Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  (1629-1680), major religious and cultural figure at the Russian court from 1664 until his death in 1680.

  Simeon Polotsky, born Samuil Petrovsky-Sitnianovich, was a Belorussian monk from Polotsk. He introduced new forms of religious literature derived from Western models, and created the first substantial body of poetry in Russian.

  Native to a largely Orthodox area of the Polish-Lithuanian state during a period of intense Catholic-Orthodox rivalry, Samuil Sitnyanovich entered the Kiev Academy around 1650, where he received a typical Western education from Ukrainian Orthodox teachers. He mastered Polish and Latin as well as the neo-Aristotelian curriculum dominant in Polish and Ukrainian schools. He continued his education at the Jesuit academy in Wilno. The Russo-Polish War of 1653-1667 that followed on the Ukrainian Cossack revolt of 1648 restored Orthodoxy to power in Polotsk, and Samuil returned to his native town. In 1656 he became a monk with the name Simeon in the local Bogoyavlenie Monastery; he also became a teacher in a school for Orthodox boys. During these early years he wrote both verse and declamations in Polish and Latin as well as Slavonic. On his first trip to Moscow in 1660 with a delegation of Polotsk clergy he presented Tsar Alexei Mikhaylovich with a series of verse greetings and other compositions for court occasions. Long commonplace in Poland and the West, such court poetry was unknown in Russia. With the revival of Polish military fortunes toward the end of the war, Polotsk returned to Catholic rule and Simeon left for Moscow in 1664, never to return.

  In Moscow Simeon played a major role in the cultural and religious life of the court. After the Church Council of 1666-1667, he prepared the official reply to the claims of the Old Ritualists that that liturgical reforms of Patriarch Nikon were

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  heretical (Zhezl pravleniia/The Staff of Governance, Moscow, 1668). In 1667 and 1670 he was tutor to the heirs to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei (d. 1670) and the future tsar, Fyodor (1672-1682), and also kept a school in the Zaikonospassky Monastery on Red Square. Simeon continued to write occasional verse for the court and church, celebrating important events and people. Many of these poems seem to have been declaimed in public, though they remained unpublished at his death. He was also a prolific writer of sermons, two large volumes of which appeared after his death, one of sermons at church festivals (Obed dushevny/The Soul’s Dinner, Moscow 1681) and the other of sermons for particular occasions, such as funerals of prominent boyars (Vecheria dushevnaya/The Soul’s Supper, Moscow, 1683). The sermons, delivered in churches in and around the Kremlin to the Russian elite, encouraged a shift in religious experience away from the central preoccupation with liturgy toward the inner experience of Christianity and its moral teachings.

  Simeon’s work introduced new genres to literature, poetry to court life, and a new style to Orthodox spirituality in Russia. His most important pupil was Silvester Medvedev (1641-1691), and he was popular both at court and in the church. Patriarch Ioakim (1674-1690), however, was less favorable, apparently distrusting the religious implications of his Western orientation. Simeon was a major influence for a generation after his death, but his baroque forms and Slavonic style soon rendered him too old-fashioned for later Russian poets and preachers. Nineteenth-century literary scholars, who looked askance at baroque style and genres such as court poetry, paid little attention to Simeon. Twentieth-century appreciation of the Baroque allowed him recognition as a major cultural figure, and the broader publications of his poetry have given him a greater audience. Historians of religion have recognized his pivotal role in the reorientation of Orthodoxy in the years preceding the great cultural changes of the time of Peter the Great. See also: ORTHODOXY

