Mike Guardia

by American Guerrilla

  Beginning ten days prior to the submarine’s intended arrival, units of the 121st Infantry kept a close watch over both rendezvous points. Volckmann ordered his men to watch for any unusual changes in the enemy’s dispositions. Measures were taken to ensure that every man knew the location of the rendezvous points, the appropriate security measures, signal procedures, and the organization of carrying parties. Two days before contact, Volckmann established outposts surrounding both rendezvous points and ordered one combat battalion to occupy each area. Civilian agents provided some 50 native canoes to ferry supplies to the shore. Finally, the combat battalions covering both rendezvous points were given clear instructions on what to do if either point were compromised by enemy activity. 267

  Yet, despite these efforts, there was still no word from SWPA concerning the protocol for making contact with the submarines. With three days remaining until the anticipated contact date—and still no word from MacArthur—Volckmann decided to travel to the primary rendezvous point himself. Leaving Calvert behind to man the GHQ, Volckmann instructed him to forward any updates received from SWPA during his absence. 268

  Using one of the USAFIP-NL messenger routes, Volckmann began his trip under the fury of a raging typhoon. The torrential rain was certainly enough to impede his movement, but the real trouble began when the deluge turned an otherwise peaceful stream into a raging rapid. With no feasible way to ford it, he had no choice but to sit and wait for the current to subside. During the unexpected layover, Volckmann discovered that things were about to get worse. A runner from GHQ relayed the following message from Calvert:

  A CARABAO WASHED OVER WATERFALL AND LANDED ON WATER WHEEL POWERHOUSE. DUE TO NO POWER OUT OF RADIO CONTACT. EVERY EFFORT MADE TO GET BACK ON AIR. 269

  Two days from the submarine’s arrival with no official guidance on contact procedures, and now communication with SWPA was lost! Volckmann was terrified at the thought of losing another opportunity to make contact with the submarines. When the storm finally subsided, two days had elapsed since his departure from GHQ. Desperately hoping that another chance had not been lost, Volckmann pushed through the mountain passes and the highland jungles at breakneck speed, finally arriving at Darigayos Cove in the predawn hours of 20 November. Greeted by Major Cubas of the 121st Infantry, Volckmann received up-to-the minute information on activity around the rendezvous points. He was satisfied with the control measures already in place but Volckmann still had no way of determining the submarine’s whereabouts. 270 Relief finally came in the form of another messenger from GHQ: Calvert had somehow managed to fix the radio and was once again trading wires with SWPA. Confirming the submarine’s arrival date on 21 November, SWPA indicated that between 0600 and 0800, USAFIP was to:

  DISPLAY ON BEACH TWO HUNDRED METERS APART TWO WHITE DISC TWO METERS IN DIAMETER WITH A SMOKE SMUDGE FIRE MIDWAY BETWEEN DISC. REPEAT SAME SIGNALS FROM 1600 TO 1800. AT 1630 COMMANDER SHORE PARTY PUT TO SEA IN A SMALL SAILING BOAT FLYING A CHINESE FLAG. IF NO CONTACT IS MADE PRIOR TO DARK DISPLAY THREE LIGHTS VERTICALLY FROM THE MAST OF THE SAIL BOAT STOP. 271

  What?! Volckmann could hardly fathom the utility behind these measures. Nothing could be more conspicuous or certain to get the enemy’s attention. 272 Although he hated these instructions, Volckmann knew that they were the only means to coordinate with his outside supplier. The unexpected radio damage had undoubtedly cost him any possible buffer time to protest. An ETA on 21 November meant that the submarine was already en route and its skipper would not be expecting any deviation from SWPA guidelines. Volckmann had no choice but to follow the signal procedures, although it remains unclear what prompted these contact procedures or why SWPA assumed that Volckmann would have two white discs and a Chinese flag in his possession. Volckmann had a makeshift Chinese flag sown together but how he obtained the white discs remains a mystery. It is possible that the supplies recovered from the first submarine included kits for signaling future skippers.

