The Poison King

by Adrienne Mayor

  MEANWHILE IN THE ROMAN CAMPS

  Nicomedes had scurried away to Aquillius’s encampment, where he had to explain to his masters how he lost so many men, all his supplies, and his war chest. Appian says that Aquillius and the Roman generals were horrified by the fiasco. Too late they realized that they had heedlessly “kindled a great strife without good judgment.” But even more alarming, they had lost a war they had begun without any public decree from the People of Rome. They were now nothing but rogue enemy combatants trapped in hostile territory, with no backing from the Senate.

  An exultant Mithradates rode out from Sinope on his finest horse, with an advance guard of 100 Sarmatians. The party ascended Mount Scoroba in the Olgassy Mountains. From these lofty peaks rising above dense pine forests they could look down toward Aquillius’s vulnerable camp. There were numerous native sanctuaries in these mountains: it is likely that Mithradates performed a sacred fire ceremony here to thank the gods Ahuramazda, Mithra, and Zeus the Warrior for his great victory.

  On the ascent of Mount Scoroba, Mithradates’ 100 Sarmatians surprised 800 of Nicomedes’ cavalrymen trying to reach Aquillius’s camp. Even though they outnumbered the Sarmatian horseman 8 to 1, the Bithynians fled in terror from the nomads. The Sarmatians captured most of them and brought them to Mithradates. The king gave these men supplies and released them. Like their compatriots, they, too, joined the Pontic cavalry.

  Down in Aquillius’s camp, Nicomedes had a frightening premonition. In the middle of the night, he fled again, to the camp of Cassius. Aquillius, in fear of Mithradates’ rapid advance, ordered his 40,000 soldiers and 4,000 cavalry to retreat. He hoped to reach the stronghold of Protopachion (eastern Bithynia). But Mithradates’ army, led by Neoptolemus and Nemanes (an Armenian commander sent by Tigranes) overtook him that same day. This battle went very badly for Aquillius: nearly 10,000 of his men lay dead on the field. Neoptolemus captured Aquillius’s camp and brought 300 prisoners to Mithradates. Following his well-established practice of philanthropia, he treated them kindly and set them free. The 300 joined the good fight.9

  But Aquillius had escaped, taking plenty of money with him. He reached the banks of the Sangarius and crossed the dark, swirling river by night. Then he headed southwest toward Pergamon, where he had once been the administrator of Rome’s Asian Province.

  Meanwhile, Cassius and Nicomedes retreated southwest to a stronghold called the Lion’s Head, near Nysa on the Maeander River, east of Tralles. These sophisticated, wealthy towns had supported Aristonicus’s Sun Citizens’ revolt in 133–129 BC. But a pro-Roman citizen of Nysa named Chaeremon supplied Cassius’s men with 60,000 bushels of grain at the Lion’s Head. Archaeologists have discovered an inscription at Nysa from Cassius thanking Chaeremon for his support.10

  Originally Cassius had about 40,000 men, but most of them had peeled off to join Mithradates. Panicked by Mithradates’ relentless approach, Cassius tried to levy raw recruits from the countryside. His centurions drafted a mob of farmers, shopkeepers, “artisans, and rustics.” These people were hostile to the Romans and sympathetic to Mithradates. Appian says that Cassius attempted to train these “unwarlike men” but had to give up in frustration. Cassius moved farther east to Apamea, a prosperous trading center. A long-established Jewish community, this town also sided with Mithradates. A severe earthquake struck Apamea just as Cassius arrived. Forced to flee again, Cassius now gave up any idea of fighting and simply hoped to reach Rhodes, the independent island allied with Rome.

  Mithradates and his army soon arrived in Apamea, hot on Cassius’s trail. After viewing the earthquake damage, Mithradates donated one hundred talents to repair the buildings. He was well aware that Alexander had once been very generous in repairing quake-damaged Apamea.11

  SWEEPING VICTORIES IN ANATOLIA

  As he took control of his new domains, Mithradates named governors to administer the territories. His administrative style was practical and flexible. Some lands (Colchis, the Bosporus) were designated vice-kingdoms; others he considered vassal-kingdoms (for example, Cappadocia under his son Ariathes and possibly even Armenia under Tigranes). Still other areas were administered by military leaders or governors. In a striking move, harking back to his Persian origins, Mithradates revived the ancient Persian title for his governors in Greater Phrygia: he called them satraps.

