The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  When discussing Watergate with the president on March 16, Ehrlichman shared a well-informed theory of what had happened in considerable detail. He recalled that, about the time Liddy’s intelligence-gathering plans were being drawn up, “there was also that [rumor] that the Democrats had entered into an illegal alliance with [Florida governor Reubin] Askew for financing of their convention in Florida,” which prompted Nixon to say in confirmation, “So, they were just trying to find that out.” Ehrlichman added, “And there were a lot of things floating around that particular job.” Nixon also noted, as this conversation proceeded, that the White House had been interested in learning “about the Democratic convention.”8 The next day, on March 17, when I told the president, “I cannot understand why they decided to go in the DNC. That absolutely mystifies me as to what—” I began, but then interjected midsentence: “Anybody who’s walked around a national committee knows that there’s nothing there.” The president, evidencing more knowledge than I possessed, explained, “Well, the point is, they’re trying to see what they could develop in terms of the—” Nixon did not complete his thought but seemed to imply that it had been a fishing expedition.9 During my conversation with the president on March 21, when we were discussing the fact that nothing was found in the DNC, Nixon made the following comment: “But Bob one time said something about the fact we got some information about this or that or the other, but I think it was about the convention, what they were planning, I said they’re [unclear].”10 Here the president was repeating what he had told me on March 13.

  Haldeman consistently reported that Liddy’s undertaking related to Larry O’Brien and the Democratic convention. During the March 28 conversation, Haldeman reported to the president about Magruder’s effort to involve the White House in the break-in based, in part, on Colson. He said that, according to Magruder: “Colson called [him] twice to tell him to get going on this thing, and he specifically referred to the Larry O’Brien information, was hard on that. And Jeb says Hunt and Liddy were in Colson’s office, and LaRue was in Jeb’s office on that phone call.” Nixon asked why Larry O’Brien, and Haldeman responded, he was told, “Well, that is what they’re bugging the Watergate for.” When Nixon pressed for more facts about why O’Brien had been targeted, Haldeman answered, “Information regarding the Florida convention stuff, down there.” Later in this conversation Nixon asked, “This stuff on O’Brien had to do with O’Brien’s activities at the convention?” Haldeman affirmed, “Apparently.” As they talked over each other, Nixon asked if they had gotten into “O’Brien’s business with [Howard] Hughes, did he get into that, or not?” Haldeman said, “No.” Nixon responded, “Okay, sounds good.”11 The last recorded Nixon conversation about this subject was on April 14, 1973, when Ehrlichman said that, based on his investigation (and conversation with Magruder), when Colson called to encourage him to get the Liddy plans approved by Mitchell, Colson had been pushing for information on Larry O’Brien.

  If this obsession with O’Brien and the Democrats’ convention seems irrational, there was little about Watergate that was otherwise.

  Appendix B

  The 18½-Minute Gap

  I am indebted to the remarkably thorough background research undertaken by Cleveland-based attorney Jim Robenalt, with whom I do continuing legal education programs (see: www.WatergateCLE.com). Jim became interested in this subject and discovered, in the course of his research as reported below, that it was mechanically impossible for Rose Mary Woods to (as she claimed) have erased part—or, as Alexander Haig suggested, all—of the June 20, 1972, conversation in question.

  This appendix addresses a frequently asked question regarding Watergate: Who was responsible for the 18½-minute gap—leaving behind a shrill buzz—on the tape of the June 20, 1972, conversation between President Nixon and H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, and what was erased? Two observations should be made about these questions. First, the answers to them have virtually no historic significance whatsoever as they provide no information about or insight into Watergate that cannot already be found in abundance elsewhere. If the question still lingers, it is due to the amount of news media attention the gap received when it was first revealed—and to the fact that everyone loves a mystery, even when it is ultimately meaningless. Only because the 18½-minute gap mystery has persisted am I addressing it here. Which brings me to the second observation: Knowing what I now know, after having gone through and studied all the Watergate conversations, it is easier to answer the “what” part of the question than the “who”—though I have some new “who” information as well.