  After setting up the specified signals, Volckmann returned to the rendezvous point at Darigayos Cove. In the distance, he noticed a large Japanese naval convoy heading south. This convoy was soon picked up by a group of what appeared to be dive-bombers. Since the Far East Air Force had been demolished three years earlier, Volckmann thought that the planes, too, were Japanese. But suddenly, the bombers swooped down in unison and began pounding the ships—the planes were American! Volckmann was ecstatic as he watched six Japanese cruisers sink beneath the waves. The excitement, however, was short-lived; within a few hours, the Japanese had dispatched a network of patrol boats to scan the area for any survivors of the ill-fated convoy. 273 This increased activity surrounding the primary rendezvous point was no doubt aggravating for Volckmann. Conspicuous signals and enemy garrisons on either side of their position certainly gave Volckmann enough to worry about. The last thing he needed now was an increased naval presence to further jeopardize their chances of contacting the submarine. Unfortunately, Volckmann had no other option than to wait and see what the Japanese would do. It was still possible that the activity may die down before the Gar would come within sight of Darigayos. For the time being, however, Volckmann decided to stay put.

  By the following morning, it seemed as though the enemy patrols had dispersed. Volckmann was about to order his men to occupy the beach when, all of a sudden, a Japanese patrol boat came in from the south! At first it appeared as though it might bypass their position, but then suddenly it made a sharp turn straight for the cove. Volckmann tried to keep his composure: perhaps the boat would not stay long; patrol boats normally carried no more than 20 men, so this was likely just a foraging party. 274

  Volckmann’s assessment proved correct: sixteen men dismounted the patrol boat and scavenged the native huts beyond the shore. The party left after only an hour and, once out of sight, Volckmann ordered his signal crew to occupy the beach. It appeared that the mission was to be a success, but his men had no more than reached the shoreline when the sound of rifle fire broke through the quiet air. Startled by the sudden burst of automatic rifles, Volckmann’s shore party scrambled for cover. Volckmann was staggered. Who could be firing on his men? The answer came as a Japanese patrol emerged from the jungle and established a beachhead right on top of the rendezvous point. 275 He could hardly believe his eyes. How did an entire patrol slip past his observation posts? Bristled with anger, Volckmann decided to wait the Japanese out.

  The afternoon hours came and went. As daylight turned to dusk, the Japanese began settling down for the night. Dejected, Volckmann sent a radiogram to SWPA indicating the primary point had been compromised. He ordered his units surrounding Darigayos to stand down and return to their base camps. 276 Now, all Volckmann could do was hope that Barnett would have better luck at the alternate rendezvous point. One failed attempt at contacting the submarine was aggravating enough, but two consecutive failed attempts might discourage SWPA from sending any more submarines entirely.

  Arriving back at GHQ, however, Volckmann’s despair over the submarine issue was put to rest by news that Barnett had made contact with the Gar at the alternate point. Overjoyed by the success, Volckmann radioed the news to the other USAFIP-NL stations. 277 The impact of the submarine’s arrival spread beyond Volckmann’s network. For the first time since the beginning of the war, civilians were coming out in droves to assist Volckmann any way they could. 278 Indeed, a newfound sense of enthusiasm ripped through the echelons of USAFIPNL. From this, it was evident that the second stage of Volckmann’s enterprise was reaching critical mass. Now that help had arrived from the outside world, USAFIP-NL would have the means to effectively stand “toe-to-toe” with the Japanese.

  Barnett arrived at GHQ only a few days after Volckmann, with the Gar’s landing party in tow. Giving a full account of the skipper’s story, Volckmann learned firsthand just how troublesome the enemy beachhead had been. As it were, the submarine had initially surfaced off Barnett’s point at San Esteban. The skipper, thinking that he had correctly surfaced at the prima
ry rendezvous point, made contact with Barnett assuming him to be Volckmann. Politely informing the errant skipper that he had missed his mark, Barnett climbed aboard the submarine and guided them farther south to Darigayos Cove. Arriving shortly after nightfall, Barnett spotted the campfires set by the Japanese on the beach. Assuming the fires had been set by Volckmann, Barnett and two of the submarine’s crew landed on the side of the cove. Only yards from the beachhead, however, they realized that the fires were manned by the Japanese. While en route back to San Esteban, they received the radio message from SWPA indicating that the primary point had been compromised. Volckmann recalled that “the skipper had been tempted to radio back: WE FOUND THAT OUT FOR OURSELVES.” 279

