The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps

by mike Evans

  Yes, we passed this information on to the British and Americans. It was part of a constant stream of intelligence we passed on to both intelligence agencies. And I still believe it is true. You must remember the dedicated efforts that were undertaken by Saddam and his institutions to hide and conceal [WMDs] was gigantic.5

  The locations of Hussein’s guerrilla war supplies were said to be at GPS coordinates known only to his son, Qusay, and his private secretary, Abid Hamid Humud. In their book, Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, retired Air Force lieutenant general Thomas McInerney and retired Army major general Paul Vallely commented that while few weapons of mass destruction have yet been found in Iraq, “what already has been found in Iraq is an astonishing amount of conventional weapons in stockpiles throughout the country.”6

  The necessity of stopping Saddam Hussein’s terror network became even more apparent when the Israelis captured three men trying to cross the Jordan River into the Palestinian Territory in September 2002. Following interrogation, the Israelis learned that the three were graduates of the Hussein-trained Arab Liberation Front. The three, along with Iraqis and terrorists from other Muslim countries, had received special training by the infamous Unit 999 commissioned by Hussein specializing in hijacking, explosives, sabotage, and assassination.

  The three infiltrators revealed that others in the unit, including members of Al Qaeda, were trained in handling chemical weapons and poisons, especially ricin. Following training, they moved to join Ansar-al-Islam, a Kurdish wing of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. The three were exported to Israel specifically to target civilian aircraft with shoulder-fired missiles at Tel Aviv’s Ben-Gurion Airport. They were also to target Americans en route to Iraq.

  Clusters of the trainees were dispatched to Turkey, France, and Chechnya. This was later confirmed by Turkish Security Forces who arrested two Al Qaeda operatives with instructions to attack the U.S. air base at Incirlik with chemical weapons.

  Armed with intelligence reports such as those indicating that Iraq was supplying WMDs to bin Laden’s terrorists, the United States began to put together a coalition to stop Saddam Hussein in Iraq. For President Bush, this was a vital step in fighting the war on terror.

  Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, Hussein had been defying UN weapons inspectors and the UN Security Council in a game of cat and mouse about Iraq’s WMD programs. Iraqi antiaircraft batteries and missiles had from time to time locked onto and even fired upon coalition fighters running routine missions to enforce the northern and southern no-fly zones that had been set up at the end of the first Gulf War. In 2002, regime change in Iraq became a major goal of the Bush administration because of Hussein’s continued human rights violations, support of terrorist organizations, and lack of evidence that he had put an end to his WMD programs. On October 10–11, 2002, Congress overwhelmingly approved taking military action against Iraq by approving the Iraq War Resolution with a vote of 296–133 in the House and 77–23 in the Senate.7 Public opinion also greatly favored the move; roughly 79 percent of the American population supported the war by May 2003.8

  NO COOPERATION FROM THE ARAB WORLD

  As the Bush administration worked diligently to put together a coalition similar to that of the first Gulf War, it rapidly became apparent that the Arab world would sit on the sidelines of this engagement. The fear of retaliation by rabidly radical Muslims within their ranks could not be overcome by persuasion or diplomacy. A confrontation with the various terrorist factions operating in the Middle East could well mean internal upheaval, death, and destruction, not to mention the violent overthrow of existing rulers in a 1979-style Islamic revolution by extremists against moderate Arab states.

  Vulnerable Arab countries feared that a U.S. attack on Iraq would prove to be the glue that would cement the various terrorist networks into a cohesive force that would severely punish anyone seen to be cooperating with the American-led coalition. There was a very real fear that, instead of liberating Iraq for democracy, it would become a haven for brutal terrorist groups to plan and execute a takeover of the entire Muslim world. Having successfully run the United States out of Lebanon following the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, terrorist organizations did not tremble in fear at facing allies of the “Great Satan.”

