Descent into Hell: The fall of Singapore - Pudu and Changi - the Thai Burma railway

by Peter Brune

  During this mayhem, the CO of the forward Punjabis, believing that the Surreys on his right flank had been overrun, ordered a withdrawal of his battalion and the company of Surreys under his command to the west towards Yen, in the hope that his force could come around the coast and rejoin the division. With the Trunk Road and virtually the whole western side of the perimeter now in Japanese hands, it was left to Brigadier Carpendale and his 28th Brigade and elements of the 15th Brigade to attempt to hold the Japanese around Gurun.

  On the morning of 15 December, Murray-Lyon was forced to order a general withdrawal. There are few more tragic sights than a demoralised army in retreat. By the morning of 16 December, preceded by the now familiar and premature demolitions, the exhausted remnants of 11th Division had withdrawn behind the Muda River. It was fortunate indeed that the Japanese did not follow this withdrawal up with their characteristic speed and aggression. It may well have been that as they had achieved this startling success by employing not two battalions as at Jitra, but only one at Gurun, that they might have felt the need to consolidate their gains and concentrate their force. Gurun, no less than Jitra, was ample testimony to their considerable military prowess.

  On 14 December, near the ‘important crossroad’, Lieutenant-Colonel Tsuji noted the ‘vast quantities of munitions’ which were ‘piled up like a mountain’ by the road. He saw trucks containing yet more ‘Churchill supplies’ which he felt had been left ‘to welcome our army’.

  The rapid loss of Jitra and Gurun now constituted a direct threat to the security of the island of Penang. Lying about four kilometres to the west of the town of Butterworth on the west coast of Malaya, and a mere twelve kilometres south-west from the new 11th Division lines at the Muda River, Penang’s prime military significance lay in its port facilities, its two telegraph cables connecting Malaya with Ceylon and India, and its fixed defences. Also, the island had extensive dumps of military hardware and stores, and handing over further ‘Churchill supplies’ to the enemy was not to be countenanced. It had been decided that two infantry battalions and their supporting units would be deployed from the mainland to secure the above-mentioned facilities if it were necessary. The rapid deterioration in events, however, had frustrated this plan.

  The reality of war descended upon an unprepared Penang on 11 December 1941. During the morning Georgetown received an extensive bombing of its harbour and districts by 41 ‘Sally’ bombers of the Japanese Army Air Force. Escorted by ‘Oscar’ fighters, and untroubled by British planes and non-existent anti-aircraft guns the Japanese bombers inflicted over 2000 civilian casualties. Because there were no air raid shelters the ignorant and helpless native population had eagerly occupied places such as Bishop Street and the busy market in Penang Road to witness dogfights and the bombing raid. They became terrified participants both during the bombing, and shortly after, when the Japanese began strafing the city. To add to the human cost, the city’s fire station suffered a direct hit and was powerless to respond. In some quarters 11 December 1941 became known as ‘Black Thursday’.

  The next day, Japanese air raids began at around 9.00 am and continued during the day. They concentrated on Georgetown’s harbour, the Penang Channel and nearby fishing villages. On the 13th came the belated entry of eight Buffalo fighters of No. 453 Squadron which had flown up from Singapore to Ipoh and Butterworth. Although five unescorted bombers were shot down, the destruction continued. By 15 December the Japanese air raids had achieved their purpose and the carnage stopped. But the damage had been done.