  At the time of the gap’s discovery in late November 1973, these questions could not be answered, and the matter was dropped when Nixon resigned. Yet a rather detailed record was developed by the Watergate special prosecutor’s office in its unsuccessful efforts to investigate the missing material and whether there had been an intentional destruction of evidence. Those records are located at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. While I have made a quick pass through that record, others, like Jim Robenalt, who find this a fascinating puzzle, have studied this material in great depth. Here I am only going to make a few key points about it.

  Background: How the Issue Arose

  Following the public uproar after the Saturday Night Massacre on October 20, 1973, which sent Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox back to Harvard after he demanded actual copies of the president’s recorded conversation, Nixon quickly caved to public pressure, and on October 23 sent his lawyers to notify Judge Sirica that he would comply with the judge’s August 29 order (upheld by the Court of Appeals on October 12) to produce the requested tapes: six conversations with me and three that took place on June 20, 1972—the first day Nixon was back at the White House following the June 17 arrests at the DNC—with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell.1

  A week later, on October 30, 1973, Fred Buzhardt returned to Judge Sirica’s courtroom to report that two of the requested conversations allegedly did not exist: the June 20, 1972, telephone call with John Mitchell, which Nixon had made from the White House residence using a telephone that was not included in the recording system; and the April 15, 1973, conversation with me in the president’s EOB office, of which no record existed because it was claimed that the recording system had run out of tape that weekend. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the Saturday Night Massacre, Buzhardt’s report of missing conversations created new headlines and even greater suspicion about Nixon’s behavior. Why, for example, had the White House waited so many months after receiving the subpoena to divulge that two of the conversations were missing? No good answer was forthcoming from the White House; instead, Buzhardt claimed that they had been so certain that they were going to win in court that they had not bothered to look for the requested information. Judge Sirica wanted to get to the bottom of what had happened, so he called for an open hearing, which began on the last day of October and proceeded for several weeks, into November 1973. The explanation given during these hearings for the missing June 20 conversation with Mitchell—that Nixon had made the call to Mitchell from a telephone that did not record them—made sense. However, the account given for my April 15 conversation being missing was less than satisfactory, even at the time, but given the discovery of the July 10, 1973, conversation with Steve Bull, it makes no sense at all. It appears, rather, that the Nixon White House succeeded in making the April 15 conversation disappear.

  A New Mystery Regarding the April 15 Conversation

  During my testimony before the Senate Watergate committee on June 25, 1973, I testified that I believed I had been taped on April 15 when meeting with the president shortly after 9:00 P.M., and I encouraged the committee to determine if such a recording existed.2 A copy of my testimony was running on the newswires even before I completed it, so it is very possible that it set off an alarm at the Western White House. Later that day, after seven o’clock in Washington and four o’clock in California, at the request of the president, Steve Bull called
the head of the Secret Service Technical Division, Louis Sims, and instructed him to get “a certain tape and listening equipment to be sent to California—via Buzhardt,” according to the Watergate special prosecutor’s office summary digest of the November 1973 tapes hearing testimony of Sims, who had replaced Al Wong. At some point, however, the plan to send the tape and listening equipment to the Western White House (on the next courier flight) was canceled, and Bull arranged for Buzhardt to listen to the conversation in Washington in Buzhardt’s White House office.

  Because of the July 10 conversation between Bull and the president, we now know the identity of the tape Buzhardt listened to on June 25. On July 10 they had the following exchange: “Well, you directly authorized me on April 15, did you not, sir, when we were in California?” Bull asked the president. “Oh, yeah, sure,” Nixon said. “That’s the only one Buzhardt has heard,” Bull reported. “No, no, no. I authorized that. I directed that, because I didn’t want that sent out there [to the Western White House]. Oh, shit. [I’d forgotten about that],” Nixon said. “And that is the only one,” Bull clarified. “That was on the day, just April 15,” Nixon repeated. “Just that one, yeah, that is correct,” Bull agreed and departed.3 There is no hesitation or uncertainty in this brief exchange: Bull was clearly confirming that they both recalled that it was, in fact, the April 15 conversation that Buzhardt had been instructed to listen to on June 25.

