Descent into Hell: The fall of Singapore - Pudu and Changi - the Thai Burma railway

by Peter Brune

  Although the tanks overran the regimental headquarters, one detachment managed to get its 4.5-inch howitzer into action and, despite being under heavy fire, hit and stopped the leading tank at a range of about thirty yards . . .

  The tanks patrolled for a short distance south of the river during the remainder of the day but, harassed by hastily formed tank-hunting parties, withdrew later in the afternoon to the bridge . . .10

  It must have been disturbing news for General Paris, when at 8.30 am he learnt that the Trolak sector had been pierced. But he would surely have been devastated 90 minutes later when told that the Japanese tank spearhead had captured the Slim River bridge. He immediately despatched an anti-tank battery north of Tanjong Malim, alerted his remaining formations to be prepared for tank contact and informed General Heath of the breakthrough. Heath responded by sending the 15th Brigade’s 2/16th Punjab, which was disposed at Rawang, to hurriedly reinforce Tanjong Malim.

  Late on the morning of 7 January 1942, Brigadiers Selby and Stewart had a joint HQ established east of Slim village. They knew that the four Battalions of 12th Brigade and the 28th Brigade’s 2/1st Gurkhas were at worst destroyed or at best, dispersed. Selby now decided to stay in the area with his two remaining 28th Brigade Battalions until dusk, to allow for the collection of the maximum number of stragglers, and then, after the last of his transport had been destroyed, to move his Slim River survivors back along the railway to Tanjong Malim. This was accomplished by around 3.00 am on the 8th.

  The Battle of the Slim River constituted the final destruction of an already debilitated 11th Indian Division. On 8 January 1942, barely a month after the outbreak of hostilities, it lay in tatters: the 4/19th Hyderabads could muster but three officers and 110 other ranks; the 5/2nd Punjab one and 80; the Argylls four and 90; the 5/14th Punjab six and 129; the 2/2nd Gurkhas 400 all told; the 2/9th Gurkhas 350 all told; and the 2/1st Gurkhas, none.11

  In his postwar despatch, General Percival inadvertedly included an appalling piece of self-indictment:

  It would be easy, but unprofitable, to attribute the defeat at the Slim River Battle to the inadequacy of the anti-tank defences, the failure to blow the bridges or to a variety of other causes. The real cause lay in the utter weariness of the troops, both officers and men. They had been fighting and moving by day and by night for a month, and few of them had had any proper rest or relief.12

  All troops engaged in any prolonged fighting withdrawal become weary—and extremely so. But Percival’s inability to facilitate adequate defensive locations compounded this problem. Further, given his description of the 11th Indian Division’s physical and mental state, the sensible course of action would have been to relieve it. Percival repeatedly stated that the Division was to fight, withdraw, but at all costs, stay intact. In the end it failed, and by any sensible evaluation, it failed in no small measure because of his mistakes.

  Kirby, belatedly in his 1971 book, The Chain of Disaster, has pointed out that such a relief might well have been made by transferring General Barstow’s 9th Indian Division from its eastern front where he claimed ‘it had been kept idle in Pahang except for the futile and unnecessary effort to hold the Kuantan airfield’.13 Kirby’s point has merit. The 8th Indian Brigade had been stationed in Kuala Lipis since 22 December, and it was possible that its fellow 9th Division’s 22nd Brigade could have joined it there by the end of December. Thus both brigades could have fought in the Slim River–Tanjong Malim area by early January 1942. A further point not mentioned by Kirby is that Percival’s obsession with the central Malayan airfields would appear to have been an over emphasis. The forecasted reinforcement convoys directed to Singapore in mid-January and early February could have approached their final destination under darkness—as was the case during the seige of Tobruk. In the end, all reinforcements reached Singapore without loss, and the destruction of his 11th Indian Division, therefore, was not an acceptable price to pay for possible attacks on convoys, or the so-called ‘administrative problems’ of relieving it.

  All such decisions assume varying degrees of risk, but, in the end, Percival lacked what Montgomery called a ‘grip’ of his campaign.

  At first light on 7 January 1942—as Japanese tanks were ravaging the 11th Indian Division’s perimeter at Slim River—General Wavell landed in a Catalina on Singapore Harbour. He was on his way to Java to assume supreme command of the newly created ABDA (American–British–Dutch–Australian) Command. Wavell had determined that, in broad terms, his task was to hold both naval and air bases stretching through a line from Singapore to Sumatra, Java, Timor and finally to Darwin.