  With Mithradates closing in, the Roman sympathizer Chaeremon of Nysa had to run for his life. With his sons, Chaeremon fled to Tralles, making for Ephesus. They were joined by many other fugitives. Mithradates’ victories were sweeping all before him. There was an exodus of inland Roman settlers moving toward the large coastal cities, where they sought refuge among the larger Italian populations, hoping to escape to Italy or safe islands. The road to Tralles, winding across deep gorges and stinking, yellow-orange streams, was lined with tombs. The fugitives passed through an ominous landscape of caves sacred to Pluto, god of the Underworld. The caverns emitted clouds of sulphurous gases, deadly to birds and animals, avoided by all except the strange eunuch priests of Cybele.12

  Mithradates, arriving in Nysa, was enraged to find Cassius’s monument in the city square thanking Chaeremon for his aid. Spies informed Mithradates that the traitor had fled with streams of Romans and sympathizers toward the coast. Two remarkable inscriptions, urgent public proclamations from Mithradates to his satrap in Nysa, were discovered in the late 1800s. These ancient “Wanted Dead or Alive” posters, disseminated throughout the land, contain crucial information about Mithradates’ plans, his intelligence operations, political rhetoric, and administrative style—and his vengeful compulsion to destroy all Romans and their local supporters.13

  The first letter reads:

  King Mithradates to the Satrap Leonippus, Greeting

  Whereas Chaeremon, a man most hateful and most hostile to our state, has always consorted with our most detested enemies, and now—learning of my approach—has removed his sons Pythodorus and Pythion to a place of safety and has himself fled, Proclaim that if anyone captures Chaeremon or Pythodorus or Pythion alive, he will receive 40 talents, and if anyone brings me the head of any of these three, he will receive 20 talents.

  Mithradates soon received an update from his spies. Now he knew that Chaeremon had reached Ephesus and had sent his sons with Cassius on to Rhodes. The king dictated another public decree to his satrap:

  Chaeremon has arranged the escape of the fugitive Romans with his sons to Rhodes. Now—learning of my approach—he has taken refuge in the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus. From there, he continues to communicate with the Romans, the common enemy of mankind. His confidence in the face of the crimes he has committed could be the starting point of a movement against us. Consider how you may by any means bring Chaeremon to us, or how he may be arrested and imprisoned until I am free of the enemy.

  Clearly, Mithradates saw Chaeremon and other Roman collaborators in Anatolia as a threat as dangerous as the Romans themselves. They must not be allowed to survive and connive with Romans to create a resistance movement. The counterinsurgents had to be rooted out with the help of the Anatolian populace. Mithradates’ phrase, “Romans, the common enemy of mankind,” stands out as a powerful play on words. According to the Romans’ own, widely known propaganda, Rome called itself the “common benefactor (or savior) of mankind.” Mithradates’ clever rewording twists Rome’s self-image into a parody that resonated with anti-Romans throughout the land.14

  Mithradates’ agents were also searching for Aquillius and Nicomedes. Nicomedes was hurrying toward Pergamon, hoping to catch up with Aquillius. But Aquillius was already heading for Rhodes, desperate to meet up with Cassius and escape to Rome.

  What about Oppius, the third Roman general in this unauthorized war? Oppius had camped in Cappadocia with forty thousand men, most of whom deserted after the defeat of Nicomedes. Oppius now made his way with the remnant to Laodicea on the Lycus River and appealed to the prosperous city of Aphrodisias for reinforcements. In 1982, archaeologists found two
inscriptions showing that Oppius received that aid. Meanwhile, Mithradates led his triumphant armies across Phrygia, demolishing Rome’s hold on Provincia Asia.15

  When Mithradates routed the Roman coalition, he received an exuberant welcome in Bithynia, Galatia, Cappadocia, and Phrygia. On the march, he confiscated great quantities of gold and silver, which had been amassed by former kings, and he took possession of a great deal of military equipment. The location of these treasures must have been surveyed during Mithradates’ early reign. Directing his generals to secure southwestern Asia Minor, Mithradates himself led the advance through Phrygia, his ranks swelling with followers as town after town pledged allegiance to the savior-king. He was being hailed as a liberator in the very land where Aristonicus had based his Sun Citizens’ revolt of 133–129 BC. Ever mindful of auspicious events, Mithradates went out of his way to pitch his tent near the old inn once occupied by Alexander the Great, a place he’d visited on his fact-finding mission.16 That early reconnaissance was paying off a thousandfold now.