  POLOVTSY

  Polovtsy, a nomadic Turkic-speaking tribal confederation (Polovtsy in Rus sources, Cumans in Western, Kipchaks in Eastern) began migrating in about 1017 or 1018 from eastern Mongolia and occupied the area stretching from Kazakhstan to the Danube by 1055. Politically disorganized and lacking a unified policy in their relations with Rus, various Polovtsian tribes became involved in Rus inter-princely conflicts and, at times, fought as Rus allies against other Polovtsy. Dynastic intermarriages often solidified Polovtsy-Rus political unions. Rus sources note two distinct Polovtsy: “Wild” (Rus enemies) and “Non-Wild” (Rus allies). Most Rus-Polovtsy confrontations resulted from their differing economies. As agriculturalists, the Rus desired to convert the steppe into cultivated lands, while the nomadic Polovtsy required the steppe for grazing animals. Consequently, conflict was inevitable: Rus sources often speak of Polovtsian raids on lands settled by Rus and subsequent Rus counterattacks. However, because of the political disunity of both sides, no permanent peace was ever reached, and by the 1230s and 1240s, both were conquered and absorbed into the Mongol Empire.

  Polovtsy had settlements, probably occupied by impoverished Polovtsy and Rus migrants who practiced agriculture. Located between Rus and the Black Sea, Polovtsy controlled trade between the two regions and directly participated in commercial activities. For their livestock, they received agricultural products and luxury items from Rus. Controlling much of the Crimea (particularly Su-dak), the Polovtsy engaged in the sale of slaves and furs to Byzantium and the Islamic East. While some Polovtsy may have converted to Christianity and Islam, the overwhelming majority retained their shamanist-T?ri religion. See also: CRIMEA; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; POLYANE; VIKINGS.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Bushkovitch, Paul. (1992). Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. New York: Oxford University Press. Vroon, Ronald. (1995). “Simeon Polotsky.” In Early Modern Russian Writers: Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Marcus C. Levitt (Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 150). Detroit: Gale Research.

  PAUL A. BUSHKOVITCH

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Golden, Peter B. (1990). “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Golden, Peter B. (1991). “Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus’.” In Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays, ed. I.S. Koropeckyj. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

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  Golden, Peter B. (1992). An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harras-sowitz Verlag. Noonan, Thomas S. (1992). “Rus’, Pechenegs, and Polovtsy: Economic Interaction Along the Steppe Frontier in the Pre-Mongol Era.” Russian History/ Histoire Russe 19:301-326. Pritsak, Omeljan. (1982). “The Polovcians and Rus’.” Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 2:321-280.

  ROMAN K. KOVALEV

  POLTAVA, BATTLE OF

  The Battle of Poltava was the defining battle of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), fought on June 27, 1709, between the Swedish and Russian armies along the River Vorskla to the north of the Ukrainian city of Poltava.

  After the rejection of a Russian peace offer in 1707, the Swedish King Karl (Charles) XII spent much of the summer of 1708 in Lithuania waiting for supplies for an assault on Russia. However, in September he decided to move down to the Ukraine where he expected to gain the support of the Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa. In the meantime, Tsar Peter I managed to defeat the Swedish forces Charles had been waiting for (the battle of Lesnaia, September 28, 1708) and seized the supplies. The Swedish forces suffered a great deal during the cold winter of 1709 and were regularly attacked by Russian units. Even though the Swedish forces had been besieging Poltava since April 1709, they were severely weakened by the time Peter was ready to attack.

  Three days before the battle Charles XII was immobilized by a leg wound caused by a stray bullet and was thus unable to personally lead the Swedish forces into battle. It had, moreover, become apparent that no help would be arriving in time from either the Polish-Lithuanian forces of Stanislaw Leszczyn?ski or other Swedish units. In spite of this, a Swedish victory presented the prospect of easing supply problems, of helping Leszczyn?ski, and-possibly-of inducin
g Ottomans and Tatars to commit to the Swedish side. Moreover, a Swedish withdrawal would have presented serious risks.

  The Swedish force of 22,000-28,000 responded to a Russian challenge with a major assault, although Peter-at the helm of a much larger force of some 45,000 men-appears to have viewed Poltava as primarily a defensive encounter. However, confusing orders left part of the Swedish force attacking Russian T-shaped redoubts rather than the main camp. These Swedish units, led by Carl Gustav Roos, lost contact with the main force as well as two-fifths of their men. They eventually retreated and were forced to surrender. The other two-thirds of the Swedish force successfully regrouped for an attack on the camp awaiting Roos. The Swedes, however, lost their momentum during the two-hour wait, whereas the Russians were revitalized by news of the surrender. A Russian force of 22,000 men and sixty-eight field guns now attacked the remaining four thousand Swedes led by Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt. Disorganization and inferior numbers ultimately led to a chaotic Swedish retreat. The Swedes lost 6,901 dead or wounded and 2,760 captured. The Russian losses were 1,345 dead and 3,290 wounded.

