Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation

by Matt Barreto, Gary Segura

  This chapter began with the political battle over a solid-waste transfer station in Pomona, California. Whether the city council ultimately approves the building of this facility remains an open question at the time of this writing. Given the prevailing stereotypes about Latinos and their environmental attitudes, proponents of the waste transfer station may not have anticipated the fierce Latino opposition. Perhaps one reason why Pomona was selected for the facility rather than its wealthier neighbor Claremont was precisely because most of its residents are low-income immigrants. Claremont is a wealthy Anglo American city that prides itself on its environmental consciousness. Our survey shows, however, that Latinos also care deeply about the environment and have much to say about air pollution, climate change, and other environmental issues. Latinos are determined to take part in politics and engage in national debates on a wide range of issues. When it comes to protecting the environment, Latinos are eager to have their voices heard, even if some Americans seem unaware that Latinos have something to say at all.

  *Adrian Pantoja is the lead coauthor of this chapter.

  Chapter 13

  SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

  We have made the case in these last pages that Latinos have the capacity to reshape the American political system and in fact have begun to do so. As a consequence of both their growing numbers and the ability (or inability) of the political parties to accommodate them, Latinos have completely reshaped California politics, begun to have a national impact in Senate elections and the presidential popular vote, and become politically engaged in a widening variety of issues.

  Almost without exception, the majority of Latino political attitudes fall on the side of collectivism and mutual responsibility—the belief that government can and should act to improve the lives of citizens. Latinos have not shown themselves to be a monolithic bloc—there are too many differences among them to expect lockstep unity. For instance, though they vote overwhelmingly and increasingly Democratic, more than half of all Latino voters have cast at least one GOP vote in an election. Nevertheless, recent elections have revealed a growing Democratic unity among Latino voters, and recent polls on Latino views of pan-ethnicity highlight a sense of group identity, across nationality groups, that is strong and growing stronger. Not only are Latinos an electoral group, but they are having a systematic impact on the electoral arena.

  We are cautious, of course, about oversimplifying the positions of Latinos. Even today, one-quarter of the Latino electorate remains reliably Republican, and there is every reason to expect that should the GOP revise and improve its outreach and messaging to Latinos—and get the issue of immigration reform off the table—the party could easily recover and collect one-third of Latino votes, or maybe more.

  Moreover, politics sometimes changes. One hundred years ago, African Americans were understood as a Republican constituency group, which is hardly imaginable today. African Americans shifted in their ideological and partisan preferences over the years, however, as events and new issues arose, and the same could happen with Latinos. Indeed, we already have an example of a Latino electorate moving right—the Latinos of California prior to the passage of Proposition 187.1

  On the other hand, it is hard for us to conceive of a set of circumstances that would shift Latinos to the GOP in large numbers anytime soon, and we have three reasons for thinking so. First, the role of race in the GOP coalition is profound and dates back to Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” if not earlier. The GOP collects a hefty share of white working-class votes in the South. Racial diversification of the party might win Republicans some new nonwhite voters, but it could very well cost them votes among poor whites; deprived of race as a reason to vote Republican, this constituency might rethink its political allegiance to a party that has never represented it economically.

  Second, the religious engine of evangelical Christianity and Mormonism, which has played a powerful role in the GOP for so long, has proved far less effective at recruiting and retaining Latino voters. Latinos are deeply religious on average and attend church more often than non-Hispanic whites. But for Latinos, as we showed in Chapter 3, religion has little to do with voting, and even hot-button social issues do not appear to sway their political thinking.

  Finally, it is difficult to know who would lead such an outreach effort in the Republican Party. George W. Bush, with support from longtime adviser Karl Rove, made Latino outreach one of his priorities, giving speeches in Spanish and publicly embracing comprehensive immigration reform. For his efforts, he received a strong 40% of the Latino vote in 2004. But Bush’s outreach to Latinos and his immigration reform efforts were also repudiated by his party; when GOP legislators, rather than assisting Bush in his efforts, passed legislation declaring undocumented immigrants to be felons, they sent millions of people into the streets and into the voting booths. As the party has gotten more, rather than less, conservative on immigration issues, the question of who will lead the effort to improve the party’s relationship with Latinos remains unanswered.

  Political scientists, by and large, are loath to make predictions. The social world and human behavior are filled with way too many variables for them to be comfortable making predictions—and the further off in the future a prediction is, the worse it is apt to be. We cannot say for sure that the GOP will lose races in 2014 because of the growth in Latino voting power. But we would be comfortable betting that Republicans will lose races, in part because that outcome would be consistent with every national election in the last decade. We cannot say that the GOP is on its way to defeat in 2016. The right GOP candidate and the wrong Democratic candidate could combine to sway enough Latino voters and moderate whites to elect a Republican president. But we wouldn’t bet on it. In fact, barring an invasion or a profound economic collapse, both of us have a very difficult time seeing a Democrat lose the race for the White House in 2016.

