Jewels of Allah: The Untold Story of Women in Iran

by Nina Ansary

  This act gave Iran’s women the most sweeping civil rights in the Islamic Middle East. It recognized a wife as an equal partner in marriage: in decision making, in planning the future of the children, in divorce, and in the matter of child custody. It limited a man to one wife (indirectly, since the Koran permits as many as four) by laying down strict conditions which virtually made it impossible for him to marry a second time: the prospective polygamist had to have his first wife agree; had to have the financial means to support equal households; had to prove that his first wife was sterile or incurably ill. The act provided that a woman could seek divorce on the same grounds open to a man (these grounds were now clearly defined), and it created a machinery whereby she could seek, and collect, alimony and child support. In the event of her husband’s death, the guardianship of children would be awarded to the wife; previously all her male in-laws would have been given precedence.

  To get these laws passed was an uphill fight all the way. Our various committees labored for hundreds of hours to word these provisions in such a way as to minimize both secular and religious resistance. We enlisted the cooperation of various ministers, since it was obvious to me that you cannot emancipate women in a male-dominated society without the active support of at least some of those men, and we sought the endorsement of Iran’s more progressive mullahs (clergy) (to whom we always prefaced our appeals with such remarks as, “Well, of course we understand that a woman’s primary responsibility is to her husband and her children, but.…”)

  Of course, there were compromises at almost every step we took: For example, we wanted to put an end to the civil code provision that a woman could not hold a job without her husband’s consent. “But just a moment,” said one of the ministers at our meeting, “suppose my wife should decide to take a job that is not in keeping with my dignity.”

  “I’m afraid you’ll have to give me an example,” I said.

  “Well, suppose she takes a job in a factory, or singing in a nightclub?”

  “Are you saying these jobs are less honorable than the one you hold?”

  Actually I realized while we were talking that if this fairly enlightened man was raising an objection, then certainly the less progressive gentlemen in our midst would balk at a law allowing a wife unlimited job options. So we added a clause “protecting” a man’s dignity—but at the same time we insisted that the clause be reciprocal and apply equally to men’s jobs and women’s dignity.

  When it was finished, I said to my co-workers: “Do you realize that we have won something of a victory with this compromise? This is the first time that Iranian law has even recognized that Iranian women have any dignity, let alone agreed to ‘protect’ it.”

  By the time of the revolution, we had almost complete equality with men, at least in the eyes of the law. We had even managed to allow abortion—indirectly, since our religion would not allow us to do it any other way—by decriminalizing it by setting up medical guidelines under which it could be performed.

  There were more areas that still needed work: one was the law governing inheritance, the second was the law that required a wife to obtain her husband’s permission whenever she wanted to travel outside of the country. Resistance to change came from a fear that we could have a rash of “runaway wives,” though I argued long and hard that it was much more important to guard against “runaway husbands,” who were, in most families, the major breadwinners. The final item on our agenda was the elimination of article 179 of the penal code, which allowed a man to escape punishment if he killed his wife in a situation where he believed she had been guilty of adultery. This law had been so liberally interpreted in the past, that a brother had once escaped sentencing for killing his sister— because he saw her getting into a taxi with a man.

  Although implementing our reforms was by no means an easy task, we had many satisfactions. There was the day a minister friend of mine came to me and complained that women’s rights had gone too far in Iran, because he was having a very hard time divorcing his wife. “I’m very sorry if anything I’ve done has caused you problems,” I said. “But I can’t really say the day is past when a man can discard a wife simply because he feels like it.”79

  This daughter of a progressive and visionary leader dared to defy centuries of tradition in order to craft laws that she and many others hoped would emancipate the women of Iran as well as change the mindset of the Iranian man. And it is interesting to note that while the Pahlavis reduced the role of the clergy, and unlike the Safavids and Qajars did not defer to them, there still was an underlying element of placating religious leaders.

  The seeds of change implanted by the Pahlavi monarchy would continue to benefit Iranian women even after the Islamic Revolution. In particular, the educational foundation launched during the Shah’s administration remained a surprising yet crucial legacy for Iran’s religious female population. We will explore that outcome further in Chapter Four.

  Irrefutably, wide-ranging, valuable gains were achieved by the Pahlavi regime, particularly for women.

  And then there were the losses—namely, a curb on various women’s associations and political parties that challenged the Pahlavi regime. During the initial phase of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule (1941–1953), political parties and women’s associations could freely espouse their views. However, the 1953 coup d’état that overthrew Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran from 1951–1953, heralded an era of strict governmental control and the termination of all “oppositional and independent political parties and organizations.”80

  Mossadegh took up the cause of nationalizing Iran’s oil industry (which had been under British control since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company [APOC]) so that the country could be self-sufficient and free from foreign domination and constraints. A patriot and nationalist in the true sense of the word, Mossadegh wanted Iran to have complete control over all of its resources and not be beholden to outside powers. He was a popular figure who gained the support of the middle class and thus mobilized a mass movement for progressive social and political reform.

