Mike Guardia

by American Guerrilla

  The next entry in Volckmann’s diary, 1 October, documents his meeting with Moses and Noble. As per orders, he went with Blackburn and Swick to Caraw where they found the colonels awaiting them. Just as Volckmann had anticipated, Moses and Noble announced their assumption of command. Dispatches were being sent to all local commanders and a coordinated counteroffensive was to begin on 15 October 1942. His first assignment was to act as Moses’ personal liaison and to deliver intelligence reports and other instructions to local USAFFE personnel. 147 Finally, Volckmann was back in the war—this time as a guerrilla.

  With the date of the operation confirmed, Moses and Noble set HHour at 0100. The colonel’s plan was simple in its conception: guerrilla forces would conduct a raid on the Japanese garrison at the Igoten Mines. The main effort consisted of elements commanded by Captain Rufino Baldwin,* formerly of the 14th Infantry Regiment (Philippine Army). Baldwin had commanded an infantry company during the retreat to Bataan and now found himself in charge of a small outfit near Bobok. Baldwin was a talented young officer, one whom Moses and Noble obviously admired. And considering that his group was the one nearest to the Igoten Mines, it stood to reason that the colonels would choose him to lead the raid. 148

  *A Philippine Army officer, Baldwin was a mestizo—a term referring to those of mixed European and Filipino descent.

  Moses’ and Noble’s orders to Baldwin were clear: conduct a raid on the Japanese garrison and destroy the Japanese thoroughfare along Kennon Road. In addition to seizing the area surrounding the mines, the raid intended the capture of a Japanese man named Acota.* The nature of Acota’s relationship to the Japanese remains unclear— Volckmann indicated that he was a high-ranking Japanese officer while Blackburn identified him as merely a Japanese agent. Whatever his disposition, Acota had become the manager of the Igoten Mines and was universally despised by both Americans and Filipinos; he had taken over the formerly American-run mines and repeatedly gave information on guerrilla activity to the Japanese garrison commanders. It was hoped that the capture of Acota would provide the guerrillas with the names of collaborators along with intelligence on enemy activity. 149

  However, the raid planned for 15 October ended in disaster. Volckmann and Blackburn were not present at the raid, but witnessed it from atop a nearby ridge. Hoping to watch a resounding success, Volckmann and Blackburn saw a tragedy unfold before their eyes. An overzealous guerrilla initiated fire too soon and alerted the Japanese to their presence. With one premature shot, the guerrillas had forfeited the element of surprise.

  Scrambling to form a counterattack, the Japanese garrison brutally repelled the guerrilla raid. Records do not reveal the exact details behind the operation, and Volckmann does not discuss it at great length in his diary, but what ensued was nearly a total disaster for the USAFFE guerrillas. Aside from their failure to capture the mines, the guerrillas had missed their human target, Acota, which had been their priority. Acota, like the Japanese troops, had been alerted by the premature fire. Dashing for cover, he fell into a nearby ditch where—unfortunately— he had broken his back. Recovered by a small group of Baldwin’s men, they quickly discovered that they could not carry him back to their hideout, and in a fit of panic they shot him where he lay. 150 As a result of the disastrous guerrilla raid, the Japanese mobilized all available reinforcements into the area surrounding the Igoten Mines.

  *Other reports have his name spelt as Okoda.

  The punitive expeditions were about to begin.

  A few days after the raid, a sobered Moses and Noble came to Volckmann with a recalibrated plan. The new task that they assigned to Volckmann was to establish a “communication” system with the other guerrillas in the area. 151 Likely, the two colonels had realized that poor communication was partially to blame for their recent debacle. Under their instructions, Volckmann took the initiative to establish a message center at the abandoned Lusod Sawmill Company a few miles east of the Igoten Mines. During peacetime, an open-wire telephone circuit connected nearly every sawmill throughout the province. 152 Using the company’s letterhead to type his memoranda and other records, he simultaneously began the process of repairing the telephone line connecting Lusod to other sawmills. Many of the phone lines and terminals were still operable, but several others had suffered collateral damage from the Japanese. The nearest sawmill was located in Bobok, where Blackburn had met the colonels a month earlier before the botched Igoten raid. Since Blackburn had prior service as the 11th Division Signal Officer, Volckmann let him take the lead in repairing the phone line from Lusod to Bobok.

