Philosophy of the Unconscious

by Eduard Von Hartmann

  Physiology and physiological psychology, namely, teach us that we have to assume perception and will (and as mediator between both the unconscious-teleological uniformity of the metaphysical substance) wherever a reflexion takes place. This happens, however, not only in every ganglion-cell, but even in the axis cylinder of every stimulated nerve-fibre. For we have seen above, in Section 2, that even in the conducting fibre the stimulus lights upon inhibiting agencies which wholly or partially absorb it, and on stored-up tension, which, in consequence of this absorption (psychically: perception) of the stimulus, becomes free (psychically: will). The same relation, however, recurs in the protoplasmic content of every living cell in the body (comp. C. Chap. iv. 2). Now, as the organism as such only reaches as far as the life of its parts, as this life consists in reflexion, whose inner psychical side cannot be entirely wanting, the individual soul also reaches as far as the organism in the narrower sense, and both only end where the living organism is bounded by dead excretions of its earlier vital processes.

  Accordingly, so far as the soul is conceived as unit and individual, its objectively spatial determination coincides with that of the organism; but this does not prevent our recognising the inner organization and the different value of the organs just as much on the psychical as on the material side of the phenomenon. Psychical functions are connected with all the organic vital functions of the cells in the body, but in the economy of the psychical individuality the psychical functions of the different cells have an importance at least as distinct as their organic functions for the economy of the organic individuality; nay, the difference is far greater still on the psychical side.

  We have seen how the psychical functions rise in gradual succession from muscular fibres to nerve-fibres, from these to the vegetative ganglion-cell, and from this, lastly, to the cells of the spinal cord, medulla oblongata, sensory centres, and cerebral hemispheres. The gradual character of this step-by-step advance of functions, which is unambiguously illustrated in the parallel scale of the animal kingdom, leaves no room for doubt that the same principle is exhibited at all stages, and that it is a serious error to try to seek the soul only in the highest link of this long chain, namely, exclusively in the cerebral hemispheres of man (and at any rate of the highest mammals). This older conception, in which Wundt is still in the main entangled, whilst Maudsley has positively surmounted it, lapses into the old error of the localisation of the mind, in that it designates a part of the Fore-brain (the cerebral hemispheres) as sole “seat” of the soul. We must break definitively with this error. Only particular psychical functions are assigned to particular parts of the nervous system. Soul in general is everywhere and nowhere, according as one understands the term. The individual soul, however (as unconscious unitary totality of the psychical functions of the organically psychical individual), is, per se, nowhere, and, referred to the external phenomenal side of the organically psychical individual, it reaches as far as the organism.

  As concerns the relation between the internal and external phenomenon, one must hold fast to this, that the immediate content of consciousness is never able to explain the processes of the material phenomenon in the organism, but that the converse also holds good, as must at length be granted by all sober men of science. If one is not inclined absolutely to forego all explanation, and to confess to the ignorabimus of Du Bois-Reymond, one must admit that only one way remains open by which an explanation can at least not be called impossible. That way, however, consists in this, that we derive the inner uniformity of the conscious mental functions and the outer uniformity of the counterpart of the material forces from a common source, and, moreover, not from such a one as formerly might have arranged by a single act the harmony of both uniformities for all time (by pre-established harmony), but from a source which is immanent with its essence in all the inner and outer phenomena, and in living activity constantly brings its essence to two-sided manifestation (comp, above, Section 5). This source of the inner and outer uniformity can accordingly be no other than the nature of the metaphysical substance itself, which is the indivisible essence of both sides of the phenomenon, as well for each single individual of higher or lower order, as also for the individual of the highest and lowest rank, i.e., for the world as a whole.