  Such a shameful episode clearly indicated how empty were the claims of Brooke-Popham, the civil administration and Malaya Command concerning civilian morale. The initial rampant destruction and the lack of any form of an early civil or military response crushed the morale of the native population. The first obvious indication was a direct hit and obliteration of Police HQ on Penang Road, which caused the death of a number of Sikh police officers. This in turn led to the desertion of many of the local constabulary who took to the hinterland with great speed. In the absence of law and order, and with a breakdown of the town’s water supply and other utilities, looting and the potential for disease now became the chief concerns. The scale of looting, the number of disfigured corpses in varying states of decay and uncontrolled fires around the city all conspired to force the authorities to evacuate the European women, children and the wounded service population from the island. In his postwar despatch, Percival was to state that: ‘Lack of transport would have made it quite out of the question to evacuate large numbers of the Asiatics. Moreover it was undesirable at that stage to increase the population of Singapore.’12 By this decision, the Asian population, and particularly the Chinese, were left in little doubt as to their place in the scheme of things. As Peter Thompson has astutely pointed out: ‘Considering that 24 self-propelled vessels, several dozen junks, private yachts and a collection of sampans, barges and rafts—all later found to be capable of ferrying Japanese soldiers—were left bobbing at anchor in Penang Harbour, this was one of Percival’s more disingenuous statements.’13

  Here, surely, was a concrete chance to show some genuine concern for the morale of the civilian population, and for that matter, to create a permanent labour supply—however limited—that might have begun some belated work upon defensive positions at any desired point along the Malay Peninsula and/ or on Singapore Island. In blunt terms, the civilians evacuated from Penang could have been literally press-ganged into construction work in exchange for their freedom, and the Chinese especially might well have been keen to contribute to the war effort. Brooke-Popham, Percival and the civil administration had become nothing more than masters of empty rhetoric. To variously complain about ‘civilian morale’ or the lack of a ‘labour construction force’ and be seen to be doing little to address either issue smacks of incompetent leadership. Peter Thompson in The Battle For Singapore provides us with a stinging rebuttal to such behaviour:

  Shenton Thomas broadcast an appeal for volunteers to provide temporary shelter for the trainload of Penang evacuees expected to cross the Causeway early on 15 December. He went to Singapore Railway Station himself to greet the refugees. Many Chinese families who had gathered at the station expecting to find relatives on the train were shocked to discover that only Europeans had been evacuated.14

  Duff Cooper went one better—or worse. In a broadcast to the people of Singapore, he stated that many of the citizens of Penang had been evacuated, but then proceeded to insert his foot fairly and squarely in his mouth by pointing out that Singaporeans could feel thankful that so many people had been rescued. The small percentage of the population who were in fact white must have indeed felt relieved, but the Chinese, Indian and Malay reaction can be well imagined. Penang was occupied by the Japanese on 19 December 1941, and with the circumstances of its occupation, the integrity of British rule lay in tatters.

  By the morning of 16 December 1941, the 11th Indian Division—against the background disasters of Gurun and Penang Island—had retreated to the south side of the Muda River. In the tactical sense nothing had changed. Lionel Wigmore, in The Japanese Thrust:

  The road from Kroh through Balang linked with the road system in the Muda area; and the route from Kroh southward through Grik reached the Trunk Road and the railway west of Kuala Kangsar. How long could the enemy force which had captured Kroh be kept from the division’s present right flank and rear? How long was it safe to keep the division west of the Perak in all the circumstances?15

  Early on 16 December—with the above issues in mind—General Heath decided to deploy the 11th Division behind the River Krian, which, flanked by swamps, constituted the best natural tank obstacle between the Perak and Muda Rivers. He ordered the 28th Brigade to cover a roughly four-kilometre line stretching from the rail bridge and road at Nibong Tebal westwards to the sea; to his eastward or right flank at the River Krian centre of Selama, he deployed the 3/16th Punjab and the 10th Mountain Battery; his exhausted and diminished 6th an
d 15th Brigades were sited between the River Krian and the key junction of Kuala Kangsar at Taiping to recover and reorganise; and to protect this critical move, he ordered Brigadier Paris’s 12th Brigade to conduct a rearguard action through Titi Karangan ‘where the Balang road linked with the road system south of the Muda, to Selama’.16 From Selama, the 12th Brigade was to move through the 3/16th Punjab to Taiping.

  Brigadier Paris had decided to concentrate his 12th Brigade on 15 December. The 5/2nd Punjab was ordered to hold the bridge on the Muda River at Batu Pekaku while the Argylls were sent to Titi Karangan. On 16 December, Japanese infantry dressed as natives, and led by a ‘European in plain clothes’,17 tried to storm the Batu Pekaku bridge. The ruse failed and the bridge was demolished. The next day Brigadier Paris withdrew his 5/2nd Punjab from Batu Pekaku, and following up closely, the Japanese encountered the Argylls at Titi Karangan.

