Mike Guardia

by American Guerrilla

  At the beginning of the assault on the San Fernando area, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry deployed its guerrillas along an east-west front situated a few kilometers north of the village. The 3rd Battalion occupied key positions from the La Union coast, stretching as far east as Highway 3 and the interior barrios of the province. “The holding of this east-west line blocked all Japanese intentions and movements to push beyond the San Fernando enclosure.” 314 Meanwhile, 2nd Battalion—in conjunction with the U.S. 123rd Infantry—laid along the rice terraces to the south of Hayashi’s main defenses. Bloody skirmishes and a fight for attrition would no doubt punctuate this battle. However, to neutralize the enemy’s well-placed redoubts, Volckmann looked to the third dimension.

  Building on the forward air controller concept, Volckmann devised a way to overcome the heavily fortified terraces. Coordinating his efforts with the Army 308th Bomb Wing and elements of the 24th Marine Air Group, Volckmann supplied his ground liaisons with twoway radios connecting them directly to the pilots overhead. Every time the 121st Infantry called in an air strike, they would display a series of white panels visible from the air. These panels would indicate the forward edge of the battle lines as a safeguard against fratricide. Once the pilot acknowledged recognition of the white panels, Volckmann’s ground liaisons would direct the plane to its target. 315

  The flight leaders of these bombing runs, after confirming the location of their target, would make a “dry run” on the mark. After completing the initial bombing runs, the pilots would then come in on strafing runs (i.e. a low-altitude fly-by punctuated by machine gun fire on a target). On the final prearranged strafing run, the pilot would give a signal to the ground forces, like dipping his wing, as a sign for the guerrillas to rush the enemy target. Simultaneously, the bombers would come in on a fake strafing run to deceive the Japanese. With their heads to the ground in fear of another violent machine gun strafing, the Japanese could not see USAFIP-NL ground forces scaling the terraces to assault their positions. 316

  The outcome of the San Fernando-Bascil operation was important not so much for what it contributed to the Japanese defeat—although destroying this Japanese contingent was no meager accomplishment— as for what it contributed to the future of military air-ground operations. Although air-ground tactics similar to Volckmann’s had also been used in the European Theater, the modern incarnations of air support and forward air control tactics more closely resemble those employed by USAFIP-NL.

  Ilocos- Tangadan Operations (15th Infantry)

  The 15th Infantry, under the command of Colonel Rob Arnold, mobilized his troops against the Japanese in Ilocos Norte at the northernmost extremities of Luzon. At first, Volckmann directed the 15th Infantry to carry out missions similar to those of the other regiments. Arnold’s men began the fight with a 100-mile demolition route along Highway 3. Special Order #129 from GHQ read:

  1. Maximum demolition of bridges, culverts, and defiles between Laoag and Vigan; between Narvacan and Lagangilang;

  2. Destruction of every wire communication;

  3. Destruction of ammunition, fuel, and other supply dumps; 4. Destruction of planes concealed in dispersal areas;

  5. Destruction of convoys and troop trains; and

  6. Encouragement of patriotic people under local leadership to unleash maximum violence against the enemy.

  7. Power lines, railroad tracks, and stations will only be destroyed upon order. 317

  In January 1945, Arnold was facing over 4,000 enemy troops within his district—the highest concentrations being in Cabugao, Laoag, and the Gabu Airfield. By this time, however, the main highways and service roads had been demolished—courtesy of Arnold’s men—and vehicular traffic had come to a standstill. This in turn isolated the prominent Japanese garrisons from one another.

  The 15th Infantry began their initial assaults during the second week of January 1945. The ensuing campaign for Ilocos-Tangadan would last nearly five months, culminating in May of that year. The offensive in Ilocos Norte targeted three garrisons, each within the towns of Bangui, Burgos and Batac. Intelligence from GHQ indicated that the enemy’s heaviest armaments within the Ilocos provinces were in Ilocos Norte. These included some 18 anti-aircraft guns and at least one 155mm artillery piece. 318 Since the demolition of the previous fall had rendered the highways useless, the Japanese had no choice but to flee on foot, abandoning any weapon that could not be shouldered. Because their motorized assets were no longer useful, the fleeting Imperial soldiers left behind countless heavy guns and artillery pieces—all of which fell into the hands of Volckmann’s guerrillas. The methodical destruction of the isolated Japanese garrisons led Volckmann to cast his eyes on a new target. Now, instead of strictly going after Japanese ground forces, he wanted to bring down their air forces as well. 319

