Hazard's Command

by V. A. Stuart

  HAZARD’S COMMAND

  Historical Fiction by V. A. Stuart

  Published by McBooks Press

  THE ALEXANDER SHERIDAN ADVENTURES

  Victors and Lords

  The Sepoy Mutiny

  Massacre at Cawnpore

  The Cannons of Lucknow

  The Heroic Garrison

  THE PHILLIP HAZARD NOVELS

  The Valiant Sailors

  The Brave Captains

  Hazard’s Command

  Hazard of Huntress

  For a complete list of nautical and military fiction

  published by McBooks Press, please see pages 253–255.

  THE PHILLIP HAZARD NOVELS, NO . 3

  HAZARD’S

  COMMAND

  by

  V. A. STUART

  MCBOOKS PRESS, INC.

  ITHACA, NEW YORK

  Published by McBooks Press 2004

  Copyright © 1971 by V.A. Stuart

  First published in the United Kingdom

  by Robert Hale Ltd., London, as Black Sea Frigate

  All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or any portion thereof in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without the written permission of the publisher. Requests for such permissions should be addressed to

  McBooks Press, Inc.,

  ID Booth Building, 520 North Meadow St., Ithaca, NY 14850.

  Cover: British ships Merlin and Firefly struck by Russian “infernal machines” (mines), 1854. Drawing by James Wilson Carmichel, engraved by Armytage. Courtesy of Mary Evans Picture Library

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Stuart, V. A.

  [Black Sea frigate]

  Hazard’s command / by V.A. Stuart.

  p. cm.—(The Phillip Hazard novels ; no. 3)

  Originally published: Black Sea frigate. London : Robert Hale Ltd., c1971.

  ISBN 1-59013-081-2

  1. Hazard, Phillip Horatio (Fictitious character)—Fiction. 2. Great Britain—History, Naval—19th century—Fiction. 3. Crimean War, 1853-1856—Fiction. 4. British—Ukraine—Fiction. I. Title. II. Series.

  PR6063.A38B55 2004

  823’.914—dc22

  2003022132

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  Printed in the United States of America

  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  Contents

  Author’s Note

  Prologue

  Chapter One

  Chapter Two

  Chapter Three

  Chapter Four

  Chapter Five

  Chapter Six

  Chapter Seven

  Chapter Eight

  Chapter Nine

  Chapter Ten

  Books Consulted on the Crimean War

  AUTHOR’S NOTE

  With the exception of the Officers and Seamen of HMS Trojan, all the British Naval and Military Officers in this novel really existed and their actions are a matter of historical fact. Their opinions are also, in most cases, widely known and where they have been credited with remarks or conversations—as, for example, with the fictitious characters—which are not actually their own words, care has been taken to make sure that these are, as far as possible, in keeping with their known sentiments.

  The main events described are historically accurate and did actually take place, as described, according to books published, soon after the Crimean War ended, by those who took part in them.

  FOR CAPTAIN HARRY HAMILTON, R.N. RETIRED

  with the author’s affectionate good wishes to

  the “Little Admiral’s” grandson.

  Although the main characters in this book were real people, and the events herein depicted did take place, in some instances both the people and the events were fictionally intensified to add to the drama of the story.

  FROM THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY MAP

  PROLOGUE

  The day dawned bleak and misty over the Crimean Upland, heralded by the boom of cannon, as first one battery and then another opened fire on the well-fortified Russian city of Sebastopol. The Russian gunners replied with spirit.

  In the small, sparsely furnished room which, in his farmhouse headquarters on the Upland, served him both as office and sleeping quarters, General Lord Raglan sat in front of a makeshift wooden desk, shoulders wearily bowed. As always, the British Commander-in-Chief was dressed in the plain blue frock coat to which he had become accustomed when, as Military Secretary to the Duke of Wellington and later as Master General of the Ordnance, he had occupied a much more impressive desk at the Horse Guards in Whitehall.

  It was cold in the low-built farmhouse, with its damp, stone-flagged floors and ill-fitting windows and the fire, which his German valet had lit in the tiny grate the previous evening, had long since burned to a heap of dead ash that did nothing to ward off the dank chill seeping in from outside. His nephew and aide-de-camp, Somerset Calthorpe, aware that he intended to work late on his despatch to the Duke of Newcastle, had placed a blanket about his knees before leaving him but Lord Raglan, finding that it impeded his penmanship, had let it slip to the floor.

  He sighed, feeling its yielding softness beneath his feet and, for a moment, let his gaze go longingly to the bed beside him, wishing that he might sleep and, in sleep, find relief from the torment of his thoughts, if only for a few hours. But there was the despatch to be completed, checked carefully, and signed … a hand in front of his mouth to stifle an involuntary yawn, he started to re-read what he had written to the Secretary for War in London. Headed “Before Sebastopol” and dated 8th November, 1854, the report was lengthy. In it the British military commander had endeavoured to describe the bloody, hand-to-hand battle fought on the Inkerman Ridge three days before, employing the stilted, tactfully worded phrases and bestowing the meaningless praise his political chief expected of him upon their French allies.

