In the Hour of Victory

by Sam Willis

  For all his experience, however, Parker was not widely admired. Collingwood wrote to his sister describing him as being ‘full of vanity, a great deal of pomp, and a pretty smattering of ignorance’1 and his recent marriage to the plump 18-year-old daughter of Admiral Sir Richard Onslow had made them both the object of public ridicule. Gossipers described her as ‘batter pudding’ and the newspapers, rather cleverly, as Parker’s ‘sheet anchor’. Wry smiles were shared over his commitment to service in the North Sea when his bed was kept so warm at home. Parker did nothing to help himself by remaining at home with his new wife when the fleet was ready to sail. Rumour circulated like wildfire that he did so to be present at a ball she had organised and it quickly reached the ears of the Admiralty. Nelson was furious and wrote to Troubridge: ‘ … what I say is in the mouth of all the old market-women at Yarmouth … Consider how nice it must be lying abed with a young wife, compared to a damned raw cold wind.’2 Lord Spencer wrote a letter dripping with venom, ‘supposing it impossible’ that Parker was still at Yarmouth ‘on account of some trifling circumstance’.3 With his knuckles rapped, Parker joined the fleet and the ball was cancelled.

  It is also important to realise that it was Parker, rather than Nelson, who was chosen to command the fleet. Nelson had been given command of the Mediterranean squadron in 1798 ahead of many more senior officers and had won a great victory at the Nile, but his subsequent affair with Emma Hamilton and his ill-judged interference in the Kingdom of Naples had won him few friends and had cooled the support of many powerful men who had been instrumental in his earlier rapid promotion. Although he may have been a sensible choice for the Baltic expedition, he was passed over and sailed as Parker’s second in command. Parker, already faced with a thorny challenge, was thus presented with another: how to command a fleet with Nelson as a subordinate.

  The Conundrum

  When, on 19 March, the British arrived at the Skaw, the northernmost tip of the Jutland peninsula at the entrance to the Kattegat Sea, nothing was certain. Britain and Denmark were by no means openly at war, nor was it certain how the British would act if war proved unavoidable. Parker’s instructions were to destroy the Danish navy and its dockyards if the Danes refused to leave the Baltic League, but the means by which he should do that were unclear because there were two routes to Copenhagen from the Kattegat.

  The direct route passed through the Sound and approached Copenhagen from the north. The longer route was through the Great Belt and brought the attacker to Copenhagen from the south.

  The alternative routes for attacking Copenhagen.

  The pilotage of both routes was poorly known to the British and each was riddled with natural and man-made hazards. The Sound was heavily defended at its entrance, at a point where it is only four kilometres wide, by the mighty Kronborg fortress, known for generations after its rebuilding in the 1690s as one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. It remains today one of the finest and most important Renaissance castles in the world.

  Assuming the enemy to be the Danes, therefore, it was still unclear exactly how they should be attacked. Nelson, however, was not even prepared to assume that much. From what the British knew about the natural hazards of attacking Copenhagen from north or south, combined with the limited intelligence they had recently acquired of Danish defensive preparations, Nelson decided to bypass the Danes completely. Instead he planned to strike at the heart of the Baltic League, Russia, via Tsar Paul’s navy in Revel and Kronstadt. It was certainly a valid proposal, both tactically and strategically, but there were two factors against it. It went directly against Parker’s specific orders to deal first with the Danes, and it wrongly assumed, because British intelligence had been wildly inaccurate, that the Danish defences were already in place. In reality only seven of the 18 Danish ships were in position, the fleet manpower was still a third under strength, the entire officer corps of the Danish naval force consisted of just 13 men, the Russians were still iced in and the Swedes had refused to help. The opportunity for a lightning strike against the Danes via the Sound was very much alive and, if seized, could have neutralised them with very little loss of life or time. The British would have then been able to sail directly for the eastern Baltic to deal with the Russians.

