Dare Not Linger
Page 14
The clash between De Klerk and Mandela over amnesty in January 1995 seemed to confirm the worst to those opposed to participation. It enfeebled the National Party’s Federal Congress in February, dominated as it was by argument over whether to stay in the GNU or pull out, strengthening the perception that the National Party had zero influence in decision-making. In November 1995 its loss of support in municipal elections held almost everywhere (except in KwaZulu-Natal and in some rural areas of the Western Cape and in Cape Town) confirmed the erosion of National Party support.
It was, however, the draft of the final constitution in May 1996 which gave De Klerk the ostensible reason to take the National Party out of the GNU. Even though he knew that the GNU was a transitional arrangement with a five-year duration, De Klerk had always pushed for some formal, permanent multiparty device in the constitution. He cited his failure to wrest this concession out of the ANC as a reason for withdrawing from the GNU three years before the agreed five years was over. The GNU itself didn’t provide for National Party influence.
‘The GNU worked well to start with,’ he writes, ‘but it soon became clear that it was a sham as far as any real power-sharing was concerned. The ANC refused to conclude a coalition agreement with us, and preferred to keep us in a gilded cage where National Party ministers had all the trappings of power but none of the substance.’24
When the Constitutional Assembly voted on the constitution, the National Party agreed to its adoption. But that evening, De Klerk left early from the dinner celebrating the new constitution. Having got wind of De Klerk’s intention to call a meeting to announce the National Party’s withdrawal from the GNU, Mbeki left with him in an attempt to dissuade him from withdrawal, to no avail. ‘They opted to pull out,’ said Mbeki, ‘and keep the party support together.’25
De Klerk’s decision to leave the GNU divided his cabinet colleagues in July 1996. In public comments immediately after the withdrawal and in a parliamentary debate some weeks later, Mandela acknowledged the contribution made by some of the National Party leaders. They had not only played constructive roles in the transition but had also broken with the past to an extent that their party – and consequently its leader – had not done so.
‘What concerns me personally,’ Mandela said, ‘is the departure from public life of outstanding personalities such as Roelof “Pik” Botha, Leon Wessels and Chris Fismer – leaders who worked hard and played a critical role in building national unity and preventing the revival of racism both within parties and in communities where they work.*
‘We regret their departure from cabinet and Parliament, and hope that they will continue to be of service to the nation.’26
As it turned out, except for the brief interlude of the Cape Town Metro election shortly after the National Party withdrawal, the electoral decline of the National Party continued, with its leading figures moving to various other parties and the bulk of its grass-roots support migrating to the Democratic Alliance.27
When De Klerk tried to get the IFP to join his exit from the GNU, Buthelezi decided to stay put. ‘A lot of our people had died,’ he said. ‘For us as black people it was more important to seek reconciliation than risk escalation of violence.’28
In composing the GNU, Mandela had assigned Buthelezi to the position of minister of home affairs, which gave him senior status. Moreover, alert to Buthelezi’s sensitivity about seniority, Mandela designated him acting president in times when the two deputy presidents were also out of the country. Despite the historic divergences between the ANC and the IFP, and between Buthelezi and Mandela, the IFP leader managed a more successful alchemy between a public oppositional role with a cooperative stance in cabinet, something De Klerk couldn’t achieve. Buthelezi was, in effect, a kind of political Jekyll and Hyde. Jakes Gerwel recalled ‘the Wednesday Buthelezi and the Saturday Buthelezi, because he was so mild in the Cabinet on Wednesdays and so aggressive at the IFP’s public meetings on Saturdays’.29 Similarly, the clashes between Buthelezi and Mandela played out in Parliament and in the public arena rather than in cabinet.
A memorable incident involved an irate Buthelezi storming the South African Broadcasting Corporation studio and, on air, confronting an interviewee, Sifiso Zulu, who had accused him of appointing himself the Zulu king’s prime minister. Later, Mandela was under pressure to dismiss Buthelezi but was concerned how this would play out in the fraught KwaZulu-Natal situation. After consulting colleagues, Mandela was advised to extract a public apology out of Buthelezi, which he did.
Buthelezi regarded participation in the GNU as a lever to help achieve the IFP’s constitutional goals. Personally, he had not been in favour of participating.
