Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation

by Matt Barreto, Gary Segura

  Chapter 6

  NOVEMBER 2008: THE LATINO VOTE IN OBAMA’S GENERAL ELECTION LANDSLIDE

  With Loren Collingwood, Sylvia Manzano, and Ali Valenzuela

  History will record that on the day Barack Obama was elected to the presidency, he received overwhelming support from the Latino electorate.* On election night, the exit polls reported that Latinos had comprised approximately 9% of the voter turnout and that Barack Obama had received two-thirds (67%) of their ballots. Some estimates were even higher.

  Did that matter?

  How Latinos voted is not in dispute, but the two bigger questions regarding the 2008 election are these. First, why the enthusiasm for Obama? George W. Bush had managed to get somewhere north of 40% of the Latino vote just four years earlier. John McCain was a longtime and noted champion of immigration reform, and as a consequence the issue of immigration played almost no role in the general election of 2008. On the basis of recent history and the specific policy positions of the two nominees on the key Latino issue, there was no reason to have assumed that Obama would do so well. Second, was the Latino vote influential in the election? Since the Latino margin was smaller than the total vote margin—Obama’s victory in 2008 was broad, deep, and overwhelming in the Electoral College—the simplest calculation was that Latinos had no effect on the outcome.

  In this chapter, we address both of these questions and offer a theory for evaluating group influence in presidential elections.

  WHY DID LATINOS SUPPORT OBAMA IN 2008?

  Did Latinos vote for Barack Obama just because of the pattern of minorities supporting the Democratic Party? Was it that Latinos, compared to whites, have lower household income and that such working-class voters are more likely to support the Democratic Party? Or are other factors also at play? We certainly need to examine the divides in the Latino community that we identified in Chapter 2—naturalized versus native, the differences between national-origin groups—to see whether they had any effect. We need to examine the possibility that characteristics specific to Latinos as a political group played a role. Finally, what can we say about race and the 2008 election specifically with respect to how racial sentiments may or may not have shaped the views of whites and Hispanics toward Obama? This is a topic we began to explore in the last chapter.

  We think the story of the 2008 election among Latinos—that is, understanding which Latinos supported President Obama and why—requires us to focus on five key factors. First, there were two issues that weighed heavily for Latinos—the economy and the Iraq War. Both tilted heavily against the incumbent party and its nominee. Second, Latinos got significantly more Democratic in the wake of two failed attempts at immigration reform in 2006 and 2007. Despite McCain’s bona fides on the issue, Latinos were more likely to vote Democrat across every category of partisan identification. Third, some Latino-specific characteristics had a significant effect on vote choice in 2008, including national-origin differences, generation, and nativity. Fourth, we show that the growing strength of Latino group identity and pan-ethnic consciousness contributed to the Democratic vote. Finally, we consider again the highly charged claims regarding Latino citizens’ propensity (or lack thereof) to vote for black candidates, first articulated by the Clinton campaign’s Latino pollster, Sergio Bendixen.1

  THE 2008 ISSUE ENVIRONMENT FOR LATINOS: IRAQ AND THE ECONOMY

  Latinos generally have a very favorable opinion of the military.2 Historically, the military has served as one venue for Latinos to increase their educational and job opportunities and assimilate in this country.3 As the United States went to war with Iraq in 2003, Latino involvement in the conflict was high, and soon it became evident that Latinos were disproportionately suffering war deaths.

  There were extensive casualties in the first year of the war among Latino soldiers, many of whom were serving in lower-level infantry positions.4 USA Today reported that, while Latinos were just 10.5% of the military at that time, they made up 17% of US combat forces (higher than their share of the population) and over 11% of those who were killed in action.5 The salience of the war was raised among Latino voters because military recruiters focused more on Latino youth, many of whom chose military service as a path to citizenship or to escape poor educational and employment opportunities in the civilian sector.

  Even early in the war, Latino attitudes had soured on Iraq, and the Pew Hispanic Center reported that Latinos had a more negative view than other Americans.6 As it became clearer to the American public that there were no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, many in the Latino community began to question why so many Latino soldiers had been put at risk in the conflict. In 2004, Senator John Kerry tapped into the frustration with the Iraq War and made this a major campaign issue. Indeed, published research on the 2004, election found that Latinos with family members in military service were more likely to support Kerry, contrary to a national trend of support for President George W. Bush among military families.7 Further, those Latinos who believed that Latinos were being disproportionately affected by war casualties were the most likely to cast a vote for Kerry in 2004.

  FIGURE 6.1The Latino Vote in 2004, by Opinion on Latino Military Service

  Iraq continued as a major issue for Latinos and non-Latinos alike in the 2006 midterm elections. By then, many Americans believed that President Bush had misled the public and provided misinformation about the administration’s true motives for the war. The number of American casualties in Iraq had hit 3,000 in 2006, and Latinos continued to be disproportionately affected. As they had done in 2004, Latino voters in 2006 identified opposition to the Iraq War as one of the major issues in their vote choice. According to a poll by the Latino Policy Coalition in September 2006, 64% of Latino voters said that a candidate’s position on the Iraq War was “very important” in how they would vote, while 56% said that Bush’s handling of Iraq had made them more likely to vote Democratic in the 2006 midterms. In fact, by April 2007 another Latino Policy Coalition Survey found that 46% of Latino registered voters had a close friend or family member serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, and that two-thirds of all Latino voters felt that the Iraq War had been a mistake.