  Demography may not be destiny, but it dramatically constrains the range of the possible. In 2012 the Democratic incumbent president was African American, presided during a period of nearly 8% unemployment, and—as a consequence—managed to poll only 39% of the white non-Hispanic vote. And he still won by more than 5 million votes! Latinos played a role in that victory—as did Asian Americans and most importantly African Americans. A lot would have to change in the thinking of those electorates for the GOP to prevail in a national election anytime soon.

  Limited time and space have prevented us from addressing here countless other aspects of Latino life in America. We have not been able to speak authoritatively about all of the social trends that affect Latinos, and apart from illustrating Latino disadvantages in education, we have said little about that area, knowing that there are volumes of good work on Latinos in the educational system. We have not offered a comprehensive overview of Latino opinion on all other issues—sometimes because their opinions were not important to their electoral behavior, and other times because their opinions were not meaningfully distinct from those of other Americans. In liking jobs, hating criminals, and knowing very little about international diplomacy, Latinos are exactly like most other Americans.

  In the coming years, Latinos will exert greater electoral and policy influence in states and communities across the country and in national politics as well. They have come to prominence in the American political realm as many before them have done—by making their way down a difficult path and going against the occasionally active resistance of the existing majority. What sets Latinos apart is their rapid rate of growth, which has led them to surpass all previous newcomer populations in size and, by extension, potential for political and social influence. The spasms of racial and xenophobic antagonism toward Latinos can in some ways be better understood if viewed from a perspective that accounts for how rapidly this population has changed socially and demographically.

  Latino Decisions has devoted the last seven years to watching these political developments, and all our polling suggests that major political change will follow from
the demographic changes we have observed. In California such change is already a reality, and as Latinos across the country continue to show up at the polls in ever greater numbers, the rest of America, we believe, will quickly catch up.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  First and foremost, we want to express our thanks and friendship to our partners in Latino Decisions, Mark Rosenkranz and Andrew Rosenkranz. The four of us have worked together since 2007 to build Latino Decisions from the ground up and we would not have succeeded without their partnership. We first hatched the idea of Latino Decisions with Mark and Andrew at Agua Verde, a restaurant near the University of Washington, when all four of us lived in Seattle. The research presented and analyzed in these pages is truly a joint effort with Mark and Andrew and would not be possible without their hard work and dedication to Latino Decisions.

  Second, Sylvia Manzano—now our third principal at Latino Decisions—came to work with us over three years ago after having started by relying on Latino Decisions’ data in her academic research and scholarship. In fact, Sylvia commissioned one of the earliest Latino Decisions studies—a poll of Latino voters in Texas during the March 2008 Obama–Clinton primary. As she likes to say, she was a customer before she became a team member. Sylvia has a very accomplished record as a social scientist, having published numerous research articles in academic journals and books, and also has a very accomplished record as a political consultant and pollster, having directed some of Latino Decisions’ largest projects during the 2012 election. Her work is pivotal to the growth and reach of Latino Decisions, and she co-authored several chapters in this book.

  Gabriel Sanchez, a nationally recognized political scientist at the University of New Mexico, was our very first employee and founder of the LD blog. Gabe has been a critical contributor since the earliest days of LD and much of the research and analysis presented in this book is a result of projects Gabe has been heavily involved with for more than five years during his collaboration with LD.

  Latino Decisions, like this book, represents a collection of smart and accomplished people, some of whom are contributors here and are rightfully listed as coauthors in many chapters. Our team of analysts and contributors amaze us with their insights and thoughtful, skilled, analysis. We are in their debt.

  The data collection team of Jessie (J-Loba) Wolf, Dan Fleetwood, Mike Nagai, Natalie Lutz, Juan Corona, Chelsea Benning, Phil Styf, Christine Jones, and dozens of skilled interviewers do an outstanding job of producing the raw material on which all LD analyses are based. We are particularly in debt to J-Loba, who has programmed (and/or copy-pasted) late into the night on too many occasions to help get us into the field in a timely and effective manner. Living the LD dream, Jessie, living the LD dream!

  Over the last seven years, we have had the privilege to work with, and for, some of the nation’s most effective advocates of Latinos and their full incorporation into American society. We are deeply in the debt of Lynn Tramonte, Clarissa Martinez de Castro, Evan Bacalao, Cristobal Alex, Adriana Quintero, Lourdes Torres, Rosalina Cardenas, Monica Lozano, Angie Kelly, Marshall Fitz, and Christopher Calhoun. To Ben Monterroso, who supported and believed in us from our very first days—before he even knew us yet!—thank you, Ben. An extra-special thanks to our friends and confidants Frank Sharry and Arturo Vargas, for being among our most enthusiastic clients, whose daily fight on behalf of Latinos—citizens and non-citizens alike—inspires us profoundly.

  Over the years, several people have taught us a great deal about how to navigate the waters of DC and have supported our growth and efforts as friends and clients. We owe great thanks to Joe Sudbay, Dina Siegal Vann, Maria Meier, Angela Arboleda, Jose Parra, Maria Cardona, Ruy Teixeira, Vanessa Cardenas, Marcelo Gaete, Tom Schaller, David Ayon, David Lublin, Cara Morris Stern, Alex Nogales, Mike Podhorzer, and Pili Tobar. Thank you.

