Live by the Sword

by Gus Russo

  70 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 15 September 1993.

  71 Although the aforementioned officer is now deceased, Halpern nonetheless would not initially volunteer the man’s name, in deference to his family. In 1997, after a micro-examination of RFK’s phone messages, veteran journalist Seymour Hersh told Halpern he knew the name of the agent. At that point, Halpern supplied the name. Also see Max Holland, “The Key to the Warren Report,” American Heritage, November 1995.

  72 Halpern noticed that Ford often wore monogrammed shirts, and thus came up with a name that matched Ford’s real initials, lest he be caught in a lie by his mob contacts.

  73 HSCA Hearings, vol. 10, 183.

  74 Norman Rothman, HSCA interview, 6 April 1978; see also FBI Memos: SAC Charlotte to Director, 24 June 1961; Evans to Belmont, 26 June 1961.

  75 Angelo Kennedy, interview by author, 4 January 1998.

  76 It will later be seen that when the CIA, in 1967, wrote its own internal history of the assassination plots, the Rothman and Ford escapades were nowhere to be found. This continued a coverup that omitted any assassination plots that could be linked to the Kennedys. John and Robert Kennedy may have utilized both the military and intelligence apparati to have Castro murdered. Many, however, scoff at the thought of presidential liaisons to the Mafia. To assess such a possibility, one may wish to examine the long history of evidence that links the Kennedy family to organized crime. See volume two of this book, Live By the Sword: Supplements and Key Documents: The Kennedys and the Mob. Judy Campbell, lover to both JFK and Sam Giancana, also claims knowledge of a Kennedy/mob plot against Castro. Campbell has stated that between 1961 and 1962 she delivered secret anti-Castro intelligence from Kennedy to Giancana. Recently, this controversial claim was corroborated by her longtime friend, Johnny Grant, who told both Seymour Hersh and ABC’s Peter Jennings that a distraught Judy confided this to him at the time it was happening (See The Dark Side of Camelot /or/ ABC’s Dangerous World, The Kennedy Years). This would have clearly been a delicate dichotomy, because by early 1961, Robert Kennedy had launched an all-out war against the Chicago don, in spite of any pre-election deals Papa Joe may have made.

  77 Michael McLaney, interview by author, 15 May 1994.

  McLaney, who played golf with the president, noted that JFK’s swing suffered from his back ailments. Did he ever hustle JFK? “Never. You don’t do that kind of thing with the President. I think we bet $5 once,” he says.

  78 Steve Reynolds, interview by author, 19 May 1994.

  Steve Reynolds disclosed few details about his boss and lifelong friend Mike McLaney at our initial interview, saying, “There was contact made. That’s all I can say. I can’t open up that can of worms. Not as long as Mike is alive.” As fate would have it, Mclaney died four months later, on September 9, 1994.

  79 Mike McLaney, HSCA testimony, 7 April 1978.

  80 Larry Murphey, interview by author, 10 July 1994.

  81 Both mob groups were familiar with the Kennedys. See volume two of this book, Live By the Sword: Supplements and Key Documents: The Kennedys and the Mob. Also see Moldea, Interference, 94-95.

  82 Gerry Hemming, interview by author, 3 June 1994.

  83 Jack Anderson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4 May 1963, in Hinckle and Turner, 181.

  84 Gerry Hemming, interview by author, 21 February 1994.

  85 Steve Reynolds, interview by author, 21 December 1994.

  86 Hinckle and Turner, 244.

  87 Michael McLaney, HSCA testimony, 7 April 1978.

  88 Steve Reynolds, interview by author, 23 April 1997.

  89 McLaney filed, and lost, a $4.2 million lawsuit against his former partner, but it helped trigger an NFL investigation in which McLaney, supported by affadavits, charged that Rosenbloom had fixed Colts’ games. McLaney and Reynolds told the author of sitting in the owner’s box at the 1958 Colts-Giants championship game—the so-called “Greatest Game Ever Played”—with Rosenbloom. With the game tied, sudden-death overtime was invoked under which the championship went to the first team to score. The Colts came within easy range of kicking what would have been a winning field goal, but in a controversial move, coach Weeb Eubank ordered his team to go for a much more difficult touchdown, which they made. Reynolds says, “Everything depended on the point spread and the side bets.” Since the Colts were favored by 3 and 1/2 points, a three-point victory would have been meaningless. According to both McLaney and Reynolds, when the decision had to be made, Eubank looked back to Rosenbloom’s box seats. “He saw four monkeys nodding in unison,” laughs Reynolds. “I spent the next week flying around the country picking up bagfuls of cash from lockers. Even Joe Kennedy had a piece of the action. The Colts were given huge bonuses by Rosenbloom. Everybody was happy.” To the insiders, it became known as “the greatest fix ever made.”