‘As a democrat,’ he said, ‘I do what my people want, even if I don’t like it. I did not want to go into this Government of National Unity in the first place, but in the discussion that took many hours, the majority said we should go into that.’30
The relationship between Mandela and Buthelezi had a long and winding history, both personal and political, dating back to the time when they were both in the ANC Youth League. It cooled as the IFP shifted away from what Buthelezi described as ‘an ANC front’ and became characterised by conflict and anger after 1994 as the situation in KwaZulu-Natal impacted on it.31
But even during difficult times, they communicated. They corresponded while Mandela was a prisoner, both directly and through Buthelezi’s wife, Irene, on both family and political matters.32 In spite of his differences with the ANC, Buthelezi consistently called for Mandela’s release and refused to negotiate with the government until Mandela and other political prisoners were released. In the period running up to the 1994 elections, Mandela frequently spoke with him, recognising him as a significant force. When interviewed about his relationship with Buthelezi, Mandela said that their relations had ‘been on a sound basis ever since I knew him as a young man’.33 By the end, their farewell tributes were, if grudging and ambiguous, nevertheless respectful. Mandela more than once said that he had ‘enormous respect’ for Buthelezi as a ‘formidable survivor, who defeated us [the ANC] in two free and fair general elections’.34 Buthelezi remained convinced that the difficulties between him and Mandela were a result of the ANC keeping them apart.35
* * *
For Mandela, the withdrawal of the National Party from the GNU meant taking practical steps, filling the positions left by the departure of National Party ministers. Pallo Jordan was assigned to environmental affairs and tourism, and the ANC deputy ministers took over the portfolios of the departing National Party ministers. But the departure could have made the country jittery; it was incumbent upon Mandela to reassure South Africa – and especially its investors – that the brief hiatus would neither threaten nor deflect the transition.
‘Deputy President F. W. de Klerk,’ Mandela said, ‘informed me earlier today that the National Party had decided to withdraw from the Government of National Unity. As you’re aware, the leadership of the National Party has emphasised that their withdrawal is not an expression of lack of confidence in our multiparty democracy, the rules of which are contained in the constitution, which we together adopted yesterday.
‘On the contrary, it reflects the fact that the National Party recognises our young democracy has come of age, and would need a vigorous opposition unfettered by the participation in the Executive. We respect their judgement on this matter; as well as the party political considerations, which precipitated their decision.
‘As I emphasised yesterday after the adoption of the new constitution, unity and reconciliation within our society depend not so much on enforced coalitions among parties. They are indelibly written in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of South Africa’s people. This is [the] course that the government and the ANC have chosen to pursue in the interest of our country. It is a course that we will pursue with even more vigour in the coming months and years.
‘The policies that the Government of National Unity has been executing are premised on
the needs and aspirations of the country’s people. This applies to all areas of endeavour, underpinned by the Reconstruction and Development Programme, to improve the quality of life of the people through sound economic policies of fiscal rectitude and other measures to promote growth and development.
‘These policies will not change. Instead they will be promoted with even more focus.
‘Though the imperative of Government of National Unity was written into the interim constitution, the onus was on parties which attained more than ten per cent of the vote in April 1994, voluntarily to decide whether or not to take positions in cabinet.
‘As the majority party, the ANC welcomed the fact that the National Party and IFP decided to take part in the Executive, especially in the early days of our delicate transition.
‘I wish to thank Deputy President F. W. de Klerk and his colleagues for the constructive role that they have played. I am confident that we shall continue to work together in pursuit of the country’s interests, and that their withdrawal will have the effect of strengthening, rather than weakening, their commitment to the country’s political, security and economic interests.
‘Indeed, we are firmly of the view that the National Party has a continuing responsibility to contribute to the process of eradicating the legacy of apartheid which they created. As such, we hope that their decision to play a more active role as an opposition party does not mean obstructing the process of transformation or defending apartheid privilege.
‘In this regard, I wish to reassure all South Africans that the course that we have undertaken as a nation is bigger than any party or individual.’36
Even though serving to stress the importance of his mission in life and to take a parting shot at De Klerk and his unhappy retirees, Mandela intended that his words would also reassert his authority over the ANC and anyone who might have harboured mutinous notions.
In 1995, a year before De Klerk’s withdrawal from the GNU, Mandela had gritted his teeth at flagrant acts of disloyalty and defiance by his estranged wife, Nomzamo Winnie Mandela, whose life since Mandela’s release in 1990 already read like a catalogue of disasters. She had been convicted of kidnapping, reviled as a scarlet woman and proved guilty of adultery, which led to Mandela announcing their separation in 1992. Later she faced charges of fraud and presided over a factious ANC Women’s League.* Despite all this, and certainly because she presented herself as a champion of the wretched of the earth, she still commanded a lot of vocal support from disadvantaged communities, support given political muscle by people such as Bantu Holomisa and Peter Mokaba of the ANC Youth League.
In February 1995, at the funeral of Warrant Officer Jabulani Xaba, who had been shot dead by white police colleagues during a confrontation between striking black officers and their white counterparts, she reportedly accused the government of failing people like Xaba because it had not removed racism from the workplace, and she said that it was time to attend to people’s expectations that apartheid imbalances would be addressed.37 Winnie Mandela’s charge could not go unanswered. A week later, after consultations with a range of people, including ministers, deputy ministers and senior ANC officials, Mandela’s office issued a statement. It read: ‘At the funeral of Warrant Officer Jabulani Xaba, which took place early last week, the Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Mrs Winnie Mandela, levelled serious criticism against the Government of National Unity.
