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Foxbat pr-3

Page 19

by James Barrington


  The foundation of America’s national strategy of deterrence is called the Triad. Nothing to do with Hong Kong street gangs, the Triad comprises the three strategic elements of the American military machine: long-range bombers, land-based ICBMs and ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

  Each component of the Triad provides America with a different strength and capability, and presents an enemy with three entirely different threats to counter. Of the three, the submarines, the SSBNs, are arguably the most lethal, offering a unique combination of mobility, colossal firepower, invisibility and hence survivability, while at the same time providing American leaders with a global strike capacity with the highly successful Trident missile.

  There are usually between five and fifteen SSBNs constantly at sea, manoeuvring within designated patrol areas that each extend to around one million square miles, ready at all times to react to coded instructions to launch one or all of their twenty-four Trident missiles.

  All US nuclear-powered submarines are assigned to either the Pacific or the Atlantic Fleets, but control over their strategic assets, meaning the missiles, is vested in the United States Strategic Command. The USStratCom Command Center is the locus of this organization and its primary function is to transmit National Command Authority directives to the strategic arsenal of all three legs of the Triad, under the ultimate authority of the President of the United States of America himself.

  The USStratCom Command Center is a purpose-built, two-level, fourteen-thousand-square-foot concrete and steel section of the Underground Command Complex, which also houses the Force Status Readiness Center, the Intelligence Operations Center and various other strategically vital offices. Like Cheyenne Mountain, the complex can be sealed in times of tension or war, and is able to operate independently for prolonged periods of time. Critical command and control communications equipment is specially shielded against the effects of the electromagnetic pulse which follows a nuclear explosion, and allows the Commander In Chief of USStratCom to control forces worldwide both before and during a nuclear war.

  As soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased the readiness state for US forces globally to DEFCON Four, CINCSTRAT ordered the complex to be sealed, then summoned his senior staff for a high-level restricted-access command briefing.

  ‘Gentlemen,’ General Mark Winchester began, ‘the CIA has obtained technical intelligence that shows North Korean forces assembling north of the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang is claiming that these manoeuvres are part of an exercise called “Silver Spring”, but the fear in Washington is that they’re actually the prelude to an invasion of South Korea.

  ‘The White House, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs, has taken this threat sufficiently seriously to go to DEFCON Four, and our forces will remain in this state, or in a higher state of readiness, until either the threat is dismissed as a false alarm or an invasion attempt is actually made by the DPRK.’

  Winchester paused and glanced around the long oblong table. Nobody spoke, or reacted in any way, which is precisely what he had expected. All of his senior staff had been fully aware of the situation for at least one day, and most of them had moved into the complex even before CINCSTRAT. The briefing he was giving would, essentially, tell them nothing they didn’t already know, but it would summarize the latest intelligence and, more importantly, lay out the options available and the actions then to be taken.

  ‘The first task is to ensure the integrity of our C3I assets,’ General Winchester said. He pronounced it ‘cee cubed eye’ and the acronym stood for command, control, communication and intelligence. ‘I want continuous checking routines to be run on all our landline, radio, microwave and satellite systems with immediate effect, starting with the Red Phone system and JANET.’

  The ‘Red Phone’ is the slang term applied to the Primary Alerting System, a network of dedicated telephone circuits that allows USStratCom controllers to communicate directly with over two hundred operational centres worldwide, including individual intercontinental ballistic missile silos and missile-launch control centres.

  ‘JANET’ is the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network, which comprises direct lines to the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon and to all other principal command headquarters. The system permits CINCSTRAT to communicate immediately with the two National Command Authorities – the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense – and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military commanders.

  The Command Center also has access to a vast range of radio networks, operating in every available frequency band. These networks, in conjunction with relay and communications satellites, allow direct contact with aircraft in flight in any part of the world, and allow the transmission of National Command Authority orders to American military assets worldwide.

