Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  Hungary’s overthrow of its Communist regime in 1989-1990 and independence today prove that the nationalist spirit of the revolution was never extinguished. The Soviet collapse in 1991 led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. In March 1999 NATO admitted Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as members. See also: HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  B?k?s, Csaba; Rainer, J?nos M.; and Byrne, Malcolm. (2003). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents. Budapest: Central European University Press. De?k, Istv?n. (2001). Phoenix: Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849. London: Phoenix Press. Felkay, Andrew. (1989). Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988: Kadar’s Political Leadership. New York: Greenwood Press. Fenyo, Mario. (1972). Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ger?, Andr?s. (1997). The Hungarian Parliament (1867-1918): A Mirage of Power, tr. James Patterson. New York: Columbia University Press. Granville, Johanna. (2003). The First Domino: International Decision Making in the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. College Station: Texas A amp; M University Press. Gy?rkei, Jeno, and Horv?th, Mklos. (1999). The Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. Budapest: Central European University Press. Kann, Robert A. (1980). History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918. Berkeley: University of California Press. Litv?n, Gy?rgy, and Bak, J?nos M. (1996). The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963. New York: Longman. O’Neill, Patrick H. (1998). Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Collapse of Communism. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

  JOHANNA GRANVILLE

  HUNS

  The Huns (the word means “people” in Altaic) were a confederation of steppe nomadic tribes, some of whom may have been the descendants of the Hsiung-nu, rulers of an empire by the same name in Mongolia. After the collapse of the Hsiung-nu state in the late first century C.E., the Huns migrated westward to Central Asia and in the process mixed with various Siberian, Ugric, Turkic, and Iranian ethnic elements. Around 350, the Huns migrated further west and entered the Ponto-Caspian steppe, from where they launched raids into Transcaucasia and the Near East in the 360s and 370s. Around 375, they crossed the Volga River and entered the western North Pontic region, where they destroyed the Cherniakhova culture and absorbed much of its Germanic (Gothic), Slavic, and Iranian (Sarmatian) ethnic elements. Hun movement westward initiated a massive chain reaction, touching off the migration of peoples in western Eurasia, mainly the Goths west and the Slavs west and north-northeast. Some of the Goths who escaped the Huns’ invasion crossed the Danube and entered Roman territories in 376. In the process of their migrations, the Huns also altered the linguistic makeup of the Inner Eurasian steppe, transforming it from being largely Indo-European-speaking (mainly Iranian) to Turkic.

  From 395 to 396, from the North Pontic the Huns staged massive raids through Transcaucasia into Roman and Sasanian territories in Anatolia, Syria, and Cappadocia. By around 400, Pannonia (Hungary) and areas north of the lower Danube became the Huns’ staging grounds for attacks on the East and West Roman territories. In the 430s and 440s, they launched campaigns on the East Roman Balkans and against Germanic tribes in central Europe, reaching as far west as southern France.

  HUNS

  The Huns’ attacks on territories beyond the North Pontic steppe and Pannonia were raids for booty, campaigns to extract tribute, and mercenary fighting for their clients, not conquests of their wealthy sedentary agricultural neighbors and their lands. Being pastoralists, they wielded great military powers, but only for as long as they remained in the steppe region of Inner Eurasia, which provided them with the open terrain necessary for their mobility and grasslands for their horses. Consequently, Hun attacks west of Pannonia were minor, unorganized, and not led by strong leaders until Attila, who ruled from about 444 or 445 to 453. However, even he continued the earlier Hun practice of viewing the Roman Empire primarily as a source of booty and tribute.

  Immediately after Attila’s sudden death in 453, the diverse and loosely-knit Hun tribal confederation disintegrated, and their Germanic allies revolted and killed his eldest son, Ellac (d. 454). In the aftermath, most of the Huns were driven from Pannonia east to the North Pontic region, where they merged with other pastoral peoples. The collapse of Hun power can be attributed to their inability to consolidate a true state. The Huns were always and increasingly in the minority among the peoples they ruled, and they relied on complex tribal alliances but lacked a regular and permanent state structure. Pannonia simply could not provide sufficient grasslands for a larger nomadic population. However, the Hun legacy persisted in later centuries. Because of their fierce military reputation, the term “Hun” came to be applied to many other Eurasian nomads by writers of medieval sedentary societies of Outer Eurasia, while some pastoralists adopted Hun heritage and lineage to distinguish themselves politically. See also: CAUCASUS; CENTRAL ASIA; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Christian, David. (1998). A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia, Vol. 1: Inner Asia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire. Oxford: Blackwell. Golden, Peter B. (1992). An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harras-sowitz Verlag. Maenchen-Helfen, O. J. (1973). The World of the Huns: Studies in Their History and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sinor, Denis. (1990). “The Hun Period.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

  ROMAN K. KOVALEV

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  ICONS

  Icons are representations, usually on wood, of sacred figures-Christ and the Virgin Mary, the apostles, saints, and miraculous events. The Greek term eikon (Russian, obraz) denotes “semblance,” indicating that the icon does not incarnate but only represents sacred objects. As such it serves to facilitate spiritual communion with the sacred; the distinctive two-dimensional flatness symbolizes an immateriality and hence proximity to the otherworldly. In rare cases this mediating role reaches miraculous proportions when the faithful believe that a “miracle-working” (chudotvornaya) icon has interceded to save them from harm, such as the depredations of war and disease.

