The Splendid Blond Beast

by Simpson, Christopher; Miller, Mark Crispin;

  43.Manchester, op. cit., pp. 535–664, with discussion of Krupp police at 538–40 and passim, and of numbers of camps at p. 553.

  44.Ibid., p. 554.

  45.Jaeger quote: International Military Tribunal vol. 3, p. 443.

  46.Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 368–70; “Nazis Blame Jews for Big Bombings,” New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 7; Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich, (Berlin), June 14, 1942.

  47.George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima. The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy. New York: John Wiley, 1966, p. 142. Widely accepted estimates put German fatalities from Allied bombing at about 500,000; see James Taylor and Warren Shaw, Dictionary of the Third Reich. London: Grafton, 1987, p. 322.

  48.Roosevelt statement: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 1, 1939, p. 181.

  For discussion of the development of international law and custom concerning aerial warfare, see Inquiry Handbooks, vol. 3, Selected Topics Connected with the Laws of Warfare as of August 1, 1914, pp. 580–609, including excerpts from the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, with commentaries; “1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare,” in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989, pp. 121–35, with historical commentaries; J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights. London: Longmans, Green, 1924; M. W. Royce, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare. New York: Harold Vinal, 1928.

  49.Jay Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939–1945. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1974, pp. 101, 120–29, 134–35. Baird stresses German pledges to retaliate against Britain as such, but note Goebbels’s use of British attacks to pledge extermination of Jews: Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich (Berlin), June 14, 1942.

  50.John Kenneth Galbraith lecture, “Sifting the Rubble: The Strategic Bombing Surveys.” National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, September 6, 1990. Galbraith was the director of the economic aspects of the Strategic Bombing Survey research.

  51.Ibid.

  52.Comments by Ramsey Potts, Lord Solly Zuckerman, and David Mac-Isaac, “Sifting the Rubble …, op. cit.

  53.Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich, (Berlin), June 14, 1942; “Nazis Blame Jews for Big Bombings,” New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 7.

  54.Ohlendorf, cited at Hilberg, op. cit., p. 695. Roughly similar defenses against Allied war crimes charges were offered by dozens of Nazis and SS men after the war but were consistently rejected by Allied tribunals.

  55.See, for example, Nicolas Nazarenko speech quoted in Simpson, Blowback, op. cit., pp. 274–75.

  56.Kershaw, op. cit., p. 369.

  57.Loc. cit.

  58.Ibid., pp. 369–70.

  59.See, for example, Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, pp. 299–311.

  60.On air raid deaths among prisoners at Krupp: Manchester, op. cit., pp. 561–64; deaths at Heinkel: Gerhard Finn, Sachsenhausen 1936–1950. Bonn: Urheber, 1985, p. 22.

  61.Martin Caidin, The Night Hamburg Died. New York: Ballantine, 1960, pp. 25–26.

  62.Hamburger Stiftung zur Foerderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur, Industrie, Behoerden und Konzentrationslager 1938–1945, Reaktionen 1988–1989, op. cit.; Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 93, 492–94.

  63.Weinmann, loc. cit.

  64.Ibid., pp. 199–203, 223–29, 260, 564.

  65.Ford plant at Cologne (Köln): Bundesgesetzblatt, September 9, 1977; and Karl Sommer affidavit, October 4, 1946, Nuremberg document no. NI-1065, National Archives microfilm collection T-301, roll 10, frames 001126ff. The GM-Opel plant at Russelsheim was converted to aircraft engine production for Junkers JU-88 bombers. Buchenwald supplied prison labor for all such production; see Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 923–24.

  66.The GM-Opel plant at Brandenburg built three-ton “Blitz” trucks: see “American Ground Transport” and GM’s reply, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, The Industrial Reorganization Act, S, 1167, part 4A, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974. Washington, DC: USGPO, p. A–21. The Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück concentration camps appear to have supplied labor for the principal armament plants in Brandenberg; see Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 259, 576. On Ford’s role in Germany: Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism. Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990, pp. 117–46, with discussion of use of POWs at pp. 121–22, 127.

  67.Christian Streit, “The German Army and the Policies of Genocide,” in Hirschfeld, Policies of Genocide, op. cit., pp. 15–29. The invasion of the USSR appears to have been the transit point where earlier Nazi policies of persecution and “cold pogroms” became a campaign of more direct and modern forms of extermination. It was here that the Nazis’ ideology of extreme anticommunism became a seemingly acceptable rationale for tens of thousands of people to participate in the anti-Semitic mass murder programs that have come to be known as the Holocaust. “The infamous mobile execution units, the Einsatzgruppen, spearheaded the racial warfare in East Central Europe,” writes Wolfgang Mommsen. At the same time, “the German Army allowed itself to become increasingly implicated in the sinister activities of the Einsatzgruppen. An important factor in this was that the military leadership in general accepted the National Socialist propaganda regarding the Soviet people … especially the radical anti-Semitic message that the Jews were largely responsible for communism. The Wehrmacht therefore put up little, if any, resistance to the idea that the war against Soviet Russia should be conducted as a racial war with the virtual annihiliation of the enemy, or at least of its leadership cadres, as a ‘legitimate’ objective.” See Wolfgang Mommsen, ibid., p. xii.