  ‘The North Korean threat, assuming this is not just an exercise, isn’t directed ostensibly against the United States, but I want to ensure that we’re ready in all respects should the situation deteriorate and involve a direct threat to the homeland. The longest-range missile the North Koreans are known to be working on currently is the Taep’o-dong 2, and the latest intelligence assessments suggest it probably can’t reach any part of the continental US except Alaska, which doesn’t really count.’ Winchester got the smiles he expected. ‘But intelligence has been wrong before, so within the next four hours I want to see two additional E-6B Cover All aircraft holding at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma at Alert Thirty and Sixty, and another National Airborne Operations Center E-4B at Alert Thirty here at Offutt.’

  Originally, the Strategic Air Command’s airborne command post was an EC-135, code-named Looking Glass. When this platform was retired from service, the upgraded E-6B TACAMO aircraft assumed the mission, and the revised code-name Cover All.

  ‘Finally, I want the Ground Mobile Headquarters deployed immediately, and to be fully operational no later than twelve noon tomorrow. Send it somewhere central – Colorado or Kansas, say – and ensure that communications with it are kept to an absolute minimum to avoid compromising its location.’

  In the circumstances, what Winchester was ordering was overkill, but he’d never seen any point in having assets if they weren’t being used, and the Ground Mobile Headquarters was USStratCom’s last-ditch asset. An entirely self-sufficient mobile unit, it can set up operations anywhere inside the United States and there duplicate all the control functions of the Command Center itself. By virtue of its mobility, its location cannot be known far enough in advance to get programmed into enemy missile-guidance systems, so it is effectively invulnerable to an enemy strike.

  ‘Any questions?’ Winchester asked, but nobody spoke. ‘OK, command briefing complete. Let’s get to it.’

  NIS Headquarters, Naegok-dong, Seoul, South Korea

  Richter was escorted to a conference room located on the top floor of the National Intelligence Service headquarters in southern Seoul. The white five-storey structure had a square central entrance hall, topped with a dome, but the bulk of the building consisted of two curving arms of offices that embraced the approach road. As ‘spook central’ buildings go, it was more attractive than most.

  ‘Mr Richter.’ A short, stocky man stood up from his seat at the end of the long table and walked towards him, extending his hand. ‘My name is Kang Jang-Ho, and I’m the deputy director of this facility. Bae Chang-Su, the director, will be here shortly. You’ve had a long flight, I understand. Can I offer you some refreshment?’

  Richter shook Kang’s hand. ‘Yes,’ he then replied, realizing that he felt pretty hungry: even business-class meals on Aeroflot were not too appealing. ‘That would be very welcome.’

  ‘Coffee and sandwiches – something like that?’ Kang suggested, picked up a telephone and held a brief conversation.

  As he put the instrument down, another man entered the room, taller and slimmer and with a thin moustache. From the way Kang straightened up, Richter guessed this must be the ‘autocratic’ Bae Ch
ang-Su, as proved the case when the newcomer introduced himself.

  They sat down at one end of the long table, equipped with chairs for over a dozen people, Bae taking his seat at the end.

  ‘You have some information for us, I understand,’ he began.

  Richter nodded and explained what he and Bykov had found out in Russia, and the assumed destination of the missing MiG-25s. The South Koreans had already known some of it, but the probability that Foxbats had also been stolen from Algeria was news to them.

  ‘According to General Bykov, at least sixteen have gone missing from Russian air bases, and we think maybe two from Aïn Oussera in Algeria, totalling a minimum of eighteen. Because of the fragmented state of the military in Russia, and the possibility that somebody high up in the Defence Ministry is facilitating these thefts, there could be a lot more aircraft unaccounted for. My own guess is that there must now be at least twenty MiG-25s north of the DMZ.’

  Bae didn’t appear surprised by this. ‘What I can’t understand is why the North Koreans would want these aircraft. All their combat planes are old and no match for ours, so I would expect them to go after more modern fighters.’

  At that moment there was a knock on the door, and a young man entered carrying a tray of refreshments. Richter waited until he’d left the room before responding.