  The evolution of icons in Russia paralleled the development of Eastern Orthodoxy itself. Initially, after Grand Prince Vladimir embraced Eastern Orthodoxy in 988, icons were produced by Greek masters in Byzantium; few in number, they were restricted to the urban elites that actually practiced the new faith. The most venerated icon in Russia, the “Vladimir Mother of God,” was actually a twelfth-century Greek icon imported from Constantinople. Revered for its representation of the Virgin’s tender relationship to Christ, it became the model of the umilenie (tenderness) style that dominated Marian representation in most Russian iconography.

  The Crusades from the West and the Mongol invasion from the East suddenly disrupted the Byzantine predominance in the mid-thirteenth century. The new indigenous icons showed a marked tendency toward not only simplification but also regionalization. As Kiev Rus dissolved into separate principalities under Mongol suzerainty, icon-painting acquired distinctive styles in Vladimir-Suzdal, Novgorod, Pskov, Yaroslavl-Rostov, Tver, and Moscow. Some icons also bore a distinctive local theme, such as the “Battle between the Novgoro-dians and Suzdalians,” a mid-fifteenth century icon with unmistakable overtones for Novgorod’s life-and-death struggle with Moscow.

  The evolution of icon painting also derived from external influences. One phase began with the resumption of ties to Byzantium in the mid-fourteenth century and culminated in the icons and frescoes of Theophanes the Greek (c. 1340-after 1405). His indigenous co-workers included the most venerated Russian icon-painter, Andrei Rublev (c. 1360-1430), whose extant creations include the

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  celebrated “Trinity” icon. A second phase came in the late fifteenth century, when Italian masters- imported to construct an awe-inspiring Kremlin- helped introduce some Western features (
for example, the clothing and gestures of the Virgin). That was but a foreshadowing of the far greater Western influence in the seventeenth century, when the official icon-painting studios in the Kremlin Armory (under Simon Ushakov, 1626-1686) used Western paints and techniques to produce more naturalistic, monumental icons. Such innovations elicited sharp criticism from traditionalists such as Archpriest Avvakum, but they heralded tendencies ever more pronounced in Imperial Russia.

  Even as Moscow developed an official style, the production of icons for popular consumption became much more widespread. The Church Council of 1551 complained about the inferior quality of such images and admonished painters not to “follow their own fancy” but to emulate the ancient icons of “the Greek icon-painters, Andrei Rublev, and other famous painters.” That appeal did nothing to stem the brisk production of popular icons, with some small towns (e.g., Palekh, Kholuy, Shuya, and Mstera) gaining particular renown. Popular icons were not only simpler (indulging fewer details and fewer colors), but also incorporated folkish elements alien to both traditional Byzantine and newer official styles. Although authorities sought to suppress such icons (e.g., a 1668 edict restricting the craft to certified icon-painters), such decrees had scant effect.

  Indeed, both popular and elite icon-painting continued to coexist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Popular icons flourished and proliferated; while some centers (such as the specialized producers in Vladimir province) exhibited artistic professionalization, the expanding production of amateur icons aroused the concern of both Church and state. But attempts to regulate the craft (e.g., decrees of 1707 and 1759) did little to restrict production or to dampen demand. A far greater threat eventually came from commercialization-the manufacture of brightly colored, cheap lithographs that pushed artisanal icons from the marketplace in the late nineteenth century. Seeking to protect popular icon painting, Nicholas II established a Committee for the Stewardship of Russian Icon Painting in 1901, which proposed a broad set of measures, such as the establishment of icon-painting schools to train craftsmen and to promote their work through special exhibitions. Icon production for elites took a quite different path. After Peter the Great closed the icon-painting studio of the Armory in 1711, its masters scattered to cities throughout the realm to ply their trade. By the late eighteenth century, however, the Academy of Arts became the main source of icons for the major cathedrals and elites. By the mid-nineteenth century the Academy had not only developed a distinct style (increasingly naturalistic and realistic) but also significantly expanded its formal instruction in icon painting, including the establishment of a separate icon-painting class in 1856.

  At the same time, believers and art connoisseurs showed a growing taste for ancient icons. By mid-century this interest began to inspire forgeries as well as orders for icons in the old style. The meaning of that old style underwent a revolutionary change in the early twentieth century: As art restorers peeled away the layers of paint and varnish applied in later times, they were astonished to discover that the ancient icons were not dark and somber, but bright and clear. The All-Russian Congress of Artists in 1911 held the first exhibition of restored icons; the new Soviet regime would devote much attention to the process of restoration.