  Mohammad Mossadegh

  In pressuring the Iranian Parliament to accept his nationalization bill, Mossadegh created the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and began negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) for transfer of control. He also engaged in a campaign against the Shah and the British. The British retaliated by freezing Iranian assets, which resulted in a full-blown crisis. The British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the American CIA organized a covert operation known as “Operation Ajax” to overthrow Mossadegh. The Shah finally agreed to Mossadegh’s overthrow after Kermit Roosevelt Jr. asserted that the United States would proceed with or without him.81 Discovering the plan, Mossadegh alerted his supporters, who took to the streets in protest. At that point, the Shah left the country, allegedly for medical reasons.82

  In 1953, Mossadegh’s government was indeed overthrown in a military coup d’état. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Shah amended the Iranian Constitution, giving himself the authority to appoint the prime minister.83

  How did the Shah’s systematic control impact the country’s female population? The independent women’s organizations that had flourished prior to the Pahlavi era were abandoned due to the strict oversight of the monarchy. Women’s organizations and periodicals were now under the purview of the Pahlavi administration. By 1959, all women’s associations were brought under the umbrella of the Federation of Women’s Organizations (Shoraye-ali-ye Jamiat-e Zan), later transformed into the High Council of Iranian Women’s Associations (Shoraye Jamiat-e Zanan-e Irani), with the Shah’s twin sister, Ashraf Pahlavi, serving as honorary president. This entity, which predominantly focused on charitable functions and promoted the education of women, was replaced in 1966 by the Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI) (Sazeman-e Zanan-e Iran). Inaugurated by Ashraf Pahlavi, who served as president, the WOI flourished with more than 400 branches and 120 centers
providing literacy classes, vocational training, and legal advice. A forceful advocate for equal rights, this organization was instrumental in employing women as judges, mayors, cabinet officers, and diplomats.

  As for women’s publications: the two major state-sanctioned women’s publications of the Pahlavi era represented the regime’s vision of the westernized-emancipated Iranian woman. Ettela’at-e Banovan (Ladies’ Information, 1957) and Zan-e Ruz (Today’s Woman, 1964) were owned and operated by the country’s largest publishing houses. Officially sanctioned by the state, both of these competing periodicals essentially avoided national politics. But there were distinct differences between the two magazines. Zan-e Ruz offered articles on beauty, fashion, and celebrities, whereas Ettela’at-e Banovan was concerned with more serious subjects affecting women.

  More specifically, Zan-e Ruz included glamorous photographs of the latest haute couture and accessories, swimwear, lingerie, hairstyles, and beauty products. Articles and exposés on Persian and European royalty, Persian and foreign celebrities, in addition to numerous “sexy” cover photos adorned the pages of the magazine. The occasional references to career, employment, and educational opportunities for women were overshadowed by emphasis on the latest plastic surgery techniques as well as seductive actresses such as Farrah Fawcett and Raquel Welch. One can only assume that such issues and images would hold minimal appeal for the traditional Iranian woman, who could not possibly understand or relate to women in a bikini or miniskirt.

  Women’s publications of the Pahlavi Era.

  Women’s publications of the Pahlavi Era.

  In contrast, Ettela’at-e Banovan offered its readers articles not only about career and educational opportunities but also family law, social reforms, and accomplished women in Iran and abroad—including well-known athletes, lawyers, pilots, scientists, and physicians. The magazine’s focus on significant topics was exemplified as well through its editorials, such as “Women’s Rights in Iran,” “The Success of Iranian Female Students in America,” “Women Factory Employees,” and “Women and Freedom in Iran.” There were also articles that showcased the achievements and challenges of women in other parts of the world, including “Uganda’s First Female Minister,” “What Our Muslim Sisters Are Doing,” and “Women Rule in the United States of America.” While Ettela’at-e Banovan occasionally published recipes and fashion spreads, its overall content was geared toward encouraging women’s participation in society at large. Unlike in Zan-e Ruz, the majority of women portrayed in Ettela’at-e Banovan were clearly Persian and conservatively dressed. Although the magazine rarely reflected the rural community, conventional attire, or Islamic designs, it acknowledged Iran’s modest culture by refraining from provocative Western trends and fashions.

  While both magazines were bestowed with the monarchy’s seal of approval and may have appealed to a minority of educated, progressive women, one can only assume that they would be of little or no interest to the traditional female population, which had limited exposure to and/or understanding of Western-influenced culture.

  Despite the demise of a number of women’s independent organizations and magazines, these losses were far outweighed by the gains. The Pahlavi regime’s tenacious pursuit of emancipation for women through education, career opportunities, family law, and many other areas distinctly reflects the initial stages of a feminist agenda. Although girls from traditional families were unable to take advantage of the many opportunities provided during the Pahlavi era, were it not for the monarchy’s belief in increased possibilities and equality for women, liberating strides could not have been made by the thousands of Iranian women who benefited from the new policies. Clearly, this important period in Iranian history saw a flourishing of women’s roles in society, and the seeds of change would continue to grow into a full-fledged women’s empowerment movement in the decades to come.