  ‘According to my source in Moscow, the North Koreans may have picked on the MiG-25 because it was specifically designed to intercept ICBMs in the terminal stage of their flight. More importantly, the Foxbat is about the only aircraft likely to be left flying after the first nuclear explosion, because the EMP – the electromagnetic pulse – will fry the electronics of pretty much everything else, either in the air or on the ground.’

  ‘You’re suggesting the North Koreans intend to launch a nuclear attack?’ Bae asked tightly.

  ‘I honestly don’t know,’ Richter replied, ‘but what concerns London is exactly the point you’ve already made. Why would they choose the MiG-25 unless they had a very good reason? And its survivability after a nuclear exchange is about the only explanation we’ve come up with. Our main concern is that, even if the West doesn’t resort to nuclear weapons, the North Koreans would, just to eliminate the opposition and give them immediate control of the skies. They could keep their fighters and bombers secure in hardened shelters, detonate a nuke over the joint South Korean and American forces, then fly these Foxbats to intercept any missiles the Americans launched. That would soon eliminate most of the opposition on land, and could give them air superiority because the only aircraft left flying would be North Korean, allowing them to consolidate an advance towards Seoul.’

  For a few moments neither Bae nor Kang responded, just stared across the table at each other as Richter began another sandwich.

  ‘You don’t paint an attractive picture,’ Bae Chang-Su said eventually, ‘but it may interest you to know that, in our last discussion, Washington outlined a remarkably similar scenario.’

  ‘So what’s your government doing about it?’

  ‘I can’t be specific about our military response, because I don’t know precisely what orders have been given, but you can assume our armed forces have escalated the alert state. The government has already made representations to Pyongyang, and we’ve sought assistance from the Americans under the terms of Operation Plan 5027. Meanwhile, until our neighbours in the north make some kind of move, that’s about all we can do.’

  The sound of an approaching helicopter became audible, and Bae glanced out of the window. ‘Excellent,’ he murmured. ‘Your taxi’s arrived on time, Mr Richter. London asked us to provide you with transportation as far as Kunsan, and I understand your Royal Navy will be sending an aircraft to meet you there.’

  Six minutes later Richter was gazing out through the side window of the Bell helicopter. Kunsan Air Base lay about a hundred and twenty miles almost due south, and his flight would take a little over an hour.

  Only forty-eight hours earlier he’d been climbing into the rear of the Antonov An-72 transport aircraft at Slavgorod North for the flight back to Moscow, and since then he seemed to have spent most of his time either busy on the phone or in the air. As the helicopter lifted off, he stared at the white shape of the NIS headquarters receding below him, and wondered what the next forty-eight hours might bring.

  Chapter Fourteen

  Saturday

  Kunsan Air Base, South Korea

  Seventy-five minutes after lifting off from Naegok-dong, the Bell touched down at Kunsan Air Base. As the rotors slowed to a stop, the crewman slid the side door open but gestured to Richter to remain in his seat. A refuelling bowser was waiting to one side of the landing pad, and beyond it Richter could see the familiar shape of a Royal Navy Merlin ASW helicopter ground-taxying slowly towards the Bell he was waiting in.

  The crewman gave a thumbs-up, then gestured towards the open door. Richter picked up his two bags and stepped out onto the discoloured concrete. He moved briskly away from the Bell before stopping beside the marshaller who was waiting for the Merlin, wands crossed below his waist. The Merlin parked some twenty yards away, its nose dipping as the pilot applied the brakes.

  The engines and spinning rotors of the Royal Navy helicopter combined to create a noise that was deafening. Richter gestured to the marshaller that he was the passenger for this aircraft. The South Korean lifted one of his wands to attract the Merlin’s pilot’s attention and pointed the other one at Richter, then waved for him to go forward.

  Richter ducked involuntarily as he moved under the rotor disk, and headed for the open side door. The aircrewman gave him a grin as he stepped into the rear compartment, and handed him a passenger helmet, based on that worn by British Army tank drivers. He then gestured to the instructor’s seat on the mission console. Directly behind the aircrewman’s seat, it lies on the starboard side of the Merlin and faces aft.