  The Dispatches

  The Copenhagen dispatches are unique for a number of reasons. First, the letters written by Parker are the least legible of all the dispatches in the entire volume. Even if one accepts that he had poor handwriting, they are hurried and scrappy, a window into a fevered mind.

  Second, the most important letter of the Copenhagen collection is not, in fact, written by the fleet commander-in-chief because he was not there during the critical phase of the action. The assault was led by Nelson, his second-in-command, and Parker defers his authority and knowledge of the attack to Nelson. Parker’s letter to the Admiralty is the weakest of all of the admirals’ letters in this collection. Third, the dispatches include a detailed exchange of letters between Parker and the commander of the Kronborg fortress concerning the intentions of each country. Unlike all of the other dispatches, therefore, these include and describe a diplomatic, as well as a military, tussle. Finally, of all of the dispatches, these are the least self-explanatory and consequently the most interesting.

  Hyde Parker’s scrawled letters are the most difficult to read of all the Admirals’ dispatches.

  Admiral H. Parker to E. Nepean, 23 March 1801

  The first letter is important because it outlines the plans for an attack that never happened. The lead story of the Copenhagen dispatches is one of indecision and uncertainty. It is written on 23 March, four days after the British fleet arrived at the Skaw. By now Parker has sailed through the Kattegat and is anchored at the north-eastern tip of Zealand. He has a choice to make.

  His first plan was simply to wait for the Danes to offer battle, which was wholly unrealistic since Danish naval strategy centred on the survival of its sailing fleet. His next plan was to attack Copenhagen via the most direct route, the Sound from the north, but in this letter Parker admits to another change of mind. He has received news of the Danes’ defensive preparations from Nicholas Vansittart, a British politician of little talent or flair and no military experience, who had been chosen to act as the political brain to Parker’s military muscle. Vansittart was there because Pitt’s government had finally fallen after 18 years in power and Addington had taken charge and rewarded his followers. Vansittart, a conservative politician, was one of those lucky men. He arrived at the anchorage spouting unverified accounts of fearsome Danish defences and rumours of squadrons of Swedish ships of the line and gunboats descending on Copenhagen from Karlskrona.4

  Parker then explains how, based on a subsequent discussion with Vansittart and Nelson, he has changed his mind about the attack on Copenhagen. Parker thus explicitly includes a subordinate and a politician in his command decision, preparing the ground to shift or share the blame should his new attack fail.

  The new plan, he explains, is to avoid Copenhagen entirely by entering the Baltic via the Great Belt, thus bypassing all of the Danish defences, and then to see how the wind blew. If it was fair for the Baltic, he would attack the Russians; if it was fair for Copenhagen, he would attack the Danes from the south. It is an extraordinary statement for a professional seaman. Once through the Great Belt, any wind that was fair for Copenhagen could be harnessed to take the fleet east and north to the Russian naval bases of Revel or Kronstadt. To sum up, therefore, this letter shifts the blame for a decision that was based on unverified intelligence, which made little professional sense and which ran contrary to Parker’s explicit orders to attack Copenhagen. Parker has lost his grip.

  LONDON, OFF THE HALL

  23 MARCH 1801

  Sir,

  Since writing my letter of this mornings date, I have had recourse to a consultation with Vice Admiral Lord Nelson and Mr Vansittart on the very formidable defence the Danes have made against any attack being made upon them, not only by man
y additional Batteries to Cronenburgh Castle but also the number of Hulks and Batteries which have lately been placed & erected for the defence of the Arsenal at Copenhagen, & renders the attack so hazardous, joind to the difficulty of the Navigation by the passage of the Sound as led us to agree in opinion that it will be more beneficial for His Majs Service to attempt the passage of the Great Belt, which having passed, & the Wind favourable for going up the Baltic is, to attempt the destruction of the Russian ships at Revel which are expected as soon as the season will permit their coming down the Baltic to co-operate with the Danes, but in the event of the Wind being contrary for getting up the Baltic, after having passed the Belt, in this case, to attempt destroying Copenhagen by coming down the passage from the Baltic. This measure will be attacking them in the Rear where it is evident they do not expect an attack, nor is it in their power to render it so defensible as by the other channel.

