POINTS OF DIVERSITY AMONG LATINOS
The Latino population of the United States is diverse in several important ways. Not only does the diversity of this population complicate any analysis of Latino public opinion, but its effect—that is, the degree to which it yields meaningful differences in Latino views or behavior—varies considerably. Three particular characteristics are especially important to understanding Latino opinion and behavior: national origin, nativity (including differences by age), and generation in the United States. These demographic facts capture the differences between the children of immigrants, the grandchildren of immigrants, and subsequent generations.
National Origin
Among the myriad complications of examining Latino public opinion and political participation is the definitional question: who exactly is a Latino? As simplistic as that question may sound, the issue of identity has important social and methodological implications. For one, Latino residents of the United States migrated or are descended from migrants from over twenty Latin American nations (including the US Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). Second, while the ethnic histories of the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Europe are complex enough, the varied racial histories of Latin America add another layer of complexity to definitions of “Latino” and account for the significant apparent variation in Latino phenotype across the United States. Think about Univision anchor Jorge Ramos, talk-show host Cristina Saralegui, actors America Ferrara and Jimmy Smits, baseball players Alex Rodriguez and Sammy Sosa, and singers Jennifer Lopez and the late Celia Cruz: all are Latinos, but they exhibit a wide array of physical characteristics reflective of the unique racial histories of their national-origin groups.
Indigenous, European, and African ancestral origins combine in each Latin American nation in ways that make Latino identity racially complex.8 Although 51.2% of the 8,634 respondents in the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) believed that Latinos constitute a distinct racial category, the reality in fact varies across national origins. Mexicans, many Central Americans, Peruvians, and Bolivians are of mestizo and indigenous ancestries; Colombian, Venezuelan, and Caribbean national origins more directly reflect the African diaspora in the Western Hemisphere; and individuals from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay better represent Spanish (and other European) colonization. Yet despite these differences, anyone with Latin American origins is considered, in the context of American politics, “Latino” or “Hispanic.” Research suggests that this racial complexity has an effect in the American political environment.9
That said, we should not overstate the diversity of national origins in the Latino population. More than 65% of all Latinos are Mexican or Mexican American, and another 9.1% are Puerto Rican. Salvadorans make up 3.6%, Cubans 3.5%, and Dominicans 2.8%.10 Almost 86% of the Latino population in the United States is from one of those five national-origin groups. Guatemalans (2.2%) and Colombians (1.9%) are by far the largest of the remaining groups. More than a dozen other Latin American nations are represented in the US populace, but their population shares are tiny. Mexicans and Mexican Americans, and to a lesser extent Puerto Ricans, dominate the conversation.
Though these national-origin groups have distinct cultural characteristics and racial histories, the Spanish language, Roman Catholicism, and entertainment and media cultures that have become highly integrated over the course of decades have knitted all these Latino communities more closely together.11 Nevertheless, several characteristics specific to certain national-origin groups can, and do, shape public opinion and political participation.
The most politically distinct are Cuban Americans in South Florida, many of whom are refugees (or offspring of refugees) of the Cuban revolution. Stereotypically Republican, Cubans have been influenced by the unique circumstances of their arrival in the 1960s; by the privileged legal immigration regime that they and no other Latino immigrants have enjoyed; and by their economic circumstances relative to other Latinos. Many who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s came with some resources and received considerable assistance from the United States. Their Republicanism is rooted in both these resource differences and their experience of the Cold War. Moreover, under the 1995 revisions to the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cuban migrants who reach US soil are given nearly automatic asylum and status, which removes immigration status as a barrier to the growth of their communities and their political incorporation.
Cuban distinctiveness appears to be eroding, however. Younger Cubans who are several generations removed from the Castro experience, as well as those descended from the “Marielitos” who arrived in the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 (and who came with fewer resources and faced some within-group bias from the longer-established population), are far less likely to be Republican. Their opinions and political characteristics more closely reflect those of other US Latinos.
The Puerto Rican experience is also distinct. Because Puerto Rico is part of the United States, Puerto Ricans, including those born on the island, are US citizens from birth—a provision of the Jones Act of 1917. Citizenship for Puerto Ricans and the lack of any legal consequences to their migration to and from the island highlight two key distinctions between Puerto Ricans and other Latinos: immigration is not an immediate issue for Puerto Ricans, and their access to the political process is straightforward.