  Three days after the battle, Charles went into exile in the Ottoman Empire and the Swedish force of 14,000-17,000 surrendered at Perevolochna. Even though the Treaty of Nystad was only concluded twelve years later, the defeat suffered at Poltava marks the end of Sweden as a great power. See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Frost, Robert I. (2000). The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721. Harlow, UK, and New York: Longman. Hughes, Lindsey. (1998). Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  JARMO T. KOTILAINE

  POLYANE

  Polyane is one of the Eastern Slavic tribes that inhabited the Kievan Rus state, as noted in the Russian Primary Chronicle.

  According to the Russian Primary Chronicle, the Polyane occupied the middle Dnieper River region: Kiev, the capital of the Rus state, as well as Vysh-gorod, Vasilev, and Belgorod. The Polyane received their name (meaning “people of the field”) on account of their settlement in the open terrain of the middle Dnieper. With its chernozem soils, the middle Dnieper was ideal for agriculture, the primary

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  economy of the Polyane. Archaeologists believe that the Polyane belonged to a larger group of Slavs, known as Duledy, who migrated east from southeastern Europe sometime during the sixth to seventh centuries. By the eighth to ninth centuries, the Polyane settled both sides of the middle Dnieper and came to form their own ethnic identity. During the ninth century, the middle Dnieper was under the control of the Khazar state, to which the Polyane paid tribute in furs. Kiev itself functioned as the western-most military outpost and a commercial center for the Khazars. During the late ninth century, the Rus prince Oleg (legendary reign 880-913) allegedly incorporated the middle Dnieper and the Polyane into the expanding Rus state, although evidence suggests that it was Grand Prince Igor (r. 924-945) who brought the two under Rus control around 930. While predominantly Slavic, the Polyane appear to have had Iranian, Turkic, and Finno-Baltic ethnic elements. Evidence for this is found through archaeological and linguistic studies of the Polyane and from Chronicle descriptions of their pre-Christian religious practices. See also: IGOR; KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; OLEG; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; VIKINGS

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Golb, Norman, and Pritsak, Omeljan. (1982). Khazarian Hebrew Document of the Tenth Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. The Russian Primary Chronicle. (1973). Tr. and ed. Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America.

  ROMAN K. KOVALEV

  POMESTIE

  Pomestie, “service landholding,” was a parcel of land (hopefully inhabited by rent-paying peasants, later serfs [see Serfdom]) in exchange for which the holder (not owner) had to render lifelong service to the state, typically military service, but occasionally service in the government bureaucracy. Ideally, when the service ended, the landholder had to surrender the pomestie to another serviceman. The pomestie was granted for use only to support the serviceman and his family (including slaves) by peasant rent payments to him in lieu of cash. It has been calculated that this was far more efficient than paying servicemen entirely in cash: the transaction costs of collecting taxes, taking them to Moscow, and then paying them to the servicemen were likely to result in a fifty percent loss, whereas there was no such shrinkage when the rent and taxes did not go through Moscow. Occasionally po-mestie is translated a “military fief,” but this is totally misleading. There was no feudalism in Russia. The pomestie was granted directly by the government’s Service Land Chancellery (Pomestny prikaz) to a specific serviceman for his support in lieu of support of other kinds (such as cash, or feeding in barracks). There were no reciprocal rights and obligations between the Service Land Chancellery and the serviceman, and there was no subinfeuda-tion.

  The pomestie bears at least superficial resemblance to forms of land tenure elsewhere, especially the Byzantine pronoia and the Persian ikhta. It is dubious, however, that the Russian pomestie was borrowed from either, and it seems likely that it was an autonomous creation by the Russians themselves.

