Live by the Sword

by Gus Russo

  Frank Church recalled senior Senators on so-called “watch-dog” committees saying, in effect, “We don’t watch the dog. We don’t know what’s going on, and, furthermore, we don’t want to know.” Senator Hubert Humphrey once declared, in the middle of a Senate hearing on a secret CIA operation in Chile, that, “I have to go now. I’m trying to get jobs for 400 people in Minnesota today. That’s a great deal more important to me right now than Chile.”66

  Like every Congressional committee that preceded it, the Church Committee’s goal became writing the report. The Committee made only a cursory attempt at determining culpability for the plots. It did so by hauling in dozens of senior CIA officers and confronting them with a question that they knew they couldn’t answer: Who ordered the plots? In these respects, the Church Committee was no different from any other potentially scandal-loaded investigation—with one exception: it was crystal clear that the Committee went out of its way to protect not just a politician, but a family: the Kennedys.

  Consider the Committee’s treatment of the Judy Campbell story: on the one hand, the Committee determined that the CIA had hired the Mafia’s Johnny Rosselli to kill Castro. But, when the Committee discovered that John Kennedy was having an affair with a woman who was a close friend of the same Johnny Rosselli, it was deemed unimportant. In the report, Kennedy’s mistress, Judy Campbell, was described as “a good friend” of undisclosed sex, and relegated to a footnote. In her brief deposition, Campbell was repeatedly asked if she was a courier for the mob. She was, interestingly, never asked if she had performed that same function for Jack Kennedy. She had.

  In truth, Republican Senator Curtis Smothers had wanted to ask this obvious question, but was not permitted to do so. Another Republican, and Church Committee Vice-Chairman, John Tower, recalled, “Smothers was overruled. The members of the Church Committee had no stomach for dredging up the martyred President’s indiscretions. The line of inquiry was terminated, and all eleven of us voted not to disclose [Judith] Campbell’s name or sex.”67

  The Committee also falsely claimed that John Kennedy ended his contact with Campbell after Hoover “informed” Kennedy in March 1962 of Campbell’s mob connection; the Committee actually had in its possession phone records proving that the contact continued for the rest of the year. Actually, Hoover had no need to tell Kennedy what he already knew. Hoover was letting Kennedy know what he—Hoover—knew.

  Furthermore, if the Church Committee had wanted to get to the bottom of the relationship, it could have called Frank Sinatra to testify, for he had introduced Campbell both to Kennedy and to Mafioso Sam Giancana. Sinatra also knew players such as Johnny Rosselli, Peter Lawford, and Marilyn Monroe. The Committee, however, demurred when it came to the idea of hauling in the “Chairman of the Board.”

  Everything the Church Committee learned tended to invite further investigation. Instead, the Committee essentially pretended that Jack Kennedy had no idea that Campbell was linked to the Mafia, that Kennedy himself was oblivious to the entire milieu. To believe otherwise would have taken the Kennedy-mob skeleton out of the closet.

  During the Church Committee hearings, both Rosselli and Giancana, men who knew the most sensitive secrets of both the CIA and the Kennedys, were violently murdered. Giancana was shot six times in the head at his home on June 19, 1975. Rosselli’s body washed ashore in Miami’s Dumbfoundling Bay on August 7, 1976. His partially decomposed body was stuffed into a fifty-five-gallon oil drum. He had been smothered, shot, sliced open from chest to navel, and had his legs hacked off—presumably by a chainsaw. No suspects were ever arrested.

  Church Committee staffers did determine that Navy Commander John Gordon was essentially correct about anti-Castro plots based in Guantanamo, Cuba. (Gordon had said that these plots were ordered by Bobby Kennedy.)68 Church Committee staffer Andy Postal was allowed to study the Guantanamo files held by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and he learned that ONI, in 1964, had investigated Gordon’s claims. The ONI report, written by Clyde Roach, affirmed the coded names offered by Gordon—OP 922 HIE, and OP-921D. The report also names people (included on Gordon’s “list”) who were aware that Alonzo Gonzalez was provided a Springfield rifle, model 1903—a classic “sniper” rifle. Roach summarized the ONI’s conclusions:

  It appears that there was a contemplated assassination plot (OP-922HIE) by individual members of FIO-GITMO [Field Intelligence Office-Guantanamo] to take place in early 1962. The plan failed, apparently due to the unavailability of a silencer and telescopic sight for the Springfield rifle already provided to Alonzo Gonzalez. Knowledge of the plot was closely held, and Gordon was not informed. He apparently did learn of some of the planning during his tenure as OIC-FIO [Officer in Charge, Field Intelligence Office].69

  The report also casts doubts on the denials of Gordon’s “Gitmo” assistant, Jack Modesset. According to ONI, “Lt. Modesset was interviewed by Naval authorities. He admitted knowledge of the plot and the passing of the Springfield rifle to Gonzalez.” Modesset further admitted that he “did help to get a silencer and did test fire the weapon with Gonzalez.” The Committee’s last words on the subject were crucial:

  It would appear that there was an assassination plot, or at least some assassination planning, which took place at GITMO [Guantanamo] in May, June and July, 1961. While John Gordon was not involved, apparently he did learn of some of the plans. . . It appears that [the plot] was not authorized by ONI. . . There exists the possibility of a back channel authorization. . . It is conceivable that the Mongoose task force, or perhaps the CIA, was involved.

  However, the Church Committee decided, according to internal memoranda, not to pursue this inquiry because “this case does not warrant such an allocation of resources.” It was a very curious decision, in light of the fact that the Church Committee was conceived for precisely the purpose of investigating assassination plots against foreign leaders.

  But then again, “Mongoose” meant Robert Kennedy. And it was politically much safer to talk about plots involving Washington’s favorite whipping boys— the Mafia. Thus, the treatment of the Gordon information was much like that of the Prouty testimony.

  Senate investigator Andy Postal recently stated that, until informed by the author in 1997, he was unaware of another curious linkage:70 apparently, Jack Modesset’s father (Jack, Sr.) and Bobby Kennedy’s father (Joe) had been partners in the oil business in Corpus Christi, Texas. Their joint venture was named Mokeen Oil (“Mo” from Modessett, and “Ke” from Kennedy).

  The Committee’s analysis of the Gordon story was not included in its public report, and only surfaced in 1994, when the Clinton-appointed JFK Review Board forced the release of the Church Committee’s internal memoranda. The only mention of the Guantanamo story that made it into the official Church Report was a footnote. But it is pregnant with implications. It tells of an unnamed CIA officer who was informed that:

  The Attorney General wanted to see a man who had contact with a small group of Cubans who had a plan for creating an insurrection, or something like that. The contact recommended by the Attorney General, referred the official to five or six Cubans who claimed to have connections within Cuba. . . The Attorney General ordered [the contact] to go to Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba “using whatever assets we could get to make contact with people inside Cuba, and start working and developing this particular group.” When the official protested that the CIA had agreed not to work out of Guantanamo, the Attorney General responded, “We will see about that.” The official said that he then reported his conversation with the Attorney General to [William] Harvey, who replied: “There was a meeting about that this morning. I forgot to tell you about it. I will take care of it.”71

  This Church Report footnote raises a myriad of questions. The most important is: Was “the contact” Jack Modesset?

  “After dad [John Gordon] died, my mother destroyed a box of his most sensitive government documents,” Heather Gordon recalls, “but we saved this.” Hidden in the Gordon
attic all these years, after being carted around from continent to continent, was an object that the late John Gordon told his family it was important to save. Heather Gordon didn’t know its importance until the author contacted her in 1994. Without knowing the contents of the ONI report, she retrieved the object, and in a telephone conversation, told the author, “I was told by a local gunsmith that it’s a sniper rifle. On the barrel it says ‘Springfield Model 1903.”‘72

  The Church Committee was also made aware of Cuban exile leader Antonio Veciana’s 1961 plot to kill Castro. However, because Veciana’s contacts in Washington were administration officials, not organized crime, this too was deemed irrelevant. In point of fact, neither Gordon nor Veciana is mentioned in the Church Report. Just as it was in the Inspector General’s Report, culpability in Washington was traded for a more politically acceptable villain—the Mafia.

  Lastly, the Church Committee’s shortcomings were partly due to the conflict of interest felt by the Committee members themselves, especially Senator Frank Church. A close observer of the Church hearings pointed out that “all the Committee members had one thing in common: they had all served with Jack Kennedy and most were friends of his.”

  The friendship of Frank Church and John Kennedy extended back to the late 1950s, when the two worked together crafting civil rights legislation. Forrester Church, the son of the now-deceased Church, called his father a close personal friend of JFK.73 As an example of their close alliance, he cites the fact that Church delivered the keynote address at the 1960 Democratic National Convention nominating Kennedy for the presidency.74

  Members of the panel were not oblivious to how Church’s agenda tainted the Committee’s impartiality. While chairing the Committee, Church was considering his own run at the presidency, and virtually everyone connected with the investigation knew this priority affected Church’s objectivity. Senator Schweiker recently said that, “In spite of good leads, Senator Church cut off the investigation of Kennedy’s knowledge of the plots. Church was gearing up for a presidential bid in 1976, and he wanted the Kennedy family’s blessing.”75

  Staff investigator David Bushong agrees. “Frank Church was understandably sensitive to the Kennedy bloc of votes in the country,” Bushong recalled in 1997.76 CIA officer Jim Flannery, who knew Church, said of the Senator, “He was very much a political animal in those days.”77 Former Church staffer Loch Johnson recalled, “At Church’s office, I told him—without mentioning presidential politics—that ‘several of the staff think you are spreading yourself too thin.’ He stopped writing long enough to look at me. ‘They’ll just have to live with it,’ he said with a quick flair of temper.” Committee Counsel Fritz Schwarz said, “Church is trying to carry water on both shoulders.” Staff director William Miller agreed, saying “Church isn’t doing his homework.”78

  Not surprisingly, in a July 19, 1975 press conference, Frank Church proceeded to point the finger of blame at the CIA, not the White House. The CIA had acted like a “rogue elephant,” Church intoned. When that catch-phrase gained quick public acceptance, the Church coverup was complete.

  A recent disclosure points out that Church’s protection of the Kennedys may have been coordinated with the Kennedys themselves. Staff investigator Andy Postal revealed in 1997 that there was secret contact between Frank Church and the Kennedy family. “Pressure came from many quarters, including Senator Ted Kennedy,” remembered Postal. “During the deliberations, Kennedy appeared before the committee and requested that this [Campbell] story not be told. The meeting was not made public.”79 Postal added that when the Kennedys were absolved in the final report, a key investigator and a senior Democratic staff member “almost came to blows over whether the Kennedys were being held to a different standard than others being investigated.”

  Senator Richard Schweiker headed the Church Committee’s investigation into the Kennedy assassination’s possible connection to intelligence activities. He has said, “My impression is that the presidents not only knew but ordered these policies by and large. . . Past presidents have used the CIA as their secret police at home and their secret army abroad.”80

  Perhaps the most forthright Committee member was Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. At the time of the hearings, Goldwater remarked that there was friction on the Committee between “those who want to protect the Kennedys and those who want to tell the truth.”81 Years later, he stated it more succinctly, saying, “We spent nine of the ten months trying to get Kennedy’s name out of it.” When asked by the press who was behind the attempts on Castro’s life, Goldwater motioned toward the White House and said, “Everything points right down there.”82

  The Paper Trail

  “Allen, as you know, much of the important material of the Kennedy administration does not exist in written form.”

  —Robert F. Kennedy, in a letter to Allen Dulles, January 7, 196483

  Richard Reeves, a political biographer of President Kennedy, is among those who believe the Kennedys planned and knew everything. Reeves’ study convinced him that “the Kennedy pressure on the CIA and other agencies was mostly verbal.”84 It was reflected in the Harvey memo, which paradoxically decried putting in writing the term “liquidation of foreign leaders,” while Harvey himself wrote it. It also popped out in the October 5, 1961 memo to Robert Woodward discussing the assassination “contingency”—a memo directing that all such details be given “orally.”

  The Church Committee minimally observed the forms by faulting Bobby Kennedy for not ending the plots when the FBI allegedly “informed” him of them. The Committee cited him for “dereliction of duty”—the equivalent of a posthumous slap on the wrist. Regarding Church’s “rogue elephant” decree, the official report refused to go that far—it acknowledged the truth. In a futile attempt to preserve its historical value, it buried in Volume Seven of the Final Report a swipe at the Committee’s own chairman, stating, “After having heard the CIA described as a rogue elephant run rampant, it is gratifying that the Committee now finds the CIA is not out of control.”85

  Recently, the author asked Committee staff attorney Jim Johnston directly if the Committee had protected the Kennedys. Johnston responded, “It’s pretty obvious, isn’t it?”86

  Why Frank Church avoided assigning the Kennedys some measure of responsibility is perhaps best expressed by Church himself, who said, “I will have no part in pointing a finger of guilt toward any former President.”87

  Despite the insulation provided for “Camelot,” the committee couldn’t avoid drawing another critical conclusion, buried so deep in its volumes as to go practically unnoticed by the press and the public:

  The conspiratorial atmosphere of violence which developed over the course of three years of CIA and exile group operations should have led the CIA investigators to ask whether Lee Harvey Oswald. . . who was known to have at least touched the fringes of the Cuban community. . . was influenced by that atmosphere.88

  On June 8, 1976, exactly one year after his testimony before the Church committee, William King Harvey died of heart failure. He had been rushed to the hospital the previous day, suffering from chest pains. Tests revealed that a lifetime of cigarettes, alcohol, and weight fluctuations had left his heart valves irreparably damaged. His doctors gave him a tough choice: either undergo experimental surgery to replace the valves, or die in a matter of days. Worst of all, his heart was so weak that anesthesia during surgery was out of the question.

  Harvey knowingly elected to go ahead with the operation, which ultimately failed. “His doctor said Bill was the bravest man he had ever met—he cried when Bill died the next day,” recalls a family member present at the time of Harvey’s death. A CIA officer said that Harvey “was asked to do things that nobody should have been asked to do.” At his funeral, Harvey’s widow, “C.G.,” lost control. Bitter that her late husband was clearly the chosen scapegoat in the assassination plots, she railed against “that awful Frank Church.”89

  The House Select Committee on Ass
assinations

  Since practically the moment Chief Justice Warren handed Lyndon Johnson his commission’s report, there were calls for a new investigation of President Kennedy’s death. Public clamor rose exponentially with each new book critical of the Warren Commission. Unfortunately, most of the published books shared one characteristic: they were written by amateur investigators (and often amateur writers), with limited ability to evaluate eyewitness or scientific testimony. Most of these books were written by well-intentioned doubters, and a few by unscrupulous money-mongers.90

  After the report of the Church Committee, a variety of questions demanded closure. For the first time, the government admitted to having planned assassinations. Was Kennedy’s death an act of retribution that investigators never considered in 1963, or worse, did some clique in our own government use this assassination capability to effect a coup?

  Public opinion polls and the Church findings notwithstanding, it was old-fashioned partisan politics that finally put the wheels in motion for a new investigation. In 1976, Coretta King, the widow of the slain civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., paid a visit to the Democratic Speaker of the House, Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill. Mrs. King told O’Neill, “I have to know what really happened to Martin.” What happened next was inevitable. The Congressional Black Caucus put its considerable weight behind the proposed investigation.