  Without going back to the mysterious bond which closely unites the outer organic individuality with the inner psychical, it is impossible to grasp the organic-psychical individuality as real living and concrete unity; it is, in other words, impossible to study physiological psychology. This bond, however, can by no means be sought in the sphere of the phenomenon, whether external material or inner conscious-mental, since we indeed started with the perception that each side of the phenomenon, even taken in its totality, is unable to explain the other side. Consequently this bond can only be sought beyond matter, as beyond consciousness, i.e., physiological psychology is forced by its own definition to pass over into the sphere of metaphysics. When this irrefragable truth first becomes generally and clearly perceived, the day of reconciliation between Physical Science and Philosophy, which so long (and not without teleological warrant) have shunned one another, will begin to break with beaming splendour, and a new era of science begin.

  The bond, however, which unites organism and consciousness into the indivisible organic-psychical individuality—the living spring whence issues the uniformity of the material and conscious-mental order in ever-renewed harmony—this essence, which is revealed in both aspects of the phenomenon, is the Unconscious, or the Unconscious Spirit in its twofold character of energetic Will and logical (therefore also purposive) Idea, and this All-One Unconscious it is which is designated in its functional individuation “unconscious soul.

  1 [Since the original was stereotyped another edition has appeared: The Physiology of Mind, being the first part of a third edition, revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten, of The Physiology and Pathology of Mind, 1876. The Pathology of Mind, being the third edition of the second part of The Physiology and Pathology of Mind, recast, enlarged, and rewritten, 1879.—TR.]

  1 Pflüger, “Die sensorischen Functionen des Rückenmarks” (Berlin, 1853).

  1 On the assumption namely that the direct sensations of the muscular contractions (which are not effected by tactile sensations of adjacent tissues) are conveyed by the motor nerves themselves to the central organs, which however is a hypothesis not to be accepted without consideration.

  1 I should much like to know what such an empiricist understands by “explanation” and “principles of explanation,” and whether he imagines it possible without ascending to “general principles” to give any explanation, were it only of the simplest physical phenomenon. Concrete reality is of course only possessed by the attraction of the atom A and the atom B; but if Newton had had the same ghost-fear of the “abstract idea” of attraction which Maudsley has of that of Will, he would never have been able to set up gravitation as a universal principle of matter.

  1 Pflüger, “Die sensorischen Functionen des Rückenmarks,” p. 125.

  2 Auerbach in Günsburg’s “Zeitschrift f. klin. Med.,” iv. p. 487.

  1 Comp, my memoir: “Truth and Error in Darwinism: A Critical Exposition of the Theory of Organic Development.” Berlin, C. Duncker, 1875.

  2 The functions of the spinal cord in the higher animals may be likened to the performances of a man who is prevented by his servitude to a strict master from working out his many-sided tendencies, and is obliged to constantly devote him-self to a well-defined and limited sphere of labour. The spinal cord of the higher animals is, as it were, simplified by its constant necessitation to hodman’s services for the behoof of the brain; but the inference is illogical that it has lost consciousness and will (which it manifestly possesses in the lower animals), since indeed in the sphere of activity reserved to it it displays distinct intelligence, and in abnormal pathological cases is wont to take part also in the vicarious execution of more independent tasks.

  1 Maudsley, who, from h
is materialistic point of view, keenly feels insolubility of the unavoidable teleological problem, gets rid of the difficulty in genuine English fashion by appealing to the unsearchable divine counsels. The locus is too characteristic of English science for the writer to resist the temptation of transcribing it:—“If it be said that the gradual building up by education of this embodied design into the constitution of the nervous centres is itself evidence of design, then we can only answer that such a proposition is merely a statement in other words of the fact that things are as they are” (i.e., are here constituted and operate teleologically), “and add the expression of a conviction that science cannot enter into the councils of creation” (p. 156). One the wonders how an English scientist has courage to go on investigating. Even a Maudsley is still green wood!

  1 Comp, my writings: “Truth and Error in Darwinism,” sect. vii. (“Mechanism and Teleology”) and J. H. v. Kirchmann’s “Realistic Theory of Cognition,” Nos. 15–22.

  2 Comp, among others, A. Zöllner, “Ueber die Natur der Kometen” (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 320–327.

