Dragonfire

by Humphrey Hawksley

Local time: 0800 Friday 4 May 2007

  It was highly unusual for a senior civil servant, particularly one so closely involved in intelligence work, to call in a television presenter for a classified briefing. But John Stopping, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, had been instructed to do so by the Foreign Secretary and was relieved, in part, to have known the presenter, Max Harding, from a posting in Moscow nearly twenty years earlier. Stopping chose to meet in his office, not for a restaurant breakfast meeting as the Foreign Secretary had tried to suggest. He was suspicious of the press and would never have agreed to be seen socializing with a journalist.

  ‘I understand you have the Chinese Foreign Minister, Jamie Song, as a guest on your phone-in show this morning,’ said Stopping, when Harding had sat down. ‘I wondered if you might like some information with which to tease him?’

  ‘Like what?’ said Harding, who was equally concerned about being fed a line from the British government. Harding was the presenter of Globe Talk, a live interview and phone-in show on BBC World Service Television. When his producer rang up the Chinese Embassy in Portland Place to ask if the Ambassador would come on the show, they called back half an hour later offering Jamie Song in a satellite link from Hong Kong.

  ‘It will be a BBC exclusive,’ said the Chinese Press Attaché. ‘We have not approached CNN because we feel that China’s position will be better understood in Europe than in the United States. You do not need to submit written questions and he will talk about anything you wish.’

  Stopping spread a pile of satellite pictures on his desk. ‘These are surveillance photographs of Chinese military activities over the past few days, and, during a break in cloud cover, pictures of what look like widespread disturbances in Tibet. You can’t use them on the programme and, frankly, without expert knowledge they won’t mean much to you.’

  Harding stood up and picked up two photographs. ‘Go on,’ he said.

  ‘We believe that the Chinese are using the raid on Drapchi prison in Lhasa to make an unnecessary show of force against India. We accept India’s explanation that a unit of the Special Frontier Force ran amok. We hope that a line will be drawn under the incident and relations normalized. These pictures, however, show substantive troop reinforcements moving in right along the border with India. They have become particularly active in the mountain areas towards Sikkim, where India and China have fought several skirmishes, and the route along which we expect Major Choedrak and Lhundrup Togden are trying to make their escape.’

  ‘Is he still alive?’ interrupted Harding.

  ‘We assume so. If he had reached India or Bhutan or if the Chinese had caught him I am sure we would know. If your viewers can bear the geography lesson, mingle their thoughts on Tibet with those of Kashmir, where Pakistan and India have been hammering it out for sixty years.’

  ‘The killing of the Western army commander and the Home Minister and the Indian airstrikes across the LoC?’

  ‘Yes. We think of Kashmir and Tibet as being on separate flanks of India. But if you look at the map they are frighteningly close to each other. Take in that and then look at the other flashpoints along this border.’ Stopping moved to the coffee table and laid a detailed map of the region over it. ‘Starting in the west, this tiny pocket of land just north of the LoC – fifteen thousand square miles known as Shaksgam Valley – was voluntarily given by Pakistan to China in 1965. The problem is that the territory was not Pakistan’s to give. The whole of Kashmir is claimed by India and there are UN resolutions regarding it. Move a fraction east, and there’s this blob of wasteland in northern Ladakh called Aksai Chin, which China took in 1959 when it was building a strategic highway between Xinjiang and Tibet. It’s about twenty-five thousand square miles, still under Chinese control, but claimed by India. These areas are among the most difficult places in the world to fight a war. No possibility of moving troops through into Ladakh. No land communication whatsoever. It would be easier on the moon, I would think. But if you look here on the map north of Chushul, east of Pangong Tso Lake, these shapes here are a column of tanks being moved closer to the border to threaten Indian positions.’

  Harding was taking notes. ‘Give me the origins of the China–India border dispute in a nutshell.’