  Chapter 4, on unengaged voters, benefitted greatly from the thinking of Arturo Vargas and Evan Bacalao, both of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, who commissioned the original project.

  The book benefitted greatly from the able research assistance of Kassra Oskooii at the UW. We thank the helpful folks at PublicAffairs, especially Clive Priddle for his encouragement and patience in extracting the final manuscript, and his very smart suggestions on improving the research and findings presented in this book. Maria Goldverg and Melissa Raymond exhibited great energy and enthusiasm in the assembly and editing stage and improved the book significantly.

  Finally, Latino Decisions would not be able to function without the support of our families and friends who have stepped in on countless occasions when we have had to take redeye flights to DC on a moment’s notice, or shouldered the parenting burdens when our conference calls went hours long—through the dinner hour—and supported our endeavors in countless other ways that have allowed us to make LD a success. We are in great debt to our families and closest friends—including Samy Alim, for his love and support, Tom Menendez and Claudio Yerahian, who are the worlds’ greatest substitute Papás; Nathan Woods and Blanca Guillen-Woods, who have welcomed us into their home to drink wine and recount our days on the mean streets (and offices) of the nation’s capital on too many occasions to count; and finally, and especially, we thank Julie Barreto.

  APPENDIX

  TABLE 9.A1Latino Influence in US House Districts in California

  TABLE 9.A2Latino Influence in California Legislative Districts

  TABLE 10.A1Tier 1 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Republicans (14 seats)

  TABLE 10.A2Tier 2 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Republicans (10 seats)

  TABLE 10.A3Tier 3 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Republicans (20 seats)

  TABLE 10.A4Tier 1 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Democrats (17 seats)

  TABLE 10.A5Tier 2 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Democrats (8 seats)

  TABLE 10.A6Tier 3 Latino Influence House Seats Held by Democrats (33 seats)

  NOTES

  All credits are to Latino Decisions unless otherwise cited.

  CHAPTER 1

  1. Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004).

  CHAPTER 2

  1. Gutiérrez (2004).

  2. Bowler and Segura (2011).

  3. US Census Bureau (2012).

  4. Hamilton and Chinchilla (2001).

  5. Pantoja, “Transnational Ties and Immigrant Political Incorporation” (2005).

  6. Brown and Lopez (2013).

  7. Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert (2011).

  8. Sawyer (2005).

  9. Stokes-Brown (2009).

  10. Lopez and Dockterman (2011).

  11. Segura and Rodrigues (2006).

  12. DeSipio (2006), 463.

  13. For data on nativity and age, see US Census Bureau, American FactFinder, “Sex by Age by Citizenship Status (Hispanic or Latino): 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates,” available at: http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_B05003I&prodType=table (accessed February 29, 2012).

  14. DeSipio (1996).

  15. Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura (2001).

  16. Wals (2011).

  17. Michelson, “The Corrosive Effect of Acculturation” (2003); see also Pedraza, Bowler, and Segura (2011).

  18. Hajnal and Lee (2011).

  19. Santoro and Segura (2011).

  20. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).

  21. Fraga et al. (2012).

  22. The LNPS was confined to Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican residents of the United States.

  23. Fraga et al. (2012).

  24. Dawson (1994).

  25. Padilla (1985).

  26. Beltran (2011).

  CHAPTER 3

  1. Exit polls suggesting that the number was closer to 44% have been widely discredited. For more on this debate, see Barreto, Guerra, Marks, Nuño, and Woods (2006), and Pedraza and Barreto (2008).

  2. Kinder and Winter (2001).

  3. Bowler and Segura (201
1).

  4. Since the CPS reports income in ranges with the final range unbounded at the upper end, we have to estimate mean incomes by extrapolating categorical mean incomes within these ranges; given the absence of an upper bound on the last category, we probably underestimate (slightly) the actual medians. For all data estimates we use sample weights provided by the Census Bureau.

  5. On subprime mortgage loans to Latinos, see National Low Income Housing Coalition (2013).

  6. See, for example, Glink (2013).

  7. See Latino Decisions–ImpreMedia, “Tracking Poll Results—February 2011,” available at: http://faculty.washington.edu/mbarreto/ld/Feb_banners.htm.

  8. Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler (2008).

  9. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001).

  10. Lopez and Cuddington (2013).

  CHAPTER 4

  1. For the lower figure, see Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013); for the higher figure, see National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Education Fund (2012).

  2. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), 15.

  3. See, for example, DeSipio (1996) and McClain and Stewart (1995).

  4. Dawson (1994).

  5. Although we have used pseudonyms to protect the identities of our informants, we have not changed any details about the particular focus groups in which they participated and we quote their actual words here.

  6. Apart from a handful of jurisdictions that allow noncitizen voting at the local or school-district level.