  Meanwhile, Volckmann busied himself making plans for the next phase of operations. Since the Japanese now had an insurgency on their hands, Volckmann was certain that massive reprisals were coming soon. It was not a question of if, but when. And when it did come, he wanted to be ready for it. Back at Lusod, Volckmann contacted Deleon, the former sawmill mechanic. 153 Deleon agreed to have the men at the local barrio fix up the sawmill and provide assistance in getting the phone lines operational. Aside from the phone line to Bobok, the Lusod Sawmill Company had terminals connected to Bokod and Dalaprit, two other nearby barrios. Dalaprit, however, was the priority terminal as Rufino Baldwin had recently located his men there.

  Encouraged by the help he received from Deleon and his friends in the barrio, Volckmann decided to expand his authority. He sent word to the local barrio leaders instructing them to provide workers and other able-bodied males to assist him in building his guerrilla network. 154 Additionally, Volckmann made requests for food and dry goods via handwritten receipts promising full compensation from the United States at the end of the war. This was a bold and daring move: Volckmann had no idea whether “Uncle Sam” would honor his receipts or if the Filipino villagers would even accept his demands. But if Volckmann acted like an officer of a defeated army, he would be treated as such. 155

  Luckily, the Filipinos responded quickly and eagerly to Volckmann’s orders. Signing his handwritten receipts, Volckmann received copious amounts of rice, vegetables, and beef—complemented by a fresh contingent of workers for the telephone line and others awaiting induction into the guerrilla movement. 156 Many of these new recruits were, coincidentally, veterans of the Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary.

  On 22 October, Moses and Noble arrived at the sawmill to discuss their future plans with Volckmann. They were going to make their way north to Apayao to establish contact with Ralph Praeger. It was reported that Praeger had made radio contact with Headquarters– Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) in Australia. If this were the case, the colonels would be able to speak directly to MacArthur and request further instruction. They also planned to give the names of all free Americans under their command in North Luzon. Upon leaving, the colonels instructed Volckmann to continue sending progress reports. However, it was the last time he would see either Moses or Noble again; the Japanese captured both men in June 1943. 157

  On 29 October, Volckmann took Bruno with him to inspect Dalaprit. As it turned out, the pair had to make a treacherous hike through the mountains, as the benign trails and bridges had been destroyed by other guerrillas to impede the Japanese’s mobility. Volckmann appreciated the logic but, as of now, the only mobility that suffered was his own. When they arrived at Dalaprit, they were amazed to see Baldwin’s camp flooded with evacuees from Igoten. He admired Baldwin for taking them in and postulated what additional manpower the guerrillas could gain from their presence. October 1942 had been Volckmann’s busiest month, and although the Japanese had yet to begin their punitive patrols, he was confident that his men would stand firm. 158

  By 9 November 1942, Volckmann had put the finishing touches on his headquarters at Lusod. The phone lines were well established and the natives continued to provide their steady stream of manpower. The “headquarters staff” at the Lusod camp now consisted of Volckmann, Blackburn, Bruno, Emilio, Deleon the mechanic, a young native guide named Atong, and an old native woman whom they nicknamed “Tenny.” Tenny earne
d not only her keep but also the men’s admiration for her tireless cooking. Occasionally, their staff included local guards and liaison personnel drawn from the nearby barrios. 159

  Although his camp at Lusod was finally organized, Volckmann would not enjoy the newfound order for very long. The 9th of November marked the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive. As the Agno River returned to its smaller size, the Japanese contingent at Baguio poured into the countryside. Later that afternoon, the telephone at Bokod reported the Japanese moving south toward Lusod. After falling back to Dalaprit, one of Baldwin’s men phoned in to report Japanese movement on the west bank of the Agno River. 160 That put them slightly more than four miles from the Lusod camp.