  “My Lord Duke,” the despatch began, “I have the honor to report to your grace that the army under my command, powerfully aided by the corps of observation of the French Army, under the command of that distinguished officer, General Bosquet, effectually repulsed and defeated a most vigorous and determined attack of the enemy on our position overlooking the ruins of Inkerman on the morning of the 5th instant. In my letter to your grace of the 3rd, I informed you that the enemy had considerably increased their force in the valley of the Tchernaya. …”

  The attack had been by overwhelming numbers—estimated at between fifty and sixty thousand men—on the vulnerable British right flank, Lord Raglan thought bitterly, skimming quickly through the first page. The French aid, which he had described as “powerful” had, as it usually did, come too late. Indeed, he reflected, the battle need never have been fought had General Canrobert, the French Commanderin-Chief, acceded to his repeated requests for troops to share responsibility for the defence of the exposed position above the Tchernaya Valley, which his men had been compelled to shoulder alone. Canrobert had over 40,000 men to his own 24,800—which included the Naval Brigade—yet the Frenchman had insisted that he could spare none of them, even for so urgent and essential a task.

  Lord Raglan’s mouth tightened in remembered exasperation. With the small force under his command, it was becoming increasingly difficult to bombard Sebastopol into submission from the Upland and, at the same time, hold the port of Balaclava, and the extended line of defence on the undulating ridge, known as Inkerman, on which the right of his line rested so precariously. Canrobert’s right, on the other hand, was protected by the British main body and his left by the sea
, where the Allied Fleets reigned supreme and he had two excellent and accessible ports in Kamiesch and Kazatch—both secure from land attack. Whereas Balaclava … Lord Raglan turned impatiently to the second page of his despatch. He had always intended Balaclava to be a temporary expedient; neither he nor Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, when they had chosen the tiny, landlocked harbour—seven miles from the besieging troops on the Upland, which it had to supply—had seen it as anything else but a stepping stone to the capture of Sebastopol. Once Sebastopol fell, Balaclava could be abandoned, since the captured city would provide not only a large harbour and well-equipped dockyard but also winter quarters for the Allied Armies, now under canvas and exposed to steadily worsening weather.

  He and Canrobert—and, before him, the late Marshal St Arnaud, his predecessor in the French supreme command—had agreed that their primary objective must be the capture of Sebastopol. They could have walked into the Russian base, virtually unopposed, within three days of their victory at the Alma and the flank march which had brought them to the south side of the city. But they had not done so. …

  He had wanted to make that final assault, Lord Raglan reflected. He had wanted with all his heart to advance when the Russians were reeling and had retreated from Sebastopol, and his own soldiers were flushed with the victory they had so gallantly won but … the French had insisted that the siege trains must first be landed. An assault without the support of heavy guns and a preliminary bombardment was so entirely contrary to the French concept of war that Canrobert had declared the mere suggestion of such a course to be a crime. Lord Raglan had recognized that he could not attack with the British army alone. Despite the almost contemptuous claim, by General Sir George Cathcart, that he could take the city with his Fourth Division and with “scarcely the loss of a man,” the British Commander-in-Chief had regretfully decided that this was a gamble he dared not risk. General Sir John Burgoyne, his Chief Engineer, had agreed with the French view and advised against an attack and so … Lord Raglan expelled his breath in a long sigh. He had ordered the landing of the siege guns and, in the three weeks which it had taken to drag these into position on the Upland, the enemy had reinforced and re-fortified Sebastopol, with the result that now the place defied all efforts to capture it.

  The Allied Armies, while technically besieging the city had, perforce, to leave the north side unguarded. Through this open door Prince Menschikoff, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, was able to pour all the troops and guns he needed for its defence and, having done so, was in a position to attack the besiegers from beyond the River Tchernaya, using for this purpose the seemingly inexhaustible reinforcements reaching him from all over Russia. The obvious point to attack was the weakest and … for a moment, Lord Raglan covered his eyes with his hands, looking back, recalling the decisions which circumstances—and the demands of his Allies—had forced him to make.

  One of these had been greatly against his better judgement, for it had involved still further weakening the defences along the line of the Inkerman Ridge but … Canrobert had assured him that, at last, the French were ready to join the British in a full-scale assault on Sebastopol which, he suggested, should be made on 7th November. Sebastopol had to be taken, if a long winter campaign were to be avoided and the French, heaven knew, had kept him waiting for long enough so, as he had to the landing of the siege trains, Lord Raglan had agreed to the French plan for the attack. Leaving his right flank to be defended by only the Second Division and the Guards Brigade, he had concentrated all his depleted force on the preliminary bombardment, on which the French still obstinately insisted, and had been busy preparing detailed orders for the assault when—two days before the date agreed by Canrobert—the Russians had struck.