  There was also anxiety at the thought that the expansive Sunni-controlled reservoirs of oil in the southern part of Iraq would be overrun by the Shiites in Iran. Such an event could give rise to a situation similar to that in Lebanon where Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, is firmly in control of the south and could just as suddenly control the lion’s share of Iraqi oil.

  Egyptian political analyst and writer Ayman El-Amir was certain that the planned invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with terror and everything to do with oil. He cautioned against creating an upheaval in the region:

  The US is now embracing a change-of-leaders doctrine and in a relatively short time the justification for such changes will be as varied as harboring terrorism, suppressing political dissent, or endangering US economic interests by, say, enforcing an oil embargo.

  Any large-scale invasion of Iraq is a risky proposition. The chaos it will create in the delicate, multi-ethnic balancing act that is Iraq, and its ramifications in the Arab world, may far outweigh the benefits…. Should the ouster of President Saddam Hussein be as swift and surgical as the US military would like it to be, leaders in the region and elsewhere may soon find themselves added to President Bush’s laundry list.9

  King Fahd in Saudi Arabia was particularly disturbed by the direction events were taking in Iraq and Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden was a Saudi citizen with quite a following in his homeland. The king was understandably concerned that he and/or his country could become bin Laden’s next target. It did not take long for this fear to translate into a refusal to allow American troops to use bases in Saudi Arabia to launch attacks on Iraq.

  RIPPLES IN THE POOL

  The Saudi royal was not the only head of state concerned about an invasion of Iraq. Both Syria and Iran could see the handwriting on the wall. Would the overthrow of Saddam Hussein be like a pebble tossed into a pond? Would the ripples spread out to encompass both of Iraq’s neighbors? Syria and Iran could readily be classified as terror-harboring and terror-supporting states, both of which President Bush promised to target following the events of 9/11. Not only that, but if the United States invaded Iraq, Iran would have U.S. troops on both its eastern and western borders with the U.S. presence already in Afghanistan. Fearing a Western-style democracy in Iraq, governments in Damascus and Tehran began to plot their course to thwart the United States at every turn.

  A long-standing friendship between Hussein’s sons and Syria’s al-Assad made him the perfect cohort to assist in hiding Iraq’s supply of WMDs. Syria acted as the go-between for the purchase of military equipment for Iraq from Russia, Yemen, and other black market suppliers in Africa. The country’s defense minister, Mustafa Tlass, was culpable in the illegal sale of Iraqi oil in order to pay for the various arms purchases.

  With Hussein’s acquisitions list in hand, Syria went shopping for munitions, replacement parts for tanks, planes, antiaircraft artillery, and the like. It was not a stretch for Syria to want to acquire such material, but it was far more revealing when the purchasing agent began to inquire about parts of a Kolchuga radar system manufactured in the Ukraine, or for Russian-made Kornet antitank guided missiles. That raised a few eyebrows. Convoys from Syria to Iraq transported thousands of the Russian-made missiles, as well as several hundred shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, to Iraq. Not all of the armaments left their storage facilities in Syria for Iraq, though. To protect against U.S. bombing runs, large numbers of parts and munitions stayed behind in the safety of Syria.

  Ever defiant, Bashar al-Assad also pursued strategic alliances with the other two members of what President Bush had labeled the “axis of evil”—North Korea and Iran. Even though Iran and Iraq had been bitter enemies in the 1980s, Iran’s
mullahs placed the perseverance of the region’s radical Islamic footprint above any past differences. Such alliances were designed to intimidate the United States into backing down from any plans to confront Iraq. After all, would the United States risk retaliation against Israel and other U.S.-friendly Arab states by the triumvirate of evil in order to unseat Saddam Hussein? Would President Bush be willing to alienate the Saudi Arabian royals by endangering the precarious balance among the Gulf States? Would he chance estrangement from U.S. allies in the West by ignoring their specific warnings against an invasion, especially since most gave little credence to the fact that Al Qaeda terrorists were receiving training in chemical weapons and other poisons in Iraq?