  With regards to the retention of Singapore, Wavell realised that Johore was the vital ground, and that time must be bought north of this state until the arrival of reinforcements. In the short term, he saw the despatch of the British 18th Division as a means of stabilising the front, and, eventually, he anticipated that the proposed deployment of the 1st Australian Corps might facilitate a counterstroke. Those reinforcements would then allow him to send the Indian divisions to the Netherlands East Indies. His trip to Singapore was thus planned for meetings with the commanders of Malaya Command, to assess the condition and morale of its troops, and, importantly, to attempt to form a time frame for these objectives. Wavell was due to arrive at Batavia on 15 January to open his HQ.

  That day, Wavell met with Duff Cooper, the Resident Minister for Far Eastern Affairs, General Pownall and Percival. General Wavell had now become Percival’s third commander in as many weeks. Wavell flew to Kuala Lumpur the following day. During the early morning of 8 January, he met ‘a disconsolate Heath’ followed by a journey forward to confer with Paris, Stewart, Selby and Barstow. All were understandably exhausted. In view of the fact that Wavell was to later order Stewart out of Singapore before its fall, to employ his knowledge of the campaign, Wavell’s first impression of the 12th Brigade commander was not favourable: ‘Well, I’ve never listened to a more garbled account of an operation.’14 It is possible that Pownall had again influenced his perceptions. On 27 December—eleven days before Wavell’s arrival—Major-General Gordon Bennett had recorded in his diary that: ‘Pownall came in. Had been to the front and accurately sized up personalities. Was not sure of Heath or Paris. He is full of fire & demands commanders also with fire. I like him . . .’15

  Upon his arrival back in Singapore Wavell sent for Percival. After keeping him ‘waiting in an ante-room for a considerable time’,16 he presented him with a written plan which he was to implement without delay. Wavell had decided that Major-General Gordon Bennett would be placed in command of north-west Johore, with the 9th Indian Division under command. Heath’s III Corps HQ and his 11th Indian Division were to be rested and refitted in southern Johore, and III Corps was also to be responsible for eastern Johore and its south-west coast. The AIF 8th Division’s 27th Brigade (Brigadier Maxwell) was to come under Bennett’s command forthwith, while its 22nd Brigade (Brigadier Taylor) was to be moved from Mersing on the east coast as soon as possible. In addition, the newly arrived—if poorly trained—Indian Army’s 45th Brigade (Brigadier Duncan) was to also come under Bennett’s command. Wavell’s plan thus embodied a decisive break to a line Muar–Segamat–Mersing and, therefore, the virtual abandonment of the provinces of Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Malacca, where it was considered the road system would make delaying tactics quite difficult. He was well aware that his plan presented the Japanese with three provinces at little cost, and that the relief of the Australian 22nd Brigade on the east coast would risk deploying troops there who had ‘less knowledge of [the] ground in that area’.17 The salient point is surely that for the first time decisive action was being taken to buy real time to rest and refit III Corps; that fresh formations were being committed, if belatedly; and that, while calculated risks were involved, they were being taken.

  According to Kirby, Wavell added another critical order to those already given:

  . . . finding that, although reconnaissance had begun, no defe
nces had been constructed or even planned in detail on the north shore of Singapore Island, he ordered these to be put in hand at once in case a withdrawal to the island became necessary.18

  Simson, of course, had made a personal plea to Percival late on the night of 26 December 1941 for defences to be built on the north shore of the island forthwith, but Percival was not to be convinced. Early on the morning of 27 December, Simson had breakfast with General Simmons. Once again his basic, common sense advice was rejected. Even after Percival’s new commander had ordered him to undertake those very constructions, that order failed to be executed. There can be no excuse offered for either Percival or Simmons for this chain of events. Further, it would seem a contradiction in terms for General Keith Simmons to have held the title ‘Commander, Singapore Fortress’. What fortress?

  The notion that Wavell was attracted to the idea of Bennett assuming a major role in the defence of Johore certainly made sense. The 8th Division was well-trained both prior to leaving Australia, and in Malaya; its 22nd Brigade had been there for a year, while the 27th had arrived in August 1941; and, above all, it was fresh and ready to fight.