  They had struck shortly before daylight on the morning of 5th November and … the British General bent once more over his report.

  “The morning was extremely dark, with a drizzling rain,” he had informed the Secretary for War, “rendering it almost impossible to discover anything beyond the flash and smoke of artillery and heavy musketry fire. It, however, soon became evident that the enemy, under cover of a vast cloud of skirmishers, supported by dense columns of infantry, had advanced numerous batteries of large calibre to the high ground to the left and in front of the Second Division, while powerful columns of infantry attacked the Brigade of Guards.

  “Strong columns of the enemy came upon the advanced pickets covering the right of the position. These pickets behaved with admirable gallantry, defending the ground, foot by foot, against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, until the Second Division, under Major-General Pennefather, with its field guns, which had immediately been got under arms, was placed in position. The Light Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, was also brought to the front without loss of time; the 1st Brigade, under Major-General Codrington, occupying the long slopes to the left towards Sebastopol, and protecting our right battery, and guarding against attack on that side; and the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Buller, forming on the left of the Second Division, with the 88th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffreys, thrown in advance. The Brigade of Guards, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and Major-General Bentinck, proceeded likewise to the front and took up most important ground to the extreme right on the alignment of the Second Division, but separated from it by a deep and precipitous ravine, and posting its guns with those of the Second Division.

  “The Fourth Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, having been brought from their encampment, advanced to the front and right of the attack: the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Goldie, proceeded to the left of the Inkerman road; the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Torrens, to the right of it and on the ridge overhanging the Valley of the Tchernaya. The Third Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, occupied in part the ground vacated by the Fourth Division, and supported the Light Division with two regiments, under Brigadier-General Sir John Campbell, while Brigadier-General Eyre held the command of the troops in the trenches. …”

  Set out thus, the battle sounded as if it had taken place according to plan but, as he re-read his account, Lord Raglan knew that this was very far from being the case. He had, of course, expected a Russian attack on his right flank; had, in fact, as he had endeavoured to impress on Canrobert, lived in hourly dread that it would come, for he was constantly receiving reports of a massive build-up of enemy troops across the Tchernaya. When, however, the attack was launched on his thinly held positions, the “dense columns” of Russian infantry he had described in his despatch had been met only by pickets of the Second Division and that Division, by itself, had had to fight a delaying action, until such time as he could order his other divisions down from the siege-works to its aid. And that had taken time, not only because of the distance involved but also because, in the swirling Crimean mist the battle had become confused. Men were fighting in thick brushwood and on precipitous slopes, among ravines, using the bayonet rather than musket fire, since visibility was, at times, so poor that to fire into the fog might have meant firing on friends, unrecognizable in the swaying tide of battle.

  Two feint attacks, one on the French left, the other in the direction of Balaclava, had been launched by the enemy simultaneously with that on the Inkerman Ridge. These diversionary sallies had achieved their purpose, in that they delayed the French aid for which he had asked—General Bosquet, from his vantage point on the Sapouné Ridge, refusing to move for over an hour until assured that they were, in fact, diversions. No one could possibly question Bosquet’s personal courage, Lord Raglan reminded himself … once in the battle, he and his splendid Zouaves had fought with admirable gallantry. Nevertheless, the stout French General had waited with all save two regiments of his Corps d’Observation, for a further two hours after bringing them down from the Heights before, at Lord Raglan’s personal request, ordering his troops to the aid of his hard pressed allies.

  One of the two regiments he had sent in to
support the depleted British 55th Regiment had refused to continue its advance without artillery cover and, himself and his staff under heavy fire, the British Commander-in-Chief had watched them retreat, seemingly indifferent to the fate of the unfortunate 55th. Only after Colonel Warren’s scant hundred men had followed him in an heroic bayonet charge had the Frenchmen halted and turned to face the enemy and, even then, Lord Raglan had had to send a staff officer to upbraid their commander before the 7th Léger could be persuaded to take an active part in the fight, this time in support of the brave and already exhausted British 77th Regiment.

  None of this could, of course, be stated in an official despatch. Lord Raglan read his reference to the incident, a wry smile curving his lips.

  “Additional batteries of heavy artillery were also placed by the enemy on the slopes to our left, the guns in the field amounting in the whole to ninety pieces, independently however, of the ship’s guns and those in the works of Sebastopol. Protected by a tremendous fire of shot, shell and grape, the Russian columns advanced in great force, requiring every effort of gallantry on the part of our troops to resist them.

  “At this time two battalions of French infantry, which had on the first notice been sent by General Bosquet, joined our right, and very materially contributed to the successful resistance to the attack, cheering with our men, and charging the enemy down the hill with great loss. About the same time a determined assault was made on our extreme left and for a moment the enemy possessed themselves of four of our guns, three of which were retaken by the 88th, while the fourth was speedily recaptured by the 77th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Egerton. In the opposite direction the Brigade of Guards, under his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, was engaged in a severe conflict.”