Dare Not Linger

by Nelson Mandela

  If his language was quaintly anachronistic or limned with whimsy, he was determined to ensure that democratic South Africa’s relationship with the rest of Africa would be based on hard realities. The Africa he had visited while underground, which had also given him a glimpse into what it was like to be treated like a full human being – and which had nurtured the liberation movement at great cost to itself – would get his full attention.

  During his first six months of liberty, Mandela spent half his time outside South Africa. Even though he visited three continents – Africa, Europe and North America – Africa was his main focus and the first to be visited, apart from an urgent dash to Stockholm, Sweden, to see his ailing friend and mentor, O. R. Tambo, in hospital.

  The Africa to which Mandela returned after his imprisonment was very different from the one he had known. Many of the leaders had passed on, with natural causes, coups, exile or executions having taken their toll. So, too, had the geopolitical situation altered, with the current leaders now grappling with the implications of momentous global changes. In July 1990, therefore, while the OAU summit of African heads of state and government crafted resolutions aimed at accelerating the final stages of South Africa’s liberation, it had to take on board the changing East–West relations, the end of the Cold War and the formation of new regional economic blocs.

  The diminution of direct involvement of external powers in African affairs was an opportunity for its peoples and governments to take full responsibility for their destinies through regional cooperation, further democratisation and popular participation. Given that the ‘daunting dual challenge of economic development and democratic transformation’ required peace and stability, conflict resolution was crucial.2 The logical expression of the new paradigm was the establishment in 1993 of the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which would partner with the United Nations. The Southern African Development Community, although embryonic, was also expected to play its part in the future.3 It had succeeded the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, which had been formed in 1980 by heads of independent states to coordinate investment and trade and to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. In 1992, with Namibia now independent and South Africa in transition to democracy, the coordinating conference was upgraded into the SADC, the focus of which had shifted to economic integration.

  Mandela and the ANC participation in the OAU meetings and summits laid the basis for the contribution that democratic South Africa would make in the quest for peace and development in Africa and the world. It also saw the beginnings of some of Mandela’s efforts towards conflict resolution. By the time South Africa joined the OAU in 1994, the union had charted a new course. It expected to meet challenges. There would be tensions – Africa being so vast with many member states with varying priorities – between collective commitments to the promotion of peace and democratisation on the one hand, and respect for the sovereignty of member states on the other. If the OAU didn’t get help from the UN and other countries, it would have a hard time marshalling resources and experience to develop peacekeeping and conflict-resolution capabilities. There was, however, an optimism: the new directions were clear.

  Therefore, when President Nelson Mandela addressed the OAU summit a month after his inauguration, in June 1994, it was a moment of great excitement. For many, it was an emotive fulfilment of a promise. Mandela’s speech, carefully crafted to articulate his country’s nascent ‘Africa policy’, set out his country’s perspective, commitments and responsibilities towards the continent. He said:

  ‘The total liberation of Africa from foreign and white minority rule has now been achieved. Our colleagues who have served with distinction on the OAU Liberation Committee have already carried out the historical task of winding up this institution, which we shall always remember as a frontline partner for the emancipation of the peoples of our continent.’

  Then, in what must have sounded dramatic even to his own ears, Mandela said, ‘Finally, at this summit meeting in Tunis, we shall remove from our agenda the consideration of the question of Apartheid South Africa.’

  This agenda item had been tabled at conventions, summits and seminars of just about any meeting of progressive forces for as long as Mandela had been in prison. Its removal from the agenda signalled a victory of immense proportions – a victory that belonged to a significant section of the world community.

  Mandela punctuated this by saying that one epoch ‘with its historic tasks has come to an end. Surely, another must commence with its own challenges. Africa cries out for a new birth, Carthage awaits the restoration of its glory.

  ‘If freedom was the crown which the fighters of liberation sought to place on the head of mother Africa, let the upliftment, the happiness, prosperity and comfort of her children be the jewel of the crown.’

  On the imperative for Africa to ‘bend every effort to rebuild the African economies’, Mandela reminded the leaders that the fundamentals ‘of what needs to be done are known to all of us. Not least among these is the need to address the reality that Africa continues to be a net exporter of capital and suffers from deteriorating terms of trade. Our capacity to be self-reliant, to find the internal resources to generate sustained development, remains very limited.’

  He pointed to the pitfalls of self-pity where leaders blame external agencies for problems when they should be doing a little soul-searching. He paid homage to the ‘great thinkers of our continent’ and upbraided Africa for failure to deal with the human tragedy of Rwanda, which ‘stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address these interrelated matters. As a result of that, a terrible slaughter of the innocent has taken and is taking place in front of our very eyes.’

  Mandela pledged: ‘We know it as a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about a new African renaissance …

  ‘The vision you shared with us was one in which we would use the resources of our country to create a society in which all our people would be emancipated from the scourges of poverty, disease, ignorance and backwardness.