  The origins of the pomestie are shrouded in the mists of the early Muscovite Middle Ages. The first recorded use of the term was in 1499, but the phenomenon definitely existed before then. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, servitors (probably military) at the Muscovite court may occasionally have been given temporary grants of land in exchange for service, but that was an extraordinarily uncertain form of compensation and therefore cannot have been used often. Until the 1450s all peasants were free and could not be compelled to pay rent to anyone [see Enserfment], and they could move at a moment’s notice. Thus no system of compensating servicemen by conditional grants of land developed at that time.

  The origins of the pomestie system (and also the service state) can be traced to Moscow’s annexation of Novgorod in 1478. Some elite Nov-gorodian laymen and churchmen preferred either to remain independent or to have Lithuania as a suzerain rather than Moscow. Those people were purged after 1478 and either executed or forcibly resettled elsewhere. Their vast landholdings were confiscated by Moscow and parceled out to loyal cavalry servicemen (pomeshchiki) for their support. The census books compiled subsequently by Moscow indicate that each serviceman was probably assigned land occupied by roughly thirty peasant households. It is fairly certain that the servicemen did not live directly on their land grants,

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  but in groups nearby. A third party collected the traditional rent and gave it to the servicemen. Thus the servicemen had no direct connection with “their” peasants and no control over them. Moscow soon discovered that this was an efficient way to assure control over newly annexed territory while simultaneously maximizing the size of the army. As Moscow annexed other lands, it handed them out to servicemen as pomestie estates. The pomestie came to embody the essence of the service state. Each eligible serviceman had an entitlement (oklad) based on his service. If he could locate land up to the limit of his entitlement, it was his. This was an effective incentive system, and servicemen strove mightily to increase their entitlements.

  Two or three generations later, during the reign of Ivan IV (“the Terrible”), several important events occurred concerning the pomestie. For one, the government advanced the service state significantly in 1556 by decreeing that all holders of service estates (pomestie) and hereditary estates (votchiny) had to render the same quantity of military service (i.e., provide one mounted cavalryman per one hundred cheti of land actually possessed). Second, it is probable that during Ivan’s reign sons began to succeed to their fathers’ service landholdings when their fathers died or could no longer render the required lifetime service. Third, during Ivan’s Oprichnina, service landholders were given control over their peasants, including the right to set the level of rent payments (a change that ca
used massive peasant flight from the center to the expanding frontiers [see Colonial Expansion]). And fourth, the Oprich-nina exterminated so many owners of hereditary estates that it appeared as though outright ownership of land was on the verge of extinction.

  The holders of pomestie estates were primarily members of the provincial middle service class cavalry who began to live directly on their service land-holdings somewhere during the middle of the sixteenth century. This experience, combined with the developments of the reign of Ivan IV, convinced them that they had the right to consider the po-mestie as their personal property, which not only could be left to their male heirs, but also could be alienated like votchina property: sold, donated to monasteries, given to anyone, used as a dowry, and so forth. This project became the goal of a middle service class “political campaign,” somewhat akin to the political campaign to enserf the peasantry. Such aspirations totally violated the initial purpose of the pomestie and undermined the basic principles of the service state. The Law Code of 1649 carefully retained the distinction between the pomestie (chapter 16, nearly all of whose sixty-nine articles are postdated 1619) and the votchina (chapter 17), but the distinctions were fading in reality. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the po-mestie essentially became hereditary property, but service still was compulsory and holders could not freely alienate it. During the Thirteen Years War (1654-1667), new formation military units began to replace the obsolescent middle service class cavalry, and after 1667 the service state nearly disintegrated. With it went the principle that service was compulsory from pomestie land.

  Peter the Great restored the service state in 1700, and all landholders and landowners had to render military service again. But the uniqueness of the pomestie was lost in 1714 when it and the votchina were juridically merged into a single form of land ownership. See also: DVORIANSTVO; ENSERFMENT; LAW CODE OF 1649; SERFDOM; SYN BOYARSKY; VOTCHINA