The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps

by mike Evans

  It was no wonder that as Operation Iraqi Freedom advanced, coalition troops found themselves under constant bombardment from a variety of terror cells and networks hard at work to create civil strife. With Syria’s help—as a backer of terror activities and a shelter for terrorists, as well as an open pipeline for incoming jihadists—it was no wonder that the United States was finding it more and more difficult to police Iraq. And, although they had no formal agreement to cooperate, Syria became a recruiting ground for Iran to enlist the aid of Hezbollah fighters in and around Baghdad.

  U.S. forces found it increasingly difficult to identify friend from foe among the Iraqis. As Lt. Col. Eric Schwartz told a New York Times reporter:

  I don’t believe there is a single organized group…. The information that we have is that it may be a collection of folks. It may be Iraqis. It may be Syrians. It may be Palestinians. We believe that Al Qaeda is possibly in there.5

  Spurred on by influential ayatollahs whose Friday sermons were filled with anti-American, hate-filled oratory and the offering of food and spending money, young Muslims in surrounding Arab countries—Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, among others—were eager to join the fight to expunge the infidels from Arab land. It didn’t hurt the cause that there was also a promise of paradise and young virgins, should a recruit become a suicide bomber.

  One of the most vocal proponents of the rebellion has been Moqtada al-Sadr, who has made no secret of his ties with Iran. During the height of resistance in July 2003, al-Sadr made a four-day visit to Iran for meetings with Rafsanjani, the former Iranian president, and senior leaders in Ayatollah Khamenei’s office. There he received an appointment as an official emissary of Iran’s Ayatollah Haeri. Al-Sadr committed to pursue the Iranian plan for Iraq: a theocratic government that wed the political and the religious. It was his assignment to denigrate Ayatollah al-Sistani in Iraq, to undertake assassinations, and to foment resistance in any way possible. In return, he would be supplied with expert assistance from Hezbollah and the elite Qods force of Iran.6

  Al-Sadr’s mentor eased the way for success for his protégé by issuing a fatwa aimed at Saddam’s Baath Party members. He decreed that they were open targets for Moqtada’s death squads, thus giving him a permit to murder. Even as al-Sadr was issued his license to incite rebellion, a decree was issued to Iranian-supported cells to engage British troops near Basra, as they were thought to be easier targets for cells trained in Iran. A group of pro-Iranian militant agitators whipped a local group in Majar al-Kabir into a killing frenzy. The result was the mob killing of six Royal Military Police troops. A second attack targeted the British 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. The third British detachment to come under fire was the crew of a Chinook helicopter while attempting to rescue a detail of British soldiers under small arms and grenade fire. Iran was determined to do the very thing that it chastised the United States for doing: interfering with the government in Iraq.

  In July, al-Sadr introduced his Mahdi army to the people of al Najaf. His announcement was made to a group of followers garbed in shrouds, ostensibly to indicate their readiness to die as martyrs. Their rallying cry was reminiscent of that introduced by Khomeini: “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

  Al-Sadr was confident of the support that he would receive from his Iranian sponsors. He had at his fingertips a network of terrorists, some from Lebanon and others from Iran and Syria. Their only purpose was to kill the invaders and anyone associated with them. Iran’s noose was tightening on Iraq. The path of the jihadists was crowded with those willing to be martyred for the resistance.

  With so many willing to take on the Americans and their colleagues, attacks against the troops escalated to as many as twenty-five daily. The weapons of choice grew more sophisticated. Missile launchers and hand grenades, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and military-grade IEDs, became the norm.

  CIVIL WAR?

  What was published early on as a decisive victory in Iraq has rapidly descended into anarchy, with the various factions warring against each other and against the coalition troops. Death squads roam the streets of Baghdad, Sunnis fight Shiites, ayatollahs fight ayatollahs for predominance, and, in the background, Iran continues to arm and support groups loyal to Tehran.

  Local militia groups sometimes open fire on police or coalition forces, resulting in gunfights that last for days. Offensives have been mounted to disarm and drive out these militants. In these bloody street battles, it is often hard to tell civilians from rebels, and slowly the surgical-accurateness of the U.S. attacks has begun to be called into question. Due to protests from the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council and media pressure, assaults are halted short of their goals and truces are negotiated. For every two steps forward, it seems U.S. efforts are forced to take three back.

  Ambushes, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and murders have become the order of the day during the occupation. Roadside bombs using IEDs target anyone who happens to get in the way. Suicide bombers attack coalition checkpoints and other gathering places with regularity. Of the explosive devices used to kill U.S. personnel, retired Navy captain Charles Nash noted that they had changed in recent months, though were still coming from the same source:

  When I was in Baghdad, I actually held one of those explosive devices—IEDs—in my hand. At the time it was the latest threat—a brand new generation. It actually forms a projectile when it blows up that pierces armor plate. You have to manufacture these things. It’s not rocket science, but somebody has to know how to do it to make them effective.

  Iranians have been doing that. We know they’ve been doing that.7

  This “latest threat” in that IEDs have significantly upgraded near the end of 2005 also proves Iran is more openly supporting the insurgents.