  It will be remembered that the Argylls were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart—a ‘crank’ according to Percival’s chief staff officer, Brigadier Torrance. Titi Karangan was a poor defensive locality. Stewart has recorded that:

  There was no natural obstacle across the front, for the line of the Muda was being given up. The country is not jungle, but rubber, thus giving the attacker the advantages not only of easy cross country movement but of concealment, the perfect conditions for encircling attack. The only counter under these circumstances is to fight a battle of manoeuvre, but even this was precluded by the orders to the 93rd [the Argylls] rigidly laying down a particular line to be denied till 12.00 hours.18

  The Argylls’ dispositions and drill at Titi Karangan relied upon companies being able to fight as self-contained, dispersed groups. These were composed of carriers, armoured cars, mortars and operated with armoured car contact between companies and with the battalion’s transport ‘four miles to the south well clear of interference’.19 All companies were to operate with both a tactical attack and withdrawal plan. Stewart deployed his A Company just north of Titi Karangan in an ambush position with his B Company poised to then encircle and attack. In addition, his armoured cars were to remain hidden from the enemy until the attack, so as to ‘come as a moral and tactical surprise’.20

  At 10.00 am on 17 December the Japanese made contact with the Argylls’ A Company. Stewart later claimed that the ambush failed because the Japanese opened fire first and that they ‘surprised our men by appearing in native dress and not in uniform’.21 But the enemy certainly did not have it all his own way. When around 200 Japanese infantry subsequently attempted to outflank the Argylls by a movement off the road and through the rubber-covered hillside, they were confronted by two light machine guns and two 2-inch mortars, which had been positioned ‘forward on the edge of the jungle strip’.22 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart would later write that: ‘They were in close order and the perfect answer to a machine-gunner’s prayer. Our fire completely surprised them, and at 75 yards’ range was devastating. They ran around in all directions in a bewildered way, making no response. A European amongst them was shot.’23

  In response to this carnage, at around 10.45 am the Japanese brought telling mortar fire to bear and knocked out the Argylls’ mortars, in unison with frontal attacks and rapid attempts to outflank them. Stewart determined that he stood little chance of delaying the enemy until midday without much of his unit becoming encircled, and therefore decided to attack. In so doing, he would have denied the enemy the ground he was expected to hold until midday, but the cost would have been horrendous—he estimated his losses might have been the greater part of his two forward companies.

  In the event, the decision was made for him when, just as the bugler was about to sound the call for an attack, a despatch rider from Brigadier Paris gave Stewart permission to ‘withdraw any time at your discretion’.24 The Argylls withdrew in an efficient, professional manner, and after marching to their rearward transport arrived at a disused hospital about sixteen kilometres to the rear. During its first action, the Argylls lost eleven soldiers but inflicted at least 200 casualties upon their enemy. Stewart would later note that the ‘200’ rapidly became ‘500’ when the news reached the media in Singapore.25 By midnight on 17 December 1941, Paris’s 12th Brigade had arrived at Selama and had come under the command of the 11th Division. By sunrise the next day, Murray-Lyon’s force was south of the River Krian.

  Meanwhile, a detached company of the Argylls and a number of their armoured cars which had occupied a position on the Kroh–Kuala Kangsar road were attacked by the Japanese on 16 December just north of Grik. As a consequence they were forced to withdraw towards Kuala Kenering and subsequently to Sumpitan on the 17th. Although the potential use of this road by the Japanese had been foreseen—despite its poor condition for motor transport—the sheer speed of the enemy’s use of it had prohibited the necessary charges being laid for its demolition. The Japanese intent had been to reach Kuala Kangsar via a southward thrust through Grik instead of a westward movement through Balang. Thus they sought to cut the 11th Indian Division’s line of communication. But unable to employ their light tank battalion because of the poor condition of the road and heavy rain, the Japanese advance had been slowed.