Nevertheless, and for reasons that remain underexplored, political participation among mainland Puerto Ricans lags considerably behind other Latino national-origin groups, and more curiously, behind voters on the island as well. As Louis DeSipio noted in 2006, “Despite these relatively equal opportunities to participate politically in the United States or in Puerto Rico, turnout in Puerto Rican Elections is approximately twice as high as Puerto Rican participation in mainland elections.”12 DeSipio cites the differences between the island and the mainland in electoral institutions (including different political parties) and the absence of meaningful party mobilization on the mainland; he also points out that politics on the island is based in different issues, including most obviously the future status of the island as a US state or an independent nation. The effect is significant: Puerto Rican turnout hovers around 40% on the mainland but is more than twice that on the island. The undermobilization of Puerto Ricans remains a missed opportunity in terms of Latino impact on the US political system.
Nativity and Generation
Approximately 40% of all Latinos in the United States are foreign-born. This number understates, however, the role of nativity in Latino political life. About 34% of the Latino population is under the age of eighteen, but 93% of those young people are US citizens, with just 1% naturalized and 92% native-born. By contrast, 52% of adult Latinos are foreign-born, less than one-third of whom (31% of the total) have naturalized to US citizenship.13 While these percentages vary significantly by state, they point to two important facts about the Latino population: only 64% of the adults are citizens of the United States, and naturalized citizens make up just 25% of the total. An additional share of this population, island-born Puerto Ricans, may not be US citizens through naturalization but have still experienced the economic, social, and linguistic challenges of migration.
Place of birth can shape attitudes and engagement in American politics in three important ways. First, embarking on the path to migration and citizenship is a profoundly self-selecting choice. Those who migrate are arguably different from their countrymen who do not, and moving from immigrant status to citizenship is even more demanding. In the past, the naturalization process was primarily driven by life events—marriage, childbirth, and the like—and naturalized immigrants voted less often than native citizens.14 More recently, however, there is considerable evidence that immigrants choose to naturalize in response to political events, particularly rhetoric, initiatives, and legislation that target immigrants. Among the consequences of politically driven naturalization may well be a higher propensity to turn out for elections.15
Second, foreign-born citizens may hold beliefs and expectations about politics that are
rooted in their home-country experience. Sergio Wals has demonstrated that variations in nation of birth can shape turnout propensity and that foreign-born citizens’ experience with democracy (or lack thereof) may affect both their expectations of the US political system and their orientation toward it.16
Finally, for obvious reasons, immigrants who arrive after school age become familiar with the US political system as adults. Melissa Michelson has observed a curious process of adverse socialization: foreign-born citizens have a more favorable view of US politics than their US-born children and grandchildren, a finding confirmed elsewhere with regard to efficacy.17 Foreign-born citizens are also more likely to identify as independents than as partisans.18 In addition, they are less likely to see what they have in common with African Americans. “Becoming” American seems to bring with it a growing familiarity with US political coalitions, an increasing awareness of racial hierarchies in American society, and decreasing satisfaction with American institutions and processes.
TABLE 2.3Selected Markers of Latino Assimilation and Acculturation, by Generation, 2006
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Latino National Survey, 2006.
a. Includes noncitizens.
The passage of generations, in theory, has the potential to erode the political distinctiveness of Latino citizens across national-origin groups and between Latinos and non-Latinos. As data from the Latino National Survey reveal (see Table 2.3), Latinos in later generations are significantly more likely to marry non-Latinos (as reflected in the declining frequency of Hispanic surnames) and to experience substantial economic and educational mobility; they are also less likely to retain their Catholic identity and significantly less likely to speak Spanish.
It is certainly the case that assimilation and acculturation produce changes in the political behavior of later generations. These changes can vary in form and function over time. For example, while self-reported electoral participation increases monotonically over generations, participation in ethnically based political activities—including attendance at protests and rallies and membership in organizations—increases through the first two generations but decreases thereafter.19
The Effects of In-Group Variation
There are at least as many similarities as differences among national-origin groups, generations, and nativities. For example, speaking Spanish and retaining Latino cultural practices are widely shared commitments across cohorts. Community and identity are enormously unifying factors.
A critical dynamic in maintaining such commonalities is the ongoing debate over immigration and policy toward undocumented immigrants. It has become increasingly clear that political views are substantially unified in response to perceived attacks on the community, notwithstanding the impact of nativity and generation. A perfect example is the Latino community’s reaction to the passage of SB 1070 in Arizona, the “papers please” law that allows police to identify undocumented aliens during virtually any contact with the public. Just a week after the bill was signed into law, opposition among Latino registered voters transcended generational boundaries: a poll conducted by the National Council of La Raza, the Service Employees International Union, and Latino Decisions showed that supermajorities of all generations opposed the law (see Figure 2.5). Two especially revealing facts are worth noting from the poll. First, all respondents were citizens and registered voters—that is, they were the most secure and incorporated Latino members of Arizona society. Second, the fourth-generation respondents were limited to individuals whose grandparents were US-born and who would thus have been long established as members of American society.