  ‘At the time, two bald men fighting over a comb. Or two young cockerels flexing their muscles. Look at it how you want,’ said Stopping. ‘In 1914, when China was in anarchy, Britain signed a border agreement with the Tibetans. It’s known as the McMahon Line and stretches 1,360 kilometres along the eastern section of the border running from Bhutan to Burma. It was also initialled by the Chinese representative at the negotiations, but never accepted by Beijing. The area directly south of the McMahon Line to what was the border of British India remains disputed and makes up much of the new Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which India announced in 1986.

  ‘After the Communists came to power, China and India signed a friendship treaty, the Panchisila Treaty or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It was 1954, and Mao was too busy consolidating his power to raise the border issue, although he steadfastly refused to recognize the McMahon Line. Then Chinese troops poured into Tibet, and by 1958, the friendship treaty was out the window and the relationship had deteriorated into open animosity.

  ‘Then came the 1959 Tibetan uprising and the escape of the Dalai Lama to India, which overshadowed everything else. Mao was outraged. The next year, Chou Enlai, Mao’s trusted moderate lieutenant, went to Delhi to thrash out a compromise. They were talking about territory where no sane human being would want to live. No oil. No minerals. Just national pride. The negotiations stalled, and in September 1962 there were the first skirmishes. On 20 October China crossed the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border and went into Ladakh to the west in a massive incursion; two days later the Indian army defences collapsed. Fighting continued for a month, then China withdrew back across the line. The Indian parliament passed a resolution saying that India “would recover every inch of its sacred soil lost to China”. That vow hangs in the mess room of the Northern Command headquarters at Udhampur.’

  ‘This is a lot more than I can say on television,’ said Harding, looking up from his notes.

  ‘The Foreign Secretary didn’t instruct me to write your script,’ retorted Stopping. ‘Only to explain to you the backdrop of the conflict. And the nub is this. China was not concerned about the geographical boundaries. As I said, the territory itself is worthless and inhospitable. It wanted India to abandon its recognition of the McMahon Line, which implicitly meant it accepted the sovereign authority of Tibet. There’s been a lull since the ’62 war, but the issues are still there.’ He ran his hand along the border. ‘Along this stretch, China claims this disputed area in Kashmir, and ten thousand square miles from the Karakorum pass. It also claims Arunachal Pradesh and does not recognize Sikkim as part of India.’

  ‘One hell of a lot of areas of dispute between two nuclear powers,’ remarked Harding.

  ‘That is exactly the point the Foreign Secretary wanted you to understand.’

  Foreign Ministry Building, Hong Kong, China

  Local time: 1800 Friday 4 May 2007

  GMT: 1000 Friday 4 May 2007

  Jamie Song chose to be interviewed in Hong Kong because it represented the modern liberal face of China. Like Tibet, Hong Kong was an autonomous region and an example to the world. If you don’t fight the motherland, she will give you all you want.

  The spotlight was harsh in Jamie Song’s eyes. He asked them to change its angle so that he could look straight at the camera without squinting. He had already changed from a swivel office chair to a straight back, so he would not move inadvertently while in shot. He made sure the sound technician clipped the microphone on the outside of his tie, instead of concealing it underneath, to lower the risk of rustling and interference. He held notes in case the cameramen were asked to do cut-aways to his hand. With nothing to hold, he could appear tense and nervous. With ten seconds to air-tim
e he brushed the lapels of his suit, specially chosen because it was hand-made in Hong Kong. He listened to the opening music and then to Harding’s introduction.

  Harding: In this BBC Globe Talk exclusive, we have the Chinese Foreign Minister, Jamie Song, live from Hong Kong, and with me in the studio is General Sir Peter Hanman, a military consultant with the Institute of Strategic Studies in London. We will be discussing the tension between India and China.

  After the dramatic prison break-out in the Tibetan capital Lhasa, by the little-known Indian regiment, the Special Frontier Force, India has said sorry. China hasn’t accepted the apology and, as you’ll see on the map on your screens now, thousands of Chinese troops are pouring into these sensitive border areas with China. Europe and America have appealed for calm. China and India – and this is one thing they seem to agree on – say it’s nobody else’s business but their own.