  My intention is, should I be so fortunate as either to meet the Russian Squadron on their passage down, or at Revel, the moment either service is performed, to return immediately to the object of Copenhagen; and I trust, great as the responsibility I take upon myself, their Lordships will do me the justice to believe that, I could only be assuased, by what appears to be, for the great object my Country has in view consistent with the peculiar situation I find myself in by the formidable disposition of Copenhagen, and which cannot be known to their Lordships.

  I therefore rely with confidence on their approbation, and am

  Sir

  Your most obedient

  humble servant

  Parker

  EVAN NEPEAN ESQR

  Nelson, meanwhile, was climbing the wooden walls with impatience. He was partially responsible for convincing Parker to sail into the Baltic via the Great Belt, but he also realised that, whatever route was taken, something had to be done immediately. He instinctively knew that indecision was unhelpful strategically and tactically and had a detrimental effect on the crews. When he eventually got to examine the Danish defences himself, he wrote with some bravado to Emma: ‘ … I have just been reconnoitring the Danish line of defence. It looks formidable to those who are children at war but to my judgement with ten sail of the line I think I can annihilate them, at all events I hope to be allowed to try.’5 Parker granted his wish.

  Admiral H. Parker to E. Nepean, 6 April 1801

  The next letter continues the theme of indecision and weakness, even if it does describe the eventual attack on Copenhagen. It is, once more, written aboard the flagship and this time ‘in Copenhagen’ but, as Parker makes clear, he got there neither from the south nor after attacking the Russians, the two options he proposed in his letter of 23 March, but via an attack on the Sound from the north.

  This time, we know that the major, but by no means the only, influence on Parker’s change of mind was Robert Otway, his flag captain, who was deeply worried about the navigation of the Great Belt and the hazards of approaching Copenhagen from the south.

  The date of this letter is particularly important. It is written on 6 April, a fortnight after his previous letter, and although Parker describes a vicious storm that threatened to scatter his fleet, he fails to mention the brief window of opportunity offered by a northerly breeze, which would have allowed his ships to pass through the Sound on 23 March, the day he wrote his first letter. His failure to do so allowed the Danes to strengthen their batteries. By the time that the British eventually attacked, every Danish ship was in its allocated position, more men had been raised than was actually necessary and the green hands had been trained.

  There was no false hope on the part of the Danes, however. Politicians and naval officers alike knew it was unlikely that they would win. Indeed, one member of the government who inspected the defences compared the Danes to the Spartans at Thermopylae.11 They had done more than enough to give the British a bloody nose but if Parker had attacked on 23 March they might not have fought at all and the bloody Battle of Copenhagen could have been avoided entirely.

  Parker describes the attack on Copenhagen in the most general terms: he cannot describe it in detail because he did not lead it himself, having left it to Nelson. He does, however, lament the deaths of Captain Mosse, a man of vast experience, and Captain Riou, an officer of immense promise. They were both greatly mourned by the service and a monument commemorating them both can still be seen in the crypt of St Paul’s Cathedral. Parker makes it quite clear that both men left dependants, whose livelihoods were then guaranteed by the navy. It does not say it here, but we know that Riou was cut in half by a cannon ball.

  Parker also mentions Sir Thomas Boulden Thompson, a legend of the service who had fought so gallantly at the Nile in the tiny 50-gun Leander. His conduct on that day was such that he was awarded a knighthood for gallantry, a reward usually reserved for flag-officers. At Copenhagen Thompson commanded the Bellona and lost a leg. His active career thus came to an end but he became an important naval administrator and served as comptroller of the navy for a decade between 1806 and 1816, after which he was appointed treasurer of Greenwich hospital and director of the Chatham Chest, the pension fund for disabled sailors. Nelson later wrote personally to William Pitt, vouching for Thompson’s professional ability, to secure a pension for his wife and children: ‘A more gallant active and Zealous Sea Officer was not in the Service.’6

