The Splendid Blond Beast

by Simpson, Christopher; Miller, Mark Crispin;

  9.Martin Wolfson, Financial Crisis: Understanding the Postwar US Experience. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharp, 1986; Anthony Sampson, The Money Lenders. New York: Penguin, 1983, pp. 148–96; Martin Mayer, The Bankers. New York: Ballantine, 1974, pp. 449–503.

  10.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit. See also: Bernhard Menne, “How Germany Used Her Foreign Loans,” Prevent World War III, No. 18, December 1946; Paul Einzig, Germany’s Default: The Economics of Hitlerism. London: Macmillan, 1934. For details concerning German reparation loans, state debt, and municipal debt, see Moody’s Investors Service, “Deutsches Reich,” Moody’s Manual of Investments, Governments. New York: Moody’s, 1927, pp. 496–555.

  11.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit.

  12.International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, “Memorandum Concerning ‘External Assets’ of German Subsidiaries” (with December 1945 balance sheet], at OMGUS Legal Division, Legal Advice Branch, box 58, file “Property and External Property Commission—LA 64,” RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. This ITT memo reports that the company’s properties included Conrad Lorenz (98.7 percent owned) and Lorenz’s subsidiaries; Focke-Wulf aircraft (percentage of ownership not disclosed); Telegrafia Ceskoslovenska (acquired in 1940) and an unnamed electric tube factory at Vrchlabi, Czechoslovakia; Standard Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft AG (100 percent owned) and its subsidiaries—Ferdinand Schuchardt Berliner Fernsprech- und Telegraphenwerk (99.5 percent), Mix & Genest AG (94 percent), Suddeutsche Apparatefabrik GmbH (100 percent), Telephonfabrik Berliner (99 percent), Telefongyar r.t. (Budapest), total 75 percent ownership through two different ITT subsidiaries; and Gesellschaft für Telephon- und Telegraphenbeteiligungen (100 percent). James Stewart Martin of the OMGUS Finance Division reports that Conrad Lorenz owned 25 percent of Focke-Wulf and that the chairman of all three of ITT’s major German subsidiaries was Gerhardt A. Westrick, Heinrich Albert’s partner in the Albert and Westrick law firm mentioned in the text; see James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, p. 209.

  13.U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, The Industrial Reorganization Act: “American Ground Transport.” Washington, DC: USGPO, 1974, p. A-17; Alfred Sloan, My Years With General Motors. New York: Macfadden, 1965, pp. 321–29. On Fritz Opel as General Motors director: Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1937, pp. 2192, 3204.

  14.Moody’s Investors Service, op. cit, 1936, pp. 1283–84.

  15.Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of IG Farben. New York: Free Press, 1978, p. 51. See also: U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on War Mobilization, Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels (report by Corwin Edwards, U.S. Department of Justice). Washington, DC: USGPO, 1944; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

  16.On General Electric: National Industrial Conference Board, Rationalization of German Industry. New York: National Conference Board, 1931, pp. 110–17. For footnote: the list here was developed from data presented in Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise. American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1917. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974. pp. 41, 67–68, 71–73, 103, 111, 143–45, 186–87. By 1940, the direct investments of Americans in Germany and Austria were estimated as approximately $225 million (book value) of branch plants of U.S. corporations and $400 million in U.S. owned German bonds. Estimates of the value of U.S. ownership of shares in German companies were not immediately available. See Martin Domke, Trading With the Enemy. New York: Central Books, 1943, pp. 294–95.

  17.The terms “business elite” and “financial and industrial elite,” as used in this book, refer to the boards of directors and most senior management of the largest and most powerful banks and companies based in a given country, plus the senior partners in law firms that cater to such clients. A convenient listing of the names, addresses, and economic roles of about 600 German personalities meeting this description can be found in: U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks (1946), box 54, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. No comparable consolidated list for U.S. personalities is known to exist, but such individuals can be readily identified through their status as directors or senior management of the fifty largest U.S.-based banks and industrial corporations filing annual reports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A small number of privately held companies and law firms based in the U.S. are not required to file annual reports with the SEC; personalities connected with such institutions can often be traced through the Martindale and Hubble law directories, Who’s Who in America, press reports, and similar sources. See David Brownstone and Gorton Carruth, Where to Find Business Information. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1979, for an extended presentation of informamtion sources for research into U.S.-based business affairs.