  On 10 January, another conference was called at Segamat between Percival, Heath and Bennett to arrange the handover between Heath’s III Corps and the AIF. Bennett was now to command ‘Westforce’: the 27th Brigade AIF; the 8th and 22nd Brigades of the 9th Indian Division, reinforced by Singapore Fortress’s 2nd Loyals (less one company); and the newly arrived 45th Indian Brigade. Bennett’s Westforce was to hold the line Batu Anam–Muar. Heath’s III Corps, meanwhile, was to assume responsibility for the line in Johore from the lateral road Endau–Kluang–Batu Pahat southwards. He was to command the 22nd Brigade AIF in the Mersing area, while his 11th Indian Division’s 15th and 28th Brigades were rested and refitted in Johore. His 12th Brigade was sent to Singapore Island for the same purpose.

  The time was now near when Major-General Gordon Bennett’s 8th Australian Division was to be given its baptism of fire. Bennett had been open in his criticism of others and had not missed an opportunity to publicise the AIF in Malaya. He was now itching to show the worth of both his 8th Division and its commander.

  14

  GEMAS

  While Generals Wavell, Percival, Heath and Bennett were planning Malaya Command’s defence of Johore, General Yamashita’s 25th Army was reinforcing its forward troops and preparing plans for the final capture of Malaya. On 8 January 1942, the 5th Division’s 21st Regiment (Colonel Harada), accompanied by a large contingent of support units, reached Singora. Two days later, the 5th Guards Regiment (Colonel Iwaguro), followed by Guards Divisional troops, reached Ipoh. By this time the Japanese were acutely aware of their long line of communication, which began at Singora. Accordingly, they earmarked the 18th Division’s 114th Regiment, one battalion of the 55th Regiment and divisional troops for a landing at Endau during late January. Not only would this operation shorten that line of communication, but they anticipated that it might allow them to outflank the British retreat through northern Johore.

  After their disaster at the Slim River, the 11th Indian Division’s greatly weakened 12th and 28th Brigades, although reinforced by the 2/16th Punjab, still retained the task of defending the Trunk Road. On 8 January General Heath, only too well aware that the division was in no condition to offer a sustained resistance, ordered General Paris to hold Kuala Lumpur until midnight on 10 January, and then retire about 50 kilometres to the vicinity of Seremban.

  Paris knew that the mountain barrier to his immediate east was essentially safe, and therefore looked to defend his northern Trunk Road approach and the western coastal area. To this end he deployed his formations in three key sectors. The first was a defence of the Trunk Road, where he posted the 28th Brigade, reinforced by two companies of the 3/17th Dogras. The second area was essentially the section of road between Batang Berjuntai and Rawang, where he deployed his 15th Brigade—reinforced by Brigadier Painter’s 22nd Brigade’s 5/11th Sikhs. The coastal sector was his last, and was covered by the Jat/Punjab Battalion and the 3rd Cavalry. Paris withdrew command of this area from the 15th Brigade and placed it under Brigadier Moir. As a timetable for withdrawal, he ordered that Rawang, the River Buloh and Klang were to be held until 4.00 pm on 10 January, and subsequently, either the 15th or 28th Brigade was to then hold Kuala Lumpur, while Brigadier Moir’s coastal force was to defend Batu Tiga until midnight on the 10th.

  Despite the fact that the 15th and 28th Brigades were able to hold their areas in the face of repeated and concentrated enemy attacks, the price was heavy. By the time the 28th Brigade had broken contact and withdrawn, the two companies of Dogras, including its HQ and CO, were overrun and lost. And the 15th Brigade fared worse—the whole of the 1/14th Punjab suffered the same fate.

  On the coastal sector, the Japanese crossed the river at Kuala Selangor and made contact with the Jat/Punjab Battalion, the 3rd Cavalry and the 73rd Field Battery, which were covering the approach to the bridge at Klang. Alan Warren, in Singapore 1942, has recorded that:

  At 6.30 p.m. the British–Indian force withdrew from Klang as planned and headed east along the road to Kuala Lumpur. About 10 p.m., amid a rain shower, the 3rd Cavalry and the Jat/Punjab Battalion were ambushed and disintegrated. Only two hundred survivors were gathered together at Batu Tiga to continue the retreat southwards.1

  An additional Japanese attempt to cut off Kuala Lumpur was staged by a Guards battalion which, after having landed at Port Swettenham on the 10th, by-passed Klang and headed for the Trunk Road, which was reached the next day. It was a near thing—the last truck convoys had passed only hours before.

