Eyes Pried Open

by Vincent Sellers

  As we surveiled the subject and watched his erratic patterns, we became increasingly concerned that he would attempt to rob another bank. We reached a decision that the FBI SWAT team would be placed on continuous alert, and if the subject came within the vicinity of a bank, the SWAT team would be called to action. Bank robberies are notoriously dangerous, especially when involving subjects who are armed and rob the bank “takeover style.” In 1986, in Miami, Florida, one of the worst tragedies in FBI history occurred when agents attempted to apprehend bank robbers immediately after a robbery, and several agents wound up losing their lives. A surviving agent from the gun battle that had erupted in Miami spoke to my class at Quantico and painted a sobering picture of the reality and dangers of arrest scenarios involving armed robbers.

  We conducted surveillance for several days. Late one morning, we observed the subject heading to the Point Loma area of San Diego. This area has several bank branches, all of which seemed to be likely targets. My partner and I positioned ourselves outside of a bank, with fellow agents from my squad taking up positions in the vicinity. The SWAT team arrived and staged several blocks away. We were ready for a robbery if the subject decided to take action.

  The main subject and his accomplice were spotted parking a few blocks away. They walked to a position across the street from the bank and appeared to be studying the entrance. I could see them and announced this activity over the radio; everyone was on high alert. The subjects positioned themselves directly behind my squad mate’s vehicle, which happened to be occupied by my squad mate as part of the surveillance operation. We breathlessly monitored the suspects, hoping that they would not realize that they were being watched. Since we presumed they were armed, this situation was becoming extremely hazardous. While watching, I elected temporarily to not call out what I was seeing, since I did not want the subjects to hear radio traffic from my squad mate’s car. After a long couple of minutes, they meandered down the street, and everyone breathed a short sigh of relief.

  A few minutes passed. We witnessed the subjects walking back towards the entrance of the bank, except this time they were wearing hats and sunglasses. We knew what was about to go down. Radio calls were made and the FBI SWAT team was alerted. We were then faced with another dilemma; we could arrest the subjects in the bank, or we could allow the robbery to occur and let the subjects head back to their car, where they could be arrested. We knew that the robbers had been armed in previous robberies, yet they had not ever fired any shots or injured anybody. If we tried to arrest them in the bank, we could find ourselves in the middle of a hostage situation or worse; there could be a fatal shooting involving innocent bystanders. The difficult decision was made by the FBI leadership to allow the bank robbery to happen and then arrest the subjects afterwards.

  About twenty to thirty seconds after walking into the building, the subjects came sprinting out. They had concealed their weapons, and were heading back to their Mercedes getaway car on foot. I could hardly believe that we had just witnessed a bank robbery, which fortunately had not resulted in any injuries or harm to the victims in the bank. Having previously seen the FBI SWAT SUVs driving on nearby streets, I knew that the subjects were about to have a little “reality check” with the SWAT guys.

  The SWAT team was fully prepared to arrest the robbers in their vehicle. They allowed both thieves to get into the car, and then they team detonated a flash grenade on the roof of the car, which stunned both occupants. Both robbers were safely arrested; no one was hurt and once again the FBI SWAT team, in conjunction with my squad, had successfully handled a potentially violent situation. I would see the FBI handle numerous situations like this with an incredibly high success rate; most people only hear about the rare occurrences where things go awry, which is statistically certain to happen eventually, due to the high variability and dynamic nature of these types of arrests.

  Later that day I was involved in some follow-up aspects of this investigation. I was picked to talk to the robber’s mother to see if we could learn any more information about her son. Telling a mother that her son had been arrested for bank robbery was painful. She sobbed and I could see the absolute despair and failure written on her face. I tried to be as understanding and compassionate as possible, which I knew she appreciated. That evening I transported the prisoner to the federal prison in downtown San Diego. I talked to him and he tried to talk his way out of going to prison; I had to give him an “A” for effort. He said that the FBI did not understand the whole picture, and that he was just trying to protect his girlfriend who had supposedly gone missing. He claimed that he robbed the bank so that he could get ransom money to free his kidnapped girlfriend. We knew that this was a lie, and he provided no details about her name, where she lived, or what her telephone number was. After reminding him that it is illegal and punishable by five years in prison to lie to an FBI agent, he stopped providing bogus information. The reality that he had reached the end of his glamorous “gangster rap” lifestyle was apparent as we waited outside of the prison for the gate to open. I told him to hang tough and wished him luck when we handed him over to the federal prison authorities.

  CHAPTER 31

  Arrest at the Car Dealership

  Another case that I worked was aimed at arresting a serial criminal who was wanted for a lengthy string of bank robberies in the San Diego area. The FBI’s standard practice when investigating bank robberies was to obtain security camera photos from banks that were robbed, which we aired on the local television stations. On one gorgeous San Diego Friday afternoon, we got lucky and received a call from a salesman at a car dealership who had just provided a test drive to a man who looked like the robber and who had inquired about paying cash for a car. This suspect was planning on returning to the car dealer the following day to complete a purchase of a vehicle.