  This conversation in July refutes both Bull’s and Buzhardt’s later testimony that Buzhardt listened to my March 20 telephone call with the president on June 25. In fact, it makes no sense for anyone to have listened to the March 20 telephone conversation on June 25 when the only purpose was to request a meeting the next day. It is clear that Steve Bull had already listened to this March 20 call, which was consistent with the president’s June 4 instruction to Bull to go through my telephone calls. The information provided to Fred Thompson in June (before my testimony) by Buzhardt, about my conversations with Nixon, show that the March 20 telephone call had been reviewed, given the level of detail Thompson had . His notes state what he was told: “The president called Dean that night, and Dean said that there was ‘not a scintilla of evidence’ to indicate White House involvement and Dean suggested he give the president a more in-depth briefing on what had transpired.” This statement by me regarding “not a scintilla of evidence” occurred almost at the end of the conversation. In addition, Nixon told Bull on June 4 that he was not interested in the April 15 conversation, because he could recall it. In the material provided to Thompson, the April 15 conversation is described as follows: “Dean along with almost everybody else was called in that day. The president told Dean that he must go before the grand jury without immunity.” It appears no one had listened to this conversation.4

  In short, there was no reason on June 25 to listen to the March 20 telephone call that Buzhardt later claimed he listened to that evening. On the other hand, given my Senate testimony, the White House had reason for concern about the April 15 conversation. It would, most important, have shown that Nixon’s firewall defense was untrue, by his own admissions.

  Clearly White House witnesses were volunteering nothing at the November missing tapes hearing. Rose Mary Woods, who also testified, remained silent about what she thought had been a terrible mistake she had made that became known as the 18½-minute gap. To explain Ms. Woods’s mistake, it is necessary to go back to an earlier date, before Buzhardt reported the two conversations missing, for the 18½-minute gap did not surface until after November 12, 1973, when the initial tape hearing was ending. But the relevant events that resulted in discovery of the tape gap began well before that time.

  Discovery of the 18½-Minute Gap

  The tapes were in the custody of the Secret Service. Their record of who made use of the tapes, such as it was, indicates that there was some activity involving the tapes before Butterfield revealed the system. Haldeman listened to the March 21 conversation on two occassions in April. On June 4, the president spent the day listening to a number of our conversations, assigning Bull to listen to our telephone calls.* No further tapes were removed from the Secret Service vault until June 25, which is when Buzhardt listened to either the April 15 conversation (according to Bull’s near contemporaneous statement on July 10) or the conversation of March 20 (according to Buzhardt’s recollection after the April 15 one was found missing). On July 10 and 11, Bull pulled tapes for Haldeman—apparently the September 15, 1972, conversation with me was on two reels. It was while Nixon was fighting in court to protect the tapes that Bull next gathered some to take to Camp David for Rose Woods to start transcribing, after they had been placed in the custody of the president or, more specifically, that of his chief of staff, Al Haig.

  The first conversation requested in the subpoena was: “(a) Meeting of June 20, 1972, in the President’s Executive Office Building (‘EOB’) office involving Richard Nixon, John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman from 10:30 A.M. to noon (time approximate).” In fact, there was no such meeting, but rather, two separate meetings, first with Ehrlichman and then with Haldeman. Because Rose found the Cox subpoena confusing, she asked for guidance as to which conversation was being requested, and she was told by Buzhardt to transcribe the Ehrlichman one. Other than a flippant comment at the end of the discussion, there was no mention of Watergate whatsoever with Ehrlichman at his first meeting with the president following the arrests at the DNC.* Rose did not finish the transcription that day and resumed when she returned to her White House office on Monday, October 1. Because the recording machine she was using did not have a foot pedal control, it made it much more difficult for her to transcribe, so during the morning of October 1, she asked for a machine with a foot pedal and a smaller headset. The Secret Service did not have such a device, so it purchased a new Uher 5000 recorder, which was equipped as she had requested and arrived at about 1:15 P.M. on October 1. Woods finished up the June 20 Ehrlichman conversation on her new machine, and while checking to be sure she had found the end of it, she went directly into the Haldeman conversation that followed. It was then that she heard a “shrill buzz” on the tape. Believing she had caused a four- to five-minute erasure by mistakenly pressing the record button instead of the off button and then the foot pedal of her new machine while she spoke on the telephone, she believed she had caused the erasure. She immediately told the president what had happened. He assured her that it was not a problem, because the Haldeman portion of the tape had not been subpoenaed, at which she returned to transcribing other conversations.