  Volckmann had no sooner hung up the phone with Dalaprit than he was greeted by another artillery barrage. As before, he found himself on the receiving end of another 75mm battery. The shells did not come very close, but close enough to convince him to move his camp. The Japanese had not pinpointed his exact location, but to bring their fire so close indicated that they were aware of his presence. He suspected the work of informers amongst the Filipinos. 161

  The following morning, the phone terminal at Bobok went dead— the Japanese had cut the line. Volckmann quickly ushered his staff into a smaller camp higher up the mountain; he was not going to let the Japanese artillery zero in on him, nor risk the enemy attacking his camp at night. Before traveling up the mountainside, Volckmann asked Tenny to go home and maintain her vigilance on Japanese activity. Volckmann indicated that he would meet her back at Lusod the following morning for any updates. 162

  The next morning, Volckmann returned to Lusod where he found Tenny waiting for him. She said that Japanese soldiers had come farther up the mountainside, but estimated that they were still a good two hours away. Volckmann thanked her for the information and asked her to continue monitoring the Japanese. With that, Volckmann departed Lusod with the promise that he would send one of his men to bring her to the new campsite. Shortly thereafter, Volckmann returned to his new campsite where Bruno and Deleon greeted him with news that the Japanese had already reached the Lusod sawmill. 163 It was quite possibly the last news that Volckmann wanted to hear; he had been at Lusod only a few hours before, and now the Japanese were encamped there!

  Two hours after sunset, Bruno retrieved Tenny and brought her into the new campsite. Upon her arrival, she gave a full report on recent Japanese activity. A Japanese captain, who had somehow been employed by the sawmill years earlier, was leading the patrol currently occupying Lusod. He was familiar with the surrounding area and, consequently, was chosen to lead the punitive expedition. The captain, according to Tenny, had questioned her at length concerning two Americans: Volckmann and Blackburn. 164

  Both men were speechless— the Japanese knew their names. By now, there was no doubt that informers were working amongst the local populace. This complicated things for Volckmann, but for now he had no choice other than to accept it as a part of guerrilla warfare. The vast majority of the Filipinos still disliked the Japanese, but with the enemy commanding greater incentives and materiel, those who “rode the fence” could easily be tipped in the opposite direction. In addition, Japanese torture had a way of making them talk. Success, therefore, lay in exercising caution regarding whom they could trust.

  Before determining what criterion they would use in evaluating their allies, Volckmann first had to relocate his camp. The Japanese patrol, and especially their captain, would make life miserable for Volckmann and Blackburn if they stayed in the same place much longer. After instructing Tenny to stay behind and monitor any changes in enemy activity, Volckmann took Blackburn, Bruno, and Emilio on a hike to Sumulpuss. 165 It was a small native barrio that the Japanese had yet to enter. The natives there were friendly and Volckmann eagerly accepted their invitation to sit down for a meal. But while eating his lunch in a small hut, located about 50 yards from the main road, Volckmann noticed some movement from behind the tree line. While he was straining his eyes to get a closer look, an entire column of Japanese infantrymen rumbled around the bend! With their bayonets fixed and wearing full battle regalia, the foot column marched down the main path just outside the barrio. One sidelong glance from a Japanese soldier and Volckmann’s game would have been over. Luckily, the column passed without incident—but for Volckmann, this was too close for comfort. He had counted 50 infantrymen by the time the last Japanese rifleman passed by. 166

  After his close encounter with the Japanese column, Volckmann decided to make his way farther north towards the summit of the mountain. The terrain up there was dominated by rainforest and heavy cloud cover—just what Volckmann needed to escape detection. The rainforest provided great concealment and the overcast would dissipate the smoke from any campfires. On the other hand, the dense foliage reminded him of his days with the 11th Infantry in Bataan; he could scarcely see beyond his nose. One hundred and twenty yards above the main trail from Sumulpuss, Volckmann and Blackburn set up camp in a small hut. The hut was deserted and had probably been a Philippine Army aid station at one point.