  While placing a high priority on icon restoration, the Soviet regime repressed production of new icons: It closed traditional ecclesiastical producers (above all, monasteries), and redirected popular centers of icon production such as Palekh to specialize in secular folk art. Although Church workshops continued to produce icons (by the early 1980s more than three million per year-an important source of revenue), not until 1982 did the Church establish an elite patriarchal icon-painting studio. The subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union not only generated a sharp surge in demand (from believers and reopened churches), but enabled the Church to establish a network of icon-painting schools specifically devoted to the revival of traditional iconography. See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; DIONISY; ORTHODOXY; PALEKH PAINTING; RUBLEV, ANDREI; THEOPHANES THE GREEK; USHAKOV, SIMON FEDOROVICH

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Onasch, Konrad, and Schneiper, Annemarie. (1995). Icons: The Fascination and the Reality. New York: Riverside Book Company.

  IDEALISM

  Ouspensky, Leonid, and Lossky, Vladimir. (1982). The Meaning of Icons, 2nd. ed. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.

  GREGORY L. FREEZE

  IDEALISM

  The debates regarding Russia’s national identity and historical destiny were always vital to the work of the prominent Russian thinkers, who were also preoccupied with moral issues and closely involved with literature. Due to its location between Europe and Asia, Russia belongs to both cultural worlds, having inherited different and often contradictory value standards that played a significant role in the course of its history. This marginal cultural situation of the country resulted in two competing approaches to its role in world history: national isolationism and openness to Europe, both trends still present in the national consciousness. During the Kievan Rus period, affiliation with Europe was a strong feature of culture. The Tatar invasion and the development of the Moscow Kingdom generated a strong tide of alienation from the West. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Moscow Kingdom was the proclaimed “the third Rome” (by monk Filotius)-the vanguard force in world history inheriting the grandeur of the Roman Empire and at the same time opposed to the declining West. Peter the Great made a radical attempt to bridge the gap between Russia and the West by assimilating European values and life standards on Russian soil. However, his attempt to create a new cultural synthesis brought about contradictory results: superficial reception of the Western standards in economic, social, political, and cultural spheres on the one hand, and reinforcement of traditional non-European Russian values on the other. As Nikolai Berdyayev noted, Russia never knew the Renaissance and never accepted the humanism and individualism produced within this cultural paradigm. Although European civilization created the disciplinary society (Michel Foucault) in the modern period, it preserved the sphere of individual rights and liberties that was gradually expanding in parallel with rational standards of social control and coercion. Communal and authoritarian tendencies of Russian culture had no real counterbalance in personal values such as those commonly accepted in Europe. Even in the period of Russian Enlightenment that started under Catherine II, the critical efforts of such leading intellectuals as Nikolai Novikov, Mikhail Shcherbatov, or Alexander Radishchev did not bring radical change to tsarist rule and the prevailing cultural climate of the country.

  The understanding of national history throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was considerably influenced by the Enlightenment, German idealism, and the philosophy of Romanticism. Whatever their value systems, Russian thinkers of the first part of the nineteenth century interpreted history in view of the tragic events of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. This is the reason why, as Vasily Zenkovsky pointed out, Russian thinkers were highly critical of the results of Western historical development. The structure of Russian thought from the Enlightenment to the beginning of the twenty-first century was based on binary oppositions lacking synthetic reconciling units. Oppositions deeply embedded in Russian thought included communitari-anism and democracy versus imperial autocracy; egalitarianism versus social hierarchy; progress versus traditionalism; and so forth. The deficiency of synthesis of contradictions inherent in Russian thought constitutes its difference from the Western intellectual paradigm.

  RUSSIA AND THE WEST: THE DILEMMA OF NATIONAL SELF-IDENTITY

  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Westernized Russian thought found its expression in two different trends: the moderate conservatism of historian and writer Nikolai Karamzin, who defended autocracy of the Catherine II variety against the chaos of the French Revolution, and the Decembrist movement, which idealized the democratic traditions of Novgorod and Pskov republics and intended to put constitutional limits on the autoc
racy of the tsar. Famous poet Alexander Pushkin (according to Berdyayev, the only Russian man of the Renaissance) vigorously supported the ideas of the Decembrists. At the opposite pole, Vladimir Odoyevsky, Dmitry Venevitinov, and other members of the Wisdom-lovers society, who represented the anti-Enlightenment trend and were convinced followers of Schelling, believed in the leading role of Russia and its mission to save European civilization. Although Pyotr Chaadayev’s thought was also nourished by Schelling and other representatives of German idealism, he took a more critical approach to Russia. According to Chaadayev, Russia lacked a true heritage of historical tradition and should therefore assimilate the European cultural

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  legacy before assuming a leadership role in tackling humanity’s problems.

  These discussions evolved into the debate of the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. Despite their criticism of serfdom and the existing political order, Ivan Kireyevsky, Alexei Khomyakov, Konstantin Aksakov, and other Slavophiles, highly disparaging of Catholicism and Protestantism, European individualism, and the rationalist culture of the Enlightenment, proclaimed the necessity of finding a particularly Russian path of cultural and political development. While critical of the West, German idealism, and Hegelian doctrine as its utmost expression, the Slavophiles were nevertheless nourished conceptually by Schelling’s philosophy. They believed in the superiority of Russian civilization based on the Russian Orthodox vision of the unity of human and God, the special harmonic order of relations existing among the believers (sobornost), and the peasant commune organization of social life as a paradigm of organic relations that should replace the external coercion of state power.