Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation

by Matt Barreto, Gary Segura

  In addition to looking at these states individually, we can use the same logic to assess the probability that these Latino and black swing states were critical to the overall presidential election result. Taking these state results together, the probability that Latinos and blacks combined swung the election to Obama in 2012 was 67.5%.

  TABLE 8.4State-Level Model Estimates of the Probability that Latino Voters, African American Voters, or Latino and African American Voters Combined Were Pivotal to Battleground State Outcomes in 2012

  DISCUSSION: EVALUATING LATINO VOTING INFLUENCE ON THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

  Based on the actual election day results we used in our simulation, Florida and Colorado were essential elements of Latino Electoral College voting power. In nearly every one of the simulation runs in which the outcome hinged on a set of states that were each decided within the margin of plausible Latino influence, these two states (worth thirty-eight electoral votes) were in that set. Given how closely contested Florida was, the high percentage of registered Latino voters in the state, the large number of electoral votes at stake there (twenty-nine), and the state’s relative heterogeneity in partisanship, it is hardly a surprise that Florida is currently the linchpin of Latino power. Nevada was close behind Florida and Colorado, appearing in over 90% of the simulation runs where the outcome hinged on Latino influence.

  The probability of African American influence was about ten points higher than the probability of Latino influence in 2012, according to our measure; several states appeared in the pivotal set (Ohio, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida) in at least 90% of the simulation runs decided within the margin of plausible variability for black turnout and vote choice. Together with Pennsylvania (88%), these states accounted for nearly one hundred votes in the Electoral College. Other than Florida, there was no overlap between the top Latino-influence states and the top black-influence states in 2012. And yet these results, taken together, point to the possibility of a minority coalition that could swing a presidential election outcome by making far more states potentially pivotal while producing state outcomes driven by a combined Latino and African American turnout and vote choice. In states where the power of African American or Latino voters would become manifest only in the event of a very close contest, it is much more likely that the combined numbers (and any uncertainty over those numbers) would be instrumental in a victory.

  A fascinating consequence of the complementary demographic strengths of blacks and Latinos is that their voting power taken together is stronger—potentially quite a bit stronger—than the voting power of each bloc taken alone. As we reported in Table 8.3, in Wisconsin the probability of Latinos swinging the state outcome was around 4% and the same probability for blacks was around 7%, but the probability of blacks’ and Latinos’ combined influence was 18.3%. In Nevada the results are even more dramatic. While Latinos are estimated to have been pivotal with a probability of 0.37 and blacks with a probability of 0.10, the two groups taken together are far more formidable: the estimated probability that Nevada would be decided by a margin smaller than the combined plausible variability of blacks and Latinos was over 90%! Although Latino and black voters, taken separately, had between a 16% and 34% chance of being instrumental to the outcome of the 2012 presidential election, together they reached over a 60% chance of influence measured in this manner.

  LOOKING AHEAD TO 2016

  Without question, US Census Bureau data indicate that the population of Latino adult citizens will continue to grow across every state. Accompanying these demographic changes will be political changes as states begin to appear more competitive and attract the interest of the campaign strategists who map out strategies toward collecting 270 Electoral College votes for their candidate. The three-point margin of defeat for Democratic US Senate candidate Richard Carmona in Arizona in 2012, for example, suggests that Arizona is moving from leaning Republican to being a toss-up as 2016 approaches. As that happens, the Latino voters who account for roughly 20% of the electorate will become manifestly relevant. If Latino turnout is high, Democrats may benefit. If the GOP changes course in Arizona and courts the Latino vote with sincerity, the party may be able to keep Arizona a “leans Republican” state. Whatever the outcome, Arizona is a state to watch in 2016 and could be the newest addition to the list of battleground states with sizable Latino electorates.

  Another state that has drawn a lot of recent attention because of its Latino electorate is Texas. After twenty-four consecutive years of Republican governors, Texas is emerging as a “pre-battleground” state. Although it is less likely to be competitive in 2016 than Arizona, the demographic changes in Texas are hard to discount. Civic groups that focus on voter registration and voter turnout are flooding the Lone Star State to register the 2 million Latinos who are eligible but not yet registered to vote. If these groups make even a dent in the rate of Latino voter registration, and ultimately the voter turnout rate, Texas could very quickly become fertile ground for Latino influence. In addition to the untapped potential of the Latino electorate, much has been made about the potential mobilizing power of Julian and Joaquin Castro as potential statewide candidates for governor, attorney general, or US senator in future Texas elections. With voter registration drives and a Castro on the ticket, Texas is very likely to be competitive by 2018 or 2020, and the reason will be Latino voters.

  Beyond Arizona and Texas, which have quite significant Latino populations, our data suggest that Virginia, North Carolina, Iowa, Ohio, and Georgia could soon become strongly Latino-influenced. These states are now witnessing very close elections year after year, and all have a Latino citizen adult population that is growing dramatically. The potential for synergistic black-Latino power in new immigrant destination states in the South such as North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia, as well as states in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic, such as Ohio, Iowa, and Pennsylvania, may have radical implications for the long-term future of presidential politics in the United States.

