Mike Guardia

by American Guerrilla

  The 121st Infantry was one of the few regiments in the area that remained intact. In February 1942, Colonel John P. Horan received authorization by radiogram from Corregidor to organize the 121st Infantry. The designation applied to the mishmash of units Horan commanded through Balete Pass. 221 After his surrender, however, the 121st refused to follow suit and continued to hold the Bontoc-Kalinga area until the Fall of Bataan. 222 After Horan’s retreat, the fragmented units fell to the command of Captain William Peryam, an American Army officer. He aligned his unit with Moses and Noble but Peryam himself was captured in January 1943. 223 By the end of that year, however, George M. Barnett had assumed command and was now reporting to Volckmann.

  Inspecting the regimental camps, Volckmann found the 121st to be among the most well-organized units still operating in Luzon. Despite several setbacks over the previous year, the regiment still retained a moderate degree of operability. The Second District’s field hospital, for instance, included a fully functioning dental office. 224 Since Barnett had already been at the helm, Volckmann apparently saw no need in appointing another commander. Barnett was left to command the Second District, USAFIP-NL.

  The Third District, encompassing the provinces of Abra and Ilocos Norte, was among the slowest to materialize. Previously, civilian agents enlisted by Volckmann reported a small guerrilla force operating near Laoag, the capital of Ilocos Norte. But Volckmann noticed something peculiar about these supposed “guerrillas”: each time that his men made contact with them, the Japanese would come out in force. To Volckmann, this made absolutely no sense—all the appropriate countermeasures were taken to ensure that no information had been leaked ahead of the agents’ arrival. Furthermore, Volckmann had regular, uninterrupted contact with guerrilla units in other areas where the concentration of enemy troops was much higher. Concluding that there must have been either an informant or a double agent at work, Volckmann sent Barnett to investigate the area. 225

  Barnett, in turn, detailed the task to one of his lieutenants, John O’Day. An Irish-American, O’Day had worked as a miner before the war. Establishing a patrol base in Laoag, O’Day made contact with the same guerrilla leader whose communications with USAFIP-NL always preceded a Japanese crackdown. A few days after making contact, the situation progressed in the same pattern that it had before: the Japanese came out in force. 226 This time, however, O’Day would not let his guerrillas be driven from the area.

  In a shrewd play of tactical ingenuity, O’Day arranged for a meeting between himself and the local guerrilla leader. When the unit arrived, O’Day’s men surrounded them at gunpoint and demanded an explanation for the continuous Japanese harassment. Rather than “play dumb” or attempt to make any excuses, the leader made a run for it. O’Day followed in hot pursuit and shot down the leader, and afterwards the surviving members confessed what they had being doing: the Japanese, in attempt to protect their air base at Laoag, had paid a few locals to pose as guerrillas. Under these auspices, they patrolled Ilocos Norte searching for other guerrillas attempting to organize the region. Whenever contact was made with a FilipinoAmerican outfit, the Japanese were promptly notified. 227

  It was a clever trick and it worked effectively until O’Day broke the cycle. With the pseudo-guerillas eliminated, and the Japanese without their indigenous spies, the entire area began to organize rapidly. Borrowing Companies K and M from the 121st, O’Day laid the groundwork for what would become the 15th Infantry. Rob Arnold, a signal officer who had earlier trained Walter Cushing’s guerrillas, was appointed commander of the Third District. After Cushing’s death, Arnold continued to make his way south. He eventually found his way into the 14th Infantry, which at the time was under Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Nakar, before joining GHQ, USAFIP-NL in 1943. Together with John O’Day, Arnold expanded the 15th Infantry into a fully operational regiment. 228

  Fourth District belonged to the 11th Infantry. It was among the most troublesome districts to organize because the units were the most widely scattered of any regiment in North Luzon. Furthermore, Ralph Praeger—the man that Volckmann had wanted to command the district—was already in Japanese custody. Before Praeger’s capture, the anti-guerrilla campaign of 1942 had been especially fierce in Apayao. Praeger’s men emerged from the debacle relatively unscathed, but the local civilians had born the brunt of the enemy’s brutality. Eager for revenge, Filipinos in the Fourth District provinces poured out of the countryside to enlist as guerrillas. 229