  18.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit, for a table of specific Dillon, Read loans, see pp. 501–506. See also: “Dillon, Read: Senate Inquiries Into the Formation and Operation of Two of the Firm’s Trusts,” Newsweek, October 14, 1933; “Easy Money,” The Nation, October 18, 1933. Dillon, Read recently cooperated in the preparation of a high-quality, authorized history of the firm; see Robert Sobel, The Life and Times of Dillon, Read. New York: Dutton, 1991, pp. 92–118, for discussion of foreign banking activities in the 1920.

  19.For data on postwar careers of senior Dillon, Read executives, see: “Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper,” January 11, 1972, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO (on Draper); Current Biography 1942, p. 267, and Current Biography 1948, p. 223 (on Forrestal); Current Biography 1962, p. 322 (on Nitze); and Current Biography 1942, p. 230, and Who Was Who, vol. 5, p. 206 (on Eberstadt).

  20.John Kouwenhoven, Partners in Banking: Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., 1918–1968. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968, 1983. Harriman and Lovett became two of the six so-called “Wise Men” widely regarded as the core of the U.S. foreign policy establishment from 1945 until the collapse of the U.S. campaign in Vietnam. Their colleagues in this role included John McCloy, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson; see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. For a more critical analysis of the same phenomenon, see G. William Domhoff, “Who Made American Foreign Policy 1945–1963?” in David Horowitz (ed.), Corporations and the Cold War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 25ff.

  21.Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 76–152; Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and Cromwell. New York: William Morrow, 1988, pp. 77–159. On Sullivan & Cromwell representation of HAPAG: Eleanor Lansing Dulles interview, Columbia University Oral History Project, pt. 2, p. 57.

  22.Pruessen, ibid., p. 66.

  23.Ibid., pp. 69–72.

  24.Dulles address, “The Power of International Finance,” March 24, 1928, Dulles papers, Princeton University.

  25.Paul Nitze with Ann Smith and Steven Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. xvii.

  26.Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service. New York: Norton, 1978, p. 47.

  27.Ibid., p. 48.

  28.Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 17–41.

  29.Frederic Propas, “Creating a Hard Line Towards Russia: The Training of State Department Soviet Experts 1927–1937,” Diplomatic History, Summer 1984, pp. 209–26.

  30.Weil, op. cit.

  31.John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change. New York: Harper, 1939; Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 175–77; John Foster Dulles, War or Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 5–16. Forrestal and Nitze: Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking, 1951, pp. 135–41
; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, op. cit., pp. xx–7; Wilson, Reed, and du Pont empire: Gerald Colby (Zilg), Du Pont Dynasty. Behind the Nylon Curtain. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1984, pp. 291–451 passim. Also, following much the same ideological development as Kennan and other “Riga Axioms” advocates were W. Averell Harriman and Robert Lovett; see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, op. cit.

  32.Yergin, op. cit., p. 26.

  33.On Albert’s role at Ford: Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1936, pp. 1283–84; and “The Right Men in the Right Places,” Prevent World War III, no. 25, May 1948. For ITT role of Gerhardt Westrick, see U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier “Westrick, Gerhardt” (file number has been suppressed), and OSS report “Request for Information about certain German business figures,” May 2, 1945, available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD. See also Martin, op. cit., p. 209; for Texaco role, see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters. New York: Bantam, 1975, p. 98.

  34.U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier no. XE01156116D016 “Westrick, Ludger” available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.