  The other complications in this alarming turn of events is that the revered Buddhist monk Lhundrup Togden who was freed from prison in the raid is still at large and believed to be heading for India. Fighting has also flared up again between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Both are nuclear powers and Pakistan has just been shaken by a military takeover. Jamie Song in Hong Kong, before we start taking calls from our viewers, can you set our minds at rest that China is not trying to stir things up in Asia?

  Song: Not at all, Max. Your excellent précis of events sums up the situation. Perhaps, though, I can make a comparison closer to home for Europeans. Suppose renegade troops in the Republic of Ireland burst across the border into British territory in the North and released convicted terrorists from the Maze prison.

  Harding: I think you’re stretching the imagination . . .

  Song: Am I? Many people in Northern Ireland, Ireland and the rest of the world believe Ulster should be part of Ireland – as many believe Tibet should have its independence from China. But the hard facts are that Tibet is part of China and Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. I dare say there are those within the Irish armed forces who sympathize with the Republican cause, and in my scenario they act on their sympathies, just as India claims commandos in the Special Frontier Force have done. What would the UK then do? Would it simply accept an apology from the Irish government and continue with business as usual? Or would it put the apology on hold, try to find out exactly what happened and in the interim reinforce the border to ensure that nothing like it could possibly happen again?

  Harding: General Hanman. Let me bring you in here. You served many years in Northern Ireland.

  Hanman: I can’t speak for the government, of course. But in the Foreign Minister’s scenario, we in the armed forces would certainly urge the government to do what Jamie Song suggests – reinforce the border.

  Harding: All right, we have our first caller, who happens to be in Hong Kong. Go ahead.

  Hong Kong: Yes. I want to ask Jamie Song. I have two questions. Firstly, did you know that India kept a commando force of Tibetan nationalists specially trained to fight against Chinese troops in Tibet? And number two. Isn’t it time China took the opportunity from this incident to reclaim back the land across the border which is now occupied by India?

  Harding: Foreign Minister?

  Song: I personally was not aware of the Special Frontier Force, but I am a businessman and diplomat. Of course, I am fully briefed now. China had repeatedly asked India to disband the unit and had pointed out the dangers. India refused until—

  Harding: Excuse me for interrupting, Foreign Minister, but can you confirm that, Sir Peter? India ignored Chinese appeals?

  Hanman: That is my understanding. But Prime Minister Dixit acted with exceptional swiftness once he discovered what had happened. I don’t think China could have asked for more.

  Harding: Jamie Song. Your second question. Should China now reclaim land you say is occupied by India?

  Song: We are very pragmatic about this. The territory under dispute is not prime real estate in Manhattan or Mayfair. Nor is it valuable like the oil fields of the Middle East. It is a pretty grim and inhospitable part of the world. The main issue here is Tibet. If India opened negotiations for a new border agreement and made an unequivocal statement that it would not support Tibetan independence, we would have absolutely nothing to quarrel about.

  Harding: By that you mean India would have to expel the Dalai Lama?

  Song: Yes. The Dalai Lama can live out his days in Europe or America. But not on our borders.

  Harding: We have a caller from Delhi. A former admiral, I believe. Go ahead, New Delhi.

  Delhi: Yes. I am Admiral Ravi Jacob retired. I understand China is moving naval vessels into the Indian Ocean. Could the Foreign Minister confirm this?

  Harding: This is in reference to intelligence reports that two Kilo-class submarines have passed through the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. The closest Indian territory is the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and New Delhi plans to protest to the United Nations.

  Song: Admiral Jacob, I honestly don’t know about that. I could tell you to ask Admiral Li, the head of our navy, but I know he won’t tell you, just as I’m sure the British Foreign Secretary Chris Baker has no idea where all the British submarines are at the moment. But I will say this. The Chinese navy has a right and a national obligation to send its warships and submarines into any international waters it wishes. It is a ridiculous notion to suggest that while American and European battle groups can sail the seas at will, those of China are confined to specific areas.

  Harding: Sir Peter Hanman, can you enlighten us any more on this?