  FIG. 7.3. Captive Roman general (right) forced to serve Mithradates (left). Faits et dits memorables, Français 289, folio 482, Bibliothèque National de France.

  Because it was occupied by Oppius and his men, Laodicea on the Lycus—famed for black sheep—was the first place to resist Mithradates. Mithradates surrounded the town and sent a messenger. “Laodiceans,” proclaimed the herald, “King Mithradates promises that none of you will be harmed if you turn over the Roman general Oppius!”

  The Laodiceans allowed Oppius’s soldiers to depart; many joined Mithradates. Then, as a mocking crowd gathered, the Laodiceans prodded Oppius’s lictors (color guard), wearing red tunics and carrying his legion standards, out the city gate, and then Oppius himself. Oppius would spend the next few years as a kind of pet captive in Mithradates’ retinue. The king never harmed Oppius but enjoyed exhibiting the tame Roman general as his personal servant in each city he visited.17

  NEW WORLD ORDER

  Aphrodisias joined Mithradates’ cause. An inscription describes how the city had previously sent envoys to Rome to plead for relief from corrupt tax farmers before the Senate on behalf of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor.18 Some pockets of resistance still remained, especially in Lycia, allied with Rhodes: Patara, Telmessus, Apollonis, Termessus, Stratonicea, Magnesia on the Maeander, and Tabae were still holding out. Mithradates sent troops to beseige them, commanded by Pelopidas, the ambassador who had confronted Aquillius and the Roman generals in their camp before the war. Other cities—Tralles, Pergamon, Adramyttion, Caunus, Cnidus, Mytilene, Miletus, Erythrae, Smyrna, Iasus, Ceramus, Magnesia near Sipylus, Arycanda, Ephesus, and the islands of Cos, Lesbos, Samos, and Chios—all willingly went over to Mithradates. Rhodes was the only hope now for Cassius and Aquillius.

  When the news of Mithradates’ great victories reached the Roman fleet blocking the entrance to the Black Sea, the Greek sailors began shouting with joy. They took over the ships for Mithradates, who now controlled the entire Black Sea as well as the Aegean. Mithradates established his new headquarters in the magnificent palace of King Attalus III on the fortified acropolis of Pergamon, former capital of Rome’s Asian Province. In the palace, anything that remained of Attalus’s old botanical gardens and toxicological notes and specimens would have intrigued Mithradates and his medical team. The king bestowed the name of his childhood companion Dorylaus on a city in Phrygia, Dorylaion. Mithradates began minting beautiful silver tetradrachms with his portrait in Pergamon, and the city of Smyrna also stamped bronze coins with his likeness. Other cities, including Ephesus, Miletus, Tralles, and Erythrae, issued new gold staters to trumpet their independence from Rome.19

  Hearing of his victory, the desperate Italian rebels, fighting for their lives in Italy, sent envoys to Mithradates. The leader of the Marsi, Silo, begged Mithradates to join forces. In response to the requests to send an army to Italy to help overthrow the Romans, Mithradates “promised that he would lead his armies to Italy after he had brought Asia under his sway.” Archaeologists have discovered special-issue gold and silver coins with images of Dionysus (god of liberation) and Mithradatic devices commemorating the communications between Mithradates and the insurgents in Italy from this time.20

  Mithradates’ first acts as the savior of Anatolia were social reforms aimed at redressing complaints against the Romans and their supporters. In what the historian Luis Ballesteros Pastor calls the “Mithridatic Revolution,” Mithradates relieved public and private debts, canceling loans owed to Roman and Italian creditors, winning support from the middle and lower classes. Mithradates also granted everyone exemptions from taxes for five years, which pleased the wealthy. These radical acts underline Mithradates’ own great wealth, now enhanced by the treasuries he had recently confiscated. But one could also say that Mithradates’ new order championed a hybrid sort of government, a benign Persian-influenced monarchy enlightened by Greek democratic traditions, offering a real alternative to Rome’s oppressive administration of its provinces during the late Republic. The oligarchies controlled by the Roman consuls were broken up in Anatolia, and in the next year Mithradates would order his cities to grant broad citizenship and civic rights.21