  The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service operated a massive airfield out of Ilocos Norte near the town of Gabu. 320 With a regular reception and dispatch of long-range bombers and transports, Volckmann undoubtedly saw the strategic opportunity that lay before him. An Allied airfield behind enemy lines would serve two functions: it would provide a landing zone and staging area for American bombers heading to Japan, and also provide a faster means of resupply for USAFIP-NL and the Sixth Army. By 9 February 1945, this idea had become a reality as the 15th Infantry captured the airfield at Gabu and converted it into an Allied landing zone.

  By the end of the initial assaults in Ilocos Norte and the capture of the Gabu Airfield, the 15th Infantry had claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 enemy soldiers. The terrified Japanese, undoubtedly aware that they were running out of time, retreated into Ilocos Sur, joining their comrades in Cabugao and Tangadan. “On their heels were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 15th Infantry.” 321 These two garrisons were the southernmost enemy strongholds in the Third District. Cabugao was a relatively small outpost but Tangadan housed over 2,000 enemy troops under the command of General Araki. On 1 April, the 2nd Battalion began its assault on Cabugao. The After-Battle Report described the situation as a “see-saw affair,” with guerrillas cresting the garrison only to be beaten back by stubborn resistance. 322 However, on 7 April, Companies C and G entered the town with no enemy resistance whatsoever. 323

  It was clear that the Japanese had used the defense of Cabugao as a stall tactic to reinforce the garrison at Tangadan. The mountainous citadel had hence become the focal point of the Japanese resistance in northwest Luzon. Tangadan lay situated along a series of hills, “bristling with guns of various calibers.” 324 The elevation gave the Japanese an excellent vantage point and their fields of fire covered any approach to the garrison. Fortunately for the guerrillas, however, a combination of dry river beds and tall grass on the hills surrounding the complex allowed safe passage for advancing troops. The mission to take Tangadan was a critical one. The Japanese could not be allowed to escape as they had in Ilocos Norte and at Cabugao. If they did so, their next rendezvous point would most likely be Cervantes, right at the edge of the Lepanto-Mankayan defenses. The 66th Infantry, which at the time was planning its initial raids on the Lepanto mine network, certainly had enough on its plate. If more enemy troops arrived to reinforce the mines at Lepanto-Mankayan, it would certainly make life more difficult for the guerrillas trying to shut down Yamashita’s mineral outlet.

  Beginning around the 10th of April, the three battalions of the 15th Infantry occupied their assault positions for the final raid on Tangadan. Each battalion divided its companies into assault and reserve elements. Reserve elements ensured that no enemy would retreat beyond the perimeter established by the guerrillas. After nearly fifteen days of air strikes, artillery barrages, mortar fire, and hand-to-hand combat, Tangadan succumbed to the guerrillas of the 15th Infantry.

  14th Infantry Operations

  Meanwhile, the 14th Infantry was steadily enjoying the fruits of the I Corps’ advance in the south. The new battlefront was certainly a distraction for Yamashita’s forces but, unfortunately, the I Corps fighting did not se
em to be making much headway. In fact, it looked as though the I Corps front had devolved into a relative stalemate. Although this development was hardly encouraging, it proved to be a blessing in disguise.

  Yamashita apparently realized that if an entire American corps were fighting its way through the mountains, he would have to lend his heaviest firepower to the beleaguered southern perimeter. Unfortunately, the only heavy armor assets he possessed were elements of the 2nd Tank Division. 325 Releasing them to repel the I Corps assault meant that Yamashita would have to compromise the “stay-put” aspect of his defensive strategy.

  As the smallest of the USAFIP-NL regiments, the 14th Infantry needed to conserve its resources. As such, Volckmann directed the 14th Infantry’s regimental commander, Major Manriquez, to limit his operations to the area surrounding Highway 4. 326 For Yamashita to get his armor moving to the beleaguered southern perimeter, he had no choice but to use the same Highway 4 that the 14th Infantry knew intimately. Thus, using the regiment’s anti-armor weapons, including mines and bazooka teams, the 14th Infantry destroyed Yamashita’s only armor asset. 327

  This defeat took away the only real maneuver asset that Yamashita had left in the area south of Baguio. Judging from the USAFIP-NL situation maps, the 2nd Tank Division provided the only means of cover for the approaches into the Ifugao and Bontoc sub-provinces (Highways 4, 5, and 11). In this regard, Yamashita could deploy his fearsome Type 89 and Type 97 battle tanks to either destroy or severely delay any Americans wishing to gain access to his headquarters through Ifugao. 328 However, with his tank units destroyed by the 14th Infantry, “The Tiger of Malaya” had lost his best line of defense.