  68.For discussion of attitudes of the “Riga Axioms” group toward the USSR, see Yergin, op. cit., pp. 17–41. For a sophisticated Western view of Soviet attitudes concerning international law during this period, particularly on war crimes and related issues, see T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law. New York: Macmillan, 1935 (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1972), pp. 311–42. See also author’s interview with John Hazard, June 7, 1991. In general, Taracouzio and other Western legal observers saw Soviet critiques and reservations on international law (which were based largely on Leninist doctrine) as indications of Soviet dishonesty, ill-intent, or at best unpredictability. Most Western commentators saw the reservations raised by the U.S. and other more conventional powers (which were based largely on contemporary versions of “realist” doctrines) as much less threatening—and, in fact, to be expected. Soviet commentaries suggest roughly parallel but opposite attitudes. See ibid., pp. 411–22. For similar Soviet arguments from a later period, see Ivan Artsibasov, In Disregard of the Law. Moscow: Progress, 1982, pp. 9–61.

  69.Quoted at Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, p. 40.

  Chapter Seven

  No Action Required

  1.On Breckinridge Long: U.S. Department of the Treasury (Randolph Paul), Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in the Murder of the Jews, Jan. 13, 1944, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 693, pp. 212–29 passim, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. New York: Pantheon, 1984, pp. 80, 153, 190–98; David Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941. New York: Pantheon, 1985, pp. 146, 173–74; Arthur Morse, While Six Million Died. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1983, pp. 32–33, 38–42.

  2.On James Clement Dunn: see Randolph Paul, ibid., p. 224. Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945. Department of State publication no. 3580. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949.

  3.Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964; on Murphy’s rivalry with Morgenthau: John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of War 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 417�
�19 passim.

  4.On Joseph Grew: Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 18, 87–96.

  5.On Green Hackworth: for a biographical summary, see National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 57, p. 110, Current Biography 1958, pp. 181–82, and the introductory notes to Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, Department of State publication no. 1506, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1940; reprint, New York, Garland Publishing, 1973. For a critical assessment of Hackworth’s role in the development of U.S. war crimes policy, see Herbert Pell, Oral History, Columbia University, 1951, pp. 584–603. For Hackworth’s role in vetoing an OSS psychological warfare plan against Nazi atrocities, see Hackworth to Berle, February 10, 1943, and Berle to Wilson (OSS), February 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/794, box 2917; Stettinius to FDR, November 4, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1143, with attachments, box 2920; both in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  6.On Loy Henderson: Yergin, op. cit., pp. 26–27, 29; Loy Henderson, Oral History, Columbia University, 1972, pp. 1–6.

  7.On Matthews: Yergin, op. cit., pp. 170, 443, sn21; H. Freeman Matthews, Oral History Interview, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO, 1976.

  8.On John Hickerson: see Randolph Paul, op. cit., p. 224; John Hickerson, Oral History, November 10, 1972, January 26, 1973, and June 5, 1973, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO; “John Hickerson, Ambassador to 2 Nations, Dies,” Washington Post, January 19, 1989.

  9.On R. Borden Reams: Reams to Hickerson, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/694, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., pp. 73–75, 99, 112–13.

  10.On Elbridge Durbrow: see Randolph Paul, op. cit., p. 224; Hull to Biddle, 740.00116 EW 1939/1052, box 2920, and Durbrow to Hackworth, December 14, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1187, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; see also Elbridge Durbrow, Oral History, May 31, 1973, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.

  11.Harvey diary cited in Tom Bower, Blind Eve to Murder. London: Granada, 1983, p. 44.

  12.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 87–88.

  13.Ibid., pp. 89–92.

  14.Ibid., p. 92.

  15.Cited in Bower, op. cit., p. 46.

  16.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit.

  17.Bower, op. cit., pp. 47–51.

  18.Ibid.

  19.Ibid., p. 46.

  20.The account of the Riegner telegram that follows is indebted to studies by Walter Lequeur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp. 143–63; Arthur Morse, Six Million, op. cit., pp. 3–36; Bower, op. cit., pp. 46–52; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., pp. 42–58.

  21.Durbrow memorandum, August 13, 1942, 862.4016/2235, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  22.Winant to the President, August 5, 1942 (Secret), can be located as an attachment to December 9, 1942, Stanton memo, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  23.Berle to Secretary of State, June 22, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/502, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  24.Bower, op. cit., pp. 49–51. On Lippmann and Sweetser’s earlier role: Walter Lippmann, “The Peace Conference,” Yale Review, July 1919, pp. 711ff, and Walworth op. cit., p. 138, 69n; and Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, op. cit., pp. 128–70.

  25.Bower, op. cit., pp. 47–49.

  26.Loc. cit.

  27.“A Proposal for a United Nations Commission on Atrocities” (Secret), attached to December 9, 1942, Stanton memo, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also Aide Memoire, September 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/557, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  28.Winant to Secretary of State, October 6, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/574, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  29.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 105–106; Bower, op. cit., p. 58.