  It was during the following two weeks (with almost daily front-page stories covering the missing tapes imbroglio) that Rose Woods’s shrill buzzing on the June 20 Haldeman conversation was discovered by others at the White House. On November 14, as Buzhardt was preparing an index for the tapes he would turn over to Judge Sirica on November 20, he reread the subpoena request for the June 20 material, and the submissions that Cox had made with his own subpoena, and realized that the Haldeman portion had also been cited in the Sirica subpoena, although he would not tell the judge for a week. It is at this time, he claims, that he learned of the gap in the recording. It was next discovered that it was not the four to five minutes that Woods had believed it to be but over eighteen minutes. Haldeman’s notes quickly confirmed that the missing part of the conversation was related to Watergate. All this would be investigated in great detail, for Judge Sirica would not only convene another public hearing on the newly discovered tape gap, but would appoint six acoustic and sound-engineering experts to examine it; they would unanimously agree that it had been intentionally erased on the Uher 5000 used by Rose Mary Woods.5 Sirica would recommend that a grand jury investigate this potential destruction of evidence. Today these records of the investigation into the tape gap are available at NARA, with some available online.6 The matter has been written about in several books by those directly involved.7

  Who Did Not Erase the June 20 Conversation?

  Jim Robenalt has discovered
and recently reported information that shows that, contrary to what was believed at the time and has remained the received history, Rose Mary Woods could not, in fact, have erased part or all of the tape, as others claim, and as she admitted doing when she discovered the buzzing sound on the tape.* The facts are rather compelling.

  The court-appointed experts conclusively found that the machine that had erased the June 20 conversation with Haldeman, leaving a shrill buzzing sound, was the Uher 5000. In the words of the experts: “Support for this conclusion includes recorder operating characteristics that we measured and found to correspond to signal characteristics observed on the evidence tape.” These sound experts, however, were not experts on the Uher 5000. But the FBI had located a specialist in the Uher 5000, and had Nixon not resigned and the inquiry into the destruction of the June 20 tape not been largely abandoned, this expert likely would have been called to Washington to testify. Jim Robenalt found this Uher 5000 expert, Doug Blackwell, on the Internet some four decades later and interviewed him.

  Blackwell, who at the time was one of the few Uher 5000 (a machine that was built in Germany and imported into the United States) service technicians in the United States, reported that the accident that Rose Woods described in detail in sworn testimony—she had mistakenly hit the record button, instead of the off button, when she answered the telephone and then pressed her foot pedal—could not have happened. Blackwell explained that the Uher 5000 was designed to prevent exactly that type of accident from occurring. It was mechanically impossible to depress the record button, placing the machine in record mode (which would erase over the content of the tape), while the reels were turning. Also, the foot pedal would not engage in this situation. Without getting too deep into the mechanical operations of the Uher 5000—as Jim Robenalt did when he spoke with Blackwell—by the end of the conversation Jim had no doubt whatsoever that Rose could not have erased the tape in any of the variations or combinations of the testimony she gave to explain how she had erased the material, which was basically as she had told the president: She had accidentally hit the record switch rather than the off switch, and then put her foot on the pedal causing the tape to turn on its reels and thus causing the problem.