  11th Infantry Operations

  The 11th Infantry—now commanded by Don Blackburn—covered Cagayan, Apayao, and Mountain provinces, the largest operational area of any regiment within USAFIP-NL. 329 Volckmann gave Blackburn considerable leeway in managing the regiment. Volckmann’s primary directive, however, was to deny Japanese access to the Cagayan River Valley. As in Lepanto-Mankayan, the Cagayan River Valley was a “breadbasket” region whose farms had been commandeered by the Japanese. 330

  The easiest way into the valley existed through two cities: Mapayao and Aparri. Both were agricultural centers and had roads offering easy access to the valley’s rice plantations. Aparri, however, seems to have been the priority target—and Volckmann was not without reason to make it so. Aparri was the last Japanese naval port into North Luzon and was also where the Japanese landed in 1941. 331

  Viewing the situation, Blackburn saw several potential problems. To corner the enemy, the 11th Infantry would have to push northward through the valley and make their way through its narrow confines into Mapayao. 332 This maneuver would give Blackburn the initiative, but it would also give more flexibility to the Japanese. Aparri was the enemy’s last outlet to Tokyo, and they were guaranteed to put up a fight for it. Furthermore, there was a possibility that the Japanese might enact a “scorched-earth policy” while retreating to Aparri. Burning the rice plantations in the wake of their retreat would deny them their breadbasket, but it would shield their movements and stall the 11th Infantry’s advance.

  Whether Volckmann or Blackburn actually feared a scorched-earth policy is unknown, but it likely influenced the decision making for the initial assault on the Japanese. The 11th Infantry had in their possession elements from USAFIP-NL’s organic artillery battalion. 333 Placing these 105mm guns at key redoubts, Blackburn targeted the farmhousesturned-Japanese command posts. This bombardment would take out as many resources as possible before the Japanese retreat began.

  As the Japanese retreated from Blackburn’s hail of artillery fire, two battalions of the 11th Infantry swooped down in a pincer-like movement to prevent the enemy from reaching and fortifying Aparri. However, due to one of the battalion commander’s lack of tenacity, a rather large contingent slipped through to Aparri. The resulting siege of the city lasted approximately three weeks. Assisted by the 1-511 Airborne Infantry Regiment, the 11th Airborne Division, which had parachuted in behind enemy lines to assist USAFIP-NL, Blackburn’s men cleared Aparri and the surrounding area of Tuguegarao, thereby shutting down and closing access to the enemy’s last operational naval port in Luzon. 334

  Bessang Pass and the Final Push

  The Battle for Bessang Pass represents perhaps the most decisive engagement for the USAFIP-NL. By the time USAFIP-NL began concentrating its forces on Bessang Pass in June 1945, the Japanese Fourteenth Army was in its last throes. Crippled by the collective action of Volckmann’s regiments and the newly arrived Sixth U.S. Army, Yamashita put everything he had into making his last stand at Bessang Pass. 335

  Bessang Pass was the narrowest part of Highway 4 heading east into the Cordillera Central. In recent months, USAFIP-NL intelligence had reported that Bessang Pass had become the back door to Yamashita’s command center. Activity along the Pass and the surrounding countryside seemed to confirm this observation: the Japanese fortified their redoubts with artillery and dug a sophisticated network of tunnels, trenches, and pillboxes. 336

  After winding down their operations in San Fernando, the 121st Infantry, which was the closest of Volckmann’s regiments, was the first to arrive. The Japanese, however, would not give up Bessang Pass without a fight. Nearly two and a half weeks of combat between the 121st Infantry and the 19th Tora Division ended in a bloody stalemate. Volckmann soon realized that taking Bessang Pass and rousting Yamashita from his hole would require more than one regiment. Beginning on 15 June 1945, Volckmann pulled the 15th Infantry and elements of the 66th Infantry into the 121st Infantry’s staging area outside of Bessang Pass.*