  Many observers believed that the charges of corruption against Rosenbloom were rock-solid and that the Kennedy Justice Department turned a blind eye to them because of the family friendship with Rosenbloom. “During the 1960 campaign, Rosenbloom sent the Colt team to West Virginia to help get out the vote for JFK,” remembers Steve Reynolds. Rosenbloom and Joe Kennedy were so close that on JFK’s election night, Rosenbloom was one of only three people invited to spend the day with the Kennedy family at Hyannis Port. This incident is mentioned by Kennedy biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin (Goodwin, 804). McLaney’s aide, Steve Reynolds, verifies it. Robert F. Kennedy once received a game ball signed by all the Colts, which he kept on his desk in the Attorney General’s office. Steve Reynolds says that Rosenbloom had direct access to the “red phone” in the Oval Office. Investigative journalist Dan Moldea writes:

  Rosenbloom was a great, great friend of Joe Kennedy,” says Rosenbloom’s longtime friend and business partner Tex McCrary. “And he was a great friend of Jack Kennedy. Carroll worshipped Jack Kennedy. And he used to love quoting old Joe. He used to love telling a joke Joe Kennedy used to tell him: ‘Never trust an Irishman with a bottle of booze or a Jew with a pack of matches (Moldea, Interference, 110).”

  90 CCIR, 126.

  91 Pappich, Church Committee interview by Andy Postal, 25 August 1975.

  92 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy, 288.

  93 Thomas Powers, 155.

  94 For a thorough discussion of this episode, see CCIR, 124-134. Later, in 1967, when it was thought New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was learning of the Kennedy administration’s plots, Bobby had his secretary retrieve the document from the FBI files, in case he needed it.

  95 CCIR, 124-134, also quoted in Rappleye and Becker, 217.

  It is not known if Hoover, Harvey, or Edwards were aware of RFK’s duplicitous dealings with the McLaney element, Charlie “Fiscalini,” or Norman Rothman.

  96 Director to Attorney General, FBI Memorandum, 29 October 1962.

  97 Thomas Powers, 143.

  98 Bruce Cheever, Church Committee interview [undated].

  99 Chamberlain, CIA, to Knoche, Memorandum, 30 April 1975 in Ford Library holdings, JFK Collection, National Archives.

  100 Thomas Parrott, “Memo for the Record,” 5 October 1961.

  101 Lonnie Hudkins, interview by author, 20 August 1993.

  Incredibly, Hudkins can corroborate his early inside knowledge of these plots. He retains copies of a December 12, 1963 Secret Service report in which he told them of the plots. The plots would not become publicly known until the Rockefeller and Church Committee investigations of the 1970’s. Regarding Cheddi Jagan, newly-released documents give credence to the Hudkins story. The documents describe a series of covert operations approved by JFK against Jagan’s Marxist-populist regime. These included start-up of a clandestine radio network, and inciting crippling labor strikes, followed by mysterious fires. Much of this activity was believed to be coordinated by a CIA-backed organization called the Institute for Free Labor Development, headed by William Doherty, Jr. Although Jagan was driven from office for over twenty years, he eventually retu
rned and was elected Prime Minister in 1992. Ironically, the Clinton administration appointed the same William Doherty, Jr. as its new ambassador to Guyana.

  102 Howard Burris, interview by author, 25 June 1998.

  103 New Times Magazine, 11 July 1975, 14-15.

  104 CCIR, 141.

  105 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, 297.

  106 Thomas Powers, 141.

  107 Brugioni, 69.

  108 CCIR, 146 and 152.

  109 Richard Goodwin, Remembering America, 189; also David Aaron to Bill Miller, Church Committee Memo of Conversation with Dick Goodwin, 27 May 1975.