  As the story of the 2012 election made clear, Republican candidates’ rhetoric and policy approaches to immigration, even in a period when economic concerns were dominating the political headlines, pose a nearly insurmountable stumbling block to the ability of the GOP to improve its electoral fortunes. Endorsing “self-deportation,” more border spending, the denial of in-state college tuition to undocumented immigrants, and “papers please” laws like SB 1070 and declaring Arizona—ground zero in the anti-immigration movement of the last few years—a “model for the nation” are policy positions that appear highly unlikely to reverse GOP fortunes among Latino voters.

  In contrast, Democrats mustered a comparatively aggressive outreach campaign that included advertisements, voter mobilization, and targeted appeals. These efforts were considerably more successful after eleventh-hour changes in policy were made by the Obama administration—specifically, deferred action for DREAM-eligible young people—the Supreme Court issued its mixed ruling on SB 1070, and the Romney campaign reacted to these events. A fair evaluation of the dynamics of the 2012 campaign among Latinos, however, would concede that the GOP push was a much stronger factor than the Democratic pull, and that Latinos have yet to reveal their full political potential.

  Latinos—alone and in coalition with African Americans—have gained newfound political power that, to date, has benefited Democrats almost exclusively. How this came to be and the long-term implications of the immigration issue for how Latinos will reshape the American political system are the questions to which we turn next.

  *An earlier version of part of this chapter appeared online and is forthcoming in print as Loren Collingwood, Matt Barreto, and Sergio I. Garcia-Rios, “Revisiting Latino Voting: Cross-Racial Mobilization in the 2012 Election,” Political Research Quarterly (2014).

  Part III

  THE LATINO AGENDA

  Chapter 9

  THE PROP 187 EFFECT: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA

  With Elizabeth Bergman,
David Damore, and Adrian Pantoja

  Attempting to separate “Latino” politics from “immigration” politics is a fool’s errand. While Latinos care about the same issues as other Americans (economic opportunity, education, health care), as Table 9.1 illustrates, immigration sits at or near the top of the Latino agenda. The economic collapse of 2008 and its subsequent effects drew attention to economic concerns, but as we approach the 2014 midterm elections it is immigration that is the priority of Latino registered voters.

  Repeated polling over the last several years by Latino Decisions and others has made it clear that a large share of Latino registered voters are intimately connected to individuals who are affected by immigration policy. A stunning 67% of Latino registered voters nationwide reported knowing an undocumented person personally. Moreover, most of those connections were familial: 51% of respondents who reported knowing one or more persons without documentation identified a family member as undocumented.

  TABLE 9.1The Most Important Problems for Latino Registered Voters, 2012 and 2013

  Source: Latino Decisions election eve poll, November 2012, and Latino Decisions/America’s Voice poll, July 2013.

  Yet, despite the intimacy of Latinos’ deep and close connections to immigration, both political parties have routinely misunderstood those connections—especially the Republican Party. In fact, over the last decade the GOP’s rhetoric has become increasingly hostile toward immigrants, especially Latinos, and its policy prescriptions have moved further and further to the right. As a result, Latinos and other minorities are increasingly casting their ballots for Democrats.

  In this chapter, we assess the electoral consequences of anti-immigrant politics. We begin at the national level by contrasting the GOP’s present positioning and politics to George W. Bush’s handling of immigration, and then we take an in-depth look at California.

  GOP IMMIGRATION POLITICS: BEFORE AND AFTER GEORGE W. BUSH

  While serving as the governor of Texas between 1995 and 2000, George W. Bush never went down the anti-immigrant path, though it might have been easy for him to do so. Instead, he supported a compromise response to the Fifth Circuit Court’s decision in Hopwood: pending the re-hearing in Fisher, that compromise ensured the continued presence of minority students at the University of Texas after the university’s affirmative action policy was struck down.1 His efforts as president to reach out to Latinos were notable. Bush was the first president in American history to deliver a speech (a weekly radio address) entirely in Spanish. He and his chief political adviser, Karl Rove, firmly believed that future GOP growth would be among Hispanics. Bush was rewarded for his efforts in this vein when an estimated 40% of Latinos voted for his reelection in 2004.

  FIGURES 9.1 AND 9.2Types of Interpersonal Connections between Undocumented Immigrants and Latino Registered Voters, June 2013

  However, not all Republicans were supportive of the Bush-Rove strategy of Latino outreach, and soon after the 2004 election, conservative Republicans in the US House of Representatives began to ratchet up their anti-immigration efforts. In December 2005, Congressman James Sensenbrenner, then chair of the House Judiciary Committee, authored HR 4437, which proposed making undocumented status a felony and, by extension, creating a lifetime ban on US citizenship for any individual in the country without proper documentation.