  Hanman: There is nothing new about Chinese naval passage through the Andaman Sea. The Burmese have given Chinese full naval facilities at Hanggyi Island and they have a surveillance station on the Cocos Islands from which they track Indian missile tests. India doesn’t like it, but can do nothing about it. The United States didn’t like Castro in Cuba and Cuba didn’t like the American base of Guantanamo on its territory left over from a previous treaty. I’m sorry to jump around the world so much, but I think it’s important to bring in these comparisons. Nobody is special here. Things happen in geopolitical change which governments don’t like. But that doesn’t mean you go to war over it.

  Harding: A call from Seattle. The caller doesn’t want to give his name, but has already identified himself to us as a supporter of the Tibetan independence movement. Go ahead, Seattle.

  Seattle: What will China do if Lama Togden gets to safety in India?

  Song: We will ask India to return him in order for him to serve the rest of his sentence.

  Seattle: And if India doesn’t?

  Song: I think we shouldn’t speculate.

  Harding: Perhaps, Foreign Minister, this a good opening for you to give us a run-down on what exactly is happening in Tibet. You have sealed it off, banned all foreign visitors, yet Western satellite pictures show widespread civil disturbance in many towns.

  Song: Yes, Max, you are right. If I could return to my analogy with Northern Ireland, a small number of Tibetan nationalists have used the Drapchi incident to try to ferment civil unrest. They are being armed and helped by units from the SFF which appear to have been infiltrated into many areas. And I might emphasize that these soldiers are doing exactly what they were trained to do when the SFF was created in 1962. The Chinese army is trying to stop the rebellion, but in many places our troops are fighting pitched battles with the insurgents. If a similar incident happened in Northern Ireland, I am sure Britain would not allow an Irish delegation into the Falls Road at the height of the disturbances.

  Harding: I think they might—

  Song: Please. Let me finish, because young Chinese men and young Tibetans are killing each other as we speak in this conflict. We did not start it. India ignited something it cannot control. We have, in any case, just announced that the disturbances are over. I have today issued an invitation for diplomats accredited to Beijing to visit Lhasa as soon as it is safe for them to do so.

>   Harding: The Tibetan government-in-exile accuses your troops of massacring civilians in their hundreds.

  Song: Well, we wouldn’t expect them to say we were serving them tea and cutting firewood for them.

  Harding: We have a call from Islamabad. Go ahead.

  Islamabad: India is also reinforcing its border with Pakistan. Its warplanes have bombed villages, killing civilians in Kashmir. Many of us in Pakistan fear we are going to be swallowed up by India. China is an old ally. I’m pleading with you to do something to help.

  Song: Kashmir is a very difficult problem and I don’t think there is anything China should do to inflame the situation any more. You are right, though. We do have very genuine and strong links with Pakistan, and China would certainly not like to see her treated unjustly by the international community.

  Harding: Sir Peter Hanman, is the Chinese alliance with Pakistan significant? Is it something we should take into account as tensions over Kashmir and Tibet mount?

  Hanman: It exists, for sure. Pakistan’s military is largely supplied by China, including its intermediate- and short-range missiles. China helped Pakistan with its nuclear-arms programme.

  Song: I refute that unequivocally. The allegation—

  Harding: OK, Foreign Minister, we’ve taken your viewpoint on board.

  Hanman: Up until the 1965 war with India, Pakistan was pretty much a Cold War ally of the United States. India was non-aligned, but regarded as in the Soviet camp—

  Harding: Sorry to interrupt, Sir Peter, but it appears we have a former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff on the line from Rawalpindi, General Awan. Why don’t we get it from the horse’s mouth.

  Rawalpindi: Yes. Thank you. During the fifties, Pakistan opted for an alliance with the United States. The question of looking to China began actually during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when America sided with India, and China offered friendship to Pakistan. In the 1965 war with India, when we were still technically a Western ally, Pakistan was completely abandoned by the United States. We were left without spares. No new equipment was available. We pleaded with the Americans to fulfil their agreements with us and they refused. It was like a stab in the back, and we turned to China. For fifteen years, between 1965 and 1980, there was very little military contact with Washington. China provided everything we needed. She gave us four billion dollars’ worth of weapons and didn’t charge a penny for it. And I would like to take the opportunity to thank Foreign Minister Song for the complete friendship China has shown us over the so many years.