‘The criticism was, in the opinion of the President, inconsistent with her position as a member of the government. In keeping with his constitutional responsibilities as head of Government, President Nelson Mandela called on the Deputy Minister to publicly retract her statement and apologise to the Government.
‘Accordingly, the President received a letter from the Deputy Minister last night, 13 February 1995, in which the Deputy Minister complied.
‘The President has accepted the apology.
‘Ministers and Deputy Ministers are custodians of the policy of the government of the day. Their acceptance of positions in Government obliges them not only to help formulate policy in relevant fora, but also to implement to the letter the decisions of government.
‘President Mandela views in a serious light any acts of commission or omission, on the part of government officials, which convey an image of disregard or disrespect for the policies and decisions of the Government of National Unity. In accordance with the fundamental principle of cabinet collective responsibility, should this happen, now and in the future, the President shall not hesitate to act firmly against any transgression.’38
A month later – following a new round of consultations within the structures of the ANC and an unauthorised trip to West Africa by Winnie Mandela – there was another statement, this time announcing her dismissal. This time the announcement was to the point:
‘As President of the Republic, Head of the Government of National Unity and leader of the ANC, I have relieved Nomzamo Winnie Mandela of her position as Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology.
‘This decision has been taken both in the interest of good government and to ensure the highest standards of discipline among leading officials in the Government of National Unity.
‘I have taken this decision after much reflection, given that Comrade Winnie Mandela has, in the past, played an important role in the struggle against apartheid, both in her individual capacity and as a leading member of the ANC and the rest of the democratic movement.
‘I hope that this action will help the former Deputy Minister to review, and seek to improve on, her own conduct in positions of responsibility, so as to enable her to make the positive contribution to society, which her talents would enable her.
‘In order to ensure the smooth functioning of government and uninterrupted service to the nation, I have appointed Brigitte Mabandla as the Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. She will assume this position with immediate effect.’39
The dismissal became part of a round of political musical chairs, with Winnie Mandela challenging it on procedural grounds. Flanked by family members she held a press conference in a boardroom whose walls were bedecked with photographs and paintings of Nelson Mandela. As the cameras clicked, without preamble she said:
The president’s letter, although dated Good Friday, 14 April 1995, was delivered to me in an unsealed envelope at 11:30p.m. on Thursday night on 13 April 1995 and purports to terminate my appointment as deputy minister only as from Tuesday 18 April 1995. Aside [sic] this repeated, clumsy, unprofessional and inept behaviour of the president’s office, one thing is clear – and that is that I’m still deputy minister up until 18 April 1995. The president owes it to me as a citizen of this country, in my capacity as a deputy minister. In the circumstances, whilst still deputy minister of arts, culture, science and technology, I publicly resign from that office to pay attention to the more pressing issues I have set out here above.
Getting to her feet and walking out with the entourage, Winnie Mandela turned and waved at the media and said, ‘Bye, Ladies and Gentlemen,’ and smiled.40
The reason for the controversy was that, according to the Constitution, the president should have consulted with the two deputy presidents and leaders of all parties in the cabinet. To avoid leaks, the president delayed the consultation as long as possible. When at the last minute he wanted to consult with Buthelezi, the latter couldn’t be found and Mandela reverted to a senior member of the IFP. Although advised that this would pass legal muster, Mandela decided that ‘the dismissal of Mrs Mandela should be treated as technically and procedurally invalid’. He did so out of a commitment ‘to act within the spirit of the constitution, and further wishes to spare the government and the nation the uncertainties which might follow protracted legal action on this issue’.41
When Mandela returned from a foreign visit, Deputy Minister Winnie Mandela was dismissed for the second and final time, in accordance with correct procedures. Dressed in a loose turquoise shi
rt over khaki chinos, Mandela was a picture of informality as he entered the boardroom. However, his grim face and stern demeanour indicated how seriously he took this unpleasant task. There was a sense of déjà vu among the assembled media contingent, who had been in the room not too long ago. Today, there was no banter, no animated recognition of particular faces that had graced these surrounds, as was his wont; just a dry delivery, rendered more emotional by the very absence of emotion in his tone. Mandela read from a prepared statement:
‘After due reflection, I have decided, in accordance with the powers vested in me by the Constitution, to terminate Mrs Winnie Mandela’s appointment; and to appoint Mrs Brigitte Mabandla to the post of Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. This will take effect on Tuesday 18 April 1995.’42
There were mixed reactions from far and wide, some supporting the sacking while others condemned it. The issue was likely to rekindle talk about the estrangement of the president and his wilful wife, especially among the grass roots where Winnie Mandela enjoyed a lot of support. Predictably, a report in the Los Angeles Times focused on marital rupture:
At a brief news conference at her Soweto home, Mrs Mandela announced that she was resigning her government post immediately – one day before her second dismissal by President Nelson Mandela, her estranged husband, was to take effect.