  ‘The objective we all pursued was the creation of a South Africa that would be a good neighbour and an equal partner with all the countries of our continent, one which would use its abilities and potentialities to help advance the common struggle to secure Africa’s rightful place within the world economic and political system.’4

  During Mandela’s presidential years, South Africa played an active role in the reshaping of the OAU. In 2002, this culminated in the launch of the African Union (AU) in Durban, complete with new systems and structures to match the post-liberation demands of the continent. Mandela’s presence in the OAU, says Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, ‘had a profound influence’ because ‘here was a man that the OAU and the member states had worked with over the years right from the beginning when MK was established. He had been to many African countries before his arrest. And when he was in prison, the OAU played an important role in supporting the struggle for his release and that of other political prisoners, as well as the struggle in South Africa. So, for this man who was also a world icon to be part of the OAU had a tremendous impact.’5

  In 1996, he also had an equally huge impact as chairman of the SADC. Anxious to lead an organisation that wouldn’t be another bureaucratic talk shop, addressing the SADC summit in Malawi in September 1997, Mandela broached the challenges that the SADC would face in harmonising development with security and – as had been the experience in the OAU – reconciling respect for the sovereignty of member states with commitment to democratic principles, features not uniformly realised in all the states. For him it was imperative that the representatives of member states ‘ask frank questions and give honest answers about the state we are in and where we intend to go’.6

  After a long delivery that contained
some of the points he had raised sharply at the 1994 OAU summit, which reflected his preoccupation with democratic processes, Mandela listed the tasks for the intergovernmental organisation. He stressed that there’d be no real progress without gender equality, respect for human rights and the ‘basic tenets of good governance’.7

  One of the issues he did not touch on was the status of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (Organ), a formal institution of the SADC that had been launched in June 1996. Chaired by President Robert Mugabe, and having met on the eve of the summit, in Gaborone, Botswana, over the past months the Organ had been the subject of intense debates centring on its structure and remit, which could supplant the summit itself in that it could ‘operate at the Summit level and … function independently of other SADC structures’.8 Irked by lack of transparency in the Organ – and wanting his structures straight and simple – Mandela was not entirely convinced that the Organ had to operate on a summit level, as is evidenced by his notes:

  1.  Attended SADC summit in Gaborone in June 1996 and agreed with the decision to form the Organ.

  2.  Was, however, not aware that it would operate on a summit level [rather than a] ministerial level.

  3.  Discovered when we met in Luanda on 1 October 1996 that Organ was itself a summit. It came to me as shock –

  Unaware of existence of any organisation.

  They may be

  Had I known, I would not have accepted chairmanship [of the SADC].

  4.  Then travelled all the way to see President Mugabe to discuss issue. Thereafter saw Pres. Masire as my predecessor and Pres. Chissano as Vice Chairman. Later four of us met in CT.*

  5.  On all these occasions they explained in great detail why the Organ had to operate on a summit level. Agreed that matter be brought to this [Blantyre, Malawi] Summit.

  6.  Met the 2 Presidents in Gaborone and suggested solution.9

  The next day the summit heard the members’ views, with no clear consensus emerging other than that there was a need for the Organ, given the region’s challenges. The decision postponed, Mandela was urged not to resign. Another discussion six months later at a meeting of heads of state in Maputo again ended without resolution.10 There was, however, greater consensus that the Organ should be a subcommittee of the SADC rather than a separate entity.

  Much has been said about Mandela’s relationship with Mugabe, including the fact that it was clear from the very start that there was no love lost between the two leaders. Mugabe, who had been the elder statesman all along, fawned over by his younger counterparts in awe of his combative anti-imperialist stance, felt somewhat eclipsed by Mandela, who arrived on the scene with laudable moral and ethical credentials. Furthermore, as someone widely credited with saying that the only white man to be trusted was a dead white man, it was hardly surprising that Mugabe was not enamoured of Mandela’s reconciliation project. Given the exigency of the survival of the SADC, however, the two men worked together on various issues, even though the status of the Organ continued to be a source of tension between them. Quett Masire recalls in his memoirs how the uneasy rapport continued over the years.11

  * * *

  The instability in the Congo and the African Great Lakes region impacted negatively on most of the SADC countries. South Africa’s involvement with the conflict began with its agreement to participate in a multinational force being established in eastern Zaire to cope with a humanitarian crisis arising from an estimated one million refugees escaping genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko asked South Africa to facilitate talks between the Zairean government and Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL). Having established itself in the east, the ADFL was advancing towards the capital, Kinshasa. Persuaded by the United States, Kabila’s ADFL took part in a series of proximity talks in South Africa in February 1996. These opened the way to face-to-face talks between Mobutu and Kabila aboard the SAS Outeniqua in Pointe-Noire at the mouth of the Congo River. Also present at the talks was the special representative of the OAU and UN.12

  Informed by the success of talks to bring about a new and democratic dispensation in South Africa – and to cast out the revanchist spirit among belligerents – Mandela believed that the end to the Zairean debacle could be similarly achieved. He thought that it would only take persuading the ageing – and universally discredited – Mobutu to leave office with dignity and Kabila to accept an inclusive approach to forming a new government.

