Philosophy of the Unconscious
Page 7
Only after these citations from European philosophers do I venture to refer to the Oriental philosophy, particularly that of the Vedas. As it is characteristic of the Oriental mind to be less systematic in its thinking but quicker in divining the occult, and to be more open to the slight whispers of genius, there are in the philosophical systems of the Hindoos and the Chinese yet unlifted treasures, in which we are often surprised to find anticipated the results of many thousand years of Western development. In the philosophy of the Vedas the Absolute is called Brahma, and has the three attributes Sat (being, substantiality), C’it (absolute unconscious knowledge), and Amanda (intellectual rapture). As absolute Knowingness, Brahma is called C’aitanja (Schopenhauer’s eternal Eye of the world, absolute subject of knowledge, at the same time intelligible Ego of all p r-cipient individuals, Kūtastà-Gīva Saksin). The identity of the real and the ideal is most emphatically asserted; for if the ideal were not the real, it would be unreal, and if the real were not the ideal, it would be degraded to dead matter without sustaining force (Graul, Tamulische Bibliothek, vol. i. p. 78, No. 141). “There is no distinction of knower, knowledge, and knowable in the highest mind, (rather) this (Brahma) is illuminated by itself in virtue of its own essence, which is spirit and bliss” (ibid., p. 188, No. 40). “Teacher.—That purely spiritual C’aitanja perceives all bodies. Since, however, he is not himself body, he is also perceived in nothing. Pupil.—If he, although knowledge, is yet cognised by nothing, how can he be knowledge? Teacher.—The syrup-juice also does not bring itself into experience, yet in virtue of the senses different from that juice which perceive it, we say that it is of a sweet nature. So one cannot doubt that knowledge belongs to the self which perceives all things (as its substance). Pupil.—Is then Brahma a somewhat that is perceived or that is not perceived? Teacher.—Neither. That which lies beyond (above these two categories) (substantial knowledge), that is Brahma. Pupil.—How then can we perceive it? Teacher.—That is just as if somebody should say: Have I speech or not? Although thy essence be knowledge, dost thou yet ask: How is knowledge? Art thou not ashamed?” (ibid., p. 148, No. 2). Absolute knowledge is, according to this, neither conscious of itself (because then without distinction of subject and object), nor immediately conscious to another, because it lies beyond the sphere of the directly discernible. Still it is existentially cognisable by us, because in all knowledge it is that which knows, in all perception that which perceives, and is even intrinsically cognoscible, if only negatively (according to the foregoing examination), as un-conscious and un-limited knowledge. The Unconscious has, in fact, been as clearly and exactly characterised in this old Indian book of the Vedanta philosophy (Panćadaśa-prakarana) as by any of the latest European thinkers.
Returning now to the latter, we may cite Herbart, who understands by “non-conscious ideas” such “as are in consciousness without our being aware of them” (Werke, v. p. 342), i.e., without our “observing them to be ours and referring them to the Ego,” or, in other words, without connecting them with self-consciousness. There is no danger of this conception being confounded with the true Unconscious; but there is another notion of Herbart’s which must be noticed on account of the application of it by Fechner, viz., that “of ideas below the threshold of consciousness,” which only stand for an endeavour after representation more or less removed from realisation, but themselves are “by no means actual representation,” rather signify for consciousness less than nothing, “an impossible quantity” (Herbart, Works, v. PP. 339–342). Herbart arrives at this rather puzzling conception through his desire to retain, in the spirit of Leibniz, a gradual continuity in the passage from actual ideas to the slumbering ideas of memory, and conversely, as well as the possibility of a reciprocal action of these slumbering ideas, without condescending to a materialistic mode of explanation of these processes, in the sense of seeing in them only material cerebral processes of a strength insufficient for excitation of consciousness.