How were the citizens polled interpreting this law, which ostensibly is aimed at undocumented immigrants? Their consensus probably arose from a widespread expectation that transcended generation: that enforcement would involve racial profiling and therefore could threaten all Latinos (see Figure 2.6). These 2010 findings from Arizona are deeply reminiscent of the impact of Proposition 187 in California and other anti-Latino or anti-immigrant actions, which appear to have had large-scale and significant political effects on Latinos across generations.20 Issues that cut to the heart of ethnic identity are particularly likely to transcend differences in nativity, generation, or national-origin group.
FIGURE 2.5Support for, and Opposition to, SB 1070 among Arizona Latino Registered Voters, May 2010
Respondents answered the following question: “Arizona has passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an illegal immigrant, and would charge anyone with trespassing who is not carrying proof of legal status when questioned by the police, and also prohibit immigrants from working as day laborers. From what you have heard, do you [rotate: support or oppose] the new immigration law in Arizona?” Source: Figure created by authors using data from National Council of La Raza/Service Employees International Union (SEIU)/Latino Decisions Arizona Poll, April–May 2010.
Though there is plenty of evidence of substantial similarity across what is in many ways a diverse population, Latinos have until recently been a step shy of establishing a sense of group identity—that is, an awareness of commonality that in the electoral arena could provide the political coherence required for mobilization and collective action. However, as suggested by the cross-generational Latino reaction to some issues, such as anti-immigrant initiatives, Latino commonalities are now gelling into such an identity.
FIGURE 2.6The Estimation of Arizona Latino Registered Voters of the Likelihood that Non-Immigrants Would Be Caught Up in Enforcement of SB 1070, May 2010
Respondents answered the following question: “How likely do you think it is that Latinos who are legal immigrants or US citizens will get stopped or questioned by the police? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not likely at all?” Source: Figure created by authors using data from National Council of La Raza/SEIU/Latino Decisions Arizona Poll, April–May 2010.
When the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) was completed in 1989, it revealed little evidence for the possibility that Latinos saw themselves as a “group” in any meaningful sense of the word.21 The vast majority of LNPS respondents understood themselves in terms of separate national identities and had little sense of a politically significant pan-ethnic identity.22 However, a mountain of evidence now suggests that this social reality has changed. The Latino National Survey completed in 2006 found very high levels of identification with pan-ethnic terminology: at least 87.6% of respondents said that they thought of themselves in these terms “somewhat strongly” or “very strongly.” Moreover, when asked to choose between national-origin identifiers, the pan-ethnic term, or merely “American” (an arbitrary, forced choice that only an academic could devise), more than one-third of the respondents chose the pan-ethnic identifier (38.3%). One of us, as part of the LNS team, has argued that this forced choice was artificial, that identities are multiple and simultaneous.23 Nevertheless, the change between 1989 and 2006 reflects a significant shift in how Latinos or Hispanics envision themselves as part of the national fabric.
Moreover, in 2006 Latinos from all groups perceived significant commonality and linked fates with other Latinos, even those from national-origin groups other than their own. Surprisingly, when the LNS assessed whether respondents felt that they and their national-origin group shared political, economic, and social conditions with other Latinos, an overwhelming 71.9% said that they had “some” or “a lot” in common with other Latinos in “thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income.” When the question was posed with respect to the respondent’s national-origin group, 74.6% said that their group had “some” or “a lot” in common with Latinos of other national-origin groups. Although there was some variation, the fact that these results were largely consistent across national-origin groups suggests that this pan-ethnic identification may have social and political relevance.
When the LNS focused on political concerns, the level of perceived commonality was again high, though lower than on the social dimension. In “thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation,” 56.1% of respondents felt that as individuals they had “some” or “a lot” in common with other Latinos, and 64.4% felt the same when assessing what their own national-origin group had in common with others.
Finally, respondents were asked whether their fate and their group’s fate were linked to the fate of other Latinos—the “linked fate” measure first described by political scientist Michael Dawson.24 At the individual level, 63.4% said that their fate was linked “some” or “a lot” to the fate of others. When asked about the fate of their national-origin group relative to other Latino groups, 71.6% said that the two were linked “some” or “a lot.” Thus, huge majorities of Latinos believe that their own futures and those of their coethnics are intrinsically linked.
The belief that Latinos and their futures are linked is very likely to have motivated recent group-based mobilization. Most major national organizations, political and otherwise, use pan-ethnic terminology and view the Latino constituency as being composed of the entire Latino population—both across generations and, most important, across nationality groups. The National Council of La Raza, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, and the Univision and Telemundo television networks all define their constituency as the pan-ethnic Latino or Hispanic population.
Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation Page 3