  Since Praeger was no longer available, Volckmann turned to Blackburn—a man whose loyalty and capabilities were beyond reproach. Blackburn had heretofore been Volckmann’s Executive Officer. Now, he was entrusted with the command of a regiment. As he awarded Blackburn his new command, Volckmann announced his intention to relocate General Headquarters from Ifugao to the La Union province near the western coast of Luzon. 230 With his departure, Volckmann left the task of organizing the 11th largely to Blackburn, his prime directive being to coordinate matters of personnel, supply, and training within the Apayao, Bontoc, and western Cagayan provinces. 231

  It came to pass that the Antipolo and the Haliap—including Tamicpao and Kamayong themselves—provided the backbone of the 11th Infantry’s manpower. In fact, more native tribesmen were represented in the 11th Infantry than in any other regiment under Volckmann’s command. Organizing the far reaches of the Fourth District proved to be an arduous and time-consuming task—for it was not until three days before D-Day in North Luzon that the regiment was officially activated as the 11th Infantry, USAFIP-NL. Its operational area consisted of the Cagayan, Apayao, and Mountain provinces, exclusive of the Benguet sub-province. 232

  The fifth and final district went to Romulo Manriquez and the 14th Infantry. It was the smallest of the USAFIP-NL regiments, but it still covered a sizeable area in the Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya provinces. Rufino Baldwin, who had commanded the largest segments of the regiment, remained in Japanese custody. Major Enriquez—who had previously commanded the 14th—surrendered his command as a “bargaining chip” when the Japanese seized his wife. Romulo Manriquez had been rebuilding the 14th Infantry ever since. 233

  Covering some 15,000 square miles, Volckmann connected the five districts through a synchronized network of intelligence and communication to coordinate strikes on enemy positions. To maintain consistency within USAFIP-NL operations, Volckmann needed an effective communication network. Two things, however, complicated a network created in this environment: the geography and the endless ring of spies. To correct this problem, Volckmann devised a system similar to the one he had operated amongst his small camps in Ifugao. Three east-west and three north-south messenger routes were laid down, linking General Headquarters to each of the district commands. Relay stations were located every four to six hours’ hiking distance along the trail. At each relay station, a non-commissioned officer would inspect the documents and credentials of the messenger. If satisfied, he would task someone on his staff to carry the message to the next closet station. Volckmann also devised a series of alternate routes that were ready to use in the event that a primary route was compromised. In addition to handling the flow of information, these routes also moved supplies among the districts. In all, Volckmann’s relay system accomplished in two days what would have taken one week with a single messenger. For the remainder of Volckmann’s time in the Philippines, nothing along these routes ever fell into enemy hands. 234

  Central to the guerrilla campaign—and perhaps its most critical asset—was the support it received from the local civilians. Even in light of the Japanese brutality, promoting the cause for a resistance movement still required a fair amount of diplomacy. If the Japanese caught a civilian collaborating with guerrillas, it meant certain death not only for the culprit, but for his entire family as well. Also, the Filipinos were collectively a people of limited resources. The wealthy plantation owners and businessmen had much to spare, but these Filipinos were in the minority and the Japanese had already seized most of their assets.
Urban Filipinos, for example those who lived in Manila and Baguio, could offer some assistance, but the high concentration of spies, Japanese troops, and Kempai Tai agents meant that these city-dwellers would have to be excessively discreet.