  The reaction to HR 4437 was immediate and widespread: the 2006 immigration rights marches turned out more than 3 million people in over 150 American cities and provided some of the impetus for immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007. In both years, members of the Senate came close to agreement but were unable to overcome the opposition to move the legislation forward. As a consequence of these failures, the last reform of the country’s immigration laws remained the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which was passed in 1986, during President Ronald Reagan’s second term.

  Examining Latino participation in the last four national elections captures the electoral repercussions of these legislative failures. While there was a good deal of finger-pointing among both parties and their allied interests as to who was responsible for derailing immigration reform, there was no such equivocation among Latino voters. According to exit polls, Latinos have increasingly and overwhelmingly favored Democratic candidates in the ensuing elections.

  Republicans, who once spoke compassionately about immigration reform, forfeited their standing on the issue and left the party with few if any credible immigration advocates.

  These dynamics are nothing new. Rather, what is happening nationally for the GOP is essentially a repetition on a grand scale of what occurred in California, beginning in the 1990s. Indeed, focusing on California enables us to observe at a finer level of analysis and over a longer period of time how immigration politics is capable of reshaping the political landscape.

  CALIFORNIA THEN AND NOW

  California is a Republican state—or at least it was a Republican state. From the end of World War II until 1994, Democrats lost every presidential election in the state save two—the Lyndon Johnson landslide over Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Bill Clinton’s plurality victory in 1992. The Democrats were two for ten over forty years. In gubernatorial elections, it was little better. Democrats won only four races during this period, to the Republicans’ nine.

  Moreover, between 1980 and 1994, Republicans were moving Latinos into the party. Field poll data make it clear that Latinos in the state were less Democratic every year between 1980 and 1994.2 Between 1980 and 1984, former California governor Ronald Reagan raised his share of the Latino vote from 35% to 45% while carrying 59% of the entire state as he cruised to his second term as president. In response to his strong showing, Reagan famously quipped to pollster Lionel Sosa that “Hispanics are Republicans, they just don’t know it.”

  But any movement among Latinos toward the GOP abruptly ended in 1994 with the passage of Proposition 187. That ballot initiative was a critical moment in Latino political development in California: it reversed the decade-plus drift in the state toward the GOP, mobilized over 1 million new Latino voter registrations, and consequently shifted the state firmly to the Democratic column in subsequent elections. Moreover, that shift back to the Democrats among Latinos occurred at precisely the moment when Latino population growth in California exploded.

  Today the Democratic Party controls every constitutional office in the state and holds supermajorities in both chambers of the California Legislature. At the federal level, both US senators are Democrats, as are thirty-nine of the state’s fifty-three-member delegation to the House of Representatives. The state has voted Democratic in the last six presidential elections, and in 2012 Barack Obama bested Mitt Romney 60% to 37%, with an electoral margin of over 3 million votes (which accounted for more than half of his national margin of 5 million). Although Latinos are not solely responsible for this margin of victory in California, they have proven critical in shifting the state legislature and the congressional delegation to the Democrats.

  Proposition 187, which required law enforcement agents to report any arrestee who violated immigration laws to the California Attorney General’s Office and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and prohibited unauthorized immigrants from accessing government services, including education, was championed by Republican governor Pete Wilson in his 1994 reelection bid. It would also form the cornerstone of his short-lived 1996 presidential bid. Although Proposition 187 passed with 59% of the vote, the bulk of its provisions were ruled unconstitutional in federal court. After an extended legal battle, California withdrew its legal defense in 1999 and that effectively killed the law.

  Emboldened by their success at the ballot box in 1994, conservatives qualified two other ballot measures consistent with the spirit of Proposition 187 in the next two elections: Proposition 209 (1996) sought to ban affirmative action in the state, and Proposition 227 (1998) significantly limited the state’s bilingual education program. As with Proposition 187, both ballot measures passed. In hindsight
, however, it was clear that any victories achieved by the proponents of these ballot measures and their GOP allies were fleeting at best, while the long-term consequences have been disastrous.

  TABLE 9.2Population and Voter Registration Growth in California, by Race/Ethnicity, 1994–2004

  The timing of these ballot measures could hardly have been worse for California Republicans: they coincided with explosive growth in the state’s Latino electorate, a trend that has been extensively documented in political science research.3

  An overview of these trends is offered in Table 9.2, which reports population and voter registration growth in California from 1994 to 2004 broken down by racial and ethnic group. Overall, California grew by nearly 15% (or 4.6 million people) during this period, but this growth was almost entirely driven by Latinos and Asian Americans. Similarly, Latinos and Asian Americans were the primary drivers of growth in voter registration. Between 1994 and 2004, the state of California added an estimated 1.8 million newly registered voters, of which 66% were Latino and 23% were Asian, leaving just 11% of new voters who were either white or black.