But now, at the present stage of science, it is not difficult to see that the so-called slumbering ideas of memory are not ideas in actu, in activity, but merely dispositions of the brain facilitating the revival of ideas. As a string, when caused to sound by aerial vibrations, always yields the same note, the note A or C, for instance, if it be attuned to A or C; so does one or another idea arise more easily in the brain, according as the distribution and tension of the cerebral molecules induces a more ready response with one or another kind of vibrations on an appropriate stimulus. And just as the string does not respond merely to homologous vibrations, but also to those which only slightly differ from or are simply related to its own; so the vibrations of the predisposed molecules of a cerebral cell are not aroused merely by one kind of vibratory impulse, but also by stimuli slightly disproportional or harmonically related to the predisposition (a connection discernible in the laws of association of ideas). What tuning is to the string, is the permanent change, which a vivid idea leaves behind it in distribution and tension of the molecules, to the brain. Although these cerebral predispositions are of the highest importance, since the quality of the feeling with which the mind reacts depends on the form of the brain-waves, (on the one hand all memory depending on them, and on the other the character of the individual being essentially conditioned by the sum of the various inherited predispositions—cf. Chap. C. x.), still such an arrangement of passive material molecules, favouring the genesis of certain ideas, cannot be termed Ideation, albeit it may, according to circumstances, co-operate as condition in the production of an idea, and, indeed, of a conscious idea. But now, as the endless continuance of vibrations once excited in the brain is out of the question, (for the powerful resistances there encountered must put an end to every movement in a finite, and indeed tolerably brief time), Herbart’s unconscious condition of the idea could only obtain within the limits, which are fixed on the one hand by the cessation of movement, and on the other by the cessation of conscious representation with unarrested movement of the cerebral vibrations, supposing the two limits not to coincide. The question then is: (1.) Do all degrees of intensity of cerebral vibrations give rise to ideation, or does ideation only commence when a certain degree of intensity is reached? and (2.) Is a conscious mental state excited by cerebral vibrations of any intensity, or only by those of a certain strength?
Fechner has approached these questions in his celebrated work “Psychophysik.” His train of thought is as follows: It is not every sensuous stimulus that causes sensation, but only a stimulus of a certain amount, which is called the threshold of stimulation; e.g., a sounding bell is heard only at a certain distance. If several homogeneous stimuli, imperceptible when taken singly, are added together, there arises conscious sensation, as in the case of several distant bells sounding simultaneously which would not be separately heard, or the rustling of the leaves in the forest. It might be suggested that the stimulus below the threshold produces no sensation, for the simple reason that it is not strong enough to overcome the resistance offered in the sense-organ and nerves as far as the central organ, but that the mind reacts with the appropriate sensation on the smallest stimulus when the latter has reached the centre itself. This assumption alone, however, is not sufficient, since it does not fit the case of differential sensation. For homogeneous stimuli, when varying in intensity, arouse different sensations; but here, too, the variations must exceed a certain degree (the threshold of differential stimulation), if the sensations are to be perceived as different. Here clearly the resistances of the nerve-fibres cannot be made responsible for the phenomenon, since each of the sensations is large enough to overcome them. On the other hand, different principles cannot be set up for the threshold of simple stimulation and the threshold of differential stimulation, since the first is reducible to the second case, when in the latter one stimulus = 0. Consequently there only remains the assumption that the vibrations at the centre must exceed a certain degree before feeling ensues. What here holds good for sensation holds of course for every ot
her mental state, and thus the second question is decided. It remains to ascertain whether the stimuli below the threshold cause the mind to react at all, the result being unconscious sensation or idea, or whether the mind’s reaction only begins at the threshold.
Let us hear Fechner further. The so-called Law of Weber runs, “Constant differences in the intensities of homogeneous sensations correspond to constant quotients of their respective stimuli;” and the highly ingenious formula hence derived by Fechner is , where γ is the sensation following on the stimulus β, b the threshold of stimulation, i.e., the value of the stimulus, which being exceeded γ exceeds the value 0, and k is a constant, which contains the relation of the measuring units of β and γ. (J. J. Müller gives a very interesting teleological deduction of this formula in the “Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Saxony,” 12th December 1870, where he shows that only by assuming this relation between stimulus and sensation is “the difference of sensation conditioned by diversity of stimuli independent of the excitability, and the difference of sensation conditioned by diversity of excitability independent of the stimulus,” two conditions on which alone consciousness is in a position to keep asunder, and thereby to recognise, the effects due to the stimuli and the excitability respectively.) If now β becomes smaller than b, i.e., the intensity less than the threshold-value of the stimulus, γ becomes negative, and sinks as much below 0, as β sinks below b (with β = 0 γ is = − ∞).
These negative γ’s now Fechner calls “unconscious sensations,” with the full consciousness, however, of having only employed a license of speech, to signify that the sensation γ is the more removed from reality the further γ sinks below 0, i.e., that an ever greater increment of stimulation is required in order first to restore the zero value of γ, and then to recall the latter to the limit of reality. The negative sign before γ accordingly signifies here (as elsewhere often the imaginary) the insolubility of the problem, from the given quantity of a stimulus to calculate a sensation.
The real meaning of the negative sign, Fechner very properly says, can only be disclosed by the comparison of the rational calculation with the explained facts. Accordingly he dismisses the common illustration of heat and cold as not to the point, and discountenances the algebraic summation of positive and negative γ’s, as being no less inadmissible than operating with positive and negative pieces of surface in calculating areas by means of rectangular co-ordinates.