  Over the next five days during 15–20 November, they remained at the hut, lying low as Japanese patrols came within yards of their location. Neither Volckmann nor anyone in the group ever saw a patrol during those five days, but they could certainly hear them. On the morning of the sixth day, however, the Japanese called off their search and began pulling out of the area. As night fell, Volckmann and his group started back toward Lusod, the same direction the Japanese had gone. Realizing that he may encounter a rear guard or backtracking patrol, Volckmann decided to stay off the main trail. 167

  After spending the night at Lusod, the group hit the trail toward Oding, the camp with the industrious American families that they had visited earlier. Volckmann was anxious to see them again and earnestly hoped that they remained in good spirits. Oding, however, was no longer the cheerful hideaway it had been when Volckmann left. During their retreat, the Japanese had passed through Oding and destroyed everything. 168 The proud houses and crude amenities built by these five families had been burned to the ground; there was no trace of any of the camp’s former inhabitants. 169

  Maintaining a course along the mountain ridgeline, Volckmann and Blackburn could see various native villages going up in flames. From this vantage point, they could see that the Japanese were crisscrossing the landscape and scorching every village in their path. They settled down for the night atop a ridge overlooking the Bobok sawmill and in the morning, continued northward to their former camp at Ekip. Coming off the ridgeline, they descended into the Bolo River Valley, which had been the region’s agricultural nerve center until the Japanese destroyed its crops. Likely, the Japanese had done so as a counterinsurgency measure.

  Nearly every trail in the Bolo River Valley bore footprints of the Japanese infantry. The farther Volckmann traveled into the valley, the more devastation he saw—a seemingly endless trail of ruble and burned villages greeted him at every turn. Deeper into the valley, Volckmann and Blackburn encountered a young Igorot who agreed to lead them into Bugias, a barrio that, surprisingly, had been spared by the Japanese. At Bugias, Volckmann learned that his camp at Ekip had been destroyed. The barrio lieutenant also provided Volckmann with a puzzling piece of news: Colonels Moses and Noble had now gone south. 170

  Volckmann pondered over what to do next. Even if he could establish contact with Moses and Noble, his report would not have been a rosy one: units heavily dispersed, phone lines dead, Japanese patrols, villages burned, etc. Furthermore, these were things that Moses and Noble probably already knew. Nevertheless, Benguet sub-province had become a hornet’s nest and Volckmann swallowed the bitter revelation that all his hard work had seemingly been undone. To make matters worse, Moses and Noble—for all intents and purposes—had fled to the north and left their guerrillas in Benguet to fend for themselves while the pair tried to track down Ralph Praeger in Apayao.

  All things considered, Moses and Noble had not done a
stellar job in organizing the Allied resistance in North Luzon. Undaunted, however, Volckmann decided to take matters into his own hands. He still recognized the colonels’ authority and remained optimistic that the false starts of October 1942 could easily be fixed. But, for the time being, Volckmann would begin organizing and training guerrilla cadres on his own. This way, when Moses and Noble finally did get back to him, he could present them with a sizeable guerrilla force ready for action. The only question was: where would he find the manpower and resources for this bold plan? The recent chaos and devastation throughout Benguet had destroyed any possibility of recruiting guerrillas there. Bruno, however, had an idea: if Benguet had become too hot to handle, Ifugao might be a feasible alternative. Bruno was a native to the Ifugao sub-province, which lay directly to the northeast, and the leaders of the border barrios were relatives of his. 171 Using his family connections, Bruno could cash in a few favors to provide the group with food, weapons, and loyal manpower.