  When faced with the almost-certainty of an incursion into Iraq, radical Islamic leaders and representatives made a beeline to Damascus to consult with the powers-that-be. The line was a “who’s who” of radicals. First on the agenda was Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi from Iran. Following a tête-à-tête with al-Assad and members of his entourage, Shahroudi issued a warning against invading Iraq. He felt that an invasion would cause irreversible chaos in the region.

  Shahroudi went from that meeting to confer with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah to lay the groundwork for the next step in the holy war against both Israel and the United States, or what Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 called the “occupier Zionist regime.” With Hezbollah firmly entrenched in Lebanon, al-Assad could be assured of having a tactical partner well-positioned to play a primary role in exporting terrorism to Israel.

  Another in line to visit al-Assad was the president of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly. His interest in Syria was basically one of economics. North Korea was a prolific purveyor of technology and information to both Syria and Iran. Such staples as the various stages of the Shahab missiles were produced in North Korea and exported to Iran and Iraq. A steady stream of North Korean technology was also instrumental in Iran’s quest for nuclear arms. Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea pledged among themselves to defend against a pro-Western Iraq and determined to do everything possible to prevent such a turn.

  North Korea made its presence known in the equation when, in December 2002, the So San was boarded in the Arabian Sea by sailors from American and Spanish ships. When Navy SEALs searched the ship, they discovered that underneath a supposed cargo of cement bags lay the real payload: fifteen complete Scud missiles, fifteen conventional warheads, twenty-three containers of nitric acid fuel, and eighty-five barrels of unidentified chemicals.10 Intelligence sources speculated that the ship, bound for Yemen as its next port, would ultimately finish its voyage in Iraq.

  One unidentified spokesperson said that if the United States invaded Iraq, the Iraqis would strike military targets, while the United States would be accused of targeting civilians. I’m reminded of a comment that professor Alan Dershowitz made during my recent interview with him:

  Countries like Israel and the United States will do anything to avoid killing children, whereas the tyrannical regimes of terrorism will do anything to kill children—they figured out this cruel arithmetic of death. 11

  Overtures of an alliance between Iraq and Iran began to surface in 2002. Saddam Hussein’s son Qusay took a delegation of upper-echelon Iraqis to Tehran on a weapons-buying mission. Of particular interest to them was the acquisition of Iran’s staple, the Shahab-3. The group also hoped to induce the Iranians to return dozens of military aircraft, including a number of F-1Es, captured during the Iran-Iraq War. So desperate were the Iraqis for war materials that they ultimately offered to buy and then return the aircraft to Iran when no longer needed to battle the United States.

  A major concern of Iran was that the aging weapons sold to Iraq would be turned against them at some point later. As part of the agreement, Iraq pledged safe passage for military equipment across its country to Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The outcome of Qusay Hussein’s trek to Iran was a pledge of ammunition and spare parts only.

  The one thing the Hussein regime may have overlooked was the tendency of the Shiite population of Iraq to side ideologically with Iran against Saddam. Of course, the Iranians could easily see how Saddam’s removal by the U.S. military could benefit their plan for regional domination. Tehran would be prepared for the eventuality with trained infiltrators ready to slip into Iraq when the opportunity arose. Shiites already living in Iran were natural allies in Iran’s postwar plan. Among the first infiltrators across the border were card-carrying members of the Islamic revolutionary Guard Corps under the direction of Iranian colonel Hosni Merza Khalil. This either went unnoticed by Iraq or Saddam turned a blind eye to the incursion by his former enemy in appreciation for the help against the United States.

  Iran’s preparations for what was a certain invasion of Iraq by American and coalition troops were ongoing. In what had the appearance of a politician in a cross-country stumping trip, Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander Yahya Rahim-Safavi visited al-Assad in Syria to review that country’s preparations for a U.S. attack on Hussein’s regime. From there, he met with Hezbollah and Hamas representatives in Lebanon.