“Mathematically the opposition of the signs can just as well be referred to the contrast of reality and non-reality, as of increment and decrement or directions. In the system of polar co-ordinates it signifies the opposition of reality and non-reality of a line, but in such a way that greater negative values mean a greater distance from reality than smaller ones. There cannot be the least objection to transfer to sensation as function of a stimulus that which is valid for the radius vector as function of an angle” (Psychophysik, ii. p. 40). What holds good here for the algebraic expression of the function, holds, of course, also for its geometrical illustration by a curve, where again the visible connection of the positive and negative part might warp the judgment. It is clear that it is difficult to find a significant expression for the negative γ’s which would not give rise to misunderstanding. Perhaps the best course would be to say, without more ado, “unreal sensation.” However, Fechner is not to be reproached for the arbitrary use of the phrase “unconscious sensation,” since he is not aware of, or at any rate does not recognise, our positive signification of the Unconscious. What is worse is that Fechner was afterwards so inconsequent as to allow himself to be deceived by the continuity of the geometrical curves below the threshold, and to speak of a real connection of the consciousnesses of different individuals below the threshold.
I have entered into this matter at such length, because I desired to protect myself against any confusion of my view of the Unconscious with Fechner’s conception of unconscious sensation, and to pay at the same time my tribute of respect to his excellent work. I also wished to avail myself of the opportunity of making the reader acquainted with the conception of the Threshold, which is of importance in very dissimilar departments of science, and which we, too, cannot dispense with in our inquiries. That for the rest the stimulation of the brain must be of a certain intensity, in order to compel the mind to react at all, is teleologically quite comprehensible; for what would become of us poor wretches, if we were obliged continually to react on the infinite quantity of infinitely small stimuli, which incessantly play around us? But if the mind once reacts on a cerebral stimulus, consciousness is also eo epso given, as will be shown in Chap. C. iii. In that case these reactions can no longer remain unconscious. If hereupon any one should have recourse to the theory of the infinitely little consciousness, he would find that theory refuted by experiments, showing that conscious sensation decreases continuously down to the zero point, to which the threshold of stimulation corresponds, thus, in fact, successively possessing the infinitely small values above the threshold, where an infinitely little consciousness is actually found, but at the threshold itself becoming 0, i.e., absolutely ceasing. I refer for confirmation to Fechner’s work.
The conception of the Unconscious has not as yet been much introduced into Natural Science. An honourable exception to the indifference of scientific men is afforded by the well-known physiologist Carus, whose works “Psyche” and “Physis” are substantially an investigation of the Unconscious in its relations to corporeal and mental life.’ How far he has succeeded in his attempt, and how much I have borrowed from him in my own work, I leave to the judgment of the reader. I only add, that the idea of the Unconscious is purely presented by this writer, free from every infinitely little consciousness. Besides the works of Carus, the notion of the Unconscious has obtained recognition in a few special disquisitions, a recognition, however, seldom extending beyond the sphere of the particular inquiry. Thus, e.g., Perty, in his book “Ueber das Seelenleben der Thiere” (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1865), finds himself drawn on to a derivation of instinct from unconscious movements, and likewise Wundt, in his “Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung” (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1862; also in Henle’s and Pfeuffer’s “Zeitschr. f. ration. Medicin,” 1858 and 1859), admits the necessity of referring the origin of sensuous perception and of consciousness in general to unconscious logical processes, “since the processes of perception are of an unconscious nature, and only their results are wont to appear in consciousness” (ibid., p. 436).
“The suggestion of the logical character of the processes of perception,” he says, “is a hypothesis of no lower order than any other assumption which we make in reference to the ground of natural phenomena; it possesses the essential requirement of every well-grounded theory, that it be at once the simplest and most appropriate expression under which the facts of observation can be subsumed” (p. 437). “If the first act of apprehension, which yet belongs to the sphere of the unconscious life, is already a process of inference, the law of logical development is thereby shown to hold even for this unconscious life; it is proved that there is not merely a conscious, but also an unconscious thinking. We believe we have hereby completely proved that the assumption of unconscious logical processes is not merely competent to explain the results of the processes of perception, but that it in fact also correctly declares the real nature of these processes, although the processes themselves are not accessible to immediate observation” (p. 438). Wundt is well aware that the expression “unconscious inference” is an improper one; “only when translated into conscious life does the psychical process of perception take the form of inference” (p. 169). The unconsciously logical processes are carried on “with a certainty and regularity” which would be impossible in conscious inference, where there exists the possibility of error (p. 169). “Our mind is so happily designed that it prepares for us the most important foundations of cognition, whilst we have not the slightest apprehension of the modus operandi. This unconscious soul, like a
benevolent stranger, works and makes provision for our benefit, pouring only the mature fruits into our laps” (p. 375).