  That night I worked with the San Diego PD and my squad to formulate a plan on how to arrest the subject. We knew an approximate time that the subject would return to the dealer on Saturday, so we decided to perform a joint arrest operation at the dealership. While this would pose some potential risk to bystanders, it allowed us to carefully plan and prepare for the arrest, which was the most desirable and predictable scenario for us.

  The FBI team reconvened late Saturday morning, and then received notification from the car dealer saying that the subject had called to say he was going to be at the dealership around noon, which was two hours earlier than we were expecting. A glance at our watches showed that the time was already 11:00 a.m.; we still had work to do to get prepared and in place, so we all ran to our cars, flipped on our police radios, rushed to the vicinity of the car dealership, and began our final coordination for planning the arrest. The plan was for the salesman to be on the lookout for the subject, and once he saw the subject arrive to get out of the way and allow the San Diego PD and FBI to perform the arrest. My role was to sit inside the car dealership, along with my partner, and ensure that the customers would be safe. We would be ready to lock doors, push customers under desks, and worst-case, we would be armed and ready for a shootout if things went awry. The subject had displayed firearms during the commission of his robberies, so there was a risk of a violent outcome.

  My partner that day was Special Agent Janet Pardee, a small woman in stature but one of the most confident, knowledgeable, and capable agents I ever met; she was only a class behind me at the FBI Academy but quickly gained experience, making her an invaluable asset for the Bureau. Janet and I went inside the dealership and quickly took inventory of the surroundings.

  As we waited inside the dealership, a member of the FBI surveillance team spotted the subject driving up. I moved quickly to lock the doors of the dealership, and told customers and staff to head to the back of the building. Janet had a vantage point that allowed her to view the subject and the arrest, and she told me to get down. I crouched behind a thin wall with my
hand on my weapon; I was ready to act if needed. The arrest was made safely and without incident.

  I later learned from one of the San Diego PD detectives that the robber had put his finger on the trigger of his gun. This meant that the detective had reached a point during the arrest at which the subject was not cooperating, and the detective had almost reached the difficult but split-second decision to use lethal force. The subject initially refused to put his hands up, and for a moment appeared to be reaching into his waistband for a weapon. Based on my positioning behind the subject, if the detective had pulled the trigger, I would have been in his line of fire, and potentially the line of fire from other agents, if a gunfight had erupted.

  A news station had intercepted the police radio transmission and was aware that we were about to arrest a bank robber. There were news cameras that rolled up to the scene as the arrest was taking place; I would later see myself on the news, at least for a brief moment. I was proud, knowing that I had taken part in an operation that successfully removed an armed and dangerous man from the streets.

  CHAPTER 32

  Sources

  FBI agents are in the information business. Information is what leads to new cases, which leads to arrests, which leads to trials, which leads to prison sentences, which ultimately results in a safer society. Clearly with 9/11 permanently seared in the collective minds of the citizens of the United States, the result of what happens when information is not gathered or effectively shared is painfully evident. In recognition of the importance of information and intelligence gathering, the FBI requires all agents to operate at least one active source of information, who is called an informant.

  The FBI Academy curriculum spends a deservedly significant amount of time instructing new agents on the vast number of rules and policies governing how sources are handled within the FBI. I relished the afternoon training classes in which we learned about informants, including the huge intelligence victories the FBI has benefitted from, and dramatic intelligence failures that resulted in secrets lost to cold war enemies. We were taught examples of embarrassing situations involving romantic links of FBI agents with their sources, which is strictly forbidden. In one extreme example, we learned about an agent who murdered his informant, whom he happened to be sleeping with, because he did not want his family to discover his secret. Another story involved an agent who was romantically linked to a source from China, who turned out to be a spy for the Chinese government. FBI agents generally are the brightest and most honest group of people in the world, but there have been several outrageously rotten apples that have been detrimental to the FBI’s reputation and the nation’s security.

  Due to a plethora of rules and accompanying administrative steps that are required when running a source, stacks of paperwork were generated, even for a brief meeting with a source. The administrative overhead was a deterrent to agents for operating sources who were not beneficial to the FBI, and in some cases were a deterrent to operating sources, period, regardless of their potential benefit to the agency. Some agents on my squad absolutely despised the idea of having to operate a source. They reasoned that since we were on a reactive violent crime squad, we had no business trying to operate sources. While I understood that argument, I felt that we were frequently in a position to deal with lower-level criminals, and that compared to other FBI agents, we were in a unique and advantageous position to get fruitful intelligence from a wide cast of characters. While many of the sources were not exactly model citizens, I realized that they could help us capture other criminals, and that we might even find inroads to get inside information on organized crime, drug cartels, and other areas that provide the greatest threats to our country.