  The advance of rebel forces diminished Kabila’s appetite for an inclusive solution. Citing fear as a deterrent to his joining the follow-up talks on the ship ten days after the initial talks, Kabila vacillated publicly, angering Mandela whom the media overheard giving the rebel leader a dressing down. It was arranged for Kabila to come the next day to Cape Town so that Mandela could brief him on the proposals drawn up after the first meeting; these had been widely consulted with governments in Africa, France and the United States. While on board the SAS Outeniqua, Mandela also phoned several heads of state in the region to discourage them from military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.13

  Mandela heard that Kabila had not halted his advance on Kinshasa, despite giving his word to the contrary. Mandela’s notes for his meeting with Kabila convey his frustration:

  1.  Advance to Kinshasa

  Bizima Karaha statement*

  Surround but don’t attack

  2.  Something grossly wrong with one who makes a firm & clear statement & later denies making statement. Tends to destroy mutual confidence & respect that should exist among comrades.

  Understands your concern over security

  But many people find your claim ridiculous, to say the least.

  3.  Promised twice to go on board at Pointe-Noire

  Lack of normal courtesies = Deputy President [Mbeki], UNO [United Nations] & OAU representative, President Mobutu.

  Kept us waiting for whole day without any information of your whereabouts

  Unfortunate attitude towards a dying man, insensitive, no human feelings, no respect.†

  Martti Ahtisaari – famous int. diplomat

  4.  Lack of appreciation for the enormous expenses at taxpayers’ cost that my country has spent,

  ship itself

  30 soldiers.

  5.  [You have been] rushing to the press.

  6.  Your image being tarnished; no longer have the moral high ground.

  7.  Unfortunate things being said about you. [I] have defended you & I am sure others as well have done so.

  8.  Sadako Ogata‡

  9.  Kofi Annan*

  [Have] given me tough job. But you are busy destroying mutual trust.

  How can I serve [a] person who treats me without respect?’14

  * * *

  The military intervention in Lesotho on 22 September 1998 by the SANDF and, to a negligible degree, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), put the SADC and its leadership – including Mandela – in the crosshairs of the international human rights community. And, as is common with all such undertakings, the intervention was well intentioned. It followed a disputed election that was simultaneously hailed as peaceful by both domestic and international observers and, according to detractors, who said it had been rigged, characterised by deep tensions and animosity.

  The mutiny by the army and two written requests from the prime minister of Lesotho for intervention prompted the SADC’s conclusion that the political process couldn’t proceed without military stabilisation of the security situation, which was to be undertaken by South Africa and Botswana on behalf of SADC.15

  On 22 September, six hundred South African troops entered Lesotho, and they were joined later by two hundred troops from the BDF. Resistance by members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) was much stiffer than had been anticipated, and eight members of the SANDF and twenty-nine of the LDF lost their lives.

  Acting
South African President Mangosuthu Buthelezi (Mandela was out of the country) briefed the National Assembly as the intervention was taking place and, with the minister of defence, spoke further to the cabinet the next day. The cabinet supported the SADC’s assessment that the aim of the intervention, called Operation Boleas, was to stabilise the situation and create an environment in which negotiations could continue to bring about a lasting settlement.16

  On his return to South Africa from North America, Mandela said, ‘We went there not to fight but in order to ensure that these violent activities – which were illegal – were stopped so that the parties could sit down and explore a peaceful settlement. We are there for that purpose. We did not fire first.’17

  The objectives of the SADC were achieved. Lesotho adopted a number of political and constitutional changes, including a proportional representation electoral system to give small parties a greater say than the previous first-past-the-post system.

  ‘There’s no doubt,’ Mandela said, ‘that SADC’s collective initiative succeeded in creating space for that country’s political leaders to find a peaceful resolution of their differences; and we ought to take this opportunity to congratulate the Botswana and South African Defence Forces on their decisive contribution; and to pay tribute to those who lost their lives.’18

  Conflict, especially where there’s a loss of life, gives rise to recriminations. The SADC invasion, as it was called in many reports, invited hard questions and accusations that South Africa – Botswana was let pretty much off the hook – had acted ultra vires; that the SADC’s intervention was inconsistent with the UN Charter and that there should have been authorisation for the intervention from the UN Security Council. Despite difficulties in achieving its objective – some operational, negative public reactions in Lesotho, etc. – the first military intervention by South Africa and the SADC was successful; however, the SADC was still not fully equipped to conduct such interventions. The intervention provided all involved with an object lesson towards the evolution of a more appropriate approach to peacekeeping and regional conflict resolution.