  For the next two weeks, the three regiments engaged in the fiercest fighting Volckmann had ever witnessed. The battle, in many respects, became an artillerymen’s game. In a desperate stroke to bolster his defenses, Yamashita concentrated the last of his functional artillery pieces on the ridges surrounding Balete Pass. What the Japanese lacked, however, was the ability to coordinate infantry-artillery operations. As their men remained bunkered down in their trench networks and pillboxes, they had no means of employing forward artillery observers to gauge the proximity of enemy formations. Before firing their rounds, the Japanese artillerymen simply calculated a hypothetical trajectory and fired into the fog, not taking into account any possible terrain features that would offset the desired impact. Volckmann, on the other hand, saw his artillery as a critical maneuver asset. With each advance on the territory surrounding Bessang Pass, Volckmann’s men would relay the distance and elevation of a particular target back to the “gun line.”** This process made it easier for American artillery to zero-in, neutralize, and severely weaken the Japanese enclaves. In contrast, Yamashita’s howitzers fired blindly with hopes that a round would make impact on an enemy patrol. 337

  As his men worked their way up the last occupied ridges surrounding the pass, liaison scouts noticed the Japanese withdrawing from the area surrounding Bessang Pass. Their direction of travel meant that they were withdrawing closer toward Yamashita—no doubt in an attempt to protect their leader’s hideout. More importantly, it meant that their positions at Bessang Pass were no longer tenable. As the Japanese retreated from their Bessang redoubts, Volckmann greeted them with another artillery salvo. Although estimates vary, it is likely that only half of the enemy’s retreating force made it to their next rally point. 338

  *At this time, the 11th Infantry remained in the midst of securing Aparri and the surrounding area. The 14th Infantry, meanwhile, moved in to occupy the Lepanto-Mankayan mines so the 66th Infantry could partake in the Bessang Pass campaign.

  **Artillery term referring to every howitzer committed to support a particular ground operation.

  The Battle for Bessang Pass was critical to the campaign, largely because it broke down the back door to Yamashita’s Headquarters. Although the worst of the fighting was still to come, the fall of the Pass signaled the end of Yamashita’s reign in North Luzon. It was scar
cely 25 miles from Bessang Pass to Yamashita’s Command Center, and the bulk of his forces had already been destroyed. 339 Furthermore, at this point, there was no hope for Yamashita to receive any assistance from the mother country. The fortifications at Bessang Pass had been his last stall tactic. Now, it was only a matter of time before the Americans would burst their way through Cervantes and Bontoc en route to his headquarters. Taking these two towns would not be overly difficult, but the accompanying terrain meant a slow and methodical approach for the Americans, as there were no roads in this part of Mountain Province and very few trails. 340

  Cervantes sat along Route 4 approximately 1,000 yards from Bessang Pass. Occupying Cervantes took nearly two weeks to accomplish, but was a critical milestone because it blocked access for Japanese reinforcements along Route 4. Following the capture of Cervantes, the USAFIP-NL Division (referring to the three regiments fighting together) worked in concert with the U.S. Army’s 6th and 32nd Infantry Divisions to storm the enemy contingent at Bontoc. Pacifying the last municipality between the Allies and Yamashita, USAFIP-NL occupied its final attack position. Together with the 6th and 32nd Infantry Division, Volckmann’s guerrillas formed a circular perimeter around the last enclave of combat-capable Japanese forces. 341

  With the encirclement of Yamashita’s defenses complete, Volckmann’s guerrillas attacked from the north and west while the 6th and 32nd Divisions closed in from the east and south, respectively. The Japanese fiercely fought over every square inch of this land until the official cease-fire came down on 15 August 1945. By the time Emperor Hirohito accepted the terms of surrender, USAFIP-NL had fought its way over 7,000 feet of elevation and came within a mere five miles of Yamashita’s Headquarters. 342 Had the Empire of Japan not surrendered, it is likely that Yamashita’s men would have fought to the death. It is also likely that Yamashita himself would have committed seppuku—a Japanese samurai tradition of stabbing oneself in the abdomen to avoid the humiliation of defeat—before the Americans reached his hideout. For whatever reason, though, Yamashita chose to respect the wishes of his Emperor and emerged from the cordillera to face the consequences of surrender.