  Japanese troops entered Kuala Lumpur at around 8.00 pm on 11 January 1942 and ‘took over the civil administration and quickly enforced law and order’.2 In a sign of things to come, law and order were certainly ‘quickly’ enforced. The heads of likely anti-Nippon locals or of those who had looted were displayed on poles in public.3

  The sheer speed of the Japanese victory at the Slim River had caused a less than satisfactory British destruction of military stores at Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham. Although Kuala Lumpur’s airfield buildings were fired and the runways cratered, the Japanese were quick to repair much of the damage. Heath’s 11th Division reached Tampin on the 13th and during that night withdrew through Westforce to the Kluang–Rengam area, while his 9th Division’s 8th Brigade reached Batu Anam on the 11th. On 13 January 1942, the 9th Indian Division came under command of Major-General Gordon Bennett’s recently constituted Westforce, and occupied its new dispositions as a part of the defence of Johore. Shortly after the III Corps withdrawal, Percival made further command changes. He would later write:

  At the request of the Commander 3 Indian Corps I appointed Brigadier Key to command the 11 Indian Division in place of Major-General Paris. The reason for this was that we considered that an Indian Army Officer was now required to pull together and reestablish confidence in what remained of the 11 Indian Division. Brigadier Lay, who had now returned to duty, was appointed to command the 8 Indian Brigade and Col. Challen took over command of the 6/15 Indian Infantry Brigade in lieu of Brigadier Moorhead.4

  Heath finally had his way with regard to the command of Indian formations by Indian Army officers. General Paris was sacked and returned to his 12th Brigade. Percival, ever the gentleman, would write in The War in Malaya, that he ‘took pains to explain to Paris that the change by no means indicated loss of confidence in him’.5

  Despite these gloomy events, 13 January saw the much welcomed arrival at Singapore of the British 18th Division’s 53rd Brigade; one heavy and one light British anti-aircraft regiment; one British anti-tank regiment; and, most importantly, 50 crated Hurricanes, 24 pilots and ground crew personnel.

  Two significant characters now enter our story. The 27th Brigade AIF was commanded by Brigadier Duncan Maxwell. In keeping with Brigadier Taylor’s prewar decision to appoint veterans of the First World War to the original commands of his 22nd Brigade
, Maxwell had become the original commander of the 2/19th Battalion. Lionel Wigmore:

  Maxwell, six feet three inches in height, was the shorter of two sons of a Tasmanian bank manager. Both had given distinguished service in 1914–1918 when they were affectionately known as ‘Big’ and ‘Little’ Maxwell. They served as troopers in the light horse on Gallipoli, and later were commissioned in the infantry. In France, each was decorated for his exploits at Mouquet Farm.6

  After the First World War, Maxwell had graduated in medicine at Sydney University and had gone into private practice at Cootamundra in NSW. It was not until August 1939 that he returned to soldiering as second-in-command of the 56th Militia Battalion. His interwar training and experience were thus limited.

  Bennett chose the 27th Brigade’s 2/30th Battalion from NSW as the first unit to confront the Japanese. It was commanded by Frederick ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan, who was senior to all of the infantry battalion COs in the 8th Division, and had commanded three militia battalions in succession since 1932. Following the First World War, Galleghan had been a public servant in the Newcastle area of NSW until 1936, after which he worked for the Commonwealth Investigation Service in Sydney. Wigmore: ‘Tall, darkvisaged, possessed of drive and determination, he tended to ride roughshod over the opinions of others, and had won a reputation as a disciplinarian which preceded him to his new battalion.’7 When training the 2/30th Battalion Galleghan had expected it to get up earlier and march further than other battalions. He was tough in the extreme towards all within it: officers and other ranks alike. Any form of debate or initiative was not encouraged—all that mattered was unquestioning loyalty from anyone and everyone. The Battalion, according to ‘Black Jack’, was going to be the finest unit in the 2nd AIF. Captain Ron Maston, 2/30th Battalion: ‘He was a very strong determined bloke . . . he set out to make we [sic] officers and NCOs capable leaders . . . [and how] caustically he dealt with us at times . . .’8