  3 Zöllner says (pp. 326, 327): “As one sees, by this assumption, all local changes of matter, whether they take place in the inorganic or organic bodies of nature, are subject to the following law, which was already substantially expressed above (p. 217): “All the activities of natural existences are determined by the sensations of pleasure and pain; and are indeed such that the movements within a confined sphere of phenomena look as if they followed the unconscious purpose of reducing the total of painful sensations to a minimum.”

  1 Comp, the anonymous work, of Descent” (Berlin, 1872), chaps. “The Unconscious from the Stand-point of Physiology and the Theory of Descent” (Berlin, 1872) chaps. iv. and v.

  1 In such a case one may often say that the madman was perfectly conscious of the difference between good and evil; that however, despite of it, he was not in a position to keep back his diseased will from patho-logical excesses, thus also cannot be made responsible for actions committed in this way. The legislation of different states would then need a rectification in respect to the question of accountability.

  1 This only means here that such impressions can lie below the threshold of the collective consciousness of the cerebral hemispheres; if, however, they are to do something, they must lie above the threshold of the particular cell-consciousness. This distinction is lacking in Maudsley, because he does not firmly hold that a stimulus cannot be at all perceived without either being perceived by a consciousness or producing such a one

  1 “Not unamusing, though somewhat saddening, is it, however, to witness the painful surprise of the man of observation, his jealous in-dignation and clamorous outcry, when the result at which he and his fellow-labourers have been so patiently, though blindly, working, when the genius-product of the century which he has helped to create, starts into life—when the metamorphosis is completed, and the caterpillar has become a butterfly; amusing, because the patient worker is supremely astonished at a result which, though preparing, he nowise foresaw; saddening, because individually he is annihilated, and all the toil in which he spent his strength is swallowed up in the product which, gathering up the different lines of investigation and thought, and giving to them a unity of development, now by epigenesis ensues” (p. 67).

  1 Comp. Häckel’s Anthropogenie, p. 514–529.

  1 Longet, Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System; I. 615.

  1 From recent experiments on monkeys, in which single parts of the brain were electrically irritated and then made inactive by destruction, David Ferrier asserts that he has obtained results which, if they are cionfirmed, would again represent an appreciable progress in our knowledge of the physiology of the brain (comp. “Proceedings of the Royal Society,” vol. xxiii., No. 162), He first asserts that removal of the frontal regions and posterior lobes impairs neither the power of feeling nor the capacity of moving; but that the former disturbs intelligence and attentive observation, and the latter calls forth a state of depression of common feeling even to refusal of food. Further, according to him, the various senses have the following central representation in the cerebrum: vision in the “angular gyrus,” hearing in the upper half of the superior temporo-sphenoidal convolutions, common sensation (tactile sense) in the “Hippo-campus major” and the uncinate convolutions, smell in the “subiculum of Ammon” or the “uncinate convolution,” taste in the lower part of the “temporo-sphenoidal lobe.” All these central representations correspond to the sense - organ of the opposite half of the body, with the exception of the olfactory centres, which correspond to the nostrils of the same side.

  1 “The cells are individuals, and as in the state, so here, there are individuals of higher dignity and of lower dignity; but the well-being and power of the higher individuals are entirely dependent upon the well-being and contentment of the humble workers in the spinal cord, which do so great a part of the daily work of life” (M. 180.)

  ADDENDA.

  ADDENDA.

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  VOL. I.

  P. 7, note, last 1.—Comp, also my “Erläuterungen zur Metaphysik des Unbewussten” (Berlin, Carl Duncker, 1874), p. 8–11.

  P. 20, 1. 24.—The second enlarged edition of “Das Ding an Sich” appeared in 1875, with the title “Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus” (Berlin, Carl Duncker).

  P. 23, 1. 17.—A thorough investigation of the part which the Unconscious, in the sense of an unconscious-logical mental function, plays in the whole Kantian philosophy, but quite specially in the Critique of Judgment, and next to that in the Critique of Pure Reason, has been undertaken by Johannes Volkelt in his dissertation “Kant’s Stellung zum unbewusst Logischen” (Phil. Monatshefte, 1873, Bd. ix. Heft 2 and 3), and in his work “Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus” (Berlin, F. Hensehel, 1873), p. 44–62. He shows in both places “that the deepening of the Kantian philosophy must always of necessity lead further into the realm of the Unconscious,” since in all departments of Kantian inquiry there appear contradictions in the solutions given by Kant, which call for removal, and can only be eliminated by the introduction of the conception of the Unconscious. Kant has, therefore, also in this respect, as in so many others, laboured and performed less for the progress of philosophy by his solution than by his statement of problems; and, at the same time, has also more truly paved the way for the recognition of the Unconscious than many a one who had far more distinctly grasped the Unconscious as an isolated conception.

  P. 28, 1. 25.—Likewise in regard to the Hegelian philosophy J. Volkelt makes some excellent remarks in his book “The Unconscious and Pessimism” (p. 62–78), where it is made clear “that the unconsciously logical must form its vital element” (p. 62), and that “Hegelianism pre-eminently possesses the inherent tendency to develop the principle of the Unconscious in its whole extent” (p. 76). If with Kant the Unconscious occupies somewhat the position of an unsuspected presupposition, which a thinker hardly ventures to own to himself, with Hegel the unconsciousness of the IDEA in its being per se forms a self-evident presupposition, which, by very reason of its self-evidence, he does not further discuss; whereas exposed, as it is, to most misunderstanding and hostility, it is precisely the point which needed the most unequivocal articulation and thorough proof. Accordingly the Unconscious appears in Hegel also an Unconscious in the literal sense of the term, although intrinsically and substantially it pervades and determines the whole content of his philosophy.

  P. 28, 1. 32.—For the rest, there may be found in Hegel’s works a sufficient number of passages to prove to the incredulous that the conception of Hegelianism just indicated was really that of the master himself, and these have been skilfully collected by Volkelt. The expression “objective thought” Hegel finds “unsuitable, because thought is usually too much employed as appertaining only to mind, to consciousness” (Encyclop., § 24). If the inner side of the world be designated Thought, nothing of the nature of consciousness should thereby be attributed t
o it. The logical in the world should rather form a system of thought devoid of consciousness (ibid., Appendix, p. 45 ff.) Hegel declares the office of Logic to be to elevate the categories originally only instinctively active in the form of impulses to the stage of consciousness (Works, iii. p. 18–19). Instinct, however, he calls purposive activity acting in an unconscious fashion (Encyclop., § 360). In his “Æsthetics” he says (2d ed., i. p. 53): “Fancy has a mode of production that is at the same time of the nature of instinct, in that the essentially symbolical and sensuous character of art-work must possess a subjective existence in the artist as native tendency and natural impulse, and as unconscious action be also the expression of the man on his natural side.”

  P. 29, 1. 36.—The essence of the Unconscious remains altogether indefinite in the following observation, which for the rest proves that Schopenhauer had a correct feeling of the importance which a profound analysis of the Unconscious must acquire at least for psychology and æsthetics: “All that is original, and therefore all that is genuine in man, acts as such unconsciously, like the forces of Nature. What has passed through consciousness has thereby become a representation. Accordingly all genuine and sterling qualities of the character and of the mind are originally unconscious, and only as such do they make a deep impression. Everything of the kind that is conscious has been already touched up, and is intentional, easily passes therefore into affectation, i.e., deceit. What man performs unconsciously costs him no trouble, can, however, also not be accomplished by any trouble. Of this kind is the formation of original conceptions, as they underlie and form the core of all genuine achievements. Therefore only the innate is genuine and will stand its test, and every one who desires to achieve anything must in every case, in action, in writing, in culture, follow rules without being aware of them” (Parerga, vol. ii. § 352).