  This landing party delivered more critical specialists than Volckmann had ever had before, including technicians trained in meteorology, demolition, and radio maintenance. Aside from delivering arms, ammunition, and other combat assets, they also provided an impressive display of radio equipment. This in turn allowed Volckmann to establish radio nets within each of the five districts. 280

  On 30 November, while GHQ busied itself coordinating another contact date, Manriquez’s men in the Fifth District recovered the greatest source of enemy information that USAFIP-NL had yet to find. A Japanese liaison plane, carrying a number of high-ranking officers, had crashed in Nueva Vizcaya. Stripping the plane for any pertinent intelligence, the 14th Infantry gathered a series of papers from a conference held by General Tomiyuki Yamashita. As the newly appointed commander of all Japanese forces in the Philippines, he had reorganized the entire defense of Luzon. 281

  Apparently, Yamashita understood that Luzon was the critical juncture of the Philippine Campaign. He admitted that Japanese ground forces could not withstand the superiority of American armor. 282 Therefore, to minimize that advantage, he would consolidate his forces within the mountains of North Luzon.

  The reconfiguring of the Fourteenth Army defense occurred throughout the summer and fall of 1944, and culminated in January 1945. As a result, six army divisions settled into the mountain landscape and Yamashita relocated his headquarters to Baguio. Not coincidentally, the puppet government also moved its capital from Manila to Baguio. 283 These events confirmed what Volckmann had seen in the documents from the plane; it was clear that the Japanese intended to make North Luzon their last defensive stronghold.

  Two more submarine contacts were made in December 1944. The first shipment, arriving on 12 December, proved to be a huge disappointment. Instead of the arms, ammunition, and medical supplies that were so vital to Volckmann’s enterprise, they opened the crates to find nothing but propaganda items: cigarettes, rubber stamps, and candy bars bearing the words “I Shall Return.” Frustrated by the futility of this nonsensical cargo, Volckmann radioed SWPA with an appeal not to send any more propaganda material. SWPA did not reply but the message appeared to have some impact, for the very next submarine arrived with 25 tons of military equipment and not one ounce of propaganda. 284

  At the same time, Volckmann began the painstaking task of determining a proper landing site for the invasion of North Luzon. The burden was enormous, as the success of the Allied landing hinged on Volckmann’s ability to select an area that would not be saturated with enemy defenses. The Yamashita defense plan relocated most of Fourteenth Army inland but a few coastal defense batteries still remained. Naval gunfire and close air support could dispatch these in short order, but the risk of collateral damage was too high. There were other considerations, too. Volckmann had to direct the landings to a spot that would allow the easiest access to the USAFIP-NL supply lines.

  Based on the intelligence assessments provided by his scouts and district commanders, Volckmann settled on Lingayen Gulf. Reports estimated that activity surrounding the gulf had died down significantly since the start of the war. 285 Volckmann knew the area well; it had been where he and the 11th Infantry had built their first defenses in 1941.

  Conferring with Calvert, Volckmann studied the intelligence overlay and cleared the message to MacArthur:

  FROM VOLCKMANN TO MACARTHUR

  THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO OPPOSITION ON THE BEACHES 286

  For the next 48 hours, Volckmann had little else to do but wait for the Allied landings and hope that he had made the right decision in selecting Lingayen Gulf. The Gulf area was devoid of enemy activity, but if his correspondence with SWPA were intercepted, Yamashita would not hesitate to deploy his holed-up forces to the beach.