  Safavi then met with Fatah to discuss Yasser Arafat’s plans to extract payment from Israel for the invasion—even though Israel was once again not permitted to participate in the military exercise against Iraq. Israel was targeted by Saddam during the first Gulf War in retaliation for the coalition attack. There was no reason to believe that it would escape Hussein’s wrath during another incursion.

  PREPARATIONS FOR AN EVENTUAL INTIFADA AGAINST THE WEST

  As it became more obvious that war would be the result of Saddam Hussein’s defiance, radical Islamists began to assemble in Iraq training camps in preparation for attacks against nations, both Western and Arab, that joined the coalition to unseat the Iraqi dictator. Both Iran and Syria funneled terrorists from Palestine, Jordan, and other Arab countries. Part of their audacious plan was to create situations that would force Israel into a confrontation with both Syria and Lebanon. (This plan came to fruition when Hezbollah crossed into Israel in July 2006, kidnapped Israeli soldiers, and began lobbing Katyusha rockets into Northern Israel.) The fear was also that Iran would be surrounded by pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, a notion that frightened the controlling mullahs. The response of the leaders in Tehran was to plan a series of saber-rattling war games designed to impress the Americans with their ability to repel any imminent threat from that quarter. An American presence in Iraq was perceived by the tyrannical Tehran mullahs to be an obvious threat to the survival of Iran’s theocratic government.

  In a move designed to take the spotlight off Tehran, two Iranian proxies—Hezbollah and Hamas—planned an all-out intifada against Israel if called upon to launch such an attack. The plan was welcomed by Nasrallah in Lebanon and by Arafat in the Palestinian Authority, who was particularly eager to forestall any attempts by the United States to democratize the PA. Arafat reportedly founded a new terrorist organization comprised of his most elite to bolster Iraq.

  Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was among the seemingly few that readily recognized the threat imposed by Hezbollah. In an interview with 60 Minutes, Armitage expressed his concern: “Hezbollah may be the ‘A-Team of Terrorists,’ and maybe Al Qaeda is actually the ‘B’ team. And they’re on the list and their time will come.”12 According to the CBS report, Florida Democrat Bob Graham believed that Hezbollah had a global network of radical Islamic supporters, with enough operatives in the United States to pose a terrorist threat here. Said Graham, “It has a significant presence of its trained operatives inside the United States waiting for the call to action.”13 Graham, aware that Hezbollah’s funding came from Iran and Syria, mentioned the “blood debt” dating back to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.

  In March 2002, Bashar al-Assad made his intentions toward Israel perfectly clear in a television address:

  As far as an occupier is concerned, there is no distinction between soldiers and civilian
s…. There is a distinction between armed and unarmed, but in Israel everyone is armed. In any case, we adopted the following concept: resistance to occupation is a legitimate right.14

  By October 2002, Syria and Iran had an organized plan of attack to disrupt any significant U.S. progress in Iraq should President Bush go ahead with plans for an invasion. The DEBKAfile reported that:

  Syria’s Bashar [al-] Assad shares Tehran’s conviction that the installment of a pro-American regime in Baghdad is extremely dangerous, a direct threat to the Ayatollahs in Tehran, the Baath regime in Damascus, the freedom of operation of the Syria-based Palestinian terror groups, and the very existence of the Lebanese Hizballah, Tehran’s primary arm for overseas operations and intelligence.15

  Although the two countries were apparently taking every precaution to prevent a second war in Iraq, neither was proactive at the outset of the actual conflict. However, both countries soon made their presence felt as pipelines for terrorists flooding into Iraq from Arab nations around the world. Iran would go a step further and provide military-grade improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the terrorists.

  Also on the drawing board was an alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. The “Party of Allah” was to bear the primary responsibility for causing interference with what stability there might be in the region. Nasrallah, the prime instigator of trouble in South Lebanon, would see his clout increase to a more provincial role. His cooperation with Iran and Syria was paramount in intensifying the current jihad and taking it to the next level.