  Ultimately, to win the civilians’ support, Volckmann had to guarantee two things: (1) that the United States Government would properly compensate them; and (2) that they would be safe from any Japanese reprisal. As mentioned earlier, Volckmann produced handwritten receipts for everything that he received. Later, he retained a Financial Officer on the USAFIP-NL staff whose sole responsibility was to document receipts for all goods and services provided by civilians. After the war, Volckmann made it a priority to ensure that the Army compensated all receipt holders for the assistance they had given him. 235 Throughout most of the war, Volckmann’s records referred to individual persons not by name, but by numeric call signs, for example Volckmann’s call sign was “1122.” Assigning call signs to nearly everyone in contact with USAFIP-NL, Volckmann guaranteed their anonymity if ever his records fell into enemy hands. 236

  A centerpiece of the Japanese war effort was their intensive propaganda. In the spring of 1943, while Volckmann remained in hiding from the previous fall’s anti-guerrilla campaign, the Japanese began an amnesty drive. Utilizing such phrases as Asia for the Asiatics and The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the program’s objective was to induce the local population to cease giving aid to the guerrillas and, in return for cash rewards, supply information about specific individuals and their activities. 237 Meanwhile, the Japanesecontrolled media continued circulating denouncements of all things American: America’s economy had failed, the United States military had been defeated, and they would never be able to return to the Philippines. 238

  Volckmann hated these tactics but simultaneously admitted being fascinated by them. Never before had he been exposed to this kind of warfare: psychological warfare. It made for a very interesting case study, one that Volckmann documented well. However, he was relatively certain that the propaganda machine would not affect most of his local support. 239

  The Japanese occupation could not erase Filipino support for America so easily. Yet, there were indications that a few Filipinos were steadily buying in to the propaganda. The Japanese could be successful over time if—and only if—they could convince the Filipinos that there was no hope of victory and that America really had forgotten about them. That message had already convinced some Filipinos to cast their lot with the Japanese. Hired as spies and informants, they were paid regular salaries by the Kempai Tai and given bonuses for information that led to the capture of American officers. To augment their ground forces, the Japanese also impressed several Filipinos into constabulary units. Although a number of Filipinos voluntarily accepted their conscription, many did so only out of fear. 240

  But however effective their propaganda machine may have been, the Japanese often did more to negate their own success. While trying to win “hearts and minds,” the Japanese brutally tortured and killed those who were suspected of aiding guerrillas. These detestable tactics angered many of the Filipinos and hence, the Japanese not only undermined their own progress, they unwittingly gave the Filipinos more reasons to support Volckmann. 241

  Once he had secured the civilians’ support, Volckmann then had to determine how he was to use it. The support structure provided by Filipinos fell into two categories: combat support and combat manpower. Combat support persons could either be regular civilians or volunteer guerrillas assigned to non-combat roles. These individuals provided Volckmann’s unit with food, water, technical and intelligence support, and other non-combat related specialties. It appears that Volckmann understood that these persons were the ones he needed to bring into his orbit first. Support personnel were critical, as their logistics provided his only lifeline. At the time, no other means existed for obtaining food or supplies. Technical support enabled Volckmann to maintain radio communication with his subordinate commands and, later, with General MacArthur in Australia, while the intelligence network provided Volckmann with continuous “eyes on the ground.” Although USAFFE possessed a working knowledge of the North Luzon landscape, it was nowhere near as intimate as the natives who had lived there for generations.

  Indeed, the centerpiece of the civilian auxiliary was the intelligence network. Knowledge of the enemy, terrain, and weather were all critical to Volckmann’s guerrilla forces. And for intelligence gathering to be effective, it had to be a continuous process. The Filipinos he employed in this regard were indispensable. The Japanese would not normally suspect an average Filipino lingering in the vicinity of their garrisons, particularly since many Japanese outposts were located near settled areas or trading centers. The USAFIP-NL intelligista could easily and inconspicuously blend in with a crowd—a luxury that Volckmann and his American cohorts did not have.

