Caulfield was or was not doing, the president wondered if he had known of the Watergate operation, since Haldeman had earlier told him of Caulfield’s proposed Operation Sandwedge, which Mitchell had turned down. “Well, I’m not sure he did,” Haldeman said, “but I think what happened, obviously what happened, Mitchell set this apparatus up, did not stay in very close contact with him. We did talk about an early issue, and that was doing it out of New York versus doing it out of our own campaign offices. John pulled that back, pulled it out, set it up over there [at the campaign]. Then we started pushing and, and this is really, this is the point where what a lack of information there was, we weren’t getting the right kind of—” Haldeman continued without responding to a question from the president, who was concerned to know if he had done something to provoke it. “—we weren’t getting, the obvious stuff. When I asked, can we have tape recordings of not, ah, bugged stuff, of a public speech or this press conference—”

  “Well, I asked about that. I asked for that God damn stuff all the time,” Nixon added, then talking over Haldeman, who continued, saying he wanted a record of what Humphrey and McGovern had said. Nixon then remembered that he had added Scoop Jackson to the list. Haldeman said, “And I pushed hard on that, but they weren’t getting it. Now what I’m told is, Magruder didn’t know much about this other apparatus,” referring to Liddy’s operation. “He knew that it was in place. He didn’t know what it did. He kept pushing them.” Haldeman explained that this occurred because the White House was seeking more information. “And Liddy’s story is that the reason he was bugging is, Magruder was lashing him so mercilessly on getting information, and then Liddy moved out and did it.” But that was not the whole story, for after the arrests Haldeman had learned more, so he added, “Now I know there is another factor, in which they very much laid low, because Mitchell was pushing on using them, there was this, ah—”

  “Paper,” Nixon injected.

  “Secret papers, and financial data that O’Brien had, that he was going to get. I didn’t even know about that, so we weren’t pushing on that.* But we were pushing on trying to get this external information, which would not have required bugging at all, but just maybe as simple as holding
a tape recorder at a press conference, or something like that, and getting pictures and words.” Nixon, still wondering if he were somehow complicit, asked in a barely audible rhetorical fashion, “Do you remember I used to talk to you sometimes, loosely, I [always said], Jesus Christ, they bugged us [unclear]. I personally [unclear] now fight back!” Haldeman responded that O’Brien had been the wrong person to bug.

  After a brief pause in the conversation, the president expressed concern that Ehrlichman had concluded that nothing could really be done to deal with the situation, but Haldeman corrected him: “[Ehrlichman] wanted to strengthen the Dean report stuff, because there was some other things we could do on it,” but I was concerned about how far to go with it, “because the FBI knows a lot of stuff.” This prompted Nixon to ask what he should do about the FBI. Haldeman thought maybe Nixon should put Lou Nichols, an old friend and former FBI agent, back in and in charge of the agency, but the president rejected that idea, as he did Henry Petersen, who, he told Haldeman, “isn’t worth a shit.” Haldeman remarked that they might have to live with Gray’s getting torn up at a confirmation hearing. Still seeking information about Watergate, Nixon changed the subject to ask, “You don’t think Colson knew about the bugging?”

  “No, not the Watergate bugging, anyway. But I think he knew about other things, and it’s awful close to Hunt, that’s my problem,” Haldeman noted. “That’s fine,” Nixon said. This exchange indicates that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had told the president that they wanted to get Colson off the staff. As Haldeman proceeded he again hinted at problems he was not sharing with the president about Hunt and Colson, if Haldeman actually knew—namely, the Ellsberg break-in, which involved Ehrlichman far more deeply than Colson. “That’s the one area that you have to watch it,” Haldeman said, referring to the Hunt and Colson relationship. “If you look at all the possible problems on this, you’ve got to assume that one, or some of them, are going to evolve, and some aren’t.” Haldeman did warn that things could start to unravel. If the Cubans broke, for example, it could lead to other problems. With this comment Haldeman yawned loudly, very unconcerned, and changed the subject. He observed that Chapin would be a bad witness, because he was such a nice person, but Strachan, who “knew everything that was going on,” would be a good witness, because he could not remember anything. Regarding Strachan, the president asked, “Does he know about Watergate?” Haldeman said, “I don’t think he knows it was being done in advance, but I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know how much he knew, but he may have known they were gathering information.” The president believed the odds were that Strachan did know, but Haldeman remained uncertain. Then the president said confidently, “Mitchell had to know this,” with which Haldeman agreed.