  30.Bower, op. cit., p. 80.

  31.Hilberg, op. cit., p. 266; Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 53.

  32.Winant to Secretary of State, December 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/692, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  33.“Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942” and “Himmler Order Reported,” New York Herald Tribune, November 25, 1942.

  34.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 94–99.

  35.Ibid. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is a traditional exception to the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states over their nationals that can be traced to the seventeenth-century legal theorist Hugo Grotius, among others. As a practical matter, however, by 1939 this precedent had been so widely abused as a pretext for military aggression that very few of the international-law experts of the day considered the doctrine to be sufficiently robust to provide an effective foundation for prosecution of the types of crimes central to Nazi rule. For background, see Raymond Robin, Des Occupations Militaires en Dehours des Occupations de Guerre. Paris, 1913, and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1942. For examples of continuing controversy over the legal utility of theories of humanitarian intervention, see Ian Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” and Richard Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie,” in John Norton Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974; and Richard Falk (ed.), The International Law of Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1971.

  36.Ibid., p. 99–104. For background on Glueck, see Contemporary Authors, vol. 5, pp. 445–46; Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment. New York: Knopf, 1944, and The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War. New York: Knopf, 1964. In addition to his work concerning war crimes, Glueck’s specialty was the study of juvenile delinquency.

  37.UNWCC and the Laws of War, pp. 100–104; Glueck, op. cit., Criminals, pp. 11–18.

  38.UNWCC and the Laws of War, pp. 100–104.

  39.Loc. cit.

  40.Ibid., p. 100.

  41.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 44; Hull to Bern August 17, 1942, 862.4016/2235, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  42.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 51.

  43.Loc. cit.; also, “Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942” and “Himmler Order Reported,” New York Herald Tribune, November 5, 1942.

  44.McDermott (Division of Current Information) to Editor, Christian Century, Chicago, November 25, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/656, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  45.British record: British Foreign Office FO 371 30923/C11923, December 2, 1942, Public Record Office, London; and Bower, op. cit., p. 63. U.S. record: Clattenberg to Breckinridge Long, November 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1249 (cover note), box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  46.Reproduced at Bower, op. cit., p. 64.

  47.Reams memorandum to Hickerson and Atherton, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/694, with attachments, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  48.Reams memorandum to Hickerson and Atherton, December 10, 1942, attached to ibid.

  49.Reams to Hickerson and Atherton, ibid.

  50.“Practical measures”: UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 111.

  51.Achilles comment: Stanton memo, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also Theodore Achilles, Oral History, November 13 and December 18, 1972, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.

  Chapter Eight

  Katyn

  1.See, for example, Sergo Mikoyan comments to Smithsonian Institution Wilson Center Colloquium, June 10, 1991; or Eva Seeber, Die Machte der Antihitlerkoalition und die Auseinandersetzung um Polen und die CSR 1941–1945. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1984, pp. 35–43. A similar trend is clearly manifest in the Anglo-Russian agreements of June 1942; see “Text of British White Pa
per, Including the Anglo-Russian Twenty-Year Treaty,” New York Times, June 12, 1942.

  2.Germany, Massenmord in Winniza, n.d.; Alfred de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1989, pp. 162–80, 240–44.

  3.Turner Catledge, “Our Policy Stated in Nazi-Soviet War,” New York Times, June 24, 1941. For Wall Street Journal editorial cam paign opposing aid to the USSR in the wake of the German invasion: “When Thieves Fall Out” (June 24), “Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee” (June 25), “Aid for the Comrades” (June 26), “Here We Can Be Practical” (June 28), “Tweedledum and Tweedledee” (July 2), all in 1941.

  4.Henderson to Secretary of State, October 20, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/616, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  5.See, for example, Henderson to Secretary of State, November 26, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/655, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  6.Loc. cit.

  7.Loc. cit.

  8.For the “official” version of the Darlan affair, see Murphy, op. cit., pp. 109–43. For a more critical perspective, see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War. New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 64–69. On the psychological warfare aspects of the Darlan affair, the unconditional surrender pledge, and their linkage to East-West confidence building, see Richard H. S. Crossman, “Supplementary Essay,” in Daniel Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 (reissue of 1949 text titled The Sykewar Campaign).

  9.Richard Harris Smith, OSS. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1972, pp. 36–67 passim.

  10.Kolko, op. cit., p. 110.

  11.Richard Harris Smith, OSS op. cit., p. 214.

  12.Ibid., p. 213.

  13.“Aufzeichung über Aussprachen mit Mr. Bull [Dulles] und Mr. Roberts [Edmond Taylor],” National Archives microfilm of captured German records T-175, reel 458, frames 2975007–2975043.

  Western historians have typically ignored or played down the significance of the Dulles/Hohenlohe encounters. A copy of Hohenlohe’s reports was captured and eventually made public by the Soviets in an effort to discredit Dulles after the war, and for that reason it has been occasionally denounced in the West as a forgery. In fact, however, the Hohenlohe reports are authentic; the U.S. Army captured its own set of the same documents, and those papers are today available in U.S. archives at the citation above.