  By the end of 2006, a new name was being given to these devices: EFPs, which stands for “explosive-formed penetrators.” Unlike regular roadside bombs, EFPs remain intact as they explode. The steel tubes with curved metal seals form a kind of super-shrapnel that can go directly through a tank’s or Humvee’s armor. The explosion turns the caps into molten jets of metal. Other than keeping a low profile, U.S. troops have little defense against these better-engineered booby traps. Again, evidence suggests these are being smuggled across the Iranian border.8

  In a recent interview with former CIA director James Woolsey, he said this of Iran’s involvement in Iraq:

  Iran is playing a very important role in Iraq by smuggling in improvised explosive devices and the technology for them, by helping militias such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s brigades attack Sunni, and troubled survivability of the government in Iraq. Iran has a long border with Iraq. It’s been infiltrating money, terrorists, various, I think, operational gear, and weapons for some time. It’s one of the biggest problems in Iraq.9

  One thing has become abundantly clear: those we are fighting are not a ragtag band of disgruntled Iraqis; we are facing a professional, full-frontal assault by well-armed terrorists. Iraq is headed down the slippery slope toward civil war, and at present the United States seems impotent to halt the slide.

  REBUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE

  It was obvious to all the American leaders in Iraq that Saddam had not spent his oil money on the infrastructure in his country. In what would become another finger pointed at U.S. inefficiency, it had failed to restore public utilities to the major cities, to stop looting, to prevent rampant crime in the streets of Baghdad, to halt sabotage to oil facilities, and to provide basic protection to peaceful citizens. This differed widely from what the Iraqis saw as the United States providing for its own military and civilian staff. The United States was criticized for grabbing the best buildings and for quickly providing amenities to their own. This only led to further disillusionment, as well as fueling the rumors that the Americans were there to stay, not to relinquish control to the Iraqis as soon as possible.

  Efforts to restore services were hampered by roaming resistance groups that targeted Iraq
i civilians hard at work on repairing the infrastructure and providing the basics. The workers suffered verbal harangues at best, beatings and public execution at worst. As U.S.-trained Iraqi police began to patrol the cities, they became immediate targets for the terrorists. They were murdered on the streets, in training facilities, and in police stations; they were killed where they ate and where they slept. Is it any wonder that nothing constructive can be accomplished in Iraq, or why the Americans are blamed for all the ills that have befallen the nation since the removal of Hussein?

  This violence only added to the difficulties that the United States faced daily in Iraq. The news that Saddam’s sons had been killed elicited a surprising backlash among the Muslim media. The Hussein sons were quickly elevated to martyr status, which all but negated the horrific crimes perpetrated by the two under their father’s tutelage. This only served to swell the ranks of willing martyrs for the cause. The one to benefit least from the release of the Iraqi people from the repressive Hussein regime was the United States. The invasion was declared to be the best thing that had ever happened in inspiring the Islamist cause.

  ENTER IRAN, AGAIN

  At this point in the war, even Arab-friendly states were beginning to back away from America’s involvement in Iraq. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak signed on with Iran to send Egyptian extremists imprisoned in Iran to Iraq as fighters. Mubarak, concerned about the rise of fanatical Islam in the Middle East and how it may affect Egypt, wanted to jump on the support bandwagon. He acknowledged the role of Hamas and other Palestinian forces in an effort to prevent an incursion into his country. Mubarak pledged funds and arms in support of the Islamic groups in close proximity of Egypt. After meetings between Iran’s intelligence chief, Ali Yunesi, and Mubarak’s envoy, Gen. Omar Suleiman, Iran agreed to a pact with Egypt that would protect Mubarak’s empire.

  Not content with only creating an anti-American revolution in Iraq and a Sunni-Shiite civil war, Tehran also set about to create civil war between the ranks of the U.S.-friendly Kurds and Turkmen. Communities rose against each other, clashes with United States troops became more common, and a warning was issued against trying to disarm the Kurdish soldiers. As the unrest grew, the door was opened for infiltration into Kurdish ranks by bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terrorists and others from Syria and Iran. The United States was in grave danger of losing another ally in Iraq.

  The Islamic radical offensive against American forces escalated as the year neared an end. On October 26, 2006, in the midst of Ramadan, suicide bombings escalated in the heart of Baghdad. An American Black Hawk helicopter was downed near Tikrit, a first for the terrorists in this conflict. The Al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad was hit by rockets fired from launchers disguised as generators. The targets were American VIPs, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Killed during the attack was an American colonel. A number of American civilians and military personnel were wounded. It was later determined that the rockets used were modified versions of rockets originating in France and the old Soviet Union.

  The attack was followed by what the Islamic radicals deemed to be a symbolic withdrawal of Americans from the Al-Rashid Hotel to the safety of the green zone and to protected sites outside the city. The Americans were on the run, albeit not very far.

  Following closely on the heels of the attack on the Al-Rashid on October 27 were car bombing attacks on targets in Baghdad, the Red Cross headquarters, Iraqi government offices, police stations, and a fourth attack that failed when the car bomb did not explode on contact with a cement barrier outside a second police compound. The driver responsible for the failed mission carried a Syrian passport.

  On October 28, revolutionaries targeted a tank north of Baghdad, shot a Baghdad deputy mayor—an American ally—in the head at a café in Baghdad, attacked an Iraqi military police convoy, bombed a shopping area serving Iraqis working for the government, and blew up an American supply train near Fallujah. The attackers didn’t stop there. October 30 saw the dawning of another day of intense terror activities: U.S. military patrols were attacked, roadside bombs detonated, police stations strafed with gunfire, American bases hit by mortar fire, and an American patrol ambushed. The attacks spilled over into the next day with attacks on Americans in Mosul and Abu Ghraib. As October gave way to November, the attacks intensified, both in power and superiority.

  Once the terrorists became aware that they possessed the capability to bring down a Black Hawk, an all-out campaign to rid the skies of helicopters and troop transport planes began anew. With an arsenal of rockets and machine guns, the insurgents were able to hit the engine of a Chinook helicopter. The crash killed sixteen and injured twenty on board. Another attack on a Black Hawk near Tikrit resulted in the deaths of all six crewmembers. Yet another Black Hawk, hit by machine-gun fire, rolled violently and crashed into another helicopter, bringing both down. Seventeen were killed and five wounded.

  November saw an increase in the number of strikes and a new round of assassination attempts aimed at those thought to be in collusion with the United States. Car bombings increased as American patrols were decreased to protect the troops. American commanders instigated new evasive actions designed to safeguard American units, and the terrorists took advantage of their absence.

  Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden had not been idle. He was busy setting up training camps in remote locations to provide on-the-job training for the insurgents flooding into Iraq. The objective was to whip out small cells in a short period of time, equip them with arms and funds, and send them forth to create murder and mayhem at will. The CIA determined that bin Laden had a pool of some ten thousand Saudi radicals ready and willing to join his cause—a situation that could ultimately signal trouble for the House of Saud. Why? A number of his commanders had joined him straight from the ranks of important tribes in Saudi Arabia.

  However, just as the terrorists had their training network, so did the United States. Once again the armed forces called on the Israelis, long submerged in combating antiterrorism and urban fighting. The intifada had served as an excellent training ground for the Israeli Defense Forces. They were, in turn, able to share their knowledge acquired in the trenches with U.S. troops. Special combat units were sent to Israel to train, and in return Israeli commanders were invited to the United States to provide instruction for their U.S. counterparts.

  The Israelis were also able to provide information on special operations and knowledge of the particulars of dealing with the kind of social structure the Americans were encountering in Iraq. The United States even went so far as to clandestinely import Israeli instructors into Iraq to provide on-the-ground indoctrination.

  IRAN’S BURGEONING NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

  Meanwhile, it was revealed that Iran had put itself back in the race for nuclear power. After the revolution of 1979, Iran’s nuclear program was all but defunct. Contractors who had been working with the shah’s government canceled all nuclear contracts, including finishing the Bushehr nuclear power plant whose two reactors were partially completed. The facility was further decimated in repeated attacks during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In 1995, Iran contracted with Russia to rebuild one of the reactors at Bushehr, much to the chagrin of the United States, but little evidence existed to prove that Iran’s nuclear capabilities would produce anything more than electricity.

  Then in 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a member of the dissident People’s Mujahedin of Iran (also known as Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, or MEK for short), revealed that Iran had two secret facilities aimed at something more than just powering cities: a partially underground uranium enrichment site at Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak.

  Thus began the cat-and-mouse game I outlined in detail in Showdown With Nuclear Iran that I will not recap here. Iran, because of the extremism of its worldview, saw no reason to play things straight with outside infidels. Needless to say, this issue came to a head again in the summer of 2006 with two new events.

  The first was that a package of incentives was offered by the EU
3 (Great Britain, France, and Germany) and the United States to Iran to stop its uranium enrichment programs. Iran promised a response to this by August 22, 2006. The second was Iranian talks with world leaders that took place in early July before the G8 Summit in Russia on July 15–17. At these talks, Iran was told that pressure to verify that its nuclear program was peaceful would be a major point of discussion at the G8 Summit.

  To this, Iran’s response was twofold as well. As Israeli minister of tourism Isaac Herzog told me:

  Mr. Ali Larijani, who was the head of the National Security Council of Iran, completed his negotiations with Javier Solano, on behalf of the G8 in Europe, and instead of flying back home, landed in Damascus. He landed in Damascus [on] the morning of the abduction [of two Israeli soldiers on July 12 near the Israel-Lebanon border]. Now tell me if that’s not a coincidence?

  Shortly after those kidnappings, Hezbollah began firing Katyusha rockets on Israel’s northern cities. The result was the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict that saw Israel push deeply into Lebanon with the hope of disarming Hezbollah. A UN ceasefire proposal brought the hostilities to an end on August 11, 2006, but despite suffering the destruction of most of their rocket launchers and armaments, much of the world media proclaimed Hezbollah the true winner of the fighting. During this time, the G8 Summit had come and gone, and the press paid little attention to Iran and its uranium enrichment. On July 31, however, the UN Security Council had set an August 31 deadline for Iran to stop its enrichment activities or face sanctions. The deadline came and went with no further action.