  Because Hillary Clinton had voted to authorize US force in Iraq in 2003, Barack Obama decided early on to make his opposition to the Iraq War a major campaign issue in 2008. He anticipated that this would create a clear division between him and Clinton and help him with more liberal voters, who were growing increasingly frustrated and upset over the billions of dollars in expenditures on the war and the thousands of US war casualties. Because of his consistent opposition to Iraq and the inconsistency of John McCain—who sought to criticize President Bush at times while also supporting stronger military involvement—Obama leaned into the Iraq War issue in 2008, and this may have helped position him with Latinos. Even a year out from the election, Pew reported that two-thirds of all Latinos wanted the United States to withdraw its forces.8

  In the months prior to the 2008 election, Latino Decisions polled in the four battleground states of Colorado, Florida, Nevada, and New Mexico. In those four states (all of which would switch from the GOP to the Democratic side that November), opposition to the Iraq War was palpable. In Florida, 61% of Latino registered voters said that the war was not worth fighting, while in the other three states that number ranged from 74.7% to 78.1%. In terms of policy preference, 76.4% in Florida favored either beginning troop reductions or immediately withdrawing. In the other three states, that number was over 80%.

  According to a Latino Decisions poll in November 2008, Latino attitudes on Iraq were directly related to their vote choice in 2008. For example, among those who felt that the current policy in Iraq was working and should be continued, 74% said that they cast a ballot for John McCain. In contrast, those who said that they favored an immediate withdrawal of US forces voted 83% in support of Barack Obama. Of course, the overwhelming preponderance of Latino voters favored withdrawal and so voted for Obama. Not only was the Iraq War a mobilizing iss
ue for Latinos in 2008, but it may have even eclipsed other policy issues like immigration and health care in delivering votes to Obama. For example, Obama won an estimated 73% among Latinos who agreed that it was very important for Congress and the president to pass immigration reform in 2009, and 77% of Latinos who supported a shift to universal health insurance voted for Obama in 2008—both of those figures being below the 83% of the vote Obama won among Latinos who favored an immediate withdrawal from Iraq.9

  FIGURE 6.2The Latino Vote in 2008, by Preferred Policy Position on Iraq

  The salience of the Iraq conflict and the intensity with which its costs were felt and visited upon Latino voters surely had an effect in the 2008 election. Because then-Senator Obama made opposition to the war a cornerstone of his campaign, he was able to draw a particularly stark difference between himself and his opponent. Senator McCain was an outspoken supporter of the war, both at its inception and during the election, and was generally regarded as a “hawk” on military matters, not entirely surprising given his own life history and military career.

  The economic catastrophe of the fall of 2008 was a similarly focusing issue, though one hardly unique to Latinos. Nevertheless, as discussed in earlier chapters, Latinos are particularly vulnerable to the fluctuations of economic cycles; like other low-income people, they have a narrow margin for weathering tough times.

  Senator McCain was never credible on the economy issue, particularly after pronouncing in Jacksonville, Florida, on the morning of September 15 (repeating a claim from a month earlier) that “the fundamentals of our economy are strong.” Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection just hours later. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 504 points that day.

  The electoral impact can be seen directly in the movement of states from the GOP to the Democratic column in 2008. When Latino Decisions conducted polls just six weeks out from the election in the four key battleground states (Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, and Florida, all four of which cast their electoral votes for Bush in 2004), the results in three of those states showed an overwhelming preference for Senator Obama among Latino voters, ranging from 67% to 71%. Only in Florida was the contest within the margin of error at that time. Latino voters in that state gave us an earful on the economy, which was their top priority. More than one-third reported having had trouble paying their mortgage in the past year.10 By December 2008, just a month after the election and just three months since the crisis had begun, Pew found that nearly 10% of Latino homeowners had missed a mortgage payment, and more than one-third (36%) were worried about being foreclosed.11

  Even if McCain had been personally credible on economic issues, the incumbent administration is generally blamed for economic struggles, and the Bush administration ineptitude in handling the crisis proved to be an obstacle that McCain could not overcome with Latino voters (or, indeed, with the American public at large). The issue environment, both domestically and internationally, made the 2008 election a steep climb for the McCain campaign. As history shows, it was too much to overcome.

  PARTISAN EFFECTS ON THE LATINO VOTE IN 2008

  Party identification is a powerful predictor of vote choice for all Americans, and Latinos are no exception. The effects are not necessarily consistent, however, across elections and groups. Zoltan Hajnal and Taeku Lee have found that foreign-born Americans frequently have weaker party attachments and are more likely to identify with “none of the above” in terms of political parties.12 Moreover, Latino Decisions has repeatedly found that a clear majority of Latinos—52% in a 2013 poll—have voted Republican at least once in their life, a significant share of the group given recent outcomes at the presidential and congressional levels.