  Thinking ahead, Mithradates must have been contemplating his options for dealing with the large numbers of Roman residents that still remained in Anatolia. He could not risk the emergence of a Roman resistance movement abetted by local sympathizers like Chaeremon. If he could take over the Aegean and Greece, Rome would be forced to withdraw from the eastern Mediterranean. The Adriatic Sea would become the new boundary between East and West, between Mithradates’ dominions and Rome’s. If the fighting continued, mainland Greece was the traditional battlefield for struggles pitting Eastern against Western powers. Mithradates sent envoys to Athens to broadcast the good news and to let them know he planned to liberate Greece.22

  It may have been at this time that Mithradates bestowed gifts of his magnificent armor to the cities of Nemea and Delphi in Greece. According to ancient writers, a sense of Mithradates’ extraordinary size could be gauged from his helmets, breastplates, greaves, and weapons. The armor, which glittered with precious metals and gems, was impressively large—probably deliberately oversized. Mithradates may have admired the enormous armor of the mythic heroes of the Trojan War displayed at Troy, and he certainly knew the famous story of Alexander’s psychological warfare tricks in India. Alexander ordered his blacksmiths to forge several pieces of huge armor and weapons, which he left along with gigantic horse equipment at his camp, in order to frighten the Indian armies into submission.23

  Historians ancient and modern have marveled at Mithradates’ extraordinary success in the First Mithradatic War. In less than a year he had gone from a minor king of a rich little realm on the Black Sea to one of the most powerful rulers in the ancient world. In 89 BC, Mithradates gave a public speech recounting his spectacular victories, castigating the Romans, and exhorting his followers to continue the fight. Pelopidas, Xenocles, Metrodorus the Roman Hater, and other philosopher-statesmen probably helped prepare Mithradates’ text. Dressed in his finest Persian robe and trousers, wearing rings of agate (thought to make one’s speech convincing), Mithradates would have delivered this oration in the great Theater of Pergamon. Outdoor amphitheaters were often used for political gatherings; Pergamon’s held ten thousand people.

  The speech has been preserved by ancient historians. Probably many different versions of this crucial oral presentation—essentially a policy statement and declaration of war—circulated orally and in writing among Mithradates’ enemies as well as his followers. Mithradates, maestro of public relations, would certainly have distributed copies to his allies. In a departure from his usual brevity, the historian Justin stated, “I consider this speech worthy of including in entirety in my abridged version of Trogus’s history, just as it was originally written.” Justin sought out a full copy of the speech that he considered original and verbatim. Modern historians have pointed o
ut what they see as exaggerations and distortions for propaganda and rhetorical effects, but these might also confirm that Justin’s version reflects parts of Mithradates’ actual speech. There are some obvious signs of later additions by hostile writers: for example, it seems unlikely that Mithradates would publicly brag that he had murdered Socrates the Good of Bithynia and his nephew King Ariathes of Cappadocia.

  Whether or not the version Justin published is the word-for-word speech delivered by Mithradates that day in Pergamon, it is an accurate summary of Mithradates’ program, his foreign policy, and his rationale for war with Rome. It offers the best insights we can have into Mithradates’ vision of himself as the inheritor and unifier of Greek and Persian cultures—the ideal alternative to Rome—and it explains his compelling appeal to so many diverse groups outside Rome.24

  DECLARATION OF WAR

  Mithradates’ speech is quite long. Here is the essential substance, combining paraphrase with direct quotations from Justin’s version.

  It would have been desirable [began Mithradates] to have had the opportunity to decide whether to be at war or at peace with the Romans. But even the weakest person must defend himself and retaliate when attacked. Now it is obvious the Romans were not simply hostile. They have begun a great war and now they must pay the consequences.

  I am confident of victory. You know as well as I do that the Romans can be beaten. We have already defeated Aquillius and Nicomedes and driven the Romans out of Cappadocia. The Romans are not invincible: The Samnites of Italy have defeated Roman armies. King Pyrrhus of Epirus won three battles against them. Hannibal was victorious in Italy for more than sixteen years—and it was not Roman military strength that defeated Hannibal in the end, but the bitter rivalries of his own people.