  The suspense finally ended on 9 January 1945, when Volckmann received the following radiogram from MacArthur:

  OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AMERICAN TROOPS LANDED BETWEEN SAN FABIAN AND LINGAYEN ON THE MORNING OF 9 JANUARY 1945. THE COVOY WHICH COMPOSE OVER 700 SHIPS WAS 80 MILES LONG. THERE WAS LITTLE OPPOSITION TO THE LANDING WHICH WAS PRECEDED BY A PAY AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT 287

  From his Headquarters, Volckmann could see the ships entering Lingayen some 50 miles away. Although he had promised no resistance on the beaches, MacArthur obviously deferred on the side of caution and precipitated the landings with a hail of naval gunfire. Official confirmation of the landing included orders placing Volckmann’s guerrillas under the U.S. Sixth Army’s command. 288

  Reassignment to Sixth Army began one of the greatest transformations in Volckmann’s resistance movement. The supply issues had largely been solved by the submarines, but now Volckmann had additional manpower and a permanent logistics base. Until now, USAFIP-NL operations had been limited to raids and ambushes. While these operations covered a large area and inflicted some losses on the Japanese, he had not had the wherewithal to stand “toe-to-toe” with the enemy in a prolonged battle. With the elements of the Sixth Army supplementing the groundwork that Volckmann had laid, it was only a matter of time before the Japanese war machine would breathe its last breath.

  To organize the joint effort between USAFIP-NL and Sixth Army Headquarters, Volckmann arranged for a PT boat to take him to the Lingayen landing site. Picking him up at Darigayos Cove, the PT skipper delivered him to General Walter Krueger, Sixth Army Commander. Coincidentally, Volckmann had served under Krueger some five years earlier when the latter commanded the 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Sam Houston. The two had met previously but Volckmann was unsure whether the general would remember him after their brief meeting years earlier. Emphatically recalling the then-Captain Volckmann from years past, Krueger listened intently as the guerrilla commander gave his report on the Japanese strengths in North Luzon. 289

  The general seemed perplexed by Volckmann’s assessment. If the numbers and capabilities that Volckmann reported were correct, the general said, then why weren’t the Japanese pushing the Allied landing party back into the sea? Volckmann’s reply was simple: the Japanese had dug their defenses into the mountainscape; they were expecting “Uncle Sam” to dig them out inch by inch. 290

  Aside from pledging the Sixth Army’s support, General Krueger gave Volckmann full authority to deal with the Army 308th Bomb Wing and instructed him to contact Admiral Forrest B. Royal, commander of Amphibious Group Six, who would henceforth take responsibility for the rest of Volckmann’s resupply needs. Before doing so, however, he would report to General Douglas MacArthur. 291 Arriving at MacArthur’s office, Volckmann came face-to-face with the general who had abandoned him some three years earlier. Rather than giving Volckmann an admonishment for refusing the surrender order, MacArthur congratulated him on a job well done and promoted him to Colonel! 292

  With MacArthur’s blessing, Volckmann climbed aboard the next PT boat inbound for the USS Rocky Mount, the command vessel of Admiral Royal. Once on board the flagship, Volckmann began discussing his resupply options. Now that the Allied armada had an anchorage in Lingayen Gulf, the submarines would no longer be necessary. Darigayos Cove had previously been a rendezvous point for SWPA submarines, and since it was relatively close to the main body of Royal’s fleet, the two men agreed that Darigayos would be the optimal supply point. After settling his affairs aboard the Adm
iral’s flagship, another PT boat would take Volckmann back to Lingayen beach where he would go to the Headquarters of the 308th Bomb Wing. 293

  His meeting with the Headquarters Staff of the 308th produced a lengthy discussion on the means of communication and coordinating air strikes. According to Volckmann, air support in North Luzon had its own unique challenges. Heavy cloud cover over most of the region ruled out the possibility of sustained high-altitude aerial reconnaissance. To offset this disadvantage, Volckmann drew out detailed plans to have his men direct low-altitude bombers around the mountains to their targets via two-way radios. This made Volckmann among the first in the Pacific theater to exploit the concept of forward air controllers. In a true display of tactical innovativeness, Volckmann devised a unique method of air-ground communication. Since not all of the USAFIP-NL camps had radios to communicate with one another, Volckmann devised a quicker way for them to communicate with the Sixth Army and his own General Headquarters. The result was an information retrieval device that operated in a manner not dissimilar from the way an airplane landed on an aircraft carrier. Retrofitting the aircraft of the 308th with large hooks on the underbelly of the fuselage, Volckmann instructed the pilots to fly their aircraft to the site of a USAFIP-NL camp. The pilots would then swoop down over the campsite so that their retrieval hooks would catch an encased message that hung from a wire suspended between two poles. 294