  35.Das Deutsche Führerlexicon, 1934–1935. Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1935, p. 279. Lindemann’s NSDAP membership record (no. 5453455) is available via the Berlin Document Center. See also: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Elimination of German Resources for War, pt. 5, July 2, 1945, pp. 819–20; and U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) dossier no. XE000915 Karl Lindemann and USFET Military Intelligence Service Center, Preliminary Interrogation Report: Karl Lindemann, September 12, 1945, available through the Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft. Meade, MD.

  36.National Industrial Conference Board, The Rationalization of German Industry. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1931.

  37.Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks, op. cit.

  The German system divides corporate boards into the Aufsichtsrat, which is roughly similar to a U.S.-style board of directors, and the Vorstand, or senior management committee. At Deutsche Bank, for example, the Aufsichtsrat was elected by the general stockholders’ meeting, served four-year terms (and was frequently re-elected), met twice annually, and was responsible for overall bank policy. The Aufsichtsrat’s working committees met monthly and provided much more direct supervision, including approval authority over all loans of 1 million RM or more. There were typically between twenty and thirty members of the Aufsichtsrat at Deutsche Bank, though most German corporations had much smaller boards. The Aufsichtrat appointed the Vorstand, which is similar to the president’s committee or similar senior management body in many American companies. The Vorstand at Deutsche Bank typically had between seven and eleven members. It met almost daily and directed the day-to-day affairs of the bank. Deutsche Bank and many other German companies also created a Bierat, or advisory board, which facilitated greater input into decision-making by the bank’s regional and district executives. At some companies, the Bierat included representatives of cartel partners, major suppliers or customers, the German government, or other outside groups. For details, see U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Report on the Investigation of the Deutsche Bank, November 1946, pp. 21–27, in file: “Deutsche Bank,” box 229, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. This is cited hereafter as OMGUS Deutsche Bank. For a Germanlanguage edition and commentary on this study, see OMGUS, Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank. Nordlingen: Greno, 1986.

  38.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, ibid., p. 2.

  39.The data concerning banking interlocks are calculated from OMGUS Deutsche Bank, ibid., table 11 (n.p.).

  40.On interlocks with Allianz Insurance: ibid., table 10 (n.p.). See also: U.S., Office of Military Government (U.S.) [OMGUS), Finance Division, Financial Intelligence Section, Report on the Investigation of Dr. Kurt Schmitt, January 1948, file: “Investigation: Kurt Schmitt,” box 233, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.

  41.On interlocks with Daimler Benz, BMW, etc.: OMGUS Deutsche Bank, table 12 (n.p.). On ownership of company stock: ibid., pp. 108–109 and table 12.

  42.On interlocks with Siemens group of companies: ibid., pp. 109–13. The relationship between Deutsche Bank and Siemens began in 1870, when Georg Siemens—already a major industrialist—helped found the bank and became its leading manager. Before two decades were out, Deutsche Bank became the Siemens empire’s principal banking house and source of loans for new investment. Among its early projects was the establishment of Mannesman, a major manufacturer of the steel pipe used in the oil and natural gas industries. All three institutions have operated for decades as closely integrated branches of a single financial entity.

  43.On Dresdner Bank, see: U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Report on the Investigation of the Dresdner Bank, 1946, box 235, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD, pp. 35–41, 71–75. This report is cited hereafter as OMGUS Dresdner Bank. A German-language edition and commentary is available: OMGUS (Hans Magnus Erzensberger, ed.), Ermittlungen gegen die Dresdner Bank, Nordlingen: Greno, 1986. Additional OMGUS studies in U.S. archives include profiles of Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (RG 260, OMGUS Office of Economic Affairs, OMG Berlin Sector, Finance Division, box 461, National Archives, Suitland, MD), Baron Kurt von Schroeder (box 230—available as offset printing plates), Kurt Schmitt—Allianz Insurance (box 233), Hjalmar Schacht (box 236), among others.

  44.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit, p. 79; OMGUS Dresdner Bank, op. cit., p. 41.