  I looked forward to finding sources; I was proud to represent the FBI and give citizens the opportunity to help us help make the country a better place. My first opportunity to work a source arose one afternoon when I was answering telephones as the FBI agent on duty. A call came in regarding a tip about a wanted criminal who fled the United States and was residing in South America. The information was provided by a man who seemed to have a great deal of knowledge about drug related production and kidnappings. I decided to ask him if he was willing to participate as an information source for the FBI, and he readily agreed. I was thrilled to have my first source.

  When meeting with sources, the FBI has a policy that an agent must always have an additional agent with him or her. This is necessary for several reasons. First, it provides additional safety in the event that a source turns violent. Second, it ensures that the information shared is heard by two agents; when reports are written out about the information that was shared, documentation of the meeting is more accurate and has a stronger legal basis since it was heard by two witnesses. Finally, it prevents agents from engaging in improper conduct with their sources.

  My new source claimed to have family members who were directly tied to Colombian drug production organizations, and was in a position to potentially gain excellent intelligence on the source of much of the drug trafficking that impacts our nation. He also claimed to have knowledge about kidnappings in Colombia and other South American locations. Unfortunately, neither international drug production crimes nor international kidnapping cases (without US citizen involvement) were matters that my squad could address. At the initial sessions with the informant, he shared a significant amount of information, which I studiously documented in report form. I hoped that my work would eventually help take down criminals, or possibly help rescue a kidnapping victim.

  However, I began to see over time that even with specific information, it was difficult to find agents who were willing to take on more work and pursue leads that my source generated, especially since most of the reported criminal activity was occurring outside of the United States. This was especially difficult to explain to my source, who was surprised at the lack of action that the FBI took based on the information he provided. My source was also hoping to be paid for his information, but since it did not result in any arrests, I was not able to justify any payments to him from the FBI.

  I also served as a partner for other FBI agents when meeting with their sources. I always enjoyed these occasions; I enjoyed meeting people, especially ones who were trying to help the FBI. Some of the sources played significant roles in cases ranging from bank robberies to kidnappings.

  Occasionally I had to work with sources that were usually handled by other field offices, or other law enforcement entities. In one case, due to the high security necessary around to protect the identity of sources, I received a plain brown envelope from a special security courier that was stamped “For Your Eyes Only.” I could not help but smile at the phrase, which happened to be the title of one of my favorite James Bond films. The days of working with sources, while not always productive, were at least enjoyable and exciting, and will always be a part of the FBI experience that I look back on fondly.

  CHAPTER 33

  Protection Detail

  One of the most interesting assignments that I had was working protection detail for foreign visiting dignitaries and political party members. Based on the significant body of work of fiction related to this topic, I had preconceived notions on how protection details worked. Surely there would be motorcades of agents with machine guns, earpiece radios, helicopters, and snipers on top of buildings. However, I quickly learned that this was not quite the norm.

  The Secret Service is responsible for the protection of certain people: the President of the United States, the Vice President, the families of the President and Vice President, and candidates for these offices. The Secret Service partners with multiple law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, to fulfill this mission. On several occasions, the San Diego office assigned me to be the lead agent to liaison with the Secret Service for these visits. I was responsible for coordinating intelligence gathered by the FBI tha
t would raise awareness of potential threats to those protected by the Secret Service. Also, in the event of incidents such as a shooting or a bomb being detonated, I would be the lead agent in the FBI responsible for coordinating investigations and responses. I worked directly with Secret Service agents on these assignments.

  While I never came across any legitimate threats during any of these visits, I thoroughly enjoyed learning about how things work behind the scenes. I was proud to see the memos that were sent out to all FBI agents in San Diego that would announce an upcoming visit from one of the leaders of the nation, and in the same message my name would be referenced as the agent to work with on any intelligence concerning credible threats.

  During the summer of 2006, I was assigned as the lead agent responsible for the safety of the visiting Attorney General of Mexico, Daniel Cabeza de Vaca. At the height of Mexico’s war on drugs, their Attorney General planned to come to San Diego and was scheduled to make a speech putting the drug cartels on notice that they would be aggressively pursued, and announcing the deployment of Mexican Army troops to help quell the violence. He was a high value and high risk target who would be tempting to the powerful drug cartels. He spent several days in San Diego, and the FBI was the sole law enforcement agency responsible for his protection. I coordinated getting an armored vehicle; having briefings with his personal staff and protection detail from Mexico; making hotel arrangements including adjoining rooms staffed by agents; and supervising advance preparations for each of his locations during the visit.

  My supervisor had pulled me aside and told me, “While the Attorney General’s safety is important, your safety is more important, and if bullets start flying, just protect yourself, even if that means jumping in the nearest ditch.” Throughout the visit, I was armed and constantly wearing my vest, and I thought that if violence erupted, I would fall back on my training, which would be first to take cover, and then fight back. Fortunately, there were no threats during his visit. Regardless of expectations from my management, I felt an incredible sense of responsibility for the Attorney General’s safety, and I was relieved to see him board his plane alive and with no bullet holes at the end of his journey.