  LONDON, IN COPENHAGEN

  ROAD, 6 APRIL 1801

  Elephant

  Defiance

  Monarch

  Bellona

  Edgar

  Russel

  Ganges

  Glatton

  Isis

  Agamemnon

  Polyphemus

  Ardent

  Sir,

  You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commrs of the Admiralty that, since my letter of 22d last month, I reconsiderd & weighed all the circumstances attending my going through the Passage of the Great Belt, with His Majestys Fleet under my command; and although I still think that, had we had the good fortune to have made a short passage through, Copenhagen might have been attacked from that side with less risque to the Fleet, Yet the objections and obstacles were so many, by subjecting our Communication to be cut off, by the Danes sending out two or three Ships of the Line with Frigates, and taking position & covering them with Batteries on the Islands in the narrow passage of the Navigation of the Belt as to render their being forced very difficult, more especially by any thing coming from England. This, and the danger which must have insued from the want of Pilots in so intricate a Navigation, with such a considerable Fleet (Captain Murray, of His Majs Ship Edgar and one Pilot being the only two people to be found in the Fleet who had been through that Passage) These reasons acted so forcibly on my Mind as to induce me to give up that Plan, and we have determined on the Passage through the Sound.

  From the 22d past, no opportunity of Wind offerd for going up the Sound until the 25th when the Wind shifted in a most violent squall from SW to NW & North and blew with such violence, & with so great a Sea, as to render it impossible for any ship to have weighed her Anchor.7 The Sea & Wind were even so violent as to oblige many of the Ships, from drifting, to let go a second Anchor, notwithstanding they were riding with two Cables an end; and by the Morning the Wind veered again to the Southward of the West.

  On the 30th of last Month, the Wind having come to the North again we passed into the Sound with the Fleet, but not before I had assured myself of the hostile intentions of the Danes as to opposing our passage, as the papers Nrs. 1. 2. 3. & 4 will prove. After this intercourse there could be no doubts remaining of their determination for War after anchoring about 5 or 6 Miles from the Island of Henuen, I, with Vice Admiral Lord Nelson & Rear Admiral Graves reconnoitred the formidable Line of Ships, Rideaus, Pontoons, Galleys, Fire Ships & Gun Boats, flank’d & supported by some extensive Batteries on the two Islands calld the Groines, the largest of which was mounted with from 50 to 70 pieces of Cannon – These were again commanded by two Ships of
70 Guns, & a large Frigate in the Inner Roads of Copenhagen, and two 64 Gun Ships without masts, were moored upon the Fleet, on the starboard side of the entrance into the Arsenal – The day afterwards the Wind being Southerly, we again examined their position, and came to the resolution of Attacking them from the So Ward.

  Vice Admiral Lord Nelson having offerd his services for conducting the attack, had, some days before we enterd the Sound shifted his Flag from the St. George to the Elephant,8 and after having examined and buoyed the Outer Channel of the Middle Ground, his Lordship proceeded with the 12 Ships of the Line named in the margin; all the Frigates, Bombs, Fireships & all the small Vessels, & that Evening anchored off Draco Point, to make his disposition for the Attack and wait for the Wind to the Southward. It was agreed on between us, that the remaining Ships with me, should weigh at the same moment his Lordship did, & menace the Gamn Islands & the 4 Ships of the Line that lay in the Entrance into the Arsenal, as also to cover the disabled Ships, as they came out of the Arsenal.

  Inclosed, I have the honour to transmit Vice Admiral Lord Nelsons report of the Action on the 2d instant; His Lordship has stated, so fully, the whole of his proceedings on that day as only to leave me the opportunity of testifying my entire acquiescence and testimony of the bravery and intrepidity with which the Action was supported throughout the Line; was it possible for me to add any thing to the well earned honours of Lord Nelson, it would be by asserting that his exertions, great as they have been, never were carried to a higher position of Zeal for his Country’s Service.