  In the data from the 2008 American National Election Study, party identification had a similar impact for whites and Latinos; however, the size of the effects and the degree of certainty surrounding our estimates reveal striking differences. The top graph of page 101, Figure 6.3, illustrates the predicted probability that a non-Hispanic white citizen voted for John McCain. As whites move along a seven-point party identification scale, a very predictable vote outcome emerges, with very few exceptions. The shaded band illustrates the confidence interval—effectively, how much uncertainty there is around each estimate based on the number of respondents at each level of partisanship who did not end up near the predicted probability. As is apparent, the estimates are very good. Party is a strong and accurate predictor of votes among white voters, controlling for other factors.

  We should note, however, that the graph does not start at the origin. That is, for the strongest Democrats the probability of voting for McCain is just under 0.2. That means that, in these data, the model predicts that just under 20% of white strong Democrats will vote for McCain. Our model predicts significant defection among white Democrats. At the opposite end, nearly all white strong Republicans are predicted to vote for McCain.

  Now examine Figure 6.4, the predicted probability that Latinos will vote for McCain. There are two important differences here compared to the graph for non-Hispanic whites. Although there is an upward slope, the distribution is shifted. Among strong Democrats, our model predicts virtually no McCain votes. That is, strong Latino Democrats are more reliably likely to vote for Obama than strong white Democrats, all other things being equal. At the opposite end, the McCain vote still trails partisan identification. Even among self-identified strong Latino Republicans, only about 80% are expected to vote for McCain, leaving a residual 20% support for Obama. Strong Latino Republicans, then, were significantly less reliable in supporting their party’s nominee in 2008, John McCain.

  The uncertainty in the Latino graph is increasingly large and unstable as we move from strong Democrats to strong Republicans. In practice, the model predicts a wider and wider distribution of the likelihood of voting for McCain at each level—so much so that a Latino weak Republican (point 6) has between a 36% and 100% chance of voting Republican. For whites at the same point (weak Republican), the probability of voting Republican is between 83% and 91%.

  The takeaway is twofold. First, white Republicans and Latino Democrats were more reliable voters in 2008 than their opposite counterparts. The Latino distribution was shifted toward Obama at every level of partisanship. The issues of the economy and Iraq combined with two years of bruising immigration battles that led to no legislation to move Latinos across the political spectrum away from Senator McCain and toward Senator Obama. And second, for Latino Republicans, partisanship was a weak effect and a terribly inefficient predictor of vote. Lots of Latino Republicans voted for McCain, of course—indeed, most of them did—but many of them did not.

  FIGURES 6.3 AND 6.4The Relationship between Party Identification and Vote Choice, 2008

  SPECIFIC LATINO CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR EFFECTS

  National-Origin Differences To begin our discussion of the effects of specific Latino characteristics on the 2008 election, we consider country of ancestry. Cubans demonstrated the highest Republican vote share in previous research, but other national-origin groups showed some variation in 2008.13 Latinos of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin were statistically more likely to vote for Obama, while Latinos of South American origin were less likely to vote for Obama; a majority of South American Latinos still did vote for Obama, but their rates were noticeably lower than those of voters of Mexican or Puerto Rican ancestry.

  Cuban Americans, on the other hand, demonstrated majority support for McCain. Cuban Americans have historically differed from other Latino groups on ideological and policy matters, largely as a consequence of Fidel Castro’s takeover of the island and the influx of large numbers of Cubans seeking political asylum in the United States. These refugees came with significant resources—which was one reason why they chose to flee the island—and received substantial assistance from the United States. GOP anticommunism and a residual resentment of the Kennedy administration combined with this history to help form the Cuban American identity as a Republican group. Cuba
ns also face no immigration hurdle once they reach the US mainland.

  Cuban interest groups, such as the Cuban American National Foundation, have worked hard to preserve this identity. But younger Cuban Americans are increasingly thinking and acting more like other Latino populations, and the eventual deaths of Fidel and Raul Castro may further erode the GOP identification of this group.

  Generation and Nativity A second key factor in ethnic-specific literature is generation status—most importantly, whether the subject is foreign-born or a US-born citizen. Immigration and naturalization, particularly for Mexicans but also for Dominicans and other Central and South Americans, is an exhausting and educative process that requires significant contact with the federal bureaucracy. Those seeking US citizenship through naturalization must merge their political socialization in the home country with their new experiences in the United States, and the difficult life circumstances faced by migrants on both sides of the border often come into play. Thus, we expected that generation—and in particular, status as a foreign-born citizen—would significantly affect the likelihood that Latinos would vote for Obama.

  In the end, first-generation immigrants were the most likely to vote for Obama in 2008; there was a small but statistically significant increase in the probability of voting for McCain among second-, third-, and fourth-generation US-born Latinos. Again, we find that, across generations, a majority of Latinos voted for Obama, but there was a stair-step pattern to their voting: with each successive generation, McCain increased his vote share. The relatively older Cuban population may have had some impact on this outcome.