  45.On Allen Dulles: Allen Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can We Be Neutral? New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper, 1936; reissued in an updated volume, 1939. On Warburg: Eric Warburg, Zeiten und Gezeiten. Hamburg: Hans Christians Druckerei, 1982.

  46.For Schippel comment, U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier no. XE14864–16D044, Hans Schippel, document 27, available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.

  47.Gabriel Kolko, “American Business and Germany, 1930–1941,” Western Political Quarterly, December 1962, pp. 713ff.

  48.United Fruit trade in strategic materials with Germany: Caspar Menke to Reichswirtschaftsministerium, “Betr.: Sonderkonto der United Fruit Comp., Boston.” Records of the Reich Ministry of Economics, microfilm publication T-71, roll 79, RG 242, National Archives, Washington, DC, frames 580823-37. See related correspondence at frames 580731-88, 580808-10, 580926.

  49.Sullivan & Cromwell role in attempted purchase of American Potash and Chemical, relations with IG Farben subsidiary GAF, Lisagor and Lipsius, op. cit., pp. 136–39. John Foster Dulles represents Metallgesellschaft: Borkin, op. cit., pp. 168–70. Chester Lane comment: Chester Lane, Oral History, New York: Columbia University, pp. 435–38. For a summary by John Foster Dulles of the scope of, and loopholes in, U.S. regulation of foreign businesses during wartime, see John Foster Dulles, “The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian,” Cornell Law Quarterly, March 1943, pp. 245ff. On the seizure of corporate properties in U.S.-German relations, see Hans-Dieter Kreikamp, Deutsches Vermogen in den Vereinigten Staaten, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1979, pp. 20–43.

  50.Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–1932. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970, pp. 562–74.

  51.See, for example, Charles Maier, Stanley Hoffman, and Andrew Gould, The Rise of the Nazi Regime, Historical Reassessments. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986; Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow. West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past. New York: Pantheon, 1989; or the well-known controversy between David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 2nd ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986, and Henry Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford Univ. Pre
ss, 1985.

  Chapter Five

  The Profits of Persecution

  1.“Gesetz zur Wiederbestellung des Berufsbeamtentums,” Reichsgesetzblatt (Berlin), April 7, 1933, teil 1, p. 175; “Erste Berordnung zur Durchfuhrung des Gesetz zur Wiederbestellung des Berufsbeamtentums,” Reichsgesetzblatt (Berlin), April 11, 1933, tiel 1, p. 195. Summaries and commentary available in English at: World Jewish Congress et al., The Black Book. The Nazi Crime Against the Jewish People. New York: Nexus, 1981, pp. 470–80.

  2.For example, Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Harper, 1961. pp. 285–89, 323–45, 586–600, and passim.

  3.Ibid., p. 60.

  4.Ibid., pp. 60–90.

  5.Ibid., p. 60.

  6.Interview with Benjamin Ferencz, July 9, 1988.

  7.Anne Bloch, “The Law,” in World Jewish Congress et al., op. cit., pp. 88–89.

  8.OMGUS Dresdner Bank, op. cit., p. 78.

  9.Ibid., p. 79.

  10.Rasche became a defendant in the “Ministries Case” at Nuremberg; see Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949, vols. 12, 13, 14 passim, for extensive discussion of his case. On Pleiger, see: U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks, box 54, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD, entry for Paul Pleiger (n.p.).

  11.“Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” Frankfurter Handelsblatt—Handelsteil der Frankfurter Zeitung, June 21, 1936.

  12.Ibid. On Freudenberg, see OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 297–99.

  13.“Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” op. cit. On Siemens Aryanizations discussed in footnote, see OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 155–56. The sector of the Siemens empire specializing in various aspects of electronics production is organized into two main divisions, Siemens & Halske AG and Siemens-Schuckert AG, which between them controlled at least twelve major subsidiaries during the 1920s and 1930s. On the Siemens companies’ use of forced labor: Max Stein, “Report on the Employment of Slave Work by the Siemens Concern During World War II,” February 1961, in Benjamin Ferencz papers.