  Reza Shah photographed with a young Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his twin sister Ashraf.

  Iranian schoolgirls during the reign of Reza Shah, c. 1936.

  Girls’ gymnastics at the Alliance Israélite Universelle school, Hamadan, Iran, c. 1936.

  Reza Shah and Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi visit an all-girls school, Iran, c. late 1930s.

  Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979)

  Princess Ashraf Pahlavi

  Farokhroo Parsa—Iran’s first female minister.

  Mahnaz Afkhami—Iran’s second female minister.

  The Female Literacy Corps.

  Empress Farah Pahlavi with Gilan schoolgirls, Iran c. 1960s.

  Reza Shah Kabir High School girls’ basketball team, c. 1964.

  The modern Iranian schoolgirl of the Pahlavi era, c. 1974.

  The first graduating class of the Imperial Iranian Female Naval Officers, Tehran, c. 1973.

  The emerging shadow of dichotomous trends in Iranian society, Tehran, c. 1975.

  Chapter Four

  KHOMEINI’S BLUNDERS

  The fervor touched everyone around me and we all looked for ways to participate.

  Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Laureate, referring to her initial support of Ayatollah Khomeini

  (One of the first women to become a judge in Iran during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, Ebadi nevertheless supported the revolutionaries against the Shah. Once Khomeini was in power, she was stripped of her judgeship.)

  In the midst of its groundbreaking modernization program, the Pahlavi monarchy was brazenly dismantled in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his many followers.

  The 1979 Islamic Revolution spearheaded by Khomeini ushered in a theocracy that dismantled the progressive agenda of the Pahlavi era and instituted a constitution that stipulated governance according to the precepts of Sharia (Islamic law).

  Although this radical shift had many dire consequences for women, it also had unexpected benefits for a large segment of the country’s female population. An unintended consequence of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution was that many of the seemingly patriarchal mandates intended to establish a chaste atmosphere might have inadvertently empowered women. This was particularly the case for traditional women who felt alienated and disconnected from the Pahlavis’ visionary yet disruptive policies that had favored the adoption of a Western lifestyle. It seems that the Khomeini regime made certain mistakes, however, in administering its “Islamized” educational policies. And these blunders resulted in female students being unintentionally influenced by Western ideology.

  How could Khomeini’s administration have caused such errors? What doors unexpectedly opened for so many young women when coeducation was abandoned? How did the Iran-Iraq War inadvertently lead to women’s empowerment? And what were the hidden opportunities brought on by the Islamic Revolution that resulted in the women’s movement taking hold in such a repressive environment? These are the key questions that we will explore in this chapter.

  WHO WAS KHOMEINI?

  Ruhollah Mousavi was born in 1902 into a family of Shiite scholars in the town of Khomein. Later taking his hometown as his surname, Ruhollah became known as Ruhollah Khomeini. He and his older brother, Seyed Mourteza, both attained the status of Ayatollah, which is given only to Shiite scholars of the highest knowledge.1

  A Young Ruhollah Khomeini

  Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) emerged during the early 1960s when he voiced opposition to the Shah’s White Revolution, including the emancipation of women, which he viewed as a violation of true Islam. A scholar and teacher who wrote extensively on Islamic law and philosophy, he was an advocate of strict adherence to Sharia—a position that attracted many adherents. His sermons against the Shah’s westernization agenda inspired numerous demonstrations that were ultimately put down by the Pahlavi regime. Although Khomeini was exiled in 1964 to Najaf, Iraq, he continued his efforts against the Shah’s government from abroad, where his rhetoric centered on the premise that the Pahlavi monarchy was a pagan institution (Taqut) incompatible with the true nature of Islam. He also denounced the Shah for supporti
ng Israel against the Muslim world and for allying himself with the West.2 Fundamentally, Khomeini and his supporters viewed the Shah as a puppet of the United States and the Western world.

  Khomeini’s followers continued to grow as he established himself in Iraq and devised a plan of action for launching an Islamic state. During his years in exile, he formulated his Doctrine of Clerical Rule (Velayat-e-Faqih), in which he maintained justification within Islamic doctrine for creating an Islamic state in the absence of an Iman (an infallible successor to the Prophet Muhammad.)3 By appealing to those who resented both foreign intervention in Iran and the Shah’s progressive, secular agenda, Khomeini was able to expand his revolutionary movement from his temporary outpost in Iraq. Eventually, however, the Iraqi government, namely Saddam Hussein (probably at Iran’s request, although this cannot be verified), pressured Khomeini to put an end to his political activities. Khomeini refused and was asked to leave Iraq.

  In 1978, he went to Paris. Ironically, it was in this major Western city that Khomeini managed to consolidate his revolutionary movement, primarily due to these two factors:

  1.Khomeini now had worldwide exposure, as he was able to give more than 120 interviews a day during his four months in Paris. He never had this kind of media exposure during his years in Iraq.

  2.The excellent air and telecommunication links between Tehran and Paris allowed for much closer coordination and communication between Khomeini and the revolutionary movement brewing in Iran, which could not have gained this kind of momentum from Iraq.