  General Heath, aware of the danger, had previously sent the 1st Independent Company to Lenggong to reinforce the Argylls’ company and its armoured cars. However, on 17 December, with their now customary speed and momentum, the Japanese forced him to take the 12th Brigade under his command and deploy it at Kuala Kangsar to block the enemy advance along the Grik Road. And he was also aware that as the Perak River ran north–south—and therefore not across the enemy line of advance—he might soon be forced to withdraw as far south as the road and rail junction of Kampar.

  Against the background of the crushing defeats of his 11th Indian Division in Kedah State—primarily at Jitra and Gurun—General Percival reassessed his strategic position in mid-December. Although his prime piece of military real estate was the Singapore Naval Base, that defence hinged upon the retention of Johore—lose Johore and lose the war. His intelligence was poor: the Japanese force was estimated at a division on the Trunk Road; there was, it was claimed, one on the Patani–Kroh–Grik road; a third on the east coast axis in Kelantan; Percival was informed that the Japanese ‘had already landed further forces at least equal to those in the front line’; and in Indo-China, that the Japanese ‘undoubtedly held reserves, which he could either use to reinforce those formations which he had already landed or for fresh enterprises’.26 The truth is that the 11th Division had been ejected from Kedah State by an enemy force half the strength of his assessment.

  To counter this Japanese advance, Percival had about a division on the west coast and two brigades to the east. In his postwar despatch, he pointed out that though the 11th Division’s morale ‘was not broken it could not be regarded as being as high as one would have wished’.27 He gave three reasons for this state of affairs: the Division’s poor physical condition after continuous fighting and ‘movement by both day and night’; the overwhelming Japanese air superiority; and the absence of British tanks. He further mentioned that the last two Japanese advantages—air superiority and tanks—‘could not but have the most adverse affect [sic] upon the trust of the Indian troops in the might of the British Empire’.28

  In assessing future enemy options, Percival considered that it was now obvious that their main thrust would continue along the west coast ‘with a view of attacking Singapore from the north’. But he also foresaw the possibility of an enemy thrust down the east coast being complemented by possible seaborne landings. Such landings might allow the Japanese to cut the British line of communication to their northern forces. It was this concern that prompted Percival to leave the Australian 8th Division in Johore rather than employ it to replace the 11th Division in the north. Such a relief, he thought, would temporarily leave the defences in Johore very weak. He decided that if the exhausted 11th Division manned those former Australian defensive positions, the issue of time in transfer an
d the Indian ignorance of the ground would be negative factors. He also felt it was ‘undesirable to break up the A.I.F. organisation’.29

  Given that Percival—and Brooke-Popham—believed that the aim of operations should be to keep the Japanese as far north as possible to deny them airfields and large quantities of tin and rubber in the central states, it was decided that the 11th Indian Division must continue the fight.

  In view of the above appreciation, late on 17 December 1941, Percival decided to travel to Ipoh to confer with General Heath. The next day, after a ‘reconnaissance of the area and a visit to the forward troops’,30 he made a number of important decisions. The first three were that:

  (a) While adhering to the general policy of withdrawal behind the River Perak, the enemy would be held west of the river as long as possible without permitting our forces to become inextricably committed.

  (b) The Commander 3 Indian Corps [Heath] would select and have prepared a series of positions between Ipoh and Tanjong Malim.

  (c) The immediate role of 9 Division [Barstow] would be (i) to continue to deny the Kuantan aerodrome to the enemy, (ii) to secure the 11 Indian Division and its communications against attack from the east coast.31

  Percival’s other initiatives included the use of the Perak Flotilla to counter Japanese landings along the west coast; the formation of Roseforce—50 Australian soldiers based at Port Sweetenham—to disrupt enemy communications west of the River Perak; the allocation of labour supply was to be the responsibility of the RAF for the maintenance of new air strips on Singapore Island and in southern Johore; and the amalgamation of the greatly diminished 6th and 15th Brigades to form the 6th/15th Brigade.