  Because intelligence operations had strategic implications, longrange planning was critical. The USAFIP-NL G2 files indicate that collecting intelligence centered on five priorities: evaluation of enemy forces and capabilities, interrogation of prisoners, proliferation of special agencies, psychological warfare, and infiltration. 242

  Evaluating enemy strengths and dispositions was the first logical step in conducting the intelligence operation. After being displaced into the mountains by the 1942 anti-guerilla campaign, Volckmann had to assess where the priority targets were and how to coordinate strikes on them. Assessing these targets, Volckmann directed his agents to analyze the largest garrisons, supply points, and infrastructure landmarks that linked the Japanese units together. 243

  Creating special agencies required a little more thought. To effectively promulgate his war plans, Volckmann had to take into account factors beyond the realm of enemy activity. These factors included weather, civilian activity, and the like. To fulfill this need, Volckmann established “watcher” groups to monitor airfields, shipping ports, and the coastline. Airfield watcher stations kept a close vigil on all operational airfields, while port watchers recorded the types and number of ships entering and departing North Luzon ports. Having coast watchers was an old practice from the earliest days of the U.S. Army and, consequently, it seems to be one of the few pieces of conventional doctrine that Volckmann used in the early stages of his guerrilla campaign. Operating in small teams, coast watchers provided information on the principal shipping lanes surrounding Luzon. 244

  Psychological warfare was Volckmann’s first line of defense against the enemy propaganda. Years later, he articulated the difference between covert (black) and overt (white) propaganda. Both, he said, were “of great importance in developing and supporting a spirit of resistance in enemy-controlled areas.” To counter the enemy’s circulation of the alleged American defeats, Volckmann responded in kind with his own newsletter. Two versions went into circulation throughout North Luzon: one to his subordinate units and the other to the civilian communities. The guerrilla newsletters recounted each milestone of the Allied advance in the Pacific, gleaned from KGEI-San Francisco and later, from Volckmann’s radio contact with MacArthur. The secondary effects of this newsletter were critical, as it began to sway those who had previously ridden the fence to throw their lot in with the Americans. 245

  Infiltration rounded out the intelligence apparatus as the final ingredient to gain information on the enemy. All other tenets of the intelligence plan were limited in their scope because they could not get within the walls of the enemy’s operation. Infiltrating the Japanese military complex would not be easy but, out of necessity, Volckmann found ways to make inroads. The Japanese’s “Bureau of Constabulary” was the most likely avenue of approach. Many of Volckmann’s agents found their way into its service and disseminated information on its activities and newest missions. 246 With the Japanese Fourteenth Army employing Filipino civilians for many of its staff and clerical functions, the opportunity for infiltration was ripe.

  Combat manpower provided the muscle behind Volckmann’s guerrilla fo
rce. In fact, the overwhelming majority of his guerrillas were Filipino— displaced members of either the Philippine Army or Philippine Scouts, or natives that Volckmann recruited, such as the Haliap and the Antipolo. 247 For those who did not have a military background, Volckmann devised a curriculum for tactics and drill. To his and Blackburn’s delight, they soon discovered that training natives in the art of warfare was relatively easy— for these natives were already accustomed to the Spartan lifestyle and many of them were experienced hunters, well-versed in the arts of tracking and concealment. In all, Filipino support was perhaps the critical element to Volckmann’s operation.

  On 7 October 1943, back at “General Headquarters,” Volckmann welcomed the arrival of Dennis Molintas, who together with Bando Dagwa, had come out of hiding from the previous year’s anti-guerilla operation. Molintas, a Philippine Army Reservist and former school teacher, commanded a small group of raiders from his hideout in Benguet. He accepted Volckmann’s command and agreed that the best thing to do was focus on the training, organization, and security of guerrilla forces. When he asked about when the appropriate time would be for expanding the force, Volckmann replied that that time was now. 248 At present, the only thing that he required of Molintas and his charges was their loyalty and continued patience.

  About one week after Molintas departed for his camp, Volckmann had yet another close encounter with the enemy. This time, however, the source of the trouble wasn’t the Japanese—it was their constabulary. 249 Since the Fall of Bataan, the “Bureau of Constabulary” had been the enemy’s best attempt at civil law enforcement. Manned entirely by Filipino conscripts, the amount of trouble that the constabulary could cause depended largely on who their local commander was. If the commander was nothing more than a reluctant conscript—as many of the Filipinos were—then he would intentionally keep his patrol officers away from any guerrilla hideouts. However, if he were a true turncoat, he would cause no shortage of problems. One such turncoat had found his way into the Kiangan precinct and was determined to make his presence known.