  The moment Richter secured his seatbelt, he heard the aircrewman confirming that their passenger was on board. Moments later, the Merlin began moving forwards. This aircraft’s downwash is so powerful that it’s capable of wrecking any smaller helicopter nearby, so it continued ground-taxying until it was well clear of the Bell.

  A minute later, as the helicopter finally reached the taxiway, its engine note rose to a shrill scream audible even through the muffling effect of the headset. The Merlin lifted straight up into the air, then adopted a nose-down attitude as it began climbing and accelerating, heading west away from the airfield.

  In minutes they were ‘feet-wet’ – over the sea – and established at five hundred feet and, Richter guessed, travelling at around a hundred and twenty knots, a ground-speed of nearly one hundred and forty miles an hour.

  ‘How far to Mother?’ Richter asked.

  ‘About fifty miles,’ responded the pilot, Lieutenant Craig Howe. ‘We’ll be there in around thirty minutes. So you’re Royal Navy, I gather? No civilian would say “Mother”.’

  ‘Ex,’ Richter confirmed. ‘I used to fly Sea Harriers for the Queen.’

  ‘Oh, God, not another fucking stovie,’ Howe muttered.

  Richter merely grinned at that, leant back in the seat and closed his eyes.

  United States Strategic Command (USStratCom) Command Center

  The Underground Complex, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

  General Winchester glanced around the Senior Battle Staff Area situated on the lowest level of the Command Center. Each senior officer sat at a workstation console which provided him or her with access to state-of-the-art data management systems and integrated secure and non-secure voice communication facilities. Video monitors located at each console displayed mission-critical information that allowed the proper control and management of the command’s missile and aircraft assets.

  Lower-ranking staff officers were working simultaneously in the Support Battle Staff Area on the upper floor. These terminals differed from those of the senior staff in displaying more detailed data, rather than the global pict
ure necessary for overall situation assessment.

  The principal system used for storing and processing information is the Automated Command Control System, which stores data regarding everything from the current and forecast weather to tactical information about force movements and submarine, aircraft and missile status and availability.

  Like the NORAD complex located inside Cheyenne Mountain, the USStratCom Command Center taps into a number of different surveillance systems designed to detect the launch and subsequent trajectory of both ICBMs and SLBMs.

  Data is simultaneously transmitted to USStratCom, NORAD, the NMCC in the Pentagon and the Alternate National Military Command Center in Pennsylvania. At USStratCom, the data collected is fed into a high-speed computer for processing, and is then displayed on the Command Center’s eight large wall screens at the same time as it’s shown on video monitors positioned in front of CINCSTRAT, the senior battle staff and the Warning Systems Controller.

  Data on the trajectory and predicted target area undergo a one-minute ‘confidence rating’ check, and once it’s clear that the missile is real – that is, not resulting from some form of computer-induced glitch or bad data – CINCSTRAT can launch additional aircraft for national survival and pass on advisory and preparatory information to his strategic assets. The order to retaliate with a strategic nuclear strike has to be issued by the President himself, to be relayed then by USStratCom. CINCSTRAT alone cannot make that decision.

  ‘OK, everything looks fine from here.’ General Winchester returned his gaze to his console, while speaking into his headset microphone. ‘Senior Controller, call the roll.’

  For the third time that afternoon, Lieutenant-General Virgil Neuberger moved the trackball and sent the cursor spinning across the screen. He selected ‘Strategic Assets’, clicked ‘OK’ and began to read the figures into the command group intercom.

  ‘Submarines, first. We have eleven SSBNs on patrol, with two more preparing to sail within the next twelve hours – one from Kings Bay, Georgia, the other from Bangor, Washington. All have been passed coordinates for their targets in North Korea if this thing does turn to rat-shit. The other five SSBNs are in maintenance or deep refit, and so can’t be deployed within the time available.

 

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