  110 Taylor Branch and George Crile III, “The Kennedy Vendetta,” Harper’s Magazine, August 1975.

  111 Grayston Lynch, interview by author, 20 January 1994.

  112 Lynch later said he ran 113 raids and went on five. He told Jan Weininger recently that when he was preparing to hit the beach on one raid, General Maxwell Taylor demanded to know if he, Lynch, had permission from Bobby.

  113 McCone to Director, CIA Memo, 14 April 1967.

  114 CCR, 102.

  115 Ibid, 106.

  116 Ibid, 102.

  117 Brennan to Sullivan, FBI Memo, 5 April 1968; re: interview of Harvey.

  118 CCIR, 311.

  119 CIA official who attended the seminar, interview by author, 13 September 1994.

  120 McCone to Belin, Memorandum, 1 May 1975.

  121 See JCS documents in the JFK Assassination Collection at the National Archives, College Park, MD, esp. JFK to Lansdale, “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba,” Memorandum, 13 March 1962.

  122 Reminiscences of Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, U.S. Navy (Ret.), U.S. Naval Inst, Annapolis, MD (1975). See also Brugioni, 368, fn. *.

  123 “Memo For Lansdale from Brigadier General W. H. Craig, 17 Jan 1962,” JCS Papers in Kennedy Collection.

  124 The “brink” analogy has been widely misinterpreted to mean that the Soviets might have launched their Cuban-based missiles at the U.S.. This was never a possibility. In fact, the requisite nuclear-tipped warheads that would have given the missiles potency were never even found to be on the island. Also there was no mobilization, or war-making preparedness, in the USSR detected by U.S. intelligence. A few weeks after the crisis, JFK assured German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the missiles were in fact removed. However, Kennedy admitted, “We don’t even know if they [the missiles] were ever there at all” (Russell Jack Smith, 160). CIA analyst Dino Brugioni says that in the following weeks, CIA came to believe that the warheads were in fact on the island. This conclusion was reached when the CIA obtained photos of special vans, which were custom-built to carry nuclear material (see Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball).

  Even if the warheads weren’t in Cuba, a major confrontation could have occurred in one of two ways: if the Soviets engaged the U.S. in a gunfight at the blockade line, or, if the U.S., in invading the island, sought to take the missiles out by force. In that instance, the Soviets might have employed their tactical nuclear weapons (with a 30-mile range) on the battlefield. Those weapons were known to be operational.

  125 Fursenko and Naftali, 152-154.

  126 Ibid, 150.

  127 Ibid, 182.

  128 Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 390.

  129 Serge Mikoyan Oral History, 13 Oct 1987, JFK Library.

  130 McNamara remarks, Tripartite Conference on the October Crisis of 1962, Havana, 9 January 1992.

  131 Report by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Caribbean Survey Group, “Justification for U.S. Intervention in Cuba,” 9 March 1962.

  132 CIA Memo for File, 21 August 1962.

  133 It is not known if this was also proposed by Robert Kennedy (See The Santa Ana).

  134 See esp. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy, 367.

  135 The Dennison Report was obtained by WGBH-TV and is available at the National Security Archives in Washington, D.C.

  136 Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 493

  137 Currey, 239-240.

  138 Martin, “The CIA’s Loaded Gun,” Washington Post, 10 September 1976, C1.

  139 Sam Halpern, interview by Seymour Hersh, 21 February 1997.

  140 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 15 September 1993.

  141 Thomas Powers, 142.

  142 Ibid.

  143 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 15 September 1993.

  There is yet another twist to the tale of Harvey and his dismissal after the missile crisis—one that makes Harvey out to be the unrecognized hero of the affair. It must be acknowledged that the allegation is sensational, and stems from only one source, “John Evans,” but due to “Evans”‘ intimate association with Harvey, it bears mentioning. By the summer of 1962, the CIA had begun to take seriously the warnings of its spies in Cuba. Stepping up the Cuban overflights of the U-2 spyplane, the CIA observed thousands of Soviet military technicians, increased cargo tonnage, and surface to air (SAM) missiles arriving in Cuba. By October 15, the President was advised that U-2 photos now appeared to show missiles with a range of over 2,000 miles (IRBM’s) on the island. With the “Missile Crisis” now in full swing, Kennedy and his advisors debated both interpretation of the photos and the U.S. strategy of response. However, Bill Harvey, according to John Evans, had known for months that the Cubans were building a nuclear capability, and he possessed even more frightening information that would force Kennedy into action.

  “Bill had been trying to get the missile information to Jack for months, but Bobby cut off his access to the President, and showed disdain for the accuracy of the reports,” says Evans. “Bill mounted an operation inside Cuba that would prove to Bobby what had been happening.” Top secret Cuban documents were spirited off the island in an operation that cost the lives of nine of Bill’s agents. “Bill never forgave Bobby for their deaths, but at least now he had the proof.” The proof was a document from the Kremlin that gave Castro full authority to launch the missiles, even suggesting a date, October 29, for the launch.”

  Harvey received the document on October 19, while Kennedy was maintaining appearances on the campaign trail in Chicago. Evans remembers, “Bill had tears in his eyes as he paced the floor saying, ‘How am I going to get this to Jack?’” Harvey flew to Chicago, proceeding directly to Kennedy’s Hotel, the Sheraton Blackstone. He implored Secret Service Agent Paul Cotter to let him in, saying, “I’ve got to see the President!” Shortly, Harvey was in Kennedy’s suite, handing the documents to a stunned president. (Confidential aide to Harvey, interview by author, 12 March 1995.) Later that night, Presidential aide Kenny O’Donnell advised Kennedy press spokesman Pierre Salinger, “The President may have to develop a cold tomorrow” (Abel, 75).

  Entering the Presidential suite at 8 am the next morning, Salinger found Kennedy with a scarf around his neck. Kennedy handed Salinger a note written on hotel stationery: “Slight upper respiratory infection. 1 degree temperature. Weather raw and rainy. Recommend return to Washington.” Salinger wasn’t buying any of it. Pressed by Salinger, Kennedy admitted that the story was a fiction. He then told his press secretary about the missiles in Cuba (Brugioni, 304). Flying directly back to Washington, Kennedy moved decisively to initiate a blockade of Cuba. Over the next two days, the military was placed on maximum alert, foreign allies alerted, and an address to the nation delivered on the following Monday night. Khrushchev eventually backed down on October 28, diffusing the crisis. “When the crisis ended, we were 18 hours from Armageddon,” says Evans.

  144 General Charles E. Johnson III, Church Committee interview, 28 July 1975.

  145 Jake Esterline, interview by author, 29 November 1993.

  146 Demaris, The Last Mafioso, 238.

  147 “John Evans” [pseud.], interview by author, 12 March 1995.

  148 David C. Martin, 147.

  149 Grose, 326.

  150 CIA officer, interview by author, 2 January 1995.

  151 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 15 October 1993; Jim Fl
annery, interview by author, 23 December 1993; Frankie FitzGerald and Nora Camman, interview by author, 26 January 1994.

  Cuba Desk executive assistant Sam Halpern had heard that FitzGerald and the President were related. So had Mexico City Station officer Jim Flannery, saying, “Like Sam, I heard that Des was related to the Kennedys.” A distant family relationship is certainly a possibility. Although FitzGerald’s daughter and niece claim there was no direct relationship, they agree that the bond may have something to do with the fact that Des’ grandfather was from JFK’s hometown of Brookline Massachussets, and both of Des’ parents’ last names were FitzGerald, as was JFK’s grandfather’s.

  152 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, 297.

  153 Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), 379.

  154 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, 291.

  155 Thomas Powers, 143.

  156 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 23 December 1993.

  157 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, 295.

  158 George McGovern, press release, 30 July 1975.

  159 “ZR/RIFLE (Executive Action),” documentary, Cuba Vision Network, 27 November 1993.

  160 Thomas G. Patterson, Kennedy’s Quest for Victory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 129.

  161 Wofford, 342.

  Chapter Four (The Child is the Father to the Man)

  1 Quoted on FL, 16 November 1993.

  2 Epstein, Legend, 87.

  3 Interview of James Bothelho, 7 December 1992 (FL).

  4 Interview of Ed Butler, 6 May 1993 (FL).

  5 In October 1963—a month before the assassination—Oswald would move to a rooming house in Dallas. The daughter of the owner would remember him as a nice, quiet man who played ball with her young children. Interview of Fay Puckett, 5 May 1993 (FL).

  6 Interview of Priscilla McMillan, 19 August 1993 (FL).

  7 Interview of Ruth Paine, 2 July 1993 (FL).

  8 On the 30th anniversary of the assassination, even so respected a commentator as Nicholas von Hoffman described Oswald as